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Practices of Speculation 
An Introduction
Jeanne Cortiel, Christine Hanke, Jan Simon Hutta, and Colin Milburn
May 2020. As we write this introduction, the covid-19 pandemic has covered the 
world. Drastic political measures to contain the virus have followed, appearing 
already belated and inadequate even as they envision a future after the current 
crisis. With notable national and regional differences, the policies and practices 
implemented to deal with the spread of the virus act like magnifying glasses, illu-
minating the social and economic power relations of the Global North and Global 
South more clearly than ever before, while also highlighting the fissures and ten-
sions where things may fall apart entirely. The most conspicuous of these breaking 
points include, for example, the insistent growth paradigm of neoliberal econom-
ics; the processes of transnationalization and re-bordering; the evolving role of 
spatial proximity for social networks and personal relationships, now articulated 
through the clumsy expression of “social distancing”; the preservation of civil lib-
erties in the midst of massive data collection and surveillance; the relationship 
between science and politics; and the increasingly significant role of digital media 
and software platforms for civic participation and cultural belonging. Not least, 
the pandemic has reconfigured social, political, and ecological temporalities, pro-
voking at the same time the invocation of past events, manifold scenarios of fu-
ture developments, and calls for immediate action—often coexisting in different 
contexts. These responses endow the ongoing debate around climate change with 
a new sense of urgency, even while they tend to eclipse it. This is a moment of cri-
sis writ large, and its heightened uncertainties force us to suspend any illusions 
of autonomy to fully face the vulnerabilities of ourselves and our life-supporting 
systems. The future has opened up in radically novel ways, and the speculative 
practices that give this volume its title become manifestly relevant. 
As governments, health experts, companies, and investors struggle to gain 
control over a highly complex, already destructive situation, acts of speculation—
particularly in the domains of economics and technoscience—are ubiquitous and 
proliferating. These speculations often take the form of colorful visualizations of 
data, for example, extrapolative maps and charts that appeal to the power of sci-
entific evidence. But they also frequently latch onto apocalyptic, dystopian, and 
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utopian narrative traditions, highlighting the need for an interdisciplinary re-
sponse. Even before the current pandemic, interdisciplinary scholarship has am-
ply shown how viruses and other contagious entities animate scientific, political, 
literary, and popular media discourses in a peculiarly speculative manner.1 Today, 
engulfed in discrepant narratives of the pandemic, social media and television 
broadcasts abound with claims of “fake news” and conspiracy theories, even while 
reporting the risk assessments and predictive models of scientific, economic, and 
political authorities. Virologists and epidemiologists have become the leading 
experts of the day, making the basic operational modes of scientific knowledge 
more visible than ever. However, the speculative dimensions of their response to 
covid-19 underscore the stark, inexorable force of uncertainty, even as we turn to 
science for certain answers. The current volume is grounded in this premise: as 
a field of practices oriented towards the future, speculation runs on non-knowl-
edge and uncertainty to produce new knowledge. Yet even as it turns to the future, 
speculation is bound to existing knowledge and, as such, belongs as much to his-
tory as to any eventual world to come. 
Therefore, the perturbation of linear time that we see so clearly played out in 
the covid-19 pandemic is also central to speculation in general. The relationship 
between past, present, and future—the basic structure of collective histories and 
life narratives—emerges as radically unstable. Politicians, medical and scientific 
experts, and the press alike frame the pandemic’s social realities—including the 
search for vaccines, treatments, and containment measures—in the language of 
‘not yet.’ They couple the uncertainties of the current moment with a redemptive 
future, the contours of which tend to dissipate even as we imagine them. At the 
same time, researchers and reporters seek to document the course of the past, 
gathering anecdotes and data, visualizations and geographical mappings that 
meticulously trace the spread of the virus and its speed, the rates of infection and 
mortality, as well as the resilience of health care systems. Like the uncertain fu-
ture, the past has not stopped assaulting the present. Squeezed between a radi-
cally contingent future and a past impossible to fix, the present has assumed the 
form of a speculative event.2
If the covid-19 epidemic has unfolded through the speculative dimension 
of time, it has simultaneously revealed the workings of speculation on space. A 
health crisis that only weeks or days ago might have seemed far away suddenly 
presents itself as ‘right here.’ A tiny agent that implants itself in human bodies 
1  For examples, see Treichler (1998); Mayer, R./Weingart (2004); Wald (2008); and Servitje/Vint 
(2016).
2  Here we are reminded of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of an “aeonic time” that “con-
tinually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, 
a simultaneous too-late and too-early” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2003: 262).
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is subsequently confronted with the spatial technologies of national borders. Vi-
sualizations of the virus’s geographic distribution, distinguishing countries and 
states with graded shades of red and other alarming colorations, appear both as 
awkward tools for a comparative analysis and as instruments for a re-national-
izing strategy that corresponds with the massive tightening of border controls. 
Quotidien practices of translocality and mobility that have structured daily life 
in the Global North for decades, even while remaining cruelly foreclosed in many 
parts of the world, suddenly return as newly configured threats. Meanwhile, 
space has itself become speculatively temporalized. The asynchronous arrival of 
the disease in different places has provoked a discourse of differential ‘stages’ of 
disease progression, such that, for instance, “[Italy’s] future is in the process of 
becoming America’s present” (Jordheim et al. 2020). The ‘here’ is mirrored by an 
asynchronous ‘there.’ What the covid-19 pandemic has revealed about the tem-
poralities and spatialities of speculation is not new; nevertheless, it has become 
newly existential for all of us.
As indicated in the heterogeneous policies and discourses galvanized by 
covid-19, the anticipation of the future and the circumscription of the as-yet un-
known are core functions of contemporary knowledge production, facilitated by 
methods of segmentation and linearization, derivation and projection. The tools, 
techniques, and habits of speculation have become indispensable for thinking and 
acting within systems of advanced capitalism everywhere, anywhere, across the 
board. Aligned with instrumental knowledge and financial calculus, speculation 
has been complicit in the generation of profit. The nexus of knowledge produc-
tion and profit generation in capitalism is further imbricated with state, corpo-
rate, and private interventions designed to make the future both imaginable and 
manageable. However, while speculation has nourished visions of eternal growth 
and profitable futures for the few, strategies and tactics developed to resist such 
visions have also relied on speculation. For example, in the covid-19 pandemic, 
glimpses of different, alternative ways to inhabit the relation to past and future 
have also emerged. When several European states surprisingly interrupted harsh 
austerity politics, or when the U.S. government ordered firms to change their pro-
duction to health-related equipment, or when calls to re-localize circuits of pro-
duction and consumption grew louder, or when neighbors organized to assist the 
homeless and other vulnerable populations, the future began to mutate, opening 
different horizons, responding to practices hitherto often rejected as unrealistic, 
unviable, or ‘socialist.’
A particularly strong case for a mode of speculating that escapes the mantra of 
growth and profit has been articulated in the manifesto Rethinking the Apocalypse 
(2020) by the North American indigenous collective Indigenous Action. Challeng-
ing hegemonic narratives of the disease that construct a linear story in which he-
roes of the Global North are called on to save ‘the world,’ the authors note, 
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From religious tomes to fictionalized scientific entertainment, each imagined ti-
meline constructed so predictably; beginning, middle, and ultimately, The End. 
[...] It’s an apocalyptic that colonizes our imaginations and destroys our past and 
future simultaneously. It is a struggle to dominate human meaning and all exis-
tence. [...] This is the futurism of the colonizer, the capitalist. It is at once every fu-
ture ever stolen by the plunderer, the warmonger and the rapist. [...] Apocalyptic 
idealization is a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the linear world ending from within. 
(Indigenous Action 2020)
Against a linear sequence running from a definite past to a predictable future, the 
activists call for a folding of temporality, invoking ancestral prophecies enunci-
ated in the midst of violence and exploitation: “Now. Then. Tomorrow. Yesterday.” 
This powerful intervention into the rampant discourses around covid-19 brings 
into relief another mode of speculating and, along with it, another set of specula-
tive practices.
The uncertain commons collective, in their manifesto Speculate This! (2013), has 
provided a lucid rendition of such diverging modes of speculation. Taking clues 
from Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bataille, and Derrida, the authors propose a distinction 
between firmative speculation and af firmative speculation. Firmative speculation 
is about “turning uncertainty into (external, calculable, knowable) risk,” where-
as affirmative speculation leaves the future open, thriving on uncertainty, and it 
“progresses and lives by attending to what it does not know” (uncertain commons 
2013: ch. 2). While the firmative mode predominates, casting futurity primarily 
in terms of technological progress, economic growth, and a prolongation of the 
status quo, the affirmative mode instead characterizes diverse efforts to invent 
alternatives, for example, in philosophy and the arts—especially in the domains of 
speculative fiction—but also in postcolonial and decolonial projects, environmen-
tal justice efforts, experiments in permaculture, antiracist worldmaking strate-
gies, and all manner of activist agitations that insist another world is possible.3
Affirmative speculation, in this sense, is about habits and practices opening 
towards a future that is not only uncertain, but radically contingent: a future 
that is not turned into an extension of the present, but that bears the promise of 
genuine novelty and difference in relation to what can presently be known and 
predicted. Affirmative speculation, it seems, is what a radical politics of differ-
ence—radically postcapitalist and decolonial—needs, at least, to think that things 
could be otherwise.
3  See for example, Fisher/Ponniah (2003); McNally ([2002] 2006); Juris (2008); Bryant/Srnicek/Har-
man (2011); Otto (2012); Davis/Turpin (2015); Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten (2017); Bahng (2018); 
Jerng (2018); Milburn (2018); Streeby (2018); Chua/Fair (2019); Chang (2019); and Jue (2020).
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Ambivalences, paradoxes, and indeterminacies remain, however, as already 
implied in the intellectual genealogy invoked by the uncertain commons. The two 
modes, while analytically useful, are inseparable regarding relations of knowledge 
production and politics. If imaginative, experimental, and performative practic-
es of speculation have helped to animate insurgent movements from Haiti to the 
Arab Spring, Gezi protests in Turkey, or the Movement for Black Lives, it was also 
affirmative modes of speculation in relation to the unknown—hopes, dreams, 
and desires, as well as fears—that characterized colonial projects of exploration 
in early modernity. Likewise, the supposedly ‘post-truth’ situations propagated 
by Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and the Brexiteers cannot straightforwardly be 
captured in terms of a firmative mode of speculation that seeks to make uncer-
tainties manageable—even though their affirmations of chaos and uncertainty 
clearly expose firmative orientations on other levels.4 Whose purposes affirmative 
speculation serves and how it is interlaced with firmative processes thus remains 
an uncomfortable question. 
Consider, for example, that firmative ways of speculating have acquired re-
newed relevance in activist strategies to counter ‘alternative truth’ and anti-sci-
ence claims, such as those that run riot in the climate-change-denial movement. 
In her seminal theorization of situated knowledges, Donna Haraway formulated 
precisely this paradox of “how to have simultaneously an account of radical contin-
gency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects […] and a no-nonsense com-
mitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (Haraway 1988: 579). With respect 
to the current situation of the covid-19 pandemic—the moment when we write 
these words in our separate homes, in different countries, practicing prophylactic 
social distancing—the different national political strategies cannot in all cases 
be pinned down as instances of purely firmative or affirmative speculation. For 
example, some of these strategies enact a “precautionary principle,” according to 
which it is precisely the lack of knowledge about the future that prompts preven-
tive action. As Matthew Hannah, Jan Simon Hutta, and Christoph Schemann ex-
plain, “Many experts in the current crisis thus cite the limits of their own knowl-
edge as a reason not for refraining from action but, on the contrary, for quarantine 
and the closing of borders” (Hannah/Hutta/Schemann 2020). Rather than making 
the endeavor to overcome uncertainty their prime objective and to close down an 
4  Discussing Bolsonaro’s government, Marcos Nobre (2019) has used the term “chaos as method” 
(cf. Meyer and Bustamente 2020). The calculated production of chaos and uncertainty, while 
seeming to af firm and promote contrarian beliefs, conspiracy theories, and other flights of 
speculative fancy, simultaneously aims to lock down the future, restore order, and return things 
to an imagined stability, remaking the future as an image of the past (“Make America great 
again,” “Make Brazil great again,” etc.).
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uncertain future, these experts affirmatively posit their own irredeemable lack of 
knowledge as grounds for firmative recommendations. 
Such simultaneity of different modes of speculation also shapes discussions 
about the legacies-to-be of the pandemic containment practices. On the one 
hand, firmative statements proliferate, ranging from stark warnings that the 
translocation of everyday life to online platforms will only fortify the neoliberal 
economy and enable increasingly comprehensive surveillance, to optimistic as-
surances that the widespread embrace of digital technologies and practices will 
ultimately improve social relations. On the other hand, some speculations have 
taken a more affirmative tack, welcoming the uncertainty that ensues from the 
fact that ‘nobody knows’ how we will come out of the crisis, imagining innovative 
possibilities for shifting power to the people and enhancing democratization (cf. 
Diez/Heisenberg 2020). But the “Amazonification of the planet” (Merchant 2020), 
a process that has been accelerating during the pandemic, depends as much on 
the interplay between closure and openness as does any utopian vision of a more 
egalitarian society to come after the pandemic. Much commentary has therefore 
combined firmative and affirmative (as well as anti-speculative) modes (cf. Strick 
2020). It seems, then, we are situated in a historical moment when both modes are 
more interwoven than ever. Our aim, therefore, is not simply to pit the affirmative 
against the firmative, but rather to use this distinction as a heuristic for consid-
ering different ways of inhabiting the future-oriented present, a provocation for 
further enquiries into the material effects of speculation in specific contexts.
Since the eighteenth century, the profound transformation of scientific knowl-
edge production in the context of industrialization has fundamentally shaped the 
development of the Global North: statistical and probabilistic thinking emerged 
hand in hand with mechanical objectivity, the projection of the Gaussian error 
curve onto social and natural phenomena, and the introduction of increasingly 
vast data practices into the arenas of science, politics, administrative governance, 
and civic life.5 While these epistemic innovations have often seemed to disavow 
and exclude speculation, they nevertheless introduced new, data-driven modes of 
extrapolation, anticipation, and prediction into knowledge processes. Probabilis-
tic theories and statistical methods came to permeate scientific knowledge, dis-
solving essentialist conceptions of law and causality while refurbishing notions of 
randomness and chance. The advent of quantum theory in the twentieth century 
likewise infused indeterminacy and uncertainty into the foundations of phys-
ics. These developments in the sciences, in parallel with the spreading tendrils of 
technological modernization and financial capitalism, created the conditions for 
a massive reorganization of epistemic fields and social orders around actuarial 
5  See Porter (1986); Daston (1988); Hacking (1990); Desroisères ([1993] 1998); Daston/Galison (2007); 
and Link (1996, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d).
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logics, stochastic models, and risk assessments—that is, the emergence of risk 
society.6 
In this context, since the late twentieth century, the operations of science, 
technology, medicine, and public health have become increasingly entwined with 
the speculative economies of the market, with all its attendant instruments of in-
surance, hedging, futures trading, and arbitrage, articulated in the grammar of 
forward-looking statements.7 On the f lip side, in the realm of economics and eco-
nomic behaviors, historical shifts in attitudes toward speculation and investment, 
as well as alternating positive and negative assessments and the scientification 
of finance markets, have evolved in concert with probabilistic and metrical ways 
of knowing (Stäheli [2007] 2013). The transformation of “investors into scientists 
bound to discover the hidden, objective laws of financial investments” (Preda 
2005: 152) has resulted in characteristic speculative labor practices, for example, 
in stock exchanges and algorithmic finance markets (Zaloom 2004, 2005). At the 
same time, it has become clear how closely financial speculation in global capi-
talism has been linked to colonialism and its legacies, including exploitative, ex-
tractive methods of medical, environmental, and technological experimentation, 
debt-trap investment schemes, and the global shuff ling of supply chain deriva-
tives.8 Buoyed by such ventures and enterprises, financial markets—which are 
“not primarily concerned with the production of goods or with their distribution 
to clients but with the trading of financial instruments not designed for consump-
tion” (Knorr Cetina/Preda 2005: 4)—thrive on their own promissory condition, 
their own subjunctivity. Conjured forth by the abstract models and theoretical 
conceits of economics, the performance of financial markets—indeed, the finan-
cialization of culture as such—relies deeply on imaginary visions of the future, in 
other words, speculative fictions.9 
Speculative fictions—including the genres of utopian romance, scientif-
ic romance, extraordinary voyages, science fiction, science fantasy, weird tales, 
supernatural horror, fantasy, and alternate history—are devices for rendering 
two predominant types of speculation into narrative discourse: (1) extrapolation, 
6  On risk society and its manifestations in technoscience, popular media, and environmental dis-
course, see Beck ([1986] 1992); Mayer, S./Weik von Mossner (2014); and Ghosh/Sarkar (2020). On 
the functions of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and risk in cultures of statistical knowledge pro-
duction, see Hanke (2007, 2014); Bauer/Olsén (2009); Hannah (2010); and Jordan/Mitterhofer/
Jørgensen (2018).
7  See Sunder Rajan (2006); Waldby/Mitchell (2006); Fortun (2008); Cooper (2008); Dumit (2012); 
Milburn (2015); and Patel (2017). 
8  See Mitchell (2002); LiPuma/Lee (2004); Mignolo (2011); Bear/Birla/Puri (2015); Tilley (2011); Beisel/
Boëte (2013); Peterson (2014); Chandler/Beisel (2017); and Mavhunga (2018).
9  See Callon (1998); Maeße/Sparsam (2007); Lütz (2007); MacKenzie/Muniesa/Siu (2008); Beckert 
(2016); Appadurai (2013); and Bear (2020).
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which addresses the question, “What if this goes on?” based on what is “known 
to be known”10—whether in science or otherwise—and (2) a more open form of 
speculation that asks, “What if …?” without such constraints.11 As cultural devic-
es, speculative fictions have, since the origins of modern science, contributed to 
production of scientific knowledge and technical innovations.12 At the same time, 
speculative fictions have helped to shape social imaginaries toward the possibility 
of radical change and political renovation—precisely by estranging the present 
from itself, remaking our world into the past of an altered future or the foil to a 
wholly alternative world.13 As writers such as Judith Merril and Joanna Russ have 
famously suggested, speculative fictions are not constrained to particular forms 
or styles of speculation, for they can capaciously experiment with any number of 
speculative modalities.14 For this reason, speculative fictions prove to be exquisite 
instruments for refracting the manifold practices of speculation that constitute 
the world today—the proliferating speculative markets, the forces of preemptive 
securitization, and the actuarial projections of pandemic pandemonium, as much 
as the longing for things to be otherwise.15 
Considering how central speculation has become to all areas of our social, 
political, cultural, and personal existence, systematic exploration of the gram-
mars, modes, and functions of speculation across these domains appears neces-
sary. Such has been the motivation of this essay collection: to analyze specula-
tion—whether in technoscience, finance, or fiction—as implemented by concrete 
practices, instantiated in particular forms of discourse, media apparatuses, tech-
niques of application, and everyday activities.
Tracing the Practices of Speculation
Speculation ventures to create knowledge by conjecturing what may come, but it 
is not exclusively directed towards the future: societies speculate backwards and 
sideways as well as forwards and beyond. The aim of this book is to think about 
speculation in more expansive ways at a time when the anticipation of catastro-
10  This is Samuel Delany’s phrase, according to Joanna Russ ([1971] 1972).
11  See Landon (2014); cf. Csicsery-Ronay (2008); Saler (2012). 
12  For examples, see Penley (1997); Turney (1998); Hayles (1999); Doyle (2003); Kilgore (2003); Squire 
(2004); Willis (2006); Clarke (2008); Franklin ([1988] 2008); Milburn (2008, 2015); Wald (2008); 
Sharp (2018); and Rees/Morus (2019).
13  See Jameson (2005); cf. Freedman (2000); Sargent (2010); and Levitas (2013).
14  See Merril ([1966] 2017); Russ ([1971] 2017); cf. Cortiel (1999).
15  See Vint (2015); Carroll/McClanahan (2015); Haraway 2016; Higgins/O’Connell (2019); and Mil-
burn (2020).
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phe is the order of the day and an apocalyptic tone pervades public discourse on a 
global scale. Picking up the distinction between firmative and affirmative modes 
of speculation, this book proposes an approach that investigates the concrete 
ways in which these modes are enacted in practice, how they are sometimes dif-
ferentially favored or mutually combined or rendered indistinguishable, as well 
as the entanglements and effects to which they give rise. While the essays col-
lected here were written prior to covid-19, at a moment when the image of global 
pandemic still resided in the ‘there and then’ instead of the ‘here and now,’ they 
bring into strong relief some of the speculative practices that have also shaped the 
current crisis. 
This volume is the product of a long-standing cooperation between scholars 
at the University of Bayreuth and the University of California, Davis focusing on 
“cultures of speculation.” The contributions, some of them coauthored across dis-
ciplines, examine an assortment of speculative practices from different angles, 
attending to the ways in which speculation opens new vantages and vistas, a spec-
tral panoply of firmative and affirmative horizons. 
Practices of Speculation represents an adventure in interdisciplinary collabo-
ration, the outgrowth of our collective effort to rethink conceptualizations of 
speculation in and beyond our respective disciplines, across different academic 
cultures. Several of the chapters were written as methodological mashups by co-
authors from different fields, but even the single-author chapters position them-
selves across fields and cultures of research. Moreover, the entire collection bears 
traces of the innumerable conversations we have had as a group of friends and 
colleagues working and thinking together for more than a decade. 
To move towards a fuller sense of how speculation operates through situated 
practices, we have grouped the chapters into three sections: (1) Modeling: Specu-
lating with Data; (2) Embodiment: Speculating with Matter; and (3) Figuration: 
Speculating with Fiction. These three kinds of speculative practices—all of which 
can exhibit firmative and affirmative modes—are not mutually exclusive, but 
they each have a distinctive manner of establishing relations between the known 
and the unknown. 
Modeling uses data to develop descriptive or visual accounts of possible states 
of affairs. It thus draws on facticity to describe possible actualities. Embodiment 
concerns the ways in which specific materials, beings, and environments—for 
example, the subjects and objects of a scientific laboratory or a theater space—
are mobilized to enact speculative processes and promissory visions, opening to 
futurity. Figuration, in turn, draws attention to practices of make-believe that 
speculate through the gathering and condensing of disparate signifying ele-
ments—whether images, words, scenes, or narratives. Each of these practices of 
speculation—modeling, embodiment, figuration—entails different processes of 
worldmaking, which we analyze from different disciplinary angles. The individ-
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ual chapters provide paradigmatic glimpses of particular situated practices, but 
collectively, the book aspires to provoke discussion rather than provide an ex-
haustive survey.
While speculation has been endemic to the expansion of global capitalism, 
speculation as a practice of dealing with the unknown past, future, and present 
goes back deep into history—and this history shapes the contours and affordanc-
es of speculation today. The first chapter of this collection, Susanne Lachenicht’s 
“Cultures of Speculation—Histories of Speculation,” historicizes our approach to 
speculation by looking into early modern chronotopes and perspectives on spec-
ulation, how they evolved with the Renaissance and in the context of European 
voyages of exploration. Not only the development of probability and risk calculus 
but also literary genres such as travel narratives and utopian romances show how 
much the period between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries generat-
ed a broad range of speculative practices. Speculation in the early modern period 
was about futures that, while often representing extensions of the present, also 
enabled speculating on the past, on eternity and untime. Going back into these 
histories of speculation, Susanne Lachenicht discovers in them a speculum for to-
day’s practices of speculation. The diverse timescapes of the early modern period 
can help us to critically assess our own times, our own temporal orientations and 
modes of speculation, and to recall alternative conceptions for other times not yet 
here. 
Modeling: Speculating with Data
Scientific speculation as we understand it today is rooted in numbers. Calcula-
tions, graphs, measurements, and quantified data feed the extrapolative think-
ing that yields predictive models in science and finance, as well as games both 
analog and digital. Exploring this field of speculation, the first section presents 
three case studies: one on the relationship between climate modeling in science 
and science fiction; one on manifestations of uncertainty in the model worlds of 
computer games; and one on the speculative affordances of ‘lag’ in high-frequency 
trading, online game economies, and other algorithmic recreations. All three con-
tributions showcase approaches to speculation that play with calculated models. 
What they make clear is that models become tools of speculation through narra-
tive and storytelling, above and beyond the raw calculus of quantifiable patterns.
Katherine Buse’s “The Working Planetologist: Speculative Worlds and the 
Practice of Climate Science” examines journal articles, blog posts, textbooks, and 
lectures by climate scientists, uncovering a discourse around speculative fiction 
that not only refers to specific texts but also ref lects upon the importance of sci-
ence-fictional thinking for the technical work of modeling planetary systems. 
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Connecting the discursive and mathematical construction of worlds in climate 
modeling to the speculative fictions referenced by scientists, especially Frank 
Herbert’s Dune (1965), the chapter characterizes a shared practice of climatological 
speculation in both science and fiction. The title of the chapter is adapted from 
Herbert’s use of the phrase “the working planetologist” to describe Dune’s plan-
etary ecologist, because this character enacts a kind of planetary consciousness 
that links science fiction with climate modeling. Climate scientists refer to science 
fiction pedagogically and methodologically to communicate the ideas of specula-
tive climatology, suggesting that the comprehension of our own climate requires 
embedding it in a multiverse of imaginary otherworlds.
In “The Rule of Productivity and the Fear of Transgression: Speculative Un-
certainty in Digital Games,” Felix Raczkowski investigates how practices of spec-
ulation inscribe themselves into contemporary digital games while also arguing 
that games and play enable speculation through their inherent uncertainty. Af-
ter a brief overview of the relationship between games, play, and uncertainty, the 
chapter analyzes two manifestations of uncertainty in digital games as well as 
the speculative strategies they foster in detail. On the one hand, ludic uncertainty 
serves the interest of game play in the context of online multiplayer games and 
simulations. On the other hand, uncertainty also appears as risk, and the fear of 
transgressive acts leads to various attempts to discipline the player base of online 
games. Raczkowski’s chapter concludes that both productive and transgressive 
uncertainties are entrenched in speculative concerns about the future of digital 
games and games research.
Capitalist speculation dreams of reducing risks and obliterating waiting 
times, as the subsequent chapter reminds us. Yet it also depends on open futures 
and delays at both technical and social levels. In “Lagging Realities: Temporal Ex-
ploits and Mutant Speculations,” Joseph Dumit studies shared speculative experi-
ences of lag: what happens when lags are persistent, when they are encountered as 
things to which people must creatively adapt. How do they warp reality by warp-
ing time as lagged time—never lagged-time-in-general, but always specific forms 
of lag? Drawing on thick descriptions of financial speculation, first-person-shoot-
er games, basketball, massively multiplayer online role-playing games, human 
simulation, and botting, the chapter follows where and how lag shows up, where it 
must be put into speech, and how it becomes a matter of concern, a material-semi-
otic actor that, once named into existence, has the potential to warp existence and 
time itself. Dumit’s chapter finds that even as lag slows things down, it affords the 
potential for affirmative speculation, presenting unexpected opportunities and 
soliciting anticipatory practices that, by delaying a future, can produce new ways 
of speculating.
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Embodiment: Speculating with Matter
Looking at material speculative practices, including experimentation in the sci-
ences, social research, and performance art, highlights the role of embodiment 
and pushes against an overly limited notion of speculation as abstraction. Our 
case studies here delve into scientific practices involving germfree organisms and 
mold growth, as well as performance practices for an embodied epistemology of 
“performance as research.” What these studies have in common is an interest in 
how speculation plays out in and through bodies—both human and nonhuman—
and how materiality intersects with discourse, affects, and expectations in the 
formation of speculative alternatives to the known and the familiar.
Melissa Wills’s “‘La vie impossible’: Germfree Life in the Microbiome Era” 
shows how narratives of life without microbes are being rewritten in the wake of 
twenty-first-century research into the human microbiome. Germfree life, wheth-
er animal or human, was long considered to be a technical achievement. Born and 
maintained within complex sterile chambers, germfree organisms were viewed 
as perfections of engineering and of modern medicine: healthy, long-lived, and 
free of microbial disease, they seemed to herald a future of radiant health for 
all. In the microbiome era, that assessment has changed profoundly. Examin-
ing a corpus of ten popular microbiome books, Wills shows how contemporary 
pop-science writers are actively rewriting the legacy and status of germfree ani-
mal research. Through a series of historical and rhetorical distortions, she argues, 
germfree bodies become sick, victims of the impulse to eradicate microbes and 
suffering the loss of their accustomed symbionts. Made into representatives of a 
catastrophic future to come, these bodies function as speculative interventions in 
a looming crisis of antibiotic-laced modernity, invoked as deterrents to the per-
sistent dream of life beyond germs. 
Social relations to the nonhuman that include endeavors of countering pro-
jected human impairment of health are also at the focus of another essay, which 
starts out from the observation that the fungi called “mold” are usually seen as con-
tamination when encountered in and on buildings or food. Christoph Schemann’s 
“Spores of Speculation: Negotiating Mold as Contamination” engages with some 
recurrent socio-material strategies through which such contamination is estab-
lished and navigated, including the registers of visibility, ventilation, temporality, 
and disgust. Drawing on Karen Barad’s (2007) notion of the “apparatus,” the chap-
ter shows that the activation of such processes of negotiation—as well as their al-
teration—can take shape only through specific practices of speculation. These in-
clude firmative practices that revolve around anticipated threats to human health 
and preemptive actions directed at securing an uncontaminated human future. 
Contrasting such a foreclosing mode of speculation with affirmative speculation, 
the essay goes on to examine practices such as urban exploration and dumpster 
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diving that speculate with, rather than solely about, mold. Schemann argues that 
such a contingent and unprompted mode of speculating opens up future possibil-
ities for prolific yet uncertain engagements with more-than-human materialities. 
It may also assist, he suggests, in reframing the category of contamination as a 
more nuanced and polyphonic form of collaborative encounters. 
The speculative dimensions of performative knowledge production are at the 
center of Wolf-Dieter Ernst and Jan Simon Hutta’s chapter, “Enacting Speculation: 
The Paradoxical Epistemology of Performance as Research.” The authors point out 
that the generation of knowledge, despite the focus on how bodily contingency 
can be held at bay in Western traditions of science, necessarily depends on em-
bodied and performative practices. While the sociology of knowledge and the 
feminist discussion of situated knowledges have by now made this much suffi-
ciently clear, the essay enquires into the generative potential that resides in not 
only acknowledging bodily, performative, and speculative dimensions but also 
intensifying them. Such intensification, they argue, fosters the generation of new 
knowledge as well as ways of knowing otherwise. To develop this argument, the 
chapter relates the question of speculation to the discussions about “performance 
as research” (Kershaw 2008, 2009; Stutz 2008). Drawing on an interdisciplinary 
seminar that they conducted in collaboration with Matt Adams from the arts col-
lective Blast Theory, Ernst and Hutta highlight the productive role of paradoxical 
constellations of facticity and fictionality, embodied specificity and boundless-
ness, as well as scientific inscription and practical performance. Amplifying rath-
er than reducing such paradoxicality, they argue, prompts performing research-
ers to develop creative responses to unfolding events, potentially instigating new 
knowledge as well as new ways of knowing.
Figuration: Speculating with Fiction
As a word, a concept, figuration has traveled circuitous etymological routes, from 
its roots in the Latin figura to the German Figur and the English figure, to its usage 
in contemporary theoretical discourse. Two German-speaking scholars have been 
particularly inf luential in shaping the notion of figuration: the philologist Erich 
Auerbach and the sociologist Norbert Elias. Auerbach, in his 1938 essay “Figura,” 
presents figuration as a way of reading the relationship between the Old Testament 
and the New Testament, in which the old prefigures and forecasts the new—a pat-
tern of retroactive anticipation and prospective fulfillment that he traces across 
Western literature in his well-known book, Mimesis (Auerbach [1938] 2019; cf. Balke 
2019). Similarly, Elias’s concept of figuration in approaching society as a dynamic 
process—the basis of figurational sociology—suggests configurations, networks, 
or assemblages, inf luenced by the German word Figur (a character in a play) and 
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drawing upon the etymological sense of figure as plastic form (Elias [1975] 1994). It 
is in this sense that figuration also refers to tropes and figures of speech, in which 
one thing points to another—in other words, in borrowed form. In English, figure 
is also a verb and a noun that refers to shapes and numbers as well as drawings 
and graphical images. Figuration is fraught with protean meaning—a projection 
or forecast of meaning as such.
In this section, we take a cue from Donna Haraway, who theorizes figuration 
by drawing from a range of contexts, including Auerbach’s Mimesis. Haraway 
writes, “Figurations are performative images that can be inhabited. Verbal or vi-
sual, figurations can be condensed maps of contestable worlds” (Haraway 1997: 11). 
Figuration emerges as a mode of speculation that, grounded in both the figural 
(referring to individuated figures and configurations) and the figurative (spanning 
the range of visual and verbal expressions), spins a web of interdependent figures. 
Figuration characterizes speculative practices that draw inferential, conjectural, 
and anticipatory connections between one thing (a shape, a number, an actor, a 
cipher) and another (an object, an entity, a world, or whatever). 
As a method of make-believe, speculation often plays out in the form of fiction, 
that is, imaginary and invented stories. On one level, all fictional texts are specu-
lative in this sense (Merril [1966] 1971; Freedman 2000). Speculative fiction, how-
ever, deliberately envisions sociopolitical, economic, and cultural consequences 
of scientific and technological change, as well as other knowledge-making and 
world-building practices, including those that may not be possible in our own 
universe. The chapters in this section of the book focus on speculative fiction in 
different media, exploring questions of space and scale, temporality, uncertainty, 
and self-referentiality. 
In “Scale and Speculative Futures in Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker and Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s 2312,” Matthew Hannah and Sylvia Mayer discuss two science 
fiction novels that engage with contemporary key technologies: Russell Hoban’s 
Riddley Walker (1980), which speculates about possible effects of nuclear tech-
nology, and Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2312 (2012), which speculates about possible 
consequences of computational, biomedical, and geoengineering technologies. 
Hannah and Mayer focus on the spatiality of the future worlds presented by these 
novels and demonstrate how “scale” as a narrative strategy draws attention to the 
relevance of spatial and scalar structuring in fictional future worlds—and, by im-
plication, in nonfictional worlds, as well. The re-scaled future worlds of Riddley 
Walker and 2312 shed light on the dynamics of the social constitution of both space 
and time and on the potential hazards of technological modernization.
Drawing on queer theory and fan studies, Jordan Carroll’s “The Lifecycle of 
Software Engineers: Geek Temporalities and Digital Labor” argues that geeks 
share a common experience of time. Both fans and tech workers seem to lose track 
of all other schedules when they become immersed in labor or leisure—which, for 
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geeks, blur together. While geeks have long been considered to be rebels or out-
siders, geek temporalities actually prove to be more politically ambiguous. They 
allow tech workers to accommodate themselves to punishingly long hours, but 
they also push geeks to choose work and play over heterofamilial commitments, 
setting them at odds with temporal norms surrounding heterosexual maturity. 
Moreover, although geeks would seem to be ideal consumers, their excessive at-
tachments to old media mean that they often resist capitalist narratives of prog-
ress. Geeks therefore frequently appear in fiction as archaic, childlike, or alien fig-
ures who are somehow out of synchronicity with normal people. Thus, geeks are 
often associated with characters in speculative fiction, including androids or arti-
ficial intelligences. They are capable of working like machines, but they operate on 
different timescales from most humans. Through a close reading of Ted Chiang’s 
novella The Lifecycle of Sof tware Objects (2010), this essay suggests that geek practic-
es of speculation can present alternatives to chronormativity.
In “Uncertainty between Image and Text in Ben Templesmith’s Singularity 7,” 
Jeanne Cortiel and Christine Hanke focus on the relationship between images and 
text, and the ways in which the two work together in comics to create narrative. 
They point out that something more is also created in the interaction between the 
visual and the textual in comics—an effect perhaps best described as figuration. 
Seeing this interaction as figuration turns attention to speculation as integral to 
how comics engage in worldmaking beyond narrative. Based on a paradigmatic 
reading of a dystopian graphic novel, Singularity 7 by Ben Templesmith (2004), the 
chapter attends to how comics as a medium speculate specifically in the tension 
between image and text, narrative and performance. Undertaking a dialogue be-
tween literary studies and media studies/image theory (Bildwissenschaf t), Cortiel 
and Hanke explore the question of how the visual layers, box commentary and 
character speech work together (or across one another) to undermine the stabiliz-
ing tendencies of both story and visuals in comics. This interdisciplinary dialogue 
brings out the inherently paradoxical nature of speculation in comics and dis-
cusses how uncertainty shapes the interactions between image and text. Singu-
larity 7 is a comic that deliberately deploys the effects produced by the visuals and 
the ways in which images both propel and counteract the narrative f low. Images 
perform a medial presence by themselves that is in tension with the text layers. 
Addressing the questions raised by this highly self-referential comic, the authors 
investigate how Singularity 7 specifically assembles images and text, but they also 
suggest how the uncertainty created in this performance of intermediality char-
acterizes comics in general. 
Approaching the speculative operations of comic books from another direc-
tion, Mark Jerng and Colin Milburn’s chapter, “This World Which Is Not One: Su-
perhero Comics and Other Dimensions of Reference,” examines the practices of 
allusion, citation, and reference-making in superhero fictions. Noting that super-
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hero comics always take place in an alternate reality from our own—and that the 
genre has cultivated the trope of the ‘multiverse’ or multiple universes to accom-
modate divergent, sometimes contradictory narratives—Jerng and Milburn show 
how references to historical events, works of art, or cultural clichés often seem 
to stabilize continuity and secure a consensus reality. Yet in superhero comics, 
such references also highlight discontinuities and perform a speculative ontology 
of difference, a worldview that affirms more worlds than one. The practices of 
reference in superhero comics reach out to occluded eras of the past, alternative 
histories of the present, and other worlds yet to come, assembling heterogeneous 
components through radical juxtapositions of image and text. But even at the 
moment of producing narrative cohesion and retroactive continuity—that is, at 
the moment of ‘retcon’—superhero comics register the irreducible multiplicity 
of worlds and alternative frames of reference. As Jerng and Milburn remind us, 
superhero comics have long been self-aware and self-ref lexive about such issues, 
suggesting the capacities of speculative media to grapple with the firmative and 
affirmative forces at play in our world and others.
These collected studies of diverse anticipations, projections, alterities, coun-
terfactuals, simulations, and virtualities—spectral visions brought to life through 
acts of modeling, embodiment, and figuration—are situated in a particular his-
toric moment. It is an era of urgent anticipation—like many others before. We are 
now urged to shelter in place, to ride out the pandemic storm—but tomorrow is 
another day. As they say, there’s no time like the present. So, let us not dawdle any 
longer. We hereby release this book into an uncertain future, hoping that it will 
inspire ref lections on past and future practices of speculation. Where things go 
from here, we can only imagine.
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Chapter 1: Cultures of Speculation—Histories 
of Speculation
Susanne Lachenicht
What is speculation? And since when have human societies developed cultures of 
speculation? 
Cultures of speculation—the story goes—are inextricably linked to moderni-
ty, or, as Ulrich Beck suggests, the age of “simple modernity” (Beck 1994). For a 
couple of decades now, this “simple modernity” has been moving towards “ref lex-
ive modernity” or “risk society” (Beck [1986] 1992). If we follow this linear, teleo-
logical narrative, the early modern period conceived of as pre-modernity or the 
pre-industrialization period would have been the age that preceded modernity. 
Cultures of speculation, then, might have slowly started to develop with the Re-
naissance, the (European) expansion of empires, and the increasing exploitation 
of human beings, land, oceans, of resources of any kind with the rise of capitalism 
(Moore 2016; Levy 2012)—so, between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries (cf. 
uncertain commons 2013).
However, what is speculation? And what are cultures of speculation? More of-
ten than not, they have been depicted as prioritizing “trade in the future” (Haiven 
2017: 4), putting “the future at the service of the present,” and developing a set of 
practices that “converted the future from an enemy into an opportunity” (Bern-
stein 1996: 1). Modernity—according to some authors—was about bringing risk 
under control (Bernstein 1996: 11), about trading perils (pre-modern) for calculable 
risk (modern). 
Some scholars claim that our so-called globalized society today “still largely 
privilege[s] a business-as-usual approach that reduces futures to matters of an-
ticipation, calculation, management and pre-emption of risks and uncertainties 
in the present” (Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten 2017: 1). Others have gone further 
and have voiced serious doubts that we have any sense of the future at all, that 
we have ever been “modern” (Latour [1991] 1993), and that we have ever quit the 
immutable present—meaning that (we think) that nothing essentially new (can) 
occur(s) and/or that there is no development, a worldview that the historian Rein-
hart Koselleck associated with the pre-modern period (Koselleck [1979] 2004: 58; 
cf. uncertain commons 2013). 
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If cultures of speculation, as Wilkie, Savransky, and Rosengarten suggest, 
have mostly been about bringing present (especially financial) risks under control, 
then how old are cultures of speculation? Do they emerge with the Anthropocene 
(Crutzen/Stroemer 2000), that is, when humans started becoming a geological 
factor on earth, or with the Capitalocene (Moore 2015, 2016)? Many scholars hold 
that financialization, “the growing power of the so-called FIRE (finance, insur-
ance and real estate) sector over the rest of capitalist economy” (Haiven 2017: 2), 
is one of the key elements of “risk society” today. Some call it “a global empire 
of speculative finance” (Haiven 2017: 2). However, societies and their economies 
have depended for thousands of years on historical forms of finance, whether in 
the context of agriculture, slave societies, or the Industrial Revolution. Lending, 
holding debt, and speculating on the return of credit are rather old in human his-
tory (Lapavitsas 2013; Ceccarelli 2016). According to some scholars, though, the 
seventeenth century brought about a major shift in risk assessment and calcu-
lation. Mathematicians such as Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat developed a 
theory of probability. By 1725, mathematicians set out to calculate mortality and 
life expectancies, and by the mid-eighteenth century, insurance based on proba-
bility calculations was in place (Bernstein 1996: 57–96). Pre-probability calculation 
insurance had already been available from the mid-fourteenth century, mostly to 
cover maritime risks for commerce and trade in the Mediterranean, Northern, 
Western, and Near Eastern worlds. At the center of late medieval or early modern 
risk management with regard to commerce and trade, we find Venice and Flor-
ence (Ceccarelli 2016); from the sixteenth century onwards, Atlantic sea ports such 
as Bordeaux, Nantes, and London; and from the seventeenth century, Amsterdam 
and Hamburg (Zwierlein 2011: 27–29). With these insurance practices, speculation, 
that is, risk calculation was mostly about space: perils at sea, such as storms, pi-
rates, shipwreck, or mutiny. Insurance was to cover uncertainty in a given space; 
it was less invested in a given time frame or with regard to more sophisticated 
notions of the future (Zwierlein 2011: 54–55). Has this changed? Or is this the im-
mutable present? Historians hold that scale, which involves the temporal, societal, 
and spatial dimensions of the production and effects of speculation, changed dra-
matically over the last five hundred years, in particular with globalization taking 
off from the late-nineteenth century (Osterhammel/Petersson 2003). Cultures of 
speculation would then be closely related to processes of globalization.
The authors of Speculate This! suggest distinguishing between two distinct 
modes of speculation: firmative and affirmative (uncertain commons 2013). Fir-
mative speculation is meant to “pin down, delimit, constrain, and enclose” the fu-
ture, which thus becomes (more) predictable. Affirmative speculation is to refuse 
“the foreclosure of potentialities,” it is about uncertainties, it is “to hold on to the 
spectrum of possibilities” (uncertain commons 2013: Prospects). We cannot clear-
ly separate firmative and affirmative speculation. They form a tension field, they 
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are in a dynamic and dialectic relationship with each other. Speculation about fu-
tures, then, would not only be about the probable, calculable, or plausible, but also 
about the possible and the impossible, “about futures that the present could never 
anticipate” (Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten 2017: 8). 
Sophisticated methods to calculate risk developed during the Italian Renais-
sance. Cultures of speculation emerged with “business partnerships,” “insurance 
contracts, or specialized markets for currency exchange and the trading of gov-
ernment bonds” (Ceccarelli 2016: 117–118). However, as early as the medieval pe-
riod, speculation was also about testing, about the visible and the invisible, the 
knowable and the non-knowable, the certain and the uncertain. Different genres 
were used for speculation: philosophical and theological writings, travel literature, 
satire, utopian romances (starting with Thomas More’s Utopia of 1516), and the vi-
sual arts.
In this chapter, I would like to zoom into the so-called pre-modern period, 
which, in a linear narrative, would have preceded modernity and Beck’s “ref lexive 
modernity.” We are going to look into concepts of time and modes of speculation, 
into how different contexts and genres invited different forms of speculation. In 
this way, I would like to open up some “horizons of speculation” of the early mod-
ern period by using the latter as a speculum for today’s cultures of speculation. I 
seek to test how much speculation in the early modern period might have been 
about speculating “about futures that are more than a mere extension of the pres-
ent” (Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten 2017: 2), but also about speculating on the 
past (Landwehr 2016: 231–246), on eternity and untime.
‘Discoveries,’ Conquest, and Colonization
Despite centuries of human travel to foreign destinations, from the perspective 
of the so-called Atlantic World, uncertainties about the world allegedly increased 
with the rise and expansion of the Portuguese, Spanish, French, English, and 
Dutch empires, as well as the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires from the 
1400s onwards (Canny/Morgan 2011; Darwin 2017). Migrations (including the 
forced migrations of African slaves), the rise of plantation systems, the develop-
ment of new and old economies, the Atlantic revolutions, nation-building and in-
dependence movements, and the accelerated exchange of knowledge and goods, 
brought about a higher degree of risk, financial risk in particular. Europeans back 
home, especially those who financed voyages of exploration and colonial ventures, 
would have perceived an increasing risk of failing enterprises, lost money, col-
lapsed investments, and unfulfilled expectations. In this regard, the cultures of 
speculation were largely about bringing financial risk under control (Bernstein 
1996; Zwierlein 2016). 
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Europeans struggled in their westward expansion with unknown sea currents, 
winds, storms, hurricanes, pirates and interlopers, as well as a variety of new cli-
mates, landscapes, resources, and cultures (Canny/Morgan 2011). Europeans, as 
Michel Foucault might have put it, moved “from the restrictive figures of simili-
tude” to describing and classifying “difference and discontinuity” ([1966] 1970: 51). 
Some of the earliest documents of the era of ‘discoveries,’ such as founding 
charters and royal privileges, illustrate the double-edged increase in risk and un-
certainty. The 1492 Privileges and Prerogatives Granted by Their Catholic Majesties to 
Christopher Columbus, for example, makes clear that, in sailing west to unknown 
shores, Columbus was risking his and his shipmates’ lives. But in case he should 
survive, Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon granted Columbus the rights 
of an admiral, viceroy, and governor, which included the right to exploit any seas, 
lands, and peoples he might ‘discover’ or conquer. In the project of colonization, 
the taking over of all financial risks by a future proprietor or a merchants’ com-
pany required major funds; the crown, in passing on those risks to merchant ven-
turers, assured them of all the necessary rights to exploit the resources, human 
and non-human, of the colony to be founded. Taking risk, then, was about taking 
opportunities, about chancing fortuna; furthermore, calculating risk was not the 
least about the exploitation of unknown resources. One of the first English Let-
ter Patents that King Henry VIII issued in 1496 for the Venetian Giovanni Cabo-
to states: “upon their owne proper costs and charges, to seeke out, discover, and 
find whatsoever isles, countreys, regions or provinces of the heathen and infidels” 
(“Letters Patent to John Cabot” [1496] 1909: 46). In return, Caboto was allowed 
to “subdue, occupy and possesse all such townes, cities, castles and isles of them 
found, which they can subdue, occupy and possesse” and “be holden and bounder 
of all the fruits, profits, gaines, and commodities growing of such navigation” (46). 
Similar Letter Patents can be found for King Henry IV of France when, in 1603, he 
granted the Charter of Acadia to Pierre Du Gua de Monts, or again in England, in 
the first Virginia Charter of 1606 or the charters for Maryland (1632), the Carolinas 
(1663), and Pennsylvania (1681) (Avalon Project). These charters, however, simply fur-
ther developed older, medieval patterns, established to grant major fiefs to dukes, 
counts and other vassals of the crown—especially when a given kingdom had ac-
quired new lands during (and after) warfare. Members of the aristocracy and/or 
army officers received patents to exert royal control in newly acquired countries, 
to establish the prince’s jurisdiction, armies, commerce, and trade. This required 
strict loyalty to the king. Furthermore, a certain percentage of the revenues com-
ing out of a given fief or colony had to be left to the king, while the proprietor, lord 
lieutenant, or viceroy received monopolies for certain resources and goods. Peril, 
uncertainty, and risk entailed the right to conquest and exploitation. What was 
then new about European expansion—especially the one to the west? 
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I would argue that the expansion of European (and non-European) empires in 
the early modern period opened up 1) a larger plurality of time/space relationships, 
2) a higher degree of uncertainties, 3) the scale of financial (and other) risks and 
opportunities, and 4) more varieties of firmative and affirmative speculation.
Time Regimes, Concepts of Time
Cultures of speculation are largely characterized by what notions of futurity 
they bring into play. Theorists of time (including historians) have often warned 
against purely linear concepts of time that organize time “along a modern arrow 
of progress” and have suggested to take varieties of concepts of time more seri-
ously—including different futurities (Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten 2017: 4–5). 
However, speculation is not restricted to the future or similar timescapes. We can 
also speculate about the past, the immutable present, eternity, or untime. Fur-
thermore, timescapes are context-related. To look into cultures of speculation—
so-called modern or pre-modern ones—we thus need to inquire into contexts and 
time concepts.
With the Renaissance and the rise of the new sciences, concepts of time, 
timescapes, changed—or, to put it differently, the plurality of concepts of time 
increased (Brendecke/Fuchs/Koller 2007: 13). Many Renaissance theologians and 
philosophers started thinking and speculating on time. For instance, Petrar-
ca (1304–1374) perceived humans as historical beings owning a past (memoria), a 
present (ingenium), and a future (providentia) (Keßler 2007: 34), even though the 
Latin suggests a rather different meaning of these three periods of time than our 
contemporary translation has it. However, not all humans had history, not all hu-
mans had a future.
During the so-called Age of Discovery, it became ‘clear’ for Christians/Euro-
peans that they lived in present and civilized times, while non-Christian/non-Eu-
ropean cultures—according to their degree of ‘barbarism’ and ‘lack of civiliza-
tion’—lived in the past (Fabian 2002: 75). This past, however, was different from 
European Antiquity (e.g. Thevet 1558: 54). According to many European authors, 
non-Europeans and Europeans did not share the same moment in history, nor did 
they share the same past. For André Thevet (1516–1590), a French Franciscan fri-
ar, explorer, and cosmographer who travelled to the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Brazil, Europeans lived in “modern times”; “savages,” however, were closer “to 
man’s origins, so to paradise” (Thevet 1558: 54, 87, 95). From Thevet’s perspective, 
the “savages” lived in an immutable present (cf. Fabian’s “allochrony” and “ethno-
graphic present,” 2002: 76) and had no history—at least, not prior to the arrival of 
Europeans (Thevet 1558: 84, 101–103, 106; cf. Labat 1722: 222, 317, 332). Only with 
conquest, colonization, and Christian missions, indigenous peoples of the Amer-
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icas entered human history and thus progress; they turned into ‘objects’ that now 
had a past, present, and future (Fabian 2002: 78). By the Renaissance, we see time 
and civilization coming together. Civilization and the future, progress, develop 
into one timescape: “evolutionary time” (Fabian 2002: 17, 29). This timescape was 
closely related to the context of ‘discoveries,’ conquest, colonization, and the in-
creasing exploitation of New World resources, human and non-human; it was a 
colonial concept that the colonized could not escape (cf. Hunt 2008: 94–96).
Only Europeans, as the present and modern people, were allegedly able to 
speculate on their own and other cultures’ state of civilization. It was also up to 
Europeans to bring humanity closer to a Golden Age, a worldly one. The new sci-
ences and new technologies, developed by Europeans, as many proponents of the 
Enlightenment claimed, could guide mankind back into a new Eden—on earth.
All of this sounds, indeed, like a pre-modern cultures of speculation narrative 
with the timescape past—present—future paving the way to modernity and its te-
leology about historical progress (Hunt 2008: 107). However, while the so-called 
European pre-modern period had “models of linear and measurable time” (Nagel/
Wood 2005: 408), and while timescapes were developed that Newton and natural 
scientists would later call “absolute time,” this was only one of a plurality of ways 
of organizing time and of being in time. Absolute time, then, was an invention, 
based on a metaphysical system important to the developing new sciences. It was 
also a highly contested timescape, criticized by empiricists such as David Hume 
and rationalists such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Wilcox 1987: 17–18). 
God’s time regime (Gallois 2007: 243), however, embedded and integrated 
evolutionary time, models of linear and measurable time (Le Goff’s famous “mer-
chant’s time” [1977] 1980), as much as absolute time—the biblical beginning of 
history and the end of mankind. Even if ‘modern’ timescapes such as evolution-
ary time and absolute time challenged this predominant timescape, God’s time 
regime remained the most powerful far into the nineteenth century. Time was 
divided into this world and the hereafter: life, death, and eternity. Quite contrary 
to ‘modern’ visions of the future of mankind, which all seem to share great uncer-
tainty about what the future might look like, Europeans of the early modern pe-
riod could be sure about the end of history. The Bible seemed to be clear about the 
destiny of mankind. Humans would live through four ages (Babylon, Persia, the 
Greek, and the Roman), followed by the fifth age which would include the arrival 
of the Antichrist, the battle between good and evil, the very likely victory of Jesus 
Christ, the Last Judgement, and the end of days. While Christians could not be 
sure of the exact beginning of the fifth age, they knew, thanks to the revelations of 
St. John, what would await them (Gallois 2007: 244). Uncertainty reigned with re-
gard to who would be among God’s elect and who among the eternally condemned. 
Far into the nineteenth century (and for Christian believers up to the present day), 
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speculating about the future of mankind seemed unnecessary, as God had provid-
ed for a teleological and orderly history of man (Gallois 2007: 33–35).
While mankind shared clear beginnings and a likely end of time, early mod-
ern Europeans, as many discourses from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries 
betray, could also be sure that they were in the hand of God, and if among the 
elect, guided by him—despite the many uncertainties about New World ventures. 
Zooming back into the late fifteenth century, we can see Isabella of Castile and 
Ferdinand of Aragon aware of the risks Columbus did run in sailing westwards; 
they hoped for the “assistance of God.” Columbus, in his 1493 letter to Luis de 
Santángel, echoed the belief that he had been guided by God, who had granted 
him his successful voyage at sea (Mancall 2006: 209). Parallels can be drawn to 
Protestant Europe: in his New England Charter of 1620, King James I of England 
hoped that by establishing this colony he would “advance in Largement of Chris-
tian Religion, to the Glory of God Almighty,” and he was sure that the colonizers 
would enjoy “God’s assistance” and “God’s divine blessing.” Furthermore, James 
stated that the English, in colonizing that territory, “second and followe God’s 
sacred Will, rendering reverend Thanks to his Divine Majestie for his gracious 
favour in laying open and revealing the same unto us” (“Charter of New England” 
[1620] 1909: 1830).
Surviving danger, calamities, peril depended on God’s will, his pity, compas-
sion, and grace—and on the growing abilities of man to calculate risk, to measure 
God’s world, and to reign over his resources. In the long run, God’s time regime 
was challenged, through humanism—which already by 1450 had produced “two 
canons” (Grafton 1992: 29)—the development of new sciences, and the radical En-
lightenment. Paradigms changed with encounters with new worlds and, as Fran-
cis Bacon put it in his 1620 Instauratio magna, through new sciences being a result 
of the age of humanism and the ‘discoveries’ in the Atlantic World. New sciences, 
Bacon claimed, “could affect the course of nature in useful ways, knowledge about 
how to ward off disease, improve crops, extend the span of life, and enhance the 
general welfare” (Grafton 1992: 197).
It is important to state that the coexistence of overlapping or clashing tempo-
ralities (Nagel/Wood 2005: 404)—a plurality of temporalities as parallel, contex-
tualized experiences coming together in one moment—was rather typical of the 
early modern period (Febvre [1942] 1982: 393–400). Despite the challenges of the 
developing new sciences and their a priori of measurable, linear, and—to some ex-
tent—absolute time, God’s time regime was the one that embedded and integrat-
ed all other ones (from the emic, that is, the historical actors’ perspectives). This 
is particularly true for the visual arts: what Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. 
Wood have dubbed “Renaissance anachronism” is rather typical far into the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. Artefacts and monuments, especially if used in 
sacred/ritual events, were “embedded in history” even as their “spiritual meaning 
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[…] lifted the event out of the f low of history”: “Visual artefacts collapsed past and 
present. They proposed an unmediated, present-tense, somatic encounter with 
the people and the things of the past” (Nagel/Wood 2005: 408).
While biblical narratives of the beginning and the end of the world—as much 
as the new sciences—strengthened linear and teleological temporalities, humans 
in the early modern period lived with plural concepts of time, allowing them 
specific forms of speculation. Like Einstein’s later notions on the relativity of 
time, so-called pre-modern concepts or pluralities of time turn “modern western 
time”—“which describes itself as being rational, observational, chronological, 
universal, unambiguous, fixed, natural, constant”—into an “historical anomaly 
in human culture” (Gallois 2007: 221, 246–247). But how did the plurality of times-
capes affect speculation in the early modern period?
Travel Narratives and Utopian Literatures
Travel narratives and utopian romances, which have often been defined as sepa-
rate literary genres, exemplify the early modern period’s cultures of speculation. 
More often than not, travel narratives cannot be clearly separated from fantastic, 
satirical, or utopian texts, and most of them come with firmative and affirmative 
elements. Travel narratives are as old as human history. Among the most famous 
are Marco Polo’s of the late thirteenth century and John de Mandeville’s of the 
later fourteenth century.
Printing made travel narratives (including so-called fantastic travels) widely 
available, especially in the sixteenth century and later. Next to printing, oral ac-
counts and manuscripts continued to spread news about the wonders of the world 
(Mancall 2006: 4–7; Greenblatt 1991). In travel narratives, uncertainties play an 
eminent role, especially in stories where Europeans voyage to unknown shores. 
Many narratives from the Age of Discovery are based on logbooks and journals 
that explorers kept during their voyages, such as Columbus’s logbook from 1492. 
The same holds for Amerigo Vespucci’s Mundus novus of 1504, Jacques Cartier’s 
travel account, published in Paris in 1545, and Captain John Smith’s of the early 
1600s—to name but a few. From these early European expansion travel narratives, 
we learn about things to be feared on these voyages. While most seamen, already 
in the 1400s, no longer believed in the terrifying edge of the abyss that should have 
awaited them if they had sailed too far west or east, sailing the Atlantic was none-
theless a terrifying thing. As Amerigo Vespucci writes in his 1504 Mundus novus: 
But what we suf fered on that vast expanse of sea, what perils of shipwreck, what 
discomforts of the body we endured, with what anxiety of mind toiled, this I leave 
to the judgement of those who out of rich experience have well learned what it is 
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to seek the uncertain and to attempt discoveries even though ignorant. (Mancall 
2006: 218) 
Furthermore, as Columbus’s logbook shows, his seamen were afraid of never 
finding any winds that would bring them back to Spain. They were afraid of their 
knowledge of the stars being untrustworthy. They were afraid of their maps being 
wrong about the actual islands in the Atlantic (Mancall 2006: 209–214).
Speculation about these unknown worlds and their uncertainties meant strug-
gling to make the unknown better known, controllable. When describing new 
worlds from European eyes, travel narratives of the early modern period relied 
on older models in telling their stories, often models that had been in place since 
Antiquity. Furthermore, the ‘new’ could only be described through the already 
known, and the unknown was made known through comparisons, analogies, and 
classifications based on already existent knowledge (Pagden 1982: 1–4). Between 
the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans drew upon a set of biblical 
(Old and New Testament) and mythological, that is, pagan images and paradigms. 
While (what we now call) the un- or supranatural was an element of everyday life 
even back in Europe, the further Europeans moved into unknown parts of the 
world, the more likely it became to meet monsters, pygmies, amazons, mermaids, 
giants, and other species as described, for example, by Pliny the Elder in his Natu-
ralis historia (AD 77–79). Monstrous species inhabited the rim of the world. In one 
of his letters to Luis de Santángel (1493), Columbus seemed to be surprised to find 
no antique monsters in the West Indies (Mancall 2006: 212). Sailing westwards, 
then, must have been a rather ‘calculable risk,’ as many explorers thought they 
knew what and whom they would encounter. Had not Plato described Atlantis? 
Had not Seneca prophesized the ‘discovery’ of new worlds in his Medea? Cartog-
raphers and chroniclers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries seem to 
have been well able to make the New World look old, for example, claiming that 
American Indians were descendants of some of the lost tribes of Israel. The ‘dis-
coveries’ were, then, just “another classical revival” (Grafton 1992: 58, 149).
In the long run, though, describing new worlds through ancient texts proved 
to be a conundrum, a paradox. Drawing analogies, describing new worlds through 
ancient texts, images and concepts failed abysmally. Not only did the so-called 
New World upset much of what Europeans thought they knew about God and his 
world. The New World also required new concepts, and God’s world had to be re-
conceptualized. Or, as Edmundo O’Gorman (1972) and Walter Mignolo (2005) have 
argued: helpless to grasp the New World with what they knew, Europeans ‘invent-
ed’ new worlds, first, according to their imaginary—concepts and paradigms—
then through developing new, speculative categories based on Native American, 
African, and Asian knowledge (Mignolo 1992, 1995; Lachenicht 2019). The Age of 
Discovery changed the European canon of knowledge. It fostered encroachments 
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on ancient texts, the Bible in particular. Certainties about God’s world, this world, 
and the world hereafter came to be challenged. Affirmative speculation about the 
new, about the world to be, became common practice.
The Age of Discovery not only produced more travel narratives but also what 
has been dubbed a new genre: utopian literatures (Bruce 1999: ix–xi), which often 
open up as travel narratives. There has been much debate whether early modern 
utopias are about ideal or future societies, and how they relate to real space and 
time. While many early modern utopias are set up in yet to be ‘discovered’ space 
(Koselleck 1982: 2–3)—often Atlantic or Indian Ocean worlds—they have no tem-
poral dimension, they are not about future societies (Bruce 1999: xiii). I would ar-
gue that utopias are—as (and together with) satires—the most speculative literary 
genre in the early modern period—while building on older biblical, ancient Greek 
and medieval models. Utopian literatures are speculative as 1) they always come 
as a mirror, a “distorted ref lection” (Bruce 1999: xxiv) of the societies that pro-
duced them, and 2) they speculate at the same time about untime, about imagined 
worlds that are not and are not meant to be (cf. Marin 1973; Greenblatt 1980: 22). 
Many early modern utopias are dystopias, satires, and parodies at the same time. 
Some Renaissance and Baroque texts, such as Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote 
(1605/1615) or Rabelais’s Gargantua et Pantagruel (1532–1564), have been classified as 
chivalric satires (Winter 1978); some, such as Cyrano de Bergerac’s (1619–1655) Les 
États et Empires de la Lune (postum 1657) and Les États et Empires du Soleil (postum 
1662) or Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726), have been described as satirical, 
fantastic travel narratives. Other narratives, such as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), 
Tommaso Campanella’s La città del sole (1623), or Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis 
(1627), have been identified as real utopias, self-consciously depicting ideal societ-
ies. However, there is much doubt that the eponym of the utopian genre, Thomas 
More’s Utopia, was meant to describe an ideal society (Bruce 1999: xvi–xviii). Rath-
er, like Rabelais’s work, it is as much a satire of More’s own world as it is about 
alternative possibilities of his time (Bruce 1999: xix–xxvii).
Despite their originalities and specificities, utopian and fantastic narratives 
both critically (and often satirically) assess their own time and the possibilities 
arising from the ‘discoveries’ and the new sciences of the period. They are writ-
ten from historical presentist perspectives (on presentism, see Lachenicht 2018: 5; 
Landwehr 2016: 28–39). They are not speculating on possible futures, but on un-
time and Unorte (spaces off) while ref lecting the present (cf. Nakládalová 2013: 7). 
Most of these utopian narratives start in either the author’s present or some past 
time. Voyagers set off to travel somewhere (often into Atlantic or Indian Ocean 
worlds) and end ‘nowhere,’ in an Unort where, more often than not, somebody nar-
rates the history of the Unort. They play with the things yet to be discovered, with 
the unknown that the Age of Discovery had not discovered, yet. While they in-
scribe themselves (Lachenicht 2018: 6) into the historical period of the Age of Dis-
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covery, of the new sciences (New Atlantis in particular) and new technologies, they 
produce something new: novel imaginary worlds that are, however, not to be. As 
a fictional projection of the world that exists, they serve this world as a speculum—
they are about self-recognition. They also make clear how much the world that 
exists is constructed and constantly performed, and how much it can be subject 
to change. Playing with the real and the unreal, with the ideal and the dystopian, 
they invite the reader “to talk about the possibilities of other, and perhaps better, 
worlds; and in so doing to acknowledge, perhaps, the shortcomings of our own” 
(Bruce 1999: xxvii).
Categorizing the New World
The process of European expansion between the 1400s and the twentieth century 
brought about contact, uncertainties, knowledge transfer, and (trans-)formation 
on a scale previously not known from a European perspective (e.g. MacKenzie 
1990; Jardine/Secord/Spary 1995; Rice 2000; Parrish 2006). Historians of science 
claim that the process of European expansion, colonialism, empire building, and 
the development of new sciences (and their institutions) are inextricably linked—
especially with the ‘discovery’ of the New World, i.e. the Americas (Barrera-Osorio 
2006; Delbourgo/Dew 2008; Bleichmar et al. 2009). 
European knowledge about the New World as it came to be institutionalized in 
the European Republic of Letters—its academies, royal societies, correspondence 
networks, universities, and media, including major collections of objects, maps, 
natural histories, encyclopedias, travel narratives, and dictionaries—was the 
result of Europeans speculating on the ‘new’ and how the ‘new’ fitted into God’s 
creation. European cartographers, explorers, missionaries and scientists used the 
Bible as well as ancient Greek, Roman, Arabic, Muslim, Jewish, and other sourc-
es for the project of knowledge production about the New World. The exchange 
of knowledge about the New World was vast among Europeans (e.g. Bleichmar 
2009; Jardine/Secord/Spary 1996; Boscani/Nicoli 2016). Counting and categorizing 
the world were based on practices of cultural mobility, transnational exchange, 
and knowledge formation and codification, which also involved—as more recent 
research in the history of science makes clear (Delbourgo/Dew 2008; Bleichmar 
2009; Parrish 2006; Schiebinger 2004)—indigenous populations, African or Ar-
abic slaves, pirates, maroons, and other groups so far/hitherto underrepresented 
in the master narratives of European expansion. Their presence left its traces in 
maps, encyclopedias, dictionaries, and travel narratives; Europeans used indige-
nous place names of mountains, rivers, and forests for plants, animals and people. 
Europeans also relied on indigenous knowledge with regard to the exploitation 
of nature’s resources—be it with regard to pharmaceutical products or medicine, 
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the growing and export of crops rich in carbohydrates, or the discovery and ex-
ploitation of precious metal mines.
Natural histories—that is, descriptions of the climate, landscape, f lora, fau-
na, and people of the Americas—were popular in the early modern period. Be-
tween the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, most natural histories use the scala 
naturae, the “Great Chain of Being,” in which they integrate ‘new’ and uncertain 
knowledge: starting with climates and landscapes, the narratives then move on to 
minerals, plants, primitive forms of animals, and end with ethnographic descrip-
tions of human beings. While the scala naturae remains largely intact, categories 
for minerals, plants, animals, and human beings changed dramatically between 
the sixteenth and late eighteenth century. New systems of categorization, new 
taxonomies developed. Obviously, Europeans saw the New World through their 
lenses, with the help of their cultural categories, as Christian Europeans, as colo-
nizers, as heirs of Greek and Roman Antiquity. Yet, the knowledge they acquired 
about botany, zoology, ecology, architecture, landscapes, and other subjects came 
by way of contacts and exchange with indigenous people. As scholars have shown, 
European and indigenous American (and African) epistemic structures and prac-
tices did not match (e.g. Kidwell 2004). Translation was in many ways impossible 
when concepts and epistemes differed fundamentally. When Europeans wrote 
their descriptions of the landscapes, f lora, and fauna of the New World, two or 
more knowledge systems had intersected. European knowledge about the New 
World thus comes across as “Third Space” (Bhabha 1994) knowledge; the construct-
ed worlds we find in these natural histories did not exist as either indigenous or 
European worlds but rather as speculative new worlds at the intersection of differ-
ent knowledge systems (Mignolo 1992).
Some scholars hold that while the basic structure of the natural histories re-
mains relatively stable, the motives behind the production of natural histories 
changed fundamentally: from describing God’s creation (e.g. Armstrong 2000), 
natural historians in the eighteenth became century more interested in using nat-
ural resources to improve the human condition, the economy, and the early mod-
ern state’s prowess (e.g. Koerner 1999).
Speculating about the world and how God had made it was, at least up to the 
nineteenth century, about reconciling the old and the new, faith and reason. Tra-
ditio et innovatio was also about reconciling the past, present, and what we today 
would call the future. It was about God’s one world, in its immutable present, its 
progress, and its eternity. Scientists or the so-called learned people of the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made attempts to rationalize biblical sto-
ries. Isaac La Peyrère (1596–1676) tried to conjoin faith and reason. However, be-
liefs developed that everything could be explained through new sciences, even 
Genesis and other biblical narratives, fostering the demotion and destruction of 
the authority of the Church and Bible. These beliefs produced new uncertainties 
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with regard to the history and development of Man and led humans into unknown 
futures. Nonetheless, for much of the early modern period, the Bible and ancient 
texts remained authoritative even though the new sciences offered a competitive 
and challenging second powerful narrative to explain the world.
Conclusions
Today, in the age of Beck’s “ref lexive modernity,” “discontinuities, irregularities, 
and volatilities seem to be proliferating rather than diminishing” and “global in-
terdependence makes risk management increasingly complex” (Bernstein 1996: 
329). ‘Modernity’ and ‘ref lexive modernity’ seem to have traded the past ‘certain-
ties’ about this world and the hereafter provided by the Bible and other ancient 
texts for the uncertainties of the future. Many political, economic, social, and 
cultural contexts make clear that we have further developed Enlightenment nar-
ratives about the possibilities of manufacturing or “engineering” the future (Mil-
burn 2008), about molding less the future but some immutable present.
In comparison with the early modern period, Christian certainties that man 
will not fall any deeper than into God’s hands are (mostly) absent from many con-
texts today, even if they survive in some domains, as much as ancient and pagan 
classical narratives persist, for example, in popular discourse about the uncer-
tainties of new technologies, which often invokes Pandora’s Box, humankind as 
Prometheus, or clichés about hubris. According to social psychologist Philip Mac-
naghten, these old narratives and myths have to be conceptualized 
not as antithetical to reason or science, which would be the Enlightenment fallacy, 
nor as reflective of primeval and universal structures (the Romantic fallacy), but 
rather as durable, historically-derived, collectively imagined and functional. […] 
Myths, as paradigmatic stories, are interrogated as significant cultural resources 
that have the potential to enable discussion on the deep and challenging issues 
presented by technology. (Macnaghten 2012) 
In comparison with the varieties and simultaneities of early modern timescapes, 
and also compared with non-European timescapes (Gallois 2007), we seem to face 
a period of f lattened time (Hunt 2007: 107–108)—which might be one of the rea-
sons behind trends towards firmative (and not towards affirmative) speculation. 
“Time is not a singular, natural and uncontested entity, but is viewed outside the 
discipline [of history] as both plural and as being constructed in varied manners 
in different cultures” (Gallois 2007: 242) and in different periods of time. Could 
the “pluralization of time” (Gallois 2007: 242) or a growing awareness of plural-
ities of time concepts in all cultures and periods in human history open up new 
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horizons in speculation, in critically assessing our own times and in producing—
through affirmative speculation—new possibilities and opportunities for the fu-
ture beyond the immutable present? Many of the early modern utopias (whether 
they were meant to be utopias or not) have inspired modern social concepts, such 
as the equality of genders, social security and welfare, the omnipotence of science, 
or democratic cultures. To put it differently, cultures of speculation of the early 
modern period have shaped modern present times—for better or worse.
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Chapter 2: The Working Planetologist 
Speculative Worlds and the Practice of Climate Science
Katherine Buse
In a 2010 editorial in the journal Nature, the climate scientist and Executive Direc-
tor of the International Geosphere–Biosphere Programme, Sybil Seitzinger, ar-
gues that scientists ought to be more centrally involved in international policy dis-
cussions about sustainable development. “In Frank Herbert’s 1965 science-fiction 
classic Dune,” she writes, “the number-one position on the planet is held not by a 
politician, but by a planetary ecologist” (Seitzinger 2010: 601). Seitzinger invokes 
Herbert’s novel here to make a pointed comparison. In Dune, the inhabitants of 
the planet Arrakis are engaging in a long-term terraforming project that neces-
sitates the oversight of a planetary ecologist. But here on Earth, we too have been 
making such changes, “altering, in profound and uncontrolled ways, key biologi-
cal, physical and chemical processes of ecosystems.” For Seitzinger, grappling re-
sponsibly with these processes requires a global, far-sighted perspective that she 
finds lacking in most Earth politicians. She advises that, while the governments of 
Earth have not yet considered appointing a planetary ecologist, “perhaps it is time 
to take the idea seriously.”
And she is dead serious, both as a worried scientist and policy analyst, and also 
as a reader of Dune. Although she discusses the novel explicitly only in the first and 
last sentences of her editorial, Seitzinger does not invoke Dune merely to provide a 
bit of ‘science communication’ f lavor to entertain Nature’s interdisciplinary read-
ership. After all, the perspective she takes in the editorial is profoundly similar 
to Frank Herbert’s vision in Dune: both pragmatic and theoretical, it subsumes 
socio-political concerns as components of a planetary ecological model. 
What is striking about Seitzinger’s claim about the “planetary ecologist” in 
Dune is not that she wants to see political systems that take a more ecological, more 
global, or longer-term view of the planet. Rather, it is that she believes that it is her 
own discipline that provides the best model for this political work. Seitzinger calls 
for a kind of leadership that “builds up a picture of Earth” as a complex system, to 
make sense of its points of resilience and vulnerability. To provide evidence for the 
special ability that scientists might have to keep track of a whole planet, Seitzinger 
refers to climate science. Beginning in the 1980s, climate modelers increasing-
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ly sought to couple standard atmospheric climate models with other ecological, 
geological and even social models. The complexity of such models dramatically 
increased in the early 2000s: Seitzinger highlights that, in addition to “the ba-
sics of the nitrogen cycle,” climate models now included “elementary descriptions 
of social and economic systems.” She uses this “explosion in our knowledge of 
Earth as a complex system” to demonstrate what she sees as shortcomings in the 
contemporary political landscape: the United Nations, in spite of “these advanc-
es,” has failed to acknowledge that “Earth’s restless and powerful social system 
operates within a complex and intricately linked ecological system.” Noting that 
the UN has missed out on the insights provided from “advances” in Earth system 
modeling, Seitzinger implies that climate modeling may be necessary training for 
adequate world governance. 
This editorial suggests that, because Earth system science is a capacious dis-
cipline that studies the entire planetary ecology, Earth system models afford a 
synthetic perspective that can encompass all scientific work about any Earth phe-
nomenon.1 Seitzinger calls for the inclusion of scientists “with a long view and 
an understanding of how Earth operates as a complex social–ecological system,” 
and she later refers to scientists’ grasp of the Earth system’s “economic, political 
and social sub-systems.” The editorial thus implies that scientists can model how 
Earth operates both socially and ecologically by embedding models of society into 
Earth system models, using the same methods that they have used to add com-
plexity to climate models in the past. We live in an Earth system, Seitzinger sug-
gests, and if scientists don’t yet know how to couple full-blown economic models 
or models of political choice to an atmospheric general circulation model (GCM), 
they will achieve this unification soon enough.
This approach to a planetary system is strongly reminiscent of Dune. To Pardot 
Kynes, first planetary ecologist of Arrakis, “the planet was merely an expression of 
energy, a machine being driven by its sun” (Herbert [1965] 2010: 797). Kynes, whom 
Frank Herbert has claimed was the original intended protagonist of Dune, is also 
represented in the novel as the first off-worlder to truly see the potential of the 
planet. His perspective is rigidly top-down, subsuming social and political con-
cerns to ecological ones. For example, he tells his son and successor as Imperial 
Planetologist that, “to the working planetologist, his most important tool is hu-
man beings” (440). But while it is important for the Fremen, the native inhabitants 
of Arrakis, to know they are working towards increasing the available water on the 
1  Although this is the rhetorical implication of Seitzinger’s argument, it is to be taken metaphor-
ically rather than literally: Earth system modeling has its own limitations, many of which stem 
from the dif ficulty of coupling dif ferent scales of data and simulation. For more about the rise 
of Earth system models and the challenges thereof, see Edwards (2010: 418–21). On the dif ficul-
ties of multi-scale modeling, see Winsberg (2010). 
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planet, it is unimportant that they understand it in a way that goes beyond “semi-
mystical” (444). Instead, “an act of disobedience [to their ecological aims] must 
be a sin and require religious penalties,” as this is what will give the population 
the “bravery” to follow through on their multi-generational mission, even when 
none alive will witness the results (444). For Kynes, the entire political, social and 
ecological transformation he orchestrates on the planet is unified under a funda-
mental conception of the planet as an energy system. 
However, as I will argue, it is not just Kynes (or even just Frank Herbert) who 
manifests this perspective on the relationship between a whole planet and what is 
found within that world. The world-building for which Dune is famous is charac-
teristic of a wide swathe of planetary science fiction, all relying on the same basic 
operation. The operation relies on a sense of causal closure with the planetary scale 
as its object, looping questions about individual aspects of life or nature on that 
world back into the equation of the planet as a whole. In other words, the basic per-
spective that makes Dune iconic is that of a climate modeler. As in a climate model, 
the thing being explained is always the planet itself. Combined with her reference 
to Dune, Seitzinger’s suggestion that a computational model of Earth’s climate and 
biosphere might serve as a model for how to approach politics invokes this practice 
of world-building, which I call speculative planetology. This practice is common in 
speculative fiction and is emblematized by the Imperial Planetologists in Dune. But 
it is also, as Seitzinger reveals, a speculative practice for climate modelers, an im-
portant method for thinking holistically about worlds and what makes them work.
As we have just seen, this speculative practice is sometimes explicitly linked 
by planetary scientists to science fiction. In this chapter, I will trace the feedback 
relationship between the speculative world-building done by science fiction au-
thors and the speculative world-building done by climate scientists. The practices 
of science fiction authors and of planetary scientists differ: one group is engaged 
in narration, while the other is engaged in simulation. However, it is also possi-
ble to observe narration and simulation acting upon one another, speculatively 
coevolving as part of an ongoing discourse about planets and their workings. For 
this reason, I am arguing for the existence of a shared practice of speculation that 
links these two activities: not two separate lines of development, but one specula-
tive planetology that is negotiated across multiple domains. 
One outcome of this analysis is that it forces a recontextualization of the 
oft-repeated idea that climate change is a kind of invisible monster only revealed 
by science, that it occurs at scales of space and time that dwarf human percep-
tion, forcing us to rely on models created by experts.2 The idea that we depend on 
2  For a scattering of examples, see Beck ([1986] 1992: 27); Heise (2008: 150–51, 206); Chakrabarty 
(2009: 221); and Clark (2015: 8, 140). For more critical discussions of scale and the Anthropocene, 
see Woods (2015) and Horton (2019). 
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scientific mediation to ‘see’ climate change (at least in a global sense) may be true, 
but this notion is often used to imply that climate modeling was developed apart 
from other ways of knowing—that it is an inhuman, computationally-sublime 
perspective, with little relationship to other domains of culture. To the contrary, I 
claim that the labor of Earthly self-understanding that revealed the climate crisis, 
and which continues to make sense of it, has been the collective work of scientists, 
artists, and members of the public. I call this “collective work” to draw attention 
to the fact that science is always bound up with other parts of culture, despite the 
efforts of science communicators to make the natural and the cultural seem easily 
separable.3 I demonstrate this by drawing attention the active cultural participa-
tion of scientists themselves: their performance of, and participation in, science 
fiction fandom, and their efforts to engage the public by invoking science fiction 
tropes. However, as I will claim, the relationship goes much deeper than scientists’ 
enjoyment of science fiction. After all, the central premise of climate modeling, 
that things could be otherwise, is also the central premise of science fiction.4 This 
relationship is deepened by the role of science fiction in reworking, consolidating, 
speculating upon, and mutating existing science fact. 
Among references to science fiction by climate scientists, Frank Herbert’s 
Dune is a touchstone. I treat the novel as an ideal place to discuss the feedback 
relationship between science fiction and science: not only did Dune become an im-
portant cultural resource for climate modeling, but the novel itself draws from 
scientific sources in mid-twentieth century working ecology. In Dune, Frank Her-
bert repurposed many quotations from a short, popular science book, Where There 
Is Life (1962), by the ecologist Paul Sears. I show that when Herbert directly copied 
these passages from 1960s ecological science, he often simply altered the context 
from a regional to a planetary scale. And yet, by extrapolatively limning an en-
tire planet out of these smaller-scale borrowings, Herbert is able to build the kind 
3  Bruno Latour refers to this process as “purification” (Latour 1993: 10). Climate science—a dis-
cipline that has experienced an unusually high degree of political and ideological interven-
tion—has every reason to participate in the work of purification, as attacks on the authority 
of climate scientists are very of ten attacks on their objectivity or on the clarity of the signals 
that they interpret from the natural world. The presumed capacity of natural things to ‘speak 
for themselves,’ and the presumed identity of the scientist as someone who straightforwardly 
communicates these matters of fact to the public, have become part of a battleground which 
climate scientists are of ten called upon to defend.
4  Fredric Jameson: “Its multiple mock futures serve the […] function of transforming our own 
present into the determinate past of something yet to come” (Jameson 1982: 153). Darko Suvin: 
“At all events, the possibility of other strange, covariant coordinate systems and semantic fields 
is assumed” (Suvin 1979: 5). Or, more simply and echoing many others, James Gunn: “Science 
fiction, then, is the literature of change” (Gunn 2005: 10). 
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of simulated world that characterizes both planetary science fiction and climate 
models. 
Indeed, the historical ties between climate modeling and science fiction go 
as far back as the very first implementation of the so-called standard model of 
planetary climate.5 The ability to calculate a planet’s surface temperature involves 
a few key insights. First, the atmosphere needs to be imagined as having layers. A 
climate model balances energy inputs and outputs—solar radiation on its way in 
and mainly infrared radiation on its way out—and this balance must be calculated 
from the top of the atmosphere, not from the Earth’s crust. Second, equations for 
atmospheric convection must be used to describe how heat is transported around 
inside that envelope between the crust and the top of the atmosphere. When cli-
mate science was in its infancy, scientists regularly failed to incorporate each of 
these elements into a single model. The first person to manage this wasn’t a mete-
orologist, and it wasn’t done with respect to Earth. It was a 27-year-old Carl Sagan 
who, in 1962, applied a radiative-convective model to Venus in order to determine 
the structure and temperature of its lower atmosphere (Sagan 1962). 
A year earlier, in 1961, Sagan had written an article on “The Planet Venus” in the 
journal Science that indicated the science-fictional thought processes behind his 
modeling of planetary temperature. Theorizing about Venus’s greenhouse effect, 
he argued that the planet’s carbon dioxide levels would explain recent tempera-
ture readings of 600 degrees Kelvin. Sagan opened the article with a quip about 
various speculative and fanciful scenarios that had previously been imagined for 
Venus’s climate: 
The state of our knowledge of Venus is amply illustrated by the fact that the Car-
boniferous swamp, the wind-swept desert, the planetary oil field, and the global 
Seltzer ocean each have their serious proponents, and those planning eventual 
manned expeditions to Venus must be exceedingly perplexed over whether to 
send along a paleobotanist, a mineralogist, a petroleum geologist, or a deep-sea 
diver. (Sagan 1961: 849) 
The article also included an imaginative illustration of Venus by the well-known 
science fiction magazine artist Chesley Bonestell (851). For Sagan, this image of 
Venus as a windswept “dust bowl” represented the only science-fictional scenario 
that still remained plausible: “temperatures are too high for the Carboniferous 
swamp, the planetary oil field, or the global Seltzer ocean, but, the desert […] is 
5  R.T. Pierrehumbert uses the term “standard model,” adapted from physics, in his Tyndall lec-
ture to the AGU (Pierrehumbert 2012: 11:30). It was this lecture that called my attention to Carl 
Sagan as the first to apply the standard model to a planet (23:50). 
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still roughly consistent with the data,” he wrote in conclusion, adding that readers 
should “See Fig 1” [Bonestell’s illustration] for reference (857).
Drawing attention to the history of wild theories about Venus, Sagan suggest-
ed the alignment of planetary science with the imaginative practices of science 
fiction. His own scientific work relied extensively on such practices: he was com-
mitted to thinking of distant planets as places, and to imagining what it would be 
like to inhabit them (Messeri 2016: 6). Furthermore, as complex as climate mod-
els have become over time, they remain bare-bones pictures of worlds. Sagan had 
no knowledge of Venus’s actual surface temperature to trip himself up, and this 
situation necessitated using the standard model. Because the surface could not 
be seen through Venus’s impenetrable shroud of clouds, Sagan was forced by cir-
cumstance to speculate upon it, and thus to recognize that the surface tempera-
ture depends on a balance between incoming and outgoing energy at the top of 
the atmosphere—that is, from outside the planet.6 This emphasizes that the basic 
viewpoint of a climate modeler is a deeply estranged one, not the intuitive per-
spective of a citizen of Earth at all. An understanding of planetary climate—that 
is, the idea of climate as a planetary phenomenon—begins with looking at that 
planet from the outside, from space.7 
Sagan was, of course, not alone. The planetary sciences, emerging around the 
same time as Frank Herbert’s Dune, were already thinking in science-fictional 
terms about the other planets in our solar system, such as Mars and Venus. What 
has perhaps gone unrecognized are the ways that this mode of thinking about 
planets from a distance, as well as thinking of planets as energy systems, has be-
come the backbone of a certain kind of speculative thinking about planetary cli-
mate and climate change in general, even on Earth and amongst scientists who 
are not compelled to it by distance from their planet of study. As evidence of the 
role of this speculative climate imaginary, I turn to examples of climate scientists 
who have written publicly about their interest in science fiction. 
6  As Pierrehumbert (2012: 21:09) points out, even the equations that make up the convection 
part of the standard model were formulated several centuries earlier by astronomers seeking 
to measure the temperature of stars. 
7  There are scientific theories of planetary climate that seem to approach climate from within 
the planet rather than outside of it, such as the Gaia hypothesis with its focus on the planet’s 
biota. But even the Gaia hypothesis was originally formulated as an interplanetary thought 
experiment: James Lovelock (serving as a NASA astrobiologist at the time) claims to have first 
had the idea for Gaia when he considered how one might be able to tell from afar if a planet was 
inhabited by life (cf. Hitchcock/Lovelock 1967). For more about Lovelock’s interactions with the 
space sciences, see Conway (2008).
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“SFnal”
Notably, the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, the top-ranked journal 
in atmospheric science, has featured increasingly deep engagements with science 
fiction since the 1980s, from including science fiction texts in its book review sec-
tion to publishing articles and even special issues discussing the utility of science 
fiction as a tool for climate science. In one such instance, climate physicist and 
Royal Society fellow Tim Palmer wrote an article titled, “Is Science Fiction a Genre 
for Communicating Scientific Research? A Case Study in Climate Prediction” 
(Palmer 2010a). His case study was a science fiction short story, “Sunrise,” which 
he wrote and published as an online supplement in the same issue of Bulletin of the 
American Meteorological Society (Palmer 2010b). Palmer treats “Sunrise” as a kind of 
doubled thought experiment. Within the story, he speculates on the implications 
of climate models’ low resolution with regard to regional change patterns. He alle-
gorizes the problem on a recently climate-changed fantasy planet, Migosh, where 
scientists predict favorable new average values for weather but fail to anticipate 
extreme weather events, leaving the populace unprepared for a natural disaster 
(Palmer 2010b). In the essay accompanying the story, Palmer claims that the story 
tests a hypothesis: that when communicating scientific findings to decision mak-
ers, science fiction might “sometimes be a more effective genre for communica-
tion than conventional means” (Palmer 2010a: 1413). 
In the essay, Palmer writes of his childhood experiences reading science fic-
tion: 
I can still vividly recall Isaac Asimov’s Nightfall, [which] describes a civilization’s first 
encounter with darkness for thousands of years. […] I started to wonder wheth-
er such an overwhelming existential crisis, in experiencing for the first time some 
dramatic and totally unforeseen natural phenomena, could be brought to bear in 
communicating my concerns about current uncertainties in the science of climate 
prediction? (Palmer 2010a: 1413) 
For Palmer, and specifically in cases where what is at stake is helping policymak-
ers understand the uncertainty behind predictions and the value of continued 
scientific research, science fiction can communicate about what one might call 
the “unknown unknowns” of climate prediction. In other words, what Palmer rec-
ognizes and values in science fiction is an aspect of his own work on chaos and 
predictability: the capacity of the nonhuman world to throw up the truly unan-
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ticipated, and the importance of maintaining a speculative attitude in order to 
appreciate what cannot be anticipated.8
Also in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Raymond T. Pierre-
humbert, a lead author of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published a short article called “Science Fiction 
Atmospheres” (Stocker et al. 2001; Pierrehumbert 2005). In this piece, he con-
siders various science fiction texts and wonders about the atmospheric physics 
of their worlds. Regarding Dune, he frets, “But how is the aquifer recharged if it 
never rains?” He then offers a speculative answer: 
My best guess is that Dune is a dying world, with slow leakage of water into an 
atmosphere that is becoming gradually warmer on account of the water vapor 
greenhouse ef fect. A word of warning to those Dune scientists to wish to re-en-
gineer the climate to bring on rain and surface water: if they succeed, they will al-
most certainly precipitate a runaway greenhouse. If Dune is already in a habitable 
temperature range without much water vapor greenhouse ef fect, introducing an 
ocean is likely to be fatal. (Pierrehumbert 2005: 696) 
In “Science Fiction Atmospheres,” Pierrehumbert uses science fiction worlds as 
the occasion for showing off a climate modeler’s mentality, which involves f lexi-
ble inference about how atmospheric and terrestrial systems interact to produce 
the conditions on the planet. Does Arrakis have plate tectonics? If so, the lack of 
surface water will prevent weathering of rocks and lead to a build-up of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. Is it possible to have an aquifer without also having a 
water-saturated atmosphere? No—although precipitation could evaporate before 
it reaches the ground. He playfully evaluates several science-fictional climates (as 
seen in Dune, Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy, and a few others) in this man-
ner, adding, “Graduate students take note: This is good fodder for general exam 
questions!” (Pierrehumbert 2005: 696).
This last suggestion appears to be something Pierrehumbert has truly taken 
to heart, for he builds science fiction directly into his pedagogy. In several of the 
problems from his textbook Principles of Planetary Climate (2010), students are 
asked to read science fiction stories, such as Geoffrey Landis’s “Ecopoesis” or Fritz 
Leiber’s “A Bucket of Air,” before attempting a solution. Other problems casual-
8  Palmer is not the only climate scientist to write a short story exploring a climate-related hy-
pothesis and paired to a scholarly publication. NASA climatologist and Director of the Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, Gavin A. Schmidt, coauthored the article “The Silurian Hypothesis: 
Would It Be Possible to Detect an Industrial Civilization in the Geological Record?” (Schmidt/
Frank 2018). To accompany this piece, he published a science fiction story entitled “Under the 
Sun” (Schmidt 2018) about a scientist discovering that there had been an ancient industrial civ-
ilization in Earth’s deep past.
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ly describe science-fictional entities, as we see in the following exercise entitled 
“Springtime for Europa”: 
Something is about to happen. Something wonderful. To promote life on Jupiter’s 
moon Europa, which currently is composed of a liquid water ocean covered by a 
very thick water ice crust, the alien race which built Tycho Magnetic Anomaly 1 ig-
nites thermonuclear fusion on Jupiter, heating Europa to the point that its icy crust 
melts, leaving it with a globally ocean covered surface having a temperature of 
280K. Water vapor is the only source of atmosphere for this planet. Describe what 
the atmosphere would be like, and calculate T(p) for this atmosphere. Give a rough 
estimate of the depth (in km) of the layer containing most of the mass of the atmo-
sphere. (Pierrehumbert 2010: 128) 
The aliens referenced here are the same aliens who placed the obelisk in 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, though the suggestion that “something wonderful” is about to hap-
pen on Europa is an allusion to the film’s 1984 sequel, 2010: The Year We Made Con-
tact. Why does Pierrehumbert use this story as a way into the problem? In the first 
place, it is clear that he is a fan of science fiction and that he enjoys exhibiting his 
knowledge of the genre. This in itself is significant: in some disciplinary cultures, 
it is common for scientists to conceal their fandom, or to dismiss science fiction as 
something they used to read in their childhoods. The idea of science fiction some-
how “infecting” or “planting a seed” in a scientist’s mind might seem to threaten 
certain notions of scientific authority and rationality (Milburn 2010: 563). Con-
sidered in this light, the wide range of climate scientists who are willing to go ‘on 
record’ as science fiction enthusiasts of one kind or another speaks to a more per-
vasive disciplinary openness to the genre, even amongst those who are not actively 
blogging or giving talks about science fiction. 
On the other hand, Pierrehumbert is also performing his interest in science 
fiction for heuristic purposes. He wants his students to think creatively about 
planetary atmospheres. He could have simply posed a series of equations about 
an atmosphere composed of water vapor, but by presenting a narrative context, 
he can instead ask students to “describe what the atmosphere would be like”: a 
qualitative question. This recalls Lisa Messeri’s point that for planetary scientists, 
thinking of planets as places that one “can imagine being on” is a crucial meth-
od that “potentially opens up new questions that can be asked about the planet” 
(Messeri 2016: 12). Asking what the atmosphere would be like invites the students 
to consider questions that are more experiential: not just what temperature and 
what depth, but also what weather, what kinds of clouds, what color the sky? Such 
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open-ended speculations are part of the practice of world-building that science 
fiction authors have honed over more than a century of planetary science fiction.9 
Pierrehumbert clearly aims to produce a kind of “cognitive estrangement” (Su-
vin 1979) for readers of his textbook. This aim is made evident in the workbook 
questions, but also in his concerns about generalizing climate knowledge. He 
remarks somewhat regretfully that “it is inevitable that any discussion of plane-
tary climate will draw heavily” on our observations of Earth, which remains “our 
best-observed example of a planetary climate” (Pierrehumbert 2010: xi). Yet cli-
mate science’s inheritance of Earthly terminology seems to be a source of conster-
nation for Pierrehumbert: 
For example, if I sometimes refer to “the sun” or “solar radiation,” it is to be thought 
of as referring to whatever star the planet under discussion is orbiting, and not 
necessarily Earth’s Sun or even a star like it. In the same spirit, the term solar con-
stant will be used to refer to the rate at which a planet receives energy from its 
star […] regardless of what that star may be and where the planet may be located. 
(Pierrehumbert 2010: xii)
Noting that the standard vocabulary of climate science too often presumes our 
own solar system as a frame of reference, Pierrehumbert instead proposes more 
estranging terms, such as stellar radiation and stellar constant, to “help the reader 
get used to the idea that there are a lot of stars out there, with a lot of planets with 
a lot of climates” (xiii). The same work must be done in relation to other aspects 
of planetary climate, adapting terms from climate science but emphasizing their 
generality, their ability to detach themselves from the parochial Earthbound con-
text in which they were developed: 
In a similar vein, “air” will mean whatever gas the atmosphere is composed of on 
the planet in question—af ter all, if you grew up there, you’d just call it “air.” When 
I need to refer to the specific substances that make up our own atmosphere, it will 
be called “Earth air.” (Pierrehumbert 2010: xiv)
9  World-building has for the most part been a science fiction practitioner’s term of art, rather 
than a scholarly one, because the term is so dif ficult to delimit. However, many genre defi-
nitions of science fiction imply some degree of comparison between our own world and the 
world of the narrative. Delany ([1978] 2009) is of particular note for approaching the topic 
through language. On world-building as a collective transmedia practice, see Wolf (2012). On 
the practice of planetary world-building for science fiction authors, see Gillett (1996).
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Earth air: just one f lavor among many.10 Pierrehumbert’s comment that “[I]f you 
grew up there, you’d just call it ‘air’” helps to get at one of the most significant 
moves that climate science shares with—or, as I am arguing, often explicitly 
borrows from—speculative fiction. In Principles of Planetary Climate, the science 
fictionality serves a purpose beyond that of enlivening an otherwise technical 
subject. It is a literal invitation to extrapolation, a mode that can be invoked in 
order to bridge between the known and the unknown. In a set of exercises about 
the boiling point of liquids, Pierrehumbert transitions from discussing water to 
the following: “Now, think of Glurg the Titanian, who would like to boil up liquid 
methane to make his tea. The surface pressure of Titan is about 2 bars (mostly 
nitrogen). How hot does his stove have to get?” (Pierrehumbert 2010: 124). Part of 
this pedagogy is not merely to teach the basics of thermodynamics, but to open up 
spaces for speculative thought about climatological concepts. Both the idea that 
“if you grew up there, you’d call it air” and the silly notion of “Glurg the Titanian” 
with his implausible thirst for methane tea invoke a science-fictional methodology 
that is part and parcel with what the textbook means to convey to the budding 
climate scientist. 
Robert Grumbine, a climate modeler and oceanographer who works for the 
United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has 
written about this relationship between climate science and science fiction in a 
blog post entitled “Science Fiction and Science.” After declaring himself a lifelong 
science fiction fan, he launches into an extended ref lection on the relationship 
between the two fields. While he acknowledges that “Bad SF […] can fuel some bad 
ideas about science,” he suggests that, more importantly, science fiction shares 
with science a set of common assumptions about how “interesting” a place the 
universe is, about how “problems are (generally) solvable,” how “the universe is 
(often) understandable,” and how “science translated to technology can affect how 
you live (so think about the social effects sooner rather than later)” (Grumbine 
2008). These are somewhat standard tropes of the “why science fiction?” discourse 
in popular culture—which makes sense, as Grumbine is clearly invested in science 
fiction as a genre. He consistently comments on blog and forum posts in which 
other scientists mention science fiction, often verifying or registering apprecia-
tion for a mention of a science fiction story or novel. For several years circa 2007, 
he also participated in the Usenet listserv rec.arts.sf.science, a discussion forum 
in which science-fictional scenarios—often world-building questions, resolving 
issues of scientific plausibility about a particular fictional world—are worked out 
10  One might note, as Pierrehumbert does elsewhere, that Earth air itself has not been uniform 
across geological history: some of the most important questions in climate science are about 
past changes in Earth’s atmospheric composition. For example, see Pierrehumbert (2010: 
11–14).
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by a community of lay fans, scientist-fans, and authors. For instance, Grumbine 
weighed in on a conversation about how long it would take for fast-growing Venu-
sian sky-cities to exhaust the planet’s sulphuric acid clouds by hydrogen mining—
not long—and whether the climatic effect would be warming or cooling—defi-
nitely warming (Grumbine 2007). 
However, Grumbine’s ref lections on why science fiction is important to him 
as a climate scientist, rather than as a scientist in general, are more specific, and 
could easily be taken to describe the same dynamics visible in Pierrehumbert’s 
textbook: 
I do take advantage of a somewhat SFnal view of the universe in doing my research. 
That is, I’m trying to understand, say, the earth’s climate. That’s only one place with 
one particular set of conditions. What (the SF-fan in me asks) would it be like if the 
earth rotated much faster, more slowly, if the sun produced less UV (hence less 
ozone on earth, hence less greenhouse ef fect in the stratosphere, hence …?), if the 
earth were farther away/closer in, and so on. I can’t say that it’s resulted in any jour-
nal articles that I wouldn’t have written anyhow, but it does make it easier for me 
to, say, read paleoclimate papers (the earth did rotate faster in the past, sea level 
has been much higher and lower than present, …). (Grumbine 2008)
 “What (the SF-fan in me asks) would it be like?” This series of questions and con-
cerns directly echo the sorts of questions performed by Pierrehumbert as a way 
of initiating students into the basics of planetary climate. Grumbine, like Pier-
rehumbert, refers to the idea that Earth is “only one place with one particular set 
of conditions,” suggesting that there could be—and, as he notes, has been—any 
number of different Earths (or other planets) with different conditions. 
In other words, the basic premise of science fiction—that things could be dif-
ferent—is also a basic premise of climate modeling. Is a set of observations about 
the likely climatic conditions on Gliese-581D science fiction or science? What about 
extrapolations regarding the atmosphere of Earth if its axial tilt were much great-
er? Much as they are perfectly reasonable topics for a climate science textbook, 
these questions are inevitably under the gravitational inf luence of a long history 
of speculative fiction, not only in terms of their content but in terms of method. 
This—Grumbine’s “SFnal view of the universe”—is a method for thinking about 
planets that has been developed as a shared practice, a product of feedback be-
tween science and culture.
Chapter 2: The Working Planetologist 63
Dune Worlds
To provide more direct evidence of this feedback loop, I look to Frank Herbert’s 
Dune, which is something of a touchstone for scientists interested in planetary 
climates. Both Pierrehumbert and Grumbine, for example, have written about it 
(Pierrehumbert 2005: 697; Grumbine 2008). But Dune also enjoys a more specific 
role as part of the field of planetary science—not just one imaginary planet among 
many, but a term of art that describes a kind of planet. As I will explore in the re-
mainder of this chapter, Dune’s iconic status has to do with the way that it works 
as an imaginary system.
William Michael Connolley was a climate modeler at the British Antarctic Sur-
vey until 2007.11 His climate science outreach blog, Stoat, was hosted for a time at 
the science communication hub RealClimate. Both Stoat and Connolley’s personal 
blog are full of evidence of his status as a science fiction and fantasy reader. His 
posts abound with references, both oblique and explicit, to the work of Jack Vance, 
Samuel Delany, Ursula K. Le Guin, John Crowley and others. In a post entitled 
“Whats Wrong with the World” [sic], Connolley tasks himself with describing why 
he thinks future generations will resent the present generation. He lists several 
reasons, including the following: 
Waste and general “fatness.” Not fat as in your body being overweight, though that 
is a small part of it. Water-fat, as in Dune. Fat as in all the rest: the fools who drive 
SUV’s, who need ridiculous numbers of toys (who, af ter all, could possibly need a 
GPS watch? This one folds into “environment,” too. (Connolley 2010)
Connolley’s use of the phrase “Water-fat, as in Dune” indicates the extent to 
which fictional climates can come to be part of shared worlds and ways of know-
ing worlds. The idea of “water-fatness” in the novel evokes an understanding that 
off-worlders’ bodies automatically carry a surplus of water that the native Arra-
keen population and long-term immigrants do not. But it also indicates a sense 
that those off-worlders are soft, undisciplined, and ill-prepared for life on Arrakis. 
Using this phrase carries with it a whole world adapted to a shocking level of scar-
city, indicating that Connolley imagines some future generation sneering at his 
own generation for their ignorance of what survival really means. Connolley’s use 
of this term demonstrates how a fictional climate can become emblematic of a 
set of meanings, and that he may expect his own readership to recognize this set 
11  Af ter a series of controversies related to his role as a Wikipedia editor and as a RealClimate 
blogger, Connolley quit climate science and switched to electrical engineering, saying that he 
felt that science was no longer what would advance the climate conversation: political change 
was needed.
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of meanings, signifying not only a dry climate but the ecological and social reso-
nances of that climate.
It is not for nothing that the fictional climate of Arrakis can do this kind of cul-
tural work. Dune has been hailed as “the first planetary ecology novel on a grand 
scale,” and it certainly aims to convey a sense of system (Slonczewski/Levy 2003: 
183). Each organism, each technology, each language, and each landscape in the 
text seems to have its own intricate and often diasporic natural history, evoking 
a planetary past that has been endlessly interlayered, obscured by cycles of mu-
tation, adoption, or occlusion by other histories. These entangled elements are 
depicted not only in the novel’s narration, but also in an extensive collection of 
appendices: a fictional scholarly apparatus including ecological histories, biogra-
phies of the central characters, a glossary, a map, and sociological tracts relating 
to the deep history of the planet and its inhabitants.12 
Until this point, I have restricted my overview of planetary scientists and their 
interactions with science fiction to those who can be best described as climate 
modelers. And indeed, Pierrehumbert, Connolley and Grumbine have each post-
ed online about their experiences reading Dune. But by comparison, Dune’s reach 
is even more unmistakable in the fields of astrobiology and planetary science fo-
cused outside of Earth.13 As Stephen Dick and James Strick write in The Living Uni-
verse, their history of NASA astrobiology, 
American culture was influenced strongly in [the] direction [of believing life on 
Mars not to be impossible] by Frank Herbert’s science fiction novel Dune, [which 
was] released in mass paperback just at the time of the Mariner 4 results from 
Mars and posit[ed] an entire complex culture exquisitely adapted to the conditions 
of a desert planet. (Dick/Strick 2004: 87)
Dick and Strick do not quite say this, but it seems clear that Norman Horowitz, 
head of the Biology Division at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the time, 
was particularly inf luenced by Dune. Writing in Science about the worrisomely 
dry surface of Mars just one year after Dune’s publication, he offered hope for 
the possibility of life on the red planet by noting that “one of the most interest-
ing drought-loving forms is the kangaroo rat” which can produce “all its water 
12  Some aspects of Arrakis’s ecosystems and their history are addressed only elliptically. For 
example, in a single sentence, the novel hints that the giant sandworms—huge beasts that 
swim in the desert sand like sea serpents—are not, in fact, indigenous to Arrakis. Instead, 
they are an invasive species, brought by some other people to Arrakis. This is never mentioned 
again in the novel and is only resolved two sequels later in Children of Dune.
13  For more about the relationship between climate modeling and planets other than Earth, see 
Weart (2019). 
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[…] metabolically” when fed on certain foods. “I am not suggesting that Mars is 
inhabited by kangaroo rats and that the first life-detection device on Mars should 
be a mousetrap,” he quipped, but he nonetheless felt the kangaroo rat could serve 
as an example of “what evolution can accomplish” (Horowitz 1966: 790). And yet 
there appears to be more to this choice of example than he lets on: as every Dune 
fan reading Horowitz’s piece no doubt noticed, the “kangaroo mouse,” close rel-
ative to the kangaroo rat, is the specific animal after whom the protagonist, Paul 
“Muad’Dib,” is supposed to be named. In the novel, when Paul asks to be named af-
ter a mouse he had seen, the Fremen receive it as a hopeful omen. Their leader says 
that “Muad’Dib,” their word for the kangaroo mouse, “is wise in the ways of the 
desert. Muad’Dib creates his own water. Muad’Dib hides from the sun and travels 
in the cool night. […] Muad’Dib we call ‘instructor-of-boys.’ That is a powerful base 
on which to build your life, Paul-Muad’Dib” (Herbert [1965] 2010: 497). Apart from 
the kangaroo mouse, Horowitz could hardly have chosen a creature more evocative 
of Dune’s hopeful message about the possibilities of life on a desert world than the 
kangaroo rat. 
Horowitz wrote his piece referencing the kangaroo rat a year after Dune was 
published, and his reference to the novel is clear but not overt. By contrast, more 
recent astrobiological work has cited Dune explicitly. In one article, entitled “Hab-
itable Zone Limits for Dry Planets,” the authors praise Dune for what they call “an 
exceptionally well-developed example of a habitable land planet” (Abe et al. 2011: 
443). They delve somewhat deeply into the details about Arrakis, noting for exam-
ple that there is evidence of liquid water in the planet’s past, as well as the presence 
of polar ice caps and aquifers. “The tropics are exceedingly dry, but the polar re-
gions are cool enough and moist enough to have morning dew,” they write, recall-
ing the brief scene in Dune where Duke Leto watches the morning dew collectors. 
Using a 3D model, they conclude that dry planets like Arrakis may be more likely 
to exist as habitable worlds than water worlds like our own, because water cre-
ates feedbacks that narrow the habitability range.14 Abe et al. also show that it is 
possible for a planet, including perhaps the future Earth, to lose most of its water 
without experiencing a Venus-like runaway greenhouse effect that would sterilize 
life on its surface. 
Following the Abe et al. article but performing his own reading of Dune (and 
several of its sequels) on his blog, PlanetPlanet, astrophysicist Sean Raymond 
wrote a post adding to the knowledge of Arrakis by working out the particulars of 
Arrakis’s orbit and proximity to its star, Canopus, as well as describing what would 
happen to the planet’s climate when Canopus goes supernova. Raymond seems to 
have engaged deeply with the Dune novels, as he notes that “the source of oxygen 
14  As a vapor, H2O contributes to the greenhouse ef fect, encouraging more evaporation, where-
as when frozen it increases planetary albedo and cools the planet more quickly. 
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is sandworm metabolism instead of oxygenic photosynthesis,” a detail from the 
novel that Pierrehumbert and others seem to have missed (Raymond 2014). 
In fact, since the paper by Abe and colleagues, a discourse within astrobiol-
ogy seems to have converged on the terms “Dune planet,” “Dune-like planet,” or 
sometimes “Planet Dune” to describe what another paper calls “hot, rocky planets 
with small water endowments and low obliquities [that] could conceivably remain 
habitable in their polar regions. Such planets would resemble the planet Dune in 
Frank Herbert’s famous science fiction novel by that title; hence, the name ‘Dune-
like’ planet has stuck” (Kasting et al. 2014: 12643).15 This adaptation of the name 
of Herbert’s desert world speaks to its iconic status, as well as to the speculative 
orientation of planetary science, especially in the world of astrobiology.16
In 2014, NASA scientists Ralph Lorenz and James Zimbelman published the 
geophysical science book, Dune Worlds: How Windblown Sand Shapes Planetary 
Landscapes. These planetary scientists, though highly gratified that Herbert ded-
icated his novel “to the dry-land ecologists, wherever they may be, in whatever 
time they work” (Herbert [1965] 2010: vii; Lorenz/Zimbleman 2014: 283), seem un-
surprised that Herbert was so excited by sand dunes. They return the favor by cit-
ing Herbert, both in genuine attempts to extrapolate the plausibility of the novel’s 
setting and in moments of lighthearted celebration of discoveries, as when the re-
cent identification of Titan as the “most dune-covered world we know of” lead to a 
region of the moon being named “Arrakis Planitia” (Lorenz/Zimbleman 2014: 284). 
Not least of this homage to Herbert is the fact that they seem to have named the 
entire volume Dune Worlds after the 1963 serialization of Dune in Analog: Science 
Fact and Science Fiction, when it was titled Dune World (Herbert 1963). 
To begin to explain the exemplary status that Dune seems to hold for planetary 
scientists, it is helpful to understand that the novel was itself already the result of 
feedback between science and science fiction. Frank Herbert’s formula was simple 
but transformative. He took inspiration from mid-century ecology but reworked 
the pragmatic, local ideas he encountered there as globe-spanning patterns, ex-
tending them to cover a whole world. The remainder of this chapter will track this 
formula in Herbert’s work, showing its kinship with climate modeling practices. 
15  Cf. Cresto Aleina et al. (2013); Kalidindi et al. (2018); Catling/Kasting (2017: 426).
16  It’s worth noting that these astrobiologists citing Dune are also using models of planetary cli-
mate as evidence of their claims. 
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Science Fiction’s Sources
In 1957, Frank Herbert, then a journalist and modestly successful science fiction 
author, traveled to Florence, Oregon to report on a United States Department of 
Agriculture project to stabilize sand dunes that were migrating across a highway. 
According to literary biographer Timothy O’Reilly, Herbert “became fascinated by 
sand dunes—the irresistible way they move, swallowing roads, houses, and on 
occasion entire towns.” He “imagined an entire planet that had been taken over 
by sand dunes, and an ecologist faced with the task of reclaiming it” (O’Reilly 1981: 
39). Set 200 centuries in our future, Dune extends the Oregon dune project that 
Herbert visited in 1957, envisioning the dunes creeping inexorably across an entire 
planet over the course of deep time. The terraforming process that the ecologist 
Kynes is implementing on the desert planet Arrakis mirrors the Oregon dune sta-
bilization project and the theory of ecological succession that was cutting edge in 
the middle of the twentieth century:
Our first goal on Arrakis […] is grassland provinces. We will start with these mutat-
ed poverty grasses. When we have moisture locked in grasslands, we’ll move on 
to start upland forests, then a few open bodies of water. (Herbert [1965] 2010: 440)
The specific terraforming process enacted in the novel (and on the Oregon dunes) 
demonstrates an effort on Herbert’s part to scale local working ecology up to a 
planetary size. This is made even more explicit if we consider Herbert’s sources. 
In Herbert’s initial imagining of the novel, the ecologist Liet Kynes was to be the 
main character. Kynes was partly styled on the ecologist Paul Sears, a mid-century 
scientist most famous as the author of Deserts on the March, a timely 1935 account 
of the Dust Bowl and the problem of soil erosion from the perspective of succes-
sion ecology. In his essay collection, The Maker of Dune (1987), Herbert says that 
he put the following quotation from Sears directly in the mouth of his charac-
ter Kynes: “The highest function of ecology is the understanding of consequences” 
(104).17 Actually, this is not the only thing that Herbert copied from Sears’s work. 
Though Herbert claimed to have read “over two hundred books as background for 
this novel” (104), many of them about ecology, it is nonetheless possible to identify 
nearly every ecologically oriented statement in Dune as originating in one slim 
1962 volume by Sears called Where There Is Life. 
I have found more than twenty examples of Herbert lifting elements directly 
from Where There Is Life and duplicating them in Dune. A few are mere references. 
17  Despite Herbert’s claim, this is not a verbatim quotation of Sears. The precise wording in 
Sears’s Where There Is Life is as follows: “For the highest function of science is to give us an un-
derstanding of consequences” (Sears 1962: 128).
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For instance, Herbert transforms Sears’s claim that only three per cent of the sun’s 
light is captured by photosynthesis on Earth into the notion that, in order to create 
a self-sustaining ecological system on Arrakis, the Fremen need only control three 
per cent of the land’s surface. But the majority of examples—at least fifteen—are 
direct reproductions of specific phrases and sentences from Where There Is Life. 
Many of them are uttered by the two planetary ecologists (Liet Kynes and his fa-
ther Pardot Kynes), while others are in the voice of Paul or Duke Leto. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Sears’s Where There Is Life (lef t column) and Herbert’s 
Dune (right column). Colored text indicates replicated language; underlined text 
indicates a shif t of scales.
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As a creative method, Herbert seems to have repeatedly taken a localized, regional 
phenomenon—such as the Oregon dunes or a biographical sketch about a Chi-
cago-based naturalist—and extrapolated that same phenomenon at a planetary 
scale. The following table provides a few examples. In it, I have used colored fonts 
to indicate words and phrases that Herbert copied exactly from Where There Is Life 
into Dune, while I have underlined the shifting scales of particular objects. In the 
case of Sears’s Where There Is Life, the object is usually a specific ecosystem, while 
for Herbert it is the entire planet of Arrakis. 
I have focused on these specific ‘borrowings’ on Herbert’s part because they 
speak to the means by which Dune has become a touchstone amongst imaginary 
worlds. Imaginatively shifting local phenomena up to a planetary scale is what 
allowed a simple kind of mid-century working ecology to take on the proportions 
of planetary world-building that made Dune iconic. Even the concept of a ‘climate’ 
as applied to a whole planet results from this operation. The mid-century ecologist 
Sears never describes a planetary climate: even when he is talking about the his-
tory of geological epochs (i.e. climate change), he hedges about climate as a global 
phenomenon. Rather than describing an ice age as a single, unitary change, he 
writes that it is “reasonably certain the climatic changes responsible for [glaciers 
advancing and retreating] were general and fairly simultaneous in the Old and 
New Worlds and probably on northern and southern hemispheres” (Sears 1962: 
152). He is aware that changes occurred globally, but he still differentiates climat-
ic changes spatially. And why wouldn’t he? From an Earthbound perspective, it is 
more interesting to think about the various climates of the planet, as proxies for 
describing the various kinds of ecosystems found on Earth. For Sears, the term 
“climates” is plural—a local or bioregional category, but not one that could char-
acterize the atmosphere of the whole world. For example, he writes, “It is diffi-
cult to establish anything like precise boundaries between climactic provinces […] 
In the transition belt between desert and oak woodland, one finds desert on the 
southwestern slopes and oak on the northeastern […] The climates on two sides 
of a house differ” (Sears 1962: 150–151). In Dune, Frank Herbert posits a planetary 
climate—the singular term applied to the whole of Arrakis—but this is something 
that emerges from scaling a bioregional climate up to fill a whole planet. 
 A climate model, too, takes physics about specific phenomena and systems 
and extrapolates those connections to a planetary scale. In a general circulation 
model, the grid size is hundreds of miles. Climate models depict how clouds move 
across a square that is the size of a small state at each time step. This is the correct 
methodology with which to study a planet, at least until computing power allows 
finer-resolution models. Nonetheless, a climate model cannot help but have some 
of the same cartoonish enlargement of dynamics that we see in Herbert’s exact 
duplication of passages from Where There Is Life. Speculative world-building in all 
of its forms requires generalizing phenomena and enforcing a kind of connect-
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edness that speaks to the system as a whole. For example, a general circulation 
model ensures that local parameterizations communicate with one another in 
rule-bound ways: the conservation of mass and energy is adhered to at every time 
step, which prevents local errors from being amplified. Even though the specif-
ic modeled dynamics cannot represent the complexity of a real world, the causal 
connections between elements are enforced so that the ‘world-ness’ of the model 
is not at stake—circulations will still circulate, and no element will be magically 
conjured or disappeared between grid squares.18 
I am not alone in identifying Dune’s world-building with climate modeling. 
In a discussion of terraforming narratives in science fiction, Chris Pak connects 
Dune with mid-century cybernetic theories. He writes, “Ecological principles fun-
damental to climate modelling, such as sensitive dependence on initial conditions, 
feedback systems, and cascading effects, are omnipresent in Dune, while Paul’s 
prescience is described as being subject to the same limiting factors as climato-
logical models” (Pak 2019: 204). Noting that Paul is the culmination of a Bene Ges-
serit project to create “a human computer,” Pak reads Dune as a performance of 
cybernetic modeling in service of a critique of geoengineering. This warning, that 
computational modeling can never enable control or mastery over the future of a 
planetary system, is borne out especially strongly in the novel’s sequel, Dune Mes-
siah. But despite the critique, Dune displays a mode of explanation, common in 
planetary SF, that nonetheless seems to require a character or the narrator to try 
to envision (if not control) the planet. However much they may fail, such efforts 
are crucial to the planetary scale’s emergence in the text.
For instance, in one scene, Kynes describes his realization about the atmo-
spheric composition of the planet: 
So few people ever looked up from the spice long enough to wonder at the 
near-ideal nitrogen-oxygen-CO2 balance being maintained here in the absence 
of large areas of plant cover. The energy sphere of the planet is there to see and 
understand—a relentless process, but a process nonetheless. There is a gap in it? 
Then something occupies that gap. […] I knew the little maker was there, deep in 
the sand, long before I ever saw it. (Herbert [1965] 2010: 442) 
In this passage, Kynes points to the nature of Arrakis as a chemical system and 
explains that a missing link in the cycling of nutrients around the planet was evi-
dent to him before he found the precise organism responsible for it. This moment 
exemplifies an epistemic habit of implicit causal completeness that is common in 
science fiction, but which Dune takes to an extreme. In the real world, there is 
18  There are many overviews of climate modeling available. In writing this chapter, I consulted 
Edwards (2010), Neelin (2011), and Gettelman/Rood (2016), among others.
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so much information that it would be impossible for a single person to infer the 
whole structure of a planet’s energy sphere (this, in fact, is the whole project of 
climate modeling). It is only in a science fiction text like Dune that the reader is 
presented with a world that is absent of red herrings, causally complete, and sim-
ply waiting for its missing pieces to be slotted in by a science-minded observer.19 
As a performance of ecological knowledge, this scene makes sense: as we have seen 
in Sears’s text, notions about ecology as made up of cycles and relationships were 
central to mid-century ecology. 
But consider the following scene, in which the same kind of logic is performed 
but with a non-ecological (or only partially ecological) object. Here, Paul is just 
beginning to develop his prescient powers, while he and his mother are escaping 
from the Harkonnens by hiding in the desert. Paul begins to say that the Harkon-
nens have never truly ruled the planet, but Jessica doesn’t understand: 
“Paul, you can’t think that—”
“We’ve all the evidence in our hands,” he said. “Right here in this tent—the tent it-
self, this pack and its contents, these stillsuits. We know the Guild wants a prohibi-
tive price for weather satellites. We know that—”
“What’ve weather satellites to do with it?” she asked.
Paul sensed the hyperalertness of his mind reading her reactions, computing on 
minutiae. “You see it now,” he said. “Satellites watch the terrain below. There are 
things in the deep desert that will not bear frequent inspection.”
“You’re suggesting the Guild itself controls this planet?”
She was so slow.
“No!” he said. “The Fremen! They’re paying the Guild for privacy, paying in a coin 
that’s freely available to anyone with desert power—spice. This is more than a 
second-approximation answer; it’s the straight-line computation. Depend on it.” 
(Herbert [1965] 2010: 311) 
This passage is fascinating, as it attempts to mirror the same kind of logic that 
attended Pardot Kynes’s claim, “There is a gap in [a process]? Then something oc-
cupies that gap” (Herbert [1965] 2010: 442). However, it also raises questions about 
19  This feature of science fiction worlds is similar to what Fredric Jameson famously referred to 
as world-reduction, “a process of ontological attenuation in which the sheer teeming multi-
plicity of what exists, of what we call reality, is deliberately thinned and weeded out through 
an operation of radical abstraction and simplification” (Jameson 1975: 223). For Jameson, this 
enabled thought experiments with a kind of sociopolitical causal completeness that today 
looks oddly anti-ecological. In fact, he singles out Dune as inadequately ‘reduced,’ writing of 
The Lef t Hand of Darkness that its “peculiar ecology […] along with the way of life it imposes, 
makes [it] something like an anti-Dune” (221). Nonetheless, the idea that SF represents simpli-
fied, implicitly causally-complete worlds is an analogy to modeling. 
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how a single process can be identified, and what constitutes a gap in the first place. 
Paul claims that “we’ve all the evidence” and begins to list the objects in the tent. 
Out of nowhere (or so Jessica thinks), he then adds the datum, “the Guild wants 
a prohibitive price for weather satellites.” But the gap between the Guild’s price 
for satellites and the desert survival technology in the tent is a bit more difficult 
to fill in than the gap in the cycling of atmospheric elements. This is why we are 
treated to a textual performance of causal closure as Paul’s “hyperalertness […] 
computing on minutiae” swoops in to make the non-obvious seem obvious. We 
are left inhabiting the same position as Jessica while Paul thinks, “she was so slow.” 
In this case, just as in the case of the atmospheric cycle, the different elements of 
the process must be related to one another as part of some vast system of exchang-
es and relations. Here, the squares of the grid are so vast that only the fiction of 
Paul’s immense processing power makes the leaps of association seem reasonable.
Like the scene about the atmospheric chemistry of Arrakis, this scene has the 
purpose of establishing a planetary scope to the science fiction narrative—while 
the significance of desert power has already been described at great length by 
this point in the narrative, this scene serves as an introduction to Paul’s growing 
abilities. It communicates a way of thinking about how the different parts of the 
planet have to be connected in order to make it ‘planet-shaped.’ Paul’s deductions 
leap from facts about the tent he is in, to satellites that are not in orbit around the 
entire planet, to the relationship between the Fremen and the Guild, and to the 
resources under the sand. These leaps connect the different aspects of the world in 
a way that makes a planet emerge, and the reason it works is because the ultimate 
object of each of its loops is explaining the planet itself.
Bruce Clarke writes, 
The planetary imaginary of any era is […] an abiding creative resource that consti-
tutes itself whenever an artist invents and communicates fictive images of living 
worlds—perhaps, also, of the cosmos that contains those imagined planets, or of 
the ecologies they sustain—and bodies these forth in some workable medium. 
(Clarke 2015: 152)
The reason Dune is such a touchstone for climate scientists isn’t only that it de-
picts a planet with a single unique climate. Rather, it has to do with the mode 
of inference—the planetary imaginary—that the novel performs. This mode of 
inference is, the dual action of bringing explanations up to a planetary scale (as 
when a comment about the crusades in Where There Is Life becomes a comment 
about a planet’s whole history) alongside the assumption of planetary closure. In 
Herbert’s words, a planet is “a system. A system! […] A system has order, a f lowing 
from point to point” (Herbert [1965] 2010: 806) in wide, repeating cycles. In other 
words, Arrakis’s construction is a form of speculative planetology: the closing of 
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causal loops is assumed to happen at the planetary scale, and this is what makes it 
‘work’ like a climate model. 
Reading Dune in light of climate modeling helps to explain how science fiction 
texts make objects that cohere at the planetary scale. Speculative planetology in-
volves the same kind of inference about how worlds cohere across disciplines. In 
Lisa Messeri’s terms, planetary scientists are “literally world-builders,” in that they 
are “invested in questions of what it is like to be on other worlds” (Messeri 2016: 5). 
For scientists as well as for the public, science fiction texts have helped to provide 
the templates for how to think about worlds and world-making. The discursive 
and computational construction of worlds by planetary scientists draws on ‘SFnal’ 
thinking, and on the fundamental premise of science fiction, the idea that things 
could always be different than they are. In Dune, when Duke Leto is introduced to 
Liet Kynes, the Duke refers to him as an ecologist: “‘We prefer the old title here, my 
lord,’ Kynes said. ‘Planetologist’” (Herbert [1965] 2010: 174).
With this term, Herbert anticipated a science that has only begun coming into 
its own in the last few decades, alongside advances in Earth system modeling and 
the increasingly vigorous field of astrobiology. The strategies Dune uses to create 
a world out of a desert ecosystem exhibit a kind of planetary consciousness that 
is shared between science fiction and the planetary sciences, including climate 
modeling. As this chapter has shown, planetary and climate scientists refer to 
science fiction pedagogically and methodologically to communicate this form of 
speculative planetology. In doing so, they teach us that the ability to comprehend 
our own planet requires embedding it in a multiverse of imagined otherworlds.
References
Abe, Yutaka/Abe-Ouchi, Ayako/Sleep, Norman H./Zahnle, Kevin J. (2011): “Habit-
able Zone Limits for Dry Planets.” In: Astrobiology 11, 443–460. 
Beck, Ulrich ([1986] 1992): Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Mark Ritter 
(trans.). London: Sage.
Catling, David C./Kasting, James F. (2017): Atmospheric Evolution on Inhabited and 
Lifeless Worlds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2009): “The Climate of History: Four Theses.” In: Critical In-
quiry 35, 197–222. 
Clark, Timothy (2015): Ecocriticism on the Edge. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Clarke, Bruce (2015): “The Planetary Imaginary: Gaian Ecologies from Dune to Neu-
romancer.” In: Bruce Clarke (ed.): Earth, Life, and System: Evolution and Ecology 
on a Gaian Planet. New York: Fordham University Press, 151–174. 
Connolley, William (2010): “Whats Wrong with the World.” In: Stoat, September 
28 (https://scienceblogs.com/stoat/2010/09/28/whats-wrong-with-the-world).
Katherine Buse74
Conway, Erik M. (2008): Atmospheric Science at NASA: A History. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Cresto Aleina, Fabio/Baudena, Mara/D’Andrea, Fabio/Provenzale, Antonello 
(2013): “Multiple Equilibria on Planet Dune: Climate-Vegetation Dynamics on a 
Sandy Planet.” In: Tellus B: Chemical and Physical Meteorology 65(1), article 17662.
Delany, Samuel R ([1978] 2009): “About 5,750 Words.” In: The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes 
on the Language of Science Fiction. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 
1–15.
Dick, Steven J./Strick, James E. (2004): The Living Universe: NASA and the Develop-
ment of Astrobiology. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Edwards, Paul N. (2010): A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the 
Politics of Global Warming. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gettelman, Andrew/Rood, Richard (2016): Demystifying Climate Models: A Users 
Guide to Earth System Modeling. Berlin: Springer.
Gillett, Stephen. L. (1996): World-building: A Writer’s Guide to Constructing Star Sys-
tems and Life-Supporting Planets. Cincinnati, OH: Reader’s Digest Books. 
Grumbine, Robert (2007): “Cloudless Venus.” In: rec.arts.sf.science, August 16 (https://
groups.google.com/d/msg/rec.arts.sf.science/HMZCIAPC04k/Xc8Ae8XqDZ 
AJ).
Grumbine, Robert (2008): “Science Fiction and Science.” In: More Grumbine Science, 
November 26 (http://moregrumbinescience.blogspot.com/2008/11/science-fic 
tion-and- science.html).
Gunn, James (2005): “Toward a Definition of Science Fiction.” In: James Gunn/
Matthew Candelaria (eds.): Speculations on Speculation: Theories of Science Fic-
tion. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 5–12. 
Heise, Ursula K. (2008). Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagi-
nation of the Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herbert, Frank (1963): “Dune World.” In: Analog: Science Fact and Science Fiction, De-
cember, 17–71. 
Herbert, Frank ([1965] 2010): Dune. New York: Ace.
Herbert, Frank (1969): Dune Messiah. New York: Putnam.
Herbert, Frank (1976): Children of Dune. New York: Putnam.
Herbert, Frank (1987): The Maker of Dune: Insights of a Master of Science Fiction. Tim 
O’Reilly (ed.). New York: Berkley.
Hitchcock, Dian R./Lovelock, James E. (1967): “Life Detection by Atmospheric 
Analysis.” In: Icarus 7, 149–159. 
Horowitz, Norman H. (1966): “The Search for Extraterrestrial Life.” In: Science 151, 
789–792. 
Horton, Zach (2019): “The Trans-Scalar Challenge of Ecology.” In: ISLE: Interdisci-
plinary Studies in Literature and Environment 26, 5–26. 
Chapter 2: The Working Planetologist 75
Jameson, Fredric (1975): “World-Reduction in Le Guin: The Emergence of Utopian 
Narrative.” In: Science Fiction Studies 2, 221–230.
Jameson, Fredric (1982): “Progress versus Utopia; Or, Can We Imagine the Future?” 
In: Science Fiction Studies 9, 147–158. 
Kalidindi, Sirisha/Reick, Christian H./Raddatz, Thomas/Claussen, Martin (2018): 
“Two Drastically Different Climate States on an Earth-like Terra-Planet.” In: 
Earth System Dynamics 9, 739–756.
Kasting, James F./Kopparapu, Ravikumar/Ramirez, Ramses M./Harman, Chester 
E. (2014): “Remote Life-Detection Criteria, Habitable Zone Boundaries, and 
the Frequency of Earth-like Planets around M and Late K Stars.” In: Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, 12641–12646. 
Latour, Bruno (1993): We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Lorenz, Ralph D./Zimbelman, James R. (2014): Dune Worlds: How Windblown Sand 
Shapes Planetary Landscapes. Berlin: Springer.
Messeri, Lisa (2016): Placing Outer Space: An Early Ethnography of Other Worlds. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Milburn, Colin (2010): “Modifiable Futures: Science Fiction at the Bench.” In: Isis 
101, 560–569. 
Neelin, J. David (2011): Climate Change and Climate Modeling. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
O’Reilly, Tim (1981): Frank Herbert. New York: Frederick Ungar.
Pak, Chris (2019): “Planetary Climates: Terraforming in Science Fiction.” In: Ade-
line Johns-Putra (ed.): Climate and Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 196–211. 
Palmer, Timothy N. (2010a): “Is Science Fiction a Genre for Communicating Scien-
tific Research? A Case Study in Climate Prediction.” In: Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society 91, 1413–1417. 
Palmer, Timothy N. (2010b): “Sunrise.” In: Bulletin of the American Meteorological 
Society website, October (doi:10.1175/2010BAMS3187.2). Archived at: Oxford 
University Department of Physics website, October 12, 2016, (https://www2.
physics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2016-10-12/sunrise_oct_2016_pdf_86437.
pdf). 
Pierrehumbert, Raymond T. (2005): “Science Fiction Atmospheres.” In: Bulletin of 
the American Meteorological Society 86, 696–699.
Pierrehumbert, Raymond T. (2010): Principles of Planetary Climate. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pierrehumbert, Raymond T. (2012): “Successful Predictions.” Tyndall History of 
Global Environmental Change Lecture. Fall Meeting 2012, American Geophys-
ical Union, San Francisco, California, December 3–7. In: AGU, “Fall Meeting 
Katherine Buse76
2012 Tyndall Lecture: Successful Predictions,” YouTube, December 7, 2012 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RICBu_P8JWI).
Raymond, T. Sean (2014): “Real-Life Sci-Fi World # 5: A Dune Planet (Arrakis).” In: Plan-
etPlanet October 10 (https://planetplanet.net/2014/10/10/real-life-sci-fi-world-5- 
a-dune-planet-arrakis/).
Sagan, Carl (1961): “The Planet Venus.” In: Science 133, 849–858. 
Sagan, Carl (1962): “Structure of the Lower Atmosphere of Venus.” In: Icarus 1, 
151–169. 
Schmidt, Gavin A. (2018): “Under the Sun.” In: Motherboard, April 16 (https://www.
vice.com/en_us/article/3kj4y8/gavin-schmidt-fiction-under-the-sun).
Schmidt, Gavin A./Frank, Adam (2019): “The Silurian Hypothesis: Would It Be Pos-
sible to Detect an Industrial Civilization in the Geological Record?” In: Interna-
tional Journal of Astrobiology, 18, 142–150. 
Sears, Paul (1962): Where There Is Life. New York: Dell.
Seitzinger, Sybil (2010): “A Sustainable Planet Needs Scientists to Think Ahead.” 
In: Nature 468, 601. 
Slonczewski, Joan/Levy, Michael (2003): “Science Fiction and the Life Sciences.” 
In: Edward James/Farah Mendlesohn (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Sci-
ence Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 174–185. 
Stocker, Thomas F./Clarke, Gary K. C./Le Treut, Hervé/Lindzen, Richard S./Me-
leshko, Valentin P./ Mugara, Richard K./Palmer, Timothy N./Pierrehumbert, 
Raymond T./Sellers, Piers J./Trenberth, Kevin E./Willebrand, Jürgen (2001): 
“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks.” In: John T. Houghton/Yihui Ding/
David J. Griggs/Maria Noguer/Paul J. van der Linden/Xiaosu Dai/Kathy Mas-
kell/C. A. Johnson (eds.): Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 419–470. 
Suvin, Darko (1979): Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a 
Literary Genre. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Weart, Spencer R. (2019): “Venus & Mars.” In: The Discovery of Global Warming, Jan-
uary (https://history.aip.org/climate/Venus.htm); expanded online version of 
Spencer R. Weart (2008): The Discovery of Global Warning, second ed., Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Winsberg, Eric (2010): Science in the Age of Computer Simulation. Chicago: Universi-
ty of Chicago Press. 
Wolf, Mark J. P. (2012): Building Imaginary Worlds: The Theory and History of Subcre-
ation. New York: Routledge.
Woods, Derek (2014): “Scale Critique for the Anthropocene.” In: Minnesota Review 
83, 133–142.
Chapter 3: The Rule of Productivity and the 
Fear of Transgression 
Speculative Uncertainty in Digital Games
Felix Raczkowski
Regicide, it appears, is the ultimate crime in real-world monarchies, thus war-
ranting capital punishment (Foucault [1975] 1977: 12). The same holds true for dig-
ital, ludic monarchies. Of all video game monarchies, none saw more regicide at-
tempts than Britannia—the fictional, high-fantasy country in the long-running 
role-playing game series Ultima (Origin Systems/Electronic Arts 1981–1999). The 
reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, the ruler of Britannia, Lord British, was 
always conceptualized as the alter ego of the series’s creator, Richard Garriott 
(cf. “Inside Ultima IV” 1986). With Lord British appearing in every installment of 
the series, his presence was a challenge for players, a chance to hurt the symbol-
ic stand-in for the game’s creator. Secondly, the challenge of killing Lord British 
was always situated in the rules of the games. He was simply very hard to kill in 
each installment of Ultima, so figuring out a way around his elevated hit points 
or various invulnerabilities became part of the fun of playing the game for some 
players (cf. “Killing Lord British” [2009] 2019). All of this contributed to the most 
well-known case of regicide in the history of the Ultima series, which also demon-
strates the element of uncertainty that is at the core of games.
Shortly before Ultima Online—the massively multiplayer online game (MMO) 
in the Ultima series—was set to launch in August 1997, the developers attempt-
ed a stress test on their servers (Olivetti 2015).1 They encouraged players to log on 
during that time to check whether the game’s infrastructure was capable of han-
dling large numbers of players at the same time. To increase participation in the 
test, Richard Garriott announced that he would be present in-game as Lord Brit-
ish, which offered players the chance to meet their world’s creator as a character 
directly controlled by Garriott. Since Ultima Online was famous for its fairly loose 
set of rules, which allowed players to rob or kill each other at all times, the develop-
ers usually protected their own characters through an administrative command 
1  There is some controversy over which day the assassination took place, with dif ferent sources 
claiming either August 8 or August 9, 1997 (Razimus Gaming 2016).
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that granted them invulnerability. On the day of the stress test, a server reset hap-
pened shortly before Lord British was set to address his subjects. This removed 
his invulnerability, and since the reset went unnoticed by the developers, none of 
them thought of re-entering the command (Olivetti 2015). This enabled one play-
er—to this day, known only by the character name of Rainz—to use a recently 
stolen magical fire field scroll on Lord British, killing him in a fiery inferno. In 
the aftermath of the assassination, all player characters that were present shortly 
after the event (Rainz had quickly f led the scene) were indiscriminately killed by 
the developers, while Rainz was later identified as the regicide and banned from 
Ultima Online altogether. The ultimate crime had warranted capital punishment, 
even in a virtual world. Indeed, because death is not permanent in Britannia (or 
in most games), banishment from the online world is the most severe punishment 
available in developer-monarchies. The character and their player are eliminated 
from the world altogether, in most cases leaving no trace of their participation in 
the game.
While interpreting the rules and the systems of punishment in online games 
with medieval subjects according to Foucault’s analysis of sovereign power might 
be a fun exercise (and I will return to Foucault later in the essay), the anecdote of 
Lord British’s assassination is relevant in this context because it tells us some-
thing about the unpredictability of games. The first notable observation is that 
it is possible to recount the events at all. Even though no video footage of the in-
cident exists merely screenshots and ‘eyewitness’ accounts—the assassination of 
Lord British remains one of the most well-documented and discussed events in 
video game culture and MMO history.2 The reasons for its notoriety relate to the 
unpredictability of the event itself and the openness of its immediate aftermath. 
Ultima Online proved that not only do all games encompass an element of uncer-
tainty and openness, but also that this uncertainty affects players and developers 
alike. It produced a transgressive manifestation of uncertainty: the regicide. A 
game designer’s perspective on this transgression may offer the mundane expla-
nation that Rainz’s actions did not violate the rules of the game (thus, they cannot 
be described as cheating), but instead owed to the emergent interplay of various 
systems in combination with the developers’ oversight. In this view, the assassi-
nation proves the potential of Ultima Online as an early sandbox-style game and 
thus should either be framed as a positive experience or, at least, go unpunished. 
However, the immediate reaction by the developers (indiscriminate retaliation 
followed by a ban against the regicide) suggests that the matter is more complex. 
Apparently, while some degree of uncertainty and unpredictability in games is 
encouraged and supported, there can be transgressive uncertainty even without 
breaking the rules of the game. 
2  Cf. Ramsay (2015: 128–130); and Olivetti (2015).
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In this essay, I will take a closer look at the way uncertainty, unpredictabili-
ty, openness, and speculative potential are discussed and framed in video game 
discourse. I am especially interested in the various measures taken to make lu-
dic uncertainty productive and in the strategies employed by developers to limit 
or diminish transgressive uncertainties, both of which will here be discussed as 
practices of speculation. I differentiate between two basic modes of speculation: 
the speculation that aims to put uncertainty to work, to make it productive (for ex-
ample, in the form of experiments or simulations that involve the players of online 
games), and the speculation that attempts to contain the risks of uncertainty (for 
example, in the form of experiments designed to produce formalized knowledge 
on toxic and antisocial gameplay, which then translates into systems designed 
to limit such behavior). Starting with anthropological and cultural-historical ac-
counts of games and play, I will demonstrate that uncertainty is constitutive for 
games and play. It is then possible to outline the ways in which uncertainty in 
games is ‘put to work’ through strategies aiming to harness what I will describe 
as the speculative potential of digital games. In closing, I will focus once more on 
the paradox of necessary uncertainty and rule-bound predictability in games that 
has become apparent in the events surrounding the assassination of Lord British.
Uncertainty in Games and Play
The most well-known cultural-historical definitions of play, which informed early 
video game discourse, mention unpredictability and uncertainty as a core element 
of play. The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga refers to “tension” as a driving force 
behind the human tendency to play: “Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a 
striving to decide the issue and so end it” (Huizinga [1938] 1980: 10). He later points 
to uncertainty as one of the unifying characteristics that motivate both playing by 
oneself (or single-playing, as we could call it from today’s perspective) as well as 
group-play: 
There is always the question “will it come of f?” This condition is fulfilled even when 
we are playing patience, doing jig-saw puzzles, acrostics, crosswords, diablo, etc. 
Tension and uncertainty as to the outcome increase enormously when the anti-
thetical element becomes really agonistic in the play of groups. (47) 
The difference between single- and group-play will become relevant for this anal-
ysis later on, albeit in a significantly different context. In game research, Huiz-
inga is usually paired with French sociologist and anthropologist Roger Caillois, 
although both authors have little in common ideologically or regarding their dis-
ciplinary backgrounds, as Galloway points out (Galloway 2006: 19–20). Caillois 
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cites Huizinga, building on his work to develop his own definition of play, which 
includes uncertainty as the third paragraph: “3. Uncertain: the course of which 
cannot be determined, nor the result attained beforehand, and some latitude for 
innovations being left to the player’s initiative” (Caillois 2001: 9). While Huizinga 
emphasizes uncertainty in play as a source of tension or suspense, Caillois frames 
it as an essential prerequisite for play (7–8). In doing so, he is closer to contem-
porary game design discourse than to Huizinga’s idealistic cultural-historical ac-
count. 
Both Huizinga and Caillois draw upon anthropological research on rituals in 
their works, with Huizinga devoting several paragraphs of his study to the rela-
tionship between play and ritual (Huizinga [1938] 1980: 15–27). Play and ritual are 
seen as closely related phenomena, both taking place outside of ordinary life and 
in their own time, both adhering to special rules, both allowing for transgressive 
acts under specific circumstances. Game studies today even owes one of its key 
terms (and at the same time its most contested subject) to anthropological re-
search on ritual: the “magic circle,” introduced into video game discourse by Salen 
and Zimmerman, who in turn quote Huizinga (Salen/Zimmerman 2004: 95).3 The 
magic circle marks the place and time of play and ritual, it separates transgressive 
acts from social order. The earliest mention of a magic circle in anthropological 
research can be found in the work of Dutch-German anthropologist Arnold van 
Gennep ([1909] 1960: 13), who studied rites of passage, meaning the transition be-
tween different social positions, for example, youth and adulthood or unmarried 
and married. The various rituals described by van Gennep already exhibit the pre-
carious balance between non-negotiable, absolute rules and transgressive uncer-
tainties. When discussing rites of initiation as a subset of rites of passage, van 
Gennep explains how novices in various cultures (he specifically mentions Liberia 
and Papua New Guinea) are allowed to break their respective societies’ traditional 
rules:
During the entire novitiate, the usual economic and legal ties are modified, some-
times broken altogether. The novices are outside society, and society has no pow-
er over them, especially since they are actually sacred and holy, and therefore 
untouchable and dangerous, just as gods would be. Thus, although taboos, as 
negative rites, erect a barrier between the novices and society, the society is de-
fenseless against the novices’ undertakings. That is the explanation—the simplest 
in the world—for a fact that has been noted among a great many peoples and that 
has remained incomprehensible to observers. During the novitiate, the young 
3  For more detailed accounts on the magic circle and the debates surrounding it in game studies, 
see Consalvo (2009); Stenros (2012); and Zimmerman (2012).
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people can steal and pillage at will or feed and adorn themselves at the expense 
of the community. (114)
One might be tempted to add “unpredictable” to van Gennep’s list of qualities 
describing novices and gods alike, since they are both able to act with a degree 
of freedom that makes their “undertakings” unpredictable for their own people 
and “incomprehensible to observers.” In short, rites of passage create uncertain-
ty. However, there are three important differences between the way uncertainty 
works in transitional rites and the way it can be thought of in play. Firstly, the 
ritualistic uncertainty that van Gennep alludes to is experienced by everyone but 
the novices themselves. The players-novices create moments of uncertainty and 
unpredictability for all non-players, whereas play in the way it is theorized follow-
ing Huizinga and Caillois needs to be unpredictable with uncertain outcomes for 
the players themselves. Secondly, the rites of passage are potentially threatening 
to society, since they cannot always be contained, as van Gennep describes. If the 
rites enable novices to break all common rules, society can only persist because 
the ritual is always limited in its duration. This is especially true for the rites of 
passage studied by van Gennep, because they enable the transition from one so-
cial position to the next—as soon as the novice has attained their new position, 
the ritual is over. Thus, the limited duration becomes the most important (and in 
some cases, the only) rule of rites of passage, whereas play can and must be gov-
erned by any number of rules, although they may constantly change. Thirdly, the 
rites of passage are productive (they enable transition) and potentially dangerous 
(they allow for the breaking of rules), whereas play, in its ideal form defined by 
Huizinga and Caillois, is unproductive and free of consequence. 
We have seen that both play and ritual can be thought of as cultural practic-
es generating a (more or less extensively) rule-governed time and space in which 
(more or less) unpredictable and uncertain events can play out. This broad char-
acterization can be further abstracted to the relationship between a fixed frame 
and its freely moving contents, which is the central definition of play in early game 
studies and game design discourse. Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman define play 
as “free movement within a more rigid structure” (Salen/Zimmerman 2004: 304), 
elegantly encompassing both Huizinga’s theory as well as anthropological re-
search on rituals.4 Salen and Zimmerman’s definition appears in the context of a 
game design handbook and has to be understood as an attempt to develop a defi-
nition of play that is operationalizable for game development. To this end, they 
discuss rules as systemic frames that are necessary for every kind of play. Inter-
4  Salen and Zimmerman cite Huizinga as the source of the term “magic circle” (Salen/Zimmerman 
2004: 95), and it appears that they were unaware of earlier anthropological research on rituals.
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estingly, Salen and Zimmerman account for the subversion and the breaking of 
rigid rules as an essential dimension of play, noting: 
When play occurs, it can overflow and overwhelm the more rigid structure in 
which it is taking place, generating emergent, unpredictable results. Sometimes, 
in fact, the force of play is so powerful that it can change the structure itself. (305) 
Play can become transformative, unpredictably changing the rules framing it. 
Salen and Zimmerman perceive this as a source of creativity, maintaining that 
transformative play can bring about not only new rules or a new perspective on 
play, but new ways of playing or new games altogether.5 Without explicitly ad-
dressing it, Salen and Zimmerman allude to the productivity of play that will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
When applying Salen and Zimmerman’s definition to digital games and their 
ability to enable play, it seems obvious to equate the “rigid structure” with the 
respective computer program. The rules of the game are, after all, maintained by 
an algorithmic machine, as Juul argues (Juul 2005: 53–54). In this view, the game’s 
rules are nearly absolute, since changing or violating them would require inter-
fering with the game’s code, necessitating specific technical knowledge (e.g. pro-
gramming, using editors to change variables, or even physically altering consoles 
or cartridges). Consequently, it has been argued (especially by German media 
theorists) that there is no difference between the rules of the game and the laws 
of physics or space-time in digital games, since they all have to be programmed 
and then enacted through the code (Pias 2010: 14–15). Following this, all questions 
regarding the oft-discussed magic circle as the “place” of the game and its rules 
can be put aside, since algorithmic rules are neither permeable nor negotiable (Li-
ebe 2008). The “magic” inherited from its ritualistic origins is exorcised from play, 
the danger for society is averted (although some media psychologists and worried 
parents think otherwise), and uncertainty can only manifest itself according to 
preset parameters. These manifestations include unpredictable emergent phe-
nomena, but they can no longer encompass the rules themselves. Playing digital 
games comes down to reacting to the machine’s commands (Pias 2010), enacting 
the designer’s visions (Bogost 2007), or toying with f lexible systems.
The introductory anecdote of Lord British’s assassination proves, howev-
er, that matters are more complicated. There is an ontological uncertainty, an 
essential paradox at the core of play and games, as Markus Rautzenberg points 
5  Following Salen and Zimmerman’s account, there is a growing body of research dealing with 
transgressive play, although most publications tend to focus on an af firmative reading of trans-
gression (in the sense of creativity and critique), e.g. Galloway (2006); Consalvo (2007); and Boluk/
LeMieux (2017). 
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out. Drawing on the work of Gregory Bateson, he argues that there can be no in-
stance of play in which the act of playing itself cannot be questioned (Rautzenberg 
2015). “Are we playing?” or “Is this a game?” thus become essential questions that 
highlight the paradoxical situation of play. Every move or operation has to en-
compass two contradictory meanings at the same time, inside and outside of the 
game. Bateson illustrates this with the bite in animal play (Bateson 1987), but it is 
equally true of the regicide in Ultima Online. Is the attack on Lord British part of 
the game, or is it a personal affront to the lead developer? It is, of course, both (that 
is the reason it is still remembered today). In accordance with Bateson’s theory 
and Erving Goffman’s frame analysis, Rautzenberg goes on to describe games as 
“framed uncertainties,” while also pointing out that “real” uncertainty is impossi-
ble in digital games: 
On the one hand computer games are celebrations of uncertainty, on the other, 
this uncertainty is not real. It’s just pretend uncertainty because computers have 
a problem with real randomness in so far as they can’t generate randomness due 
to their very nature as von Neumann architecture and Turing machines. This is a 
key distinction that separates computer games from other games. There are many 
forms of framed uncertainties but there is a certain edge to the notion when it 
comes to computer games because of their digital ontology. It almost seems as if 
there is a kind of longing for uncertainty, randomness and entropy in digital media 
that is articulated in computer games for us to explore. (Rautzenberg 2015: 95)
Rautzenberg’s account offers an ideal point of departure for the close reading of 
digital games and their various strategies of self-referentiality that question the 
status of games and challenge the player’s position. However, his accurate ob-
servation regarding the technical limitations of digital media is still too narrow 
to address the uncertainties that result from the cultural context of play or var-
ious player interactions. In other words, I maintain that the “frame” of a game 
is more than the sum of its algorithmic rules and that, therefore, a discussion of 
the uncertainties manifesting within this frame needs to take into account those 
phenomena that either lie outside the machine-enacted rules or that result from 
specific player interactions.6 Multiplayer games such as Ultima Online especially 
manifest uncertainties that are not located in the algorithmic rules of these games, 
but instead emerge both from the way that players act with or on each other and 
6  The game designer Greg Costikyan attempts to formalize dif ferent types of uncertainty, in-
cluding “player unpredictability” and “randomness” (Costikyan 2013: 78–86), which would most 
closely correspond with Rautzenberg’s theory and my critique. Yet, since Costikyan’s taxonomy is 
mainly directed at game designers, it misses some of the theoretical nuance in the discussion of 
games as uncertain phenomena as such. 
Felix Raczkowski84
from the paradoxes that arise from the attempts to interpret these actions (“Was 
this a serious attack or a playful bite?” “Was this a legitimate player action or an 
act of aggression against a game developer?”). Thomas Malaby has called these 
properties of games their social and semiotic contingency (Malaby 2007: 108), 
while Mark Johnson describes these types of games in his Deleuzian reading of 
various forms of unpredictability in digital games as exhibiting a specific form of 
instability (Johnson 2019: 120–145). That is, they tend to generate unpredictable 
situations and results, regardless of whether or not they’re designed to do so.7 
Thus, the question of uncertainty in digital games is connected to an episte-
mological duality that shapes many debates in game studies: should the study of 
digital games focus on the technical artifacts (software programs, hardware plat-
forms), or should it focus on the player expression and the cultural ramifications 
of digital games? And, if neither perspective is to be privileged, how can both ap-
proaches be combined with one another? This essay cannot solve these rather fun-
damental questions, but I will attempt to demonstrate how both the technical and 
the cultural dimension of digital games are intertwined when it comes to the point 
of speculating with the inherent uncertainty of digital games, either to harness it 
or to limit its consequences.
The Rule of Productivity: Uncertainty as Resource in Digital Games
Digital games have been likened to simulations, due to their conceptual related-
ness as much as their technical similarities as early computer applications (Bogost 
2006; Pias 2010; Crogan 2011; Frasca 2003; Aarseth 2004). As Pias demonstrates, 
there is a historical precedent of using heavily modified versions of chess as war 
games for educational purposes as well as for testing strategies in preparation for 
actual battles (Pias 2010: 203–228). Both games and simulations are rule-based 
structures that can offer ideal, consequence-free environments for learning or 
experimentation. At least a whole paper could be devoted to the history of games 
in thought experiments (the most inf luential of which would probably be Turing’s 
imitation game), but I will focus on discussing several speculative applications of 
digital games that attempt to make their uncertainties productive.
As far as the history of games as simulations is concerned, uncertainty is 
introduced through elements of chance, such as dice rolls (Pias 2010: 218–223), 
7  Johnson of fers an ontological exploration of randomness and chance in (digital) games, in which 
he dif ferentiates between randomness, chance, luck, and instability. Each of these concepts sit-
uates unpredictability at another level of gameplay, which allows Johnson to discuss a wide array 
of heterogeneous phenomena (e.g. procedural generation, glitches or grinding) in light of the 
question of how unpredictability is experienced during gameplay. 
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which are necessary to prevent ‘perfect’ information and absolute predictability 
in war games. In short, to reduce the gap between the perceived ‘reality’ of war 
and its rule-based representation (Bogost 2006: 107), it is necessary to address un-
certainty and unpredictability in the simulation. It thus becomes apparent that 
epistemic simulations, by which I mean simulations that are not primarily de-
signed as learning or training environments, have to allow for uncertainty to en-
sure that it is possible to adequately represent systems of imperfect information. 
One could even go so far as to presume that uncertainty is mandatory if epistemic 
simulations are supposed to contribute to the emergence of ‘new’ scientific knowl-
edge, instead of merely enabling the testing of hypotheses. As soon as computer 
simulations come into play, the central problem with this approach is identical to 
the difficulty digital games have with randomness, as Rautzenberg points out: the 
machine can only ever simulate randomness for its human operator. Emergence is 
possible when the system is complex enough, but pure chance cannot occur. This 
is especially challenging for all simulations that attempt to represent systems in 
which human behavior plays a major part, such as traffic, economics, or epidem-
ics.
The aspirations to solve these problems and to create simulations that more ad-
equately manifest the uncertainties of human behavior are increasingly directed 
towards digital games, especially massively multiplayer games. The constitutive 
uncertainty of games and their paradoxical relationship to non-game conventions 
are to be made productive as part of epistemic simulations that attempt to answer 
questions from various disciplines, ranging from biochemistry and epidemiology 
to sociology, economics, and law. The uncertainty that players introduce into vir-
tual environments thus becomes an object of speculation that is no longer framed 
as a source of concern for game developers trying to anticipate and foreclose 
transgressive player behavior. Two very different intensities of speculation can be 
discerned when it comes to ludic simulations, namely the concrete speculation 
with player behavior and the abstract speculation with games themselves. The 
propositions to make uncertainty in digital games productive all center around a 
specific duality of online games: on the one hand, their status as a frame that al-
lows for interaction between players, and on the other hand, their nature as tech-
nological artifacts that enable measurement and tracking of player interactions. 
While uncertainty is introduced through the players, the outcome of most player 
actions is automatically formalized and measured, since that is a prerequisite for 
the computer program. This enables massively multiplayer online games to func-
tion similarly to agent-based simulations, while substituting ‘real’ players for sim-
ulated agents (Salazar 2009). Given a game of sufficient popularity and enough 
players, it becomes possible to enact (social) experiments inside an ostensibly con-
sequence-free environment and with enough participants to produce results of 
statistical significance, while also accounting for the uncertainties of human be-
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havior. There have been proposals by lawyers (Broekens 2008; Bradley/Froomkin 
2004), epidemiologists (Lofgren/Fefferman 2007), economists (Castronova 2008), 
and communication scholars (Williams et al. 2011) to use MMOs for experimenta-
tion, e.g. to test legislation before it takes effect, to run simulations on the spread-
ing of contagious diseases in pandemic scenarios, or to test economic policy. All 
of these proposals are speculative in nature not only because they suggest to use 
MMOs and their players as simulations, effectively turning the players into agents 
whose “playbour” (Kücklich 2005) produces or validates scientific knowledge, but 
also because, to date, they are only notices of intent, since it has proven difficult 
for the scientific community to initiate cooperation with developers or publishers 
of games with sufficiently large player-bases (cf. Williams et al. 2011: 165). While 
there have been ethnographic studies (cf. Taylor 2006) that were conducted inside 
MMOs, the large-scale problems of economic or legal research would require ac-
cess to the game’s rules and the data accumulated during gameplay, which both 
cannot be observed from the outside, but would have to be provided by the devel-
opers. Some of the most notable examples in which scientists have had access to 
this data are internships or consulting agreements initiated by the developers to 
solve specific problems (often relating to the economics of virtual marketplaces, 
cf. Seiler 2008; Suderman 2014).8 An altogether different case compared to these 
examples might be considered when the game in question is built from the ground 
up to provide scientists with data. This happens as part of so-called citizen-sci-
ence projects (Cooper 2014), which are usually employed to contribute to scientific 
certainties, e.g. to either minimize contingency, uncertainty, or chance or to make 
their inevitable appearance in play productive. However, at least one game has 
been developed with the explicit goal of producing specific uncertainties in the 
form of unpredictable human choices that were then used in Bell tests in physics 
(BIG Bell Test Collaboration 2018). These tests are dependent on sources for un-
predictability, which poses problems that cannot be solved by computers alone but 
can be alleviated through unpredictable decisions by humans (in this case, quite 
literally through the production of bits by either pressing 1 or 0).
Attempts to make uncertainty productive in digital games could be discussed 
in more detail; however, for the scope of this essay, it is sufficient to note that we 
can observe what Patrick Crogan calls the “concretization of computer games”:
To play a computer game today—or to think and write about it—is to be part of 
this concretization, to adopt this facticity, to participate in its economic, logistical, 
technocultural becoming. Whether ignored, denied, sublated, or explicitly con-
fronted, it is always a question of how to adopt this becoming. We are all betting 
8  Among the best-known economists to cooperate with video game publishers in this way is the 
former minister of finance of Greece, Yanis Varoufakis (Suderman 2014).
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on the future of computer games, with, against, or in some other orientation to 
their predominant becoming under the aegis of what Stiegler calls the “program-
ming industries.” (Crogan 2011: 31)
Crogan describes the mode in which players, scholars, and developers/publishers 
engage with digital games as gambling: to play, research, or develop digital games 
means placing a bet on their future. This form of speculation becomes especially 
interesting when we observe that the future of digital games may be concerned 
with predicting and preempting futures, often (according to Crogan and in line 
with Pias) continuing their historical legacy as military computer simulations. 
Thus, following Crogan, we can state that there is at least second-degree spec-
ulation taking place in the papers cited above. By proposing to use uncertainty 
in games to enact experiments, they speculate on the futures addressed by their 
specific disciplines while also speculating on the future of digital games them-
selves. This essay, discussing these phenomena in the context of speculation and 
uncertainty, could be regarded as a third degree of speculation; as the bet placed 
by certain disciplines in the humanities (media studies and game studies) on the 
future of digital games and game research. 
The speculative practices I have discussed all aim to make digital games pro-
ductive, to put game mechanics and players to work on problems and research 
questions, and even to conceive of new games and virtual worlds in an attempt to 
preempt some futures and close down others. I maintain that all of this becomes 
possible because of the uncertainty at the core of games that allows for unpre-
dictable situations to arise in and around play, especially when several players are 
interacting with each other as well as with complex systems on the side of the 
machine. These uncertainties can enable not only potentially productive behavior, 
but also transgressive or harmful acts, which invite different forms of experimen-
tation and speculation in the attempts to prevent them.
The Fear of Transgression: Uncertainty as a Challenge 
for Digital Games
Besides the rare cases in which the in-game representation of a game developer 
becomes the victim of aggression, which subsequently must be punished in an ap-
propriately deterrent and terminal fashion, MMOs have developed communities 
in which transgressive acts in the form of verbal hostility, threats, harassment, 
and abusive in-game behavior between players are common. While it might be 
objected that verbal (or textual) abuse through chats or voice chat clients is not 
part of the game and thus cannot be compared to transgressions afforded by or 
enabled through the game’s rules (such as the assassination of Lord British), game 
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developers are recognizing so-called toxic behavior as a problem that is especial-
ly threatening to free-to-play business models (cf. Blackburn/Kwak 2014). These 
games depend on large player bases and a constant inf lux of new players, since 
the base game is free and the developers make money through in-game purchases. 
However, the low bar of entry for these games also means that the inhibitions re-
garding transgressive behavior are lowered—after all, the capital punishment of 
banishment holds little meaning anymore if you can just create a new account for 
the same game without any costs. Additionally, banning players has fallen out of 
favor with the developers even in games where it might work as a deterrent, since 
it always risks losing a customer permanently. In short, major online-game devel-
opers and publishers see themselves confronted with a situation that is marked by 
an ever-growing environment of toxicity (Alexander 2018), as well as the dimin-
ished efficiency and appeal of typical counter-measures against these behaviors. 
Bateson’s paradox regarding the situation of play holds the potential of abuse in 
game environments: uncertainty can become hostility; the play bite can quickly 
come to be the real bite between players.
At this point, a disclaimer is in order. The issue of harassment in online games 
and the larger culture surrounding digital games in general is extremely broad 
and remains underexplored. It encompasses not only the toxicity that marks spe-
cific game communities, but also larger cultural debates regarding representation 
and gender in video games, as well as organized harassment campaigns such as 
GamerGate (Mortensen 2018). These concerns are far beyond the scope and topic 
of this essay and will not be addressed further. However, I am interested in ha-
rassment and toxicity because transgressive behavior such as this constitutes the 
‘dark’ counterpart to the productive uncertainties inherent to gaming. While the 
transgressions function differently to the productive uncertainties, they both fol-
low from and can be described through the ritualistic roots of play. Transgression 
is always possible and its most dangerous extremes have to be managed somehow. 
This problem of management is, moreover, where speculative practices once again 
come into play.
The game developers, confronted with increasing hostility inside the commu-
nities surrounding their games, attempt to solve these issues through technology. 
They develop systems that are supposed to encourage positive behavior and dis-
courage negative behavior. These systems are constantly refined, adapted, tested, 
and evaluated. Players enter a speculative feedback loop in which their actions 
are permanently monitored by game systems that are designed (and periodically 
adjusted) to steer behavior in a productive or, at least, harmless direction. The 
most striking example of such systems was developed by Riot Games for the mul-
tiplayer game League of Legends. Released in 2009, the game has exploded with 
popularity. Since 2016, it boasts more than 100 million monthly players (Kollar 
2016). However, it has also developed a reputation for having an unfriendly and 
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aggressive community of players (LeJacq 2015). Riot Games has conducted several 
experiments in cooperation with psychologists, with Jeffrey Lin, a game designer 
with a PhD in cognitive neuroscience, serving as the project coordinator (Maher 
2016: 569). Through the methods of psychology in conjunction with big data anal-
ysis, it has become possible to describe and formalize toxicity. The studies found 
that, in League of Legends, it was not merely a small minority of players responsi-
ble for most of the transgressive acts; rather, most players were overstepping the 
bounds of social conduct defined by Riot, at least from time to time (Maher 2016: 
569).9 This demonstrates that permanently banning the offenders is no longer a 
solution for League of Legends, because the game would lose a significant part of 
its players over time. We can now return to Foucault in the context of the intro-
ductory anecdote of Lord British’s assassination. While the singular transgression 
(the regicide) can be met with the most severe punishment, a situation in which 
various transgressions are regularly committed by a significant part of the player 
population calls for reform. Foucault’s analysis of the transition from sovereign to 
disciplinary society can be applied to online multiplayer games, as well, although 
the power structures and discursive formations are vastly different. What is in-
teresting in the context of uncertainty and speculation is that, in the case of Riot 
Games, the focus on reform instead of punishment entails (again paraphrasing 
Foucault) a will to knowledge that is directed at the players and their behavior. 
Online multiplayer games become the site of experiments once more. But this 
time, the players not merely participants in experiments that pertain to research 
questions and disciplines for which the game is just a scientific medium. Instead, 
they are the immediate objects of inquiry. To modify player behavior and make 
the community friendlier and more welcoming, there must be (scientific) knowl-
edge about several factors. Which behaviors most need to change? How should 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviors be recognized and evaluated? What systems are best for 
encouraging change and reform? The various experiments conducted in League of 
Legends have posed such questions on a large scale: 
The Riot team devised 24 in-game messages or tips, including some that encour-
age good behaviour—such as “Players perform better if you give them construc-
tive feedback af ter a mistake”—and some that discourage bad behaviour: “Team-
mates perform worse if you harass them af ter a mistake.” They presented the tips 
9  The code of conduct for League of Legends, called “The Summoner’s Code,” was introduced in 2010. 
Updated in 2017, the current version of the code states: “Play as a team, win as a team. Don’t rage, 
blame or tear people down. Make allies on the Rif t. Never feed intentionally and don’t give up the 
fight! Lead the way for newbies, be helpful. Keep your account information private” (“The Sum-
moner’s Code” [2010] 2017). There is a clear emphasis on cooperation and a positive and welcom-
ing atmosphere, which suggests that these are the norms that are violated the most.
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in three colours and at dif ferent times during the game. All told, there were 216 
conditions to test against a control, in which no tips were given. That is a ridiculous 
number of permutations to test on people in a laboratory, but trivial for a com-
pany with the power to perform millions of experiments each day. (Maher 2016: 
569–570)
Experiments such as these turn League of Legends into what has been called “the 
largest virtual psychology lab in the world” (Hsu 2015). They contribute to various 
research papers in social psychology or information science (e.g. Kwak/Blackburn 
2015). Moreover, they bring about tangible changes in the game itself, through 
which widespread behavioral reform is encouraged. These systems are all de-
signed to shift decision and judgement regarding transgressive behavior from the 
developers to either the game’s algorithms or the players themselves. Systems such 
as the Tribunal or the Honor System leave it to players to rate each other’s behavior, 
which results in automatic rewards or punishments by the game. The current iter-
ation of the Honor System offers players a level-based progression with rewards, 
depending on the way fellow players judge their behavior after each round of the 
game. Since Riot continuously evaluates the efficacy of their measures through 
new research, which then leads to changes in the game, it is difficult to discuss the 
various systems in relation to the current state of the game, as both are constantly 
changing. The important point is that the potentially transgressive uncertainties 
are subject to continuous and speculative experimental treatment, aiming to cre-
ate a player community that no longer has to be threatened with capital punish-
ment. The ideal player population governs and reforms itself, necessitating mini-
mal interventions but maximal research effort from developers. 
Closing Remarks
An element of uncertainty is necessary for play and games. This uncertainty is mo-
bilized differently in rituals, child’s play, sports, or digital games. Nevertheless, it 
brings with it potentials and threats that are comparable between vastly different 
forms of play and games: the thrill of unpredictability, the open outcome, the en-
joyment of unforeseen moves, as well as the danger of transgression, the chance 
that play suddenly shifts into non-play, the risk that pretend aggression turns 
into real aggression, or even the possibility that the fabric of society itself be-
comes threatened through boundless rituals. Where digital games are concerned, 
I maintain that there are specific speculative practices that have emerged to ad-
dress these uncertainties. Two modes of speculation have been discussed in this 
essay: productive speculation that aims to put uncertainty to work, and preventive 
speculation that attempts to limit the risks of uncertainty. Both modes of specula-
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tion are directed at players and systems alike. They both propose to address impli-
cations resulting from play and games taking place under the conditions of digital 
media. Ultimately, they both speculate on the future of digital games.
According to Crogan, to participate in gaming culture (even to study it aca-
demically) means to bet on the future of games (Crogan 2011: 30–36). These bets (or, 
as we may call them, speculations) have become far more tangible in some fields 
than others. There is keen interest in digital games as spaces for experimentation 
and simulation from researchers of various disciplines. The future of online games 
speculated by the scientific community frames them as laboratories, as epistemic 
toolboxes that, ideally, can be specifically designed to answer questions that are 
not related to the games themselves. This in turn means that research questions 
would have to be posed in a way that allows them to be formalized in game rules—
the experiments have to work as games and vice versa. While these visions have 
not yet been widely realized, the experiments to limit transgressive behavior are 
already leading to results that warrant further study. As game developers such as 
Riot attempt to solve behavioral issues through systems and implemented design 
decisions, their repeated experimentation and refinement produces a specific 
knowledge on the way digital media can be used in large-scale behavior modifica-
tion. In the case of League of Legends, the systemic solution means the implemen-
tation of a system of rewards and punishments, levels and scores, that relies on 
self-surveillance of the player populace. These strategies, which resemble neobe-
haviorist approaches and gamification (Raczkowski 2014), also demonstrate that 
such concepts can be successfully implemented on a large scale. Future research 
will have to focus on the consequences of these speculations, especially for imple-
mentations in non-game contexts—such as the Chinese social credit system (Mis-
treanu 2018)—that attempt to modify the behavior of whole populations through 
digital media and big data.
Digital games are currently entrenched in forms of speculation that are all di-
rected toward the future of the medium, in one way or another. There is, therefore, 
a definite need to study these practices critically and, in doing so, to take part in 
the speculations regarding the futures and potentials of digital games.
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Chapter 4: Lagging Realities 
Temporal Exploits and Mutant Speculations
Joseph Dumit
How long does the beachball spin before you hard-reset your computer? Detect-
ing the difference between a lag and a crash has become a fraught problem for 
everyone involved. Of course, our tolerance for different forms of delay changes 
historically: browser loading, phone dial tone, email response time. We adjust and 
readjust to them. 
There is an early passage in Ellen Ullman’s book The Bug (2003) in which the 
programmer protagonist is standing in a checkout line while the cashier rings 
out the purchases. Buttons press, numbers appear on display, chime, repeat, door 
open. There is a second-long delay between button pressing and the number dis-
play, however: a brief lag. The programmer realizes that this is a bug she never 
could track down fifteen years earlier and that the bug still exists, causing this 
unneeded lag. She meditates on how pervasive such delays are in our lives, how 
inevitable and unconscious they seem to us. A life of little waits, a real life of lags. 
Lag often seems to be something we wait on, putting us on pause, while it 
does something in the background—like a traffic jam. We habituate to lags, up 
to a point. Adjustments are themselves lags: the time of adjustment. We often 
normalize them to ourselves and declare that others who adjust more slowly are 
lagging, therefore we are adjusting properly = no lag. But experienced time itself 
takes the form of durations, chunks, in which the chunking itself is the material 
of the experience. Just pause, for a moment, on all these lags: the time it takes for 
a cable box to switch channels, the phone to get a dial tone, a website to actually 
show up, your phone to switch gears, a friend to answer the phone, a student to 
turn in a paper, or a colleague to answer an email. What is lag and what isn’t? 
Lag is usually invoked when a delay is perceived as too long, calling attention to 
our own now frustrated anticipation, the speculation we didn’t necessarily know 
we were involved in. The event is not proceeding as planned. If it is slowness, then 
it can be accounted for, anticipation reduced to calculation. Irritating when you 
don’t know how long to wait. Psychologists have helped us program our devices 
to settle us down: the difference between the “Don’t Walk” light that you wait im-
patiently for and the one that counts down. The difference with the countdown is 
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the direct interpolation of time into the equation. Is there anticipation when you 
know exactly how long you have to wait?
Everything takes time. This seems a banal truism, but there is much more in 
it than we first suppose. The time that things/actions take is sometimes visible, 
but often not. When visible and noticed, we sometimes, like Ullman, see it as a 
mistake. We become sensitive to what we feel are unnecessary delays. We might 
call these lags. Something that could be corrected. Time saved. Literally, we have 
saved time from the monster of waste. In these cases, we embody a capitalist time 
that seems to be the opposite of speculation: we should not have to wait for the 
future!
The desire of technologics, like that of the dual inheritors of rationalism called cap-
italism and science, is to obliterate the delay. Everything should be instantaneous 
and always the newest of the new—and, thus, the uncanny and its pluralized prox-
ies. The just-in-time inventory of absolute information should be always at hand, 
at the click of a button, at my beck and call, so that there can be a quick turnaround. 
Waiting should be outlawed. (Kochhar-Lindgren 2005: 185)
Of course, this is not true at all. Capitalist speculation depends on futures and de-
lays at the technical and social levels. Analyses from science and technology stud-
ies of corporate speculative power and ref lexive market creation that draw upon 
and reinforce existing inequalities have investigated these speculative dynamics 
in genomics and biomedicine (Fortun 2008; Thacker 2005; Cooper 2008; Sunder 
Rajan 2006), pharmaceuticals (Peterson 2014; Dumit 2012; Sunder Rajan 2017), fi-
nance (LiPuma/Lee 2004), and security (de Goede 2012). Analyses of positive uses 
of speculation are rarer but include affirmative speculation (uncertain commons 
2013), the affordances of glitches and delays in digital culture and gaming (Krapp 
2011; Boluk/Lemieux 2017), and cultural resistance and invention (Moten 2003; 
Bhabha 1991).
Whereas Kochhar-Lingren and others (e.g. Lampert 2012) treat delay as some-
thing to universalize, asking about its ontology and its philosophical implications, 
in this chapter I am interested in the shared speculative experiences of lag. What 
happens when lags are persistent, when we encounter them as things we have to 
creatively adapt to? How do they in turn warp reality by warping time to be lagged 
time—never lagged-time-in-general, but always specific forms of lag? The empir-
ical question is never: What is lag? Or much less: Is this lag? But rather: What kind 
of lag-time is this? 
To study lag, therefore, to make it a method, we cannot start with a concept of 
time, of timescapes—or even of lag—but instead we follow where and how “lag” 
shows up, where it must be put into speech, how and where it becomes a matter of 
concern, a material-semiotic actor named into existence that has the potential to 
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warp existence and time itself. My technique for following lag is that of empirical 
philosophy (Mol 1993)—following how “lag” is enacted in its naming—and sub-
stance as method, investigating how each lag is worked on, made into a substance 
that often transforms worlds by becoming its own form of time (Dumit 2020). In 
this chapter, I use thick description to treat texts (written accounts in textbooks, 
websites, chats, news) ethnographically for how they use lag to make lives. Lag, 
delay, latency, synchrony, etc. are all seen as active constructions—forms of time 
that are being tamed and strategized, even as they structure what one can do, how 
one can speculate. 
Even basketball, like most competitive sports, can be looked at this way. There 
is a clock keeping track of game time, it counts down from twelve minutes to zero 
each quarter. But there are also actions that stop the clock, that lag the end of the 
game, stretching it out. These actions are part of the game but they can also be 
(perceived to be) abused, to the point where the rules committee has to institute 
new sanctions: “delay of game” penalties to prevent the lag strategies from over-
taking the “proper” game strategies. At one point, a dominant player, Shaquille 
O’Neal (Shaq), was also a very poor free-throw shooter. A strategy against him 
developed: foul him repeatedly, bumping him, hitting him. “Hack a Shaq,” it was 
called. Each foul stopped the clock, giving him the opportunity to shoot two free 
throws—which he would often miss, giving the hacking team the opportunity to 
get the ball back. As this strategy spread, new types of players were identified: 
those who can almost always make free throws (and who were now put onto the 
court in certain circumstances), and those who cannot. The examples can be mul-
tiplied, but the point is that the attempt to make a game fair within time depends 
on implicit lags that can be made explicit and warp the time of the game, making 
it unfair in unforeseen ways. 
This may seem banal, but what fascinates here is that inside of every shared 
time is also a set of lags that can become actionable. They unshare the time. They 
recompose game time to the point where it becomes legitimate, over and over, to 
ask: What game are we playing? What time is it? What is happening? What hap-
pened to the time? And how to do things with lag? 
Even as it slows things down, each lag (experienced as such) invents a kind of 
future: it provokes a sense that the future is being interrupted, that something is 
getting in the way of the smooth unfolding of time. This frustrates the forward 
rush, yet it presents unexpected opportunities, soliciting anticipatory practices 
that, by playing with the temporal disruptions, also try to exert control on the fu-
ture. Each lag, by delaying a future, itself produces new ways of speculating: accel-
erating and even inventing some futures at the expense of others. In this chapter, 
therefore, we follow specific lags that have had transformative and disorienting 
effects on digital finance, games, and life, conjuring into existence new forms of 
temporality, creating new kinds of time. I dwell on gaming, in particular, because 
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I have been studying it as an anthropologist, and because lag is a continual ex-
plicit challenge to both game designers and players. Among other things, games 
are pastimes: many are literally designed and used to pass time, to lag life, until 
something else happens. Gaming thus offers a deeply ref lexive site for noticing 
how lag is made into opportunity. 
Lag Is a Bug, Lag Is a Feature 
The delay that Ullman noticed does not mean that once it is fixed there is no time 
taken. Just normal delay = no lag. Or rather, no lag that matters … until it does. 
Financial speculation, markets, depend upon information but also time. You can 
know more about what is going to happen, or you can know about it sooner. Both 
are advantageous in reducing the risk of your bets. Stock markets are full of spa-
tial and temporal lags, small differences in prices between two markets that can 
be arbitraged, or the actual minute or microsecond delay between price changes 
and information about those changes. These are constant targets of algorithmic, 
network, and hacking exploitation that manipulate a presumed equality of specu-
lation time (MacKenzie 2015, 2017; Hayles 2017; Miyazaki 2013). 
Fidelity Investments, a behemoth financial services company based in the U.S. 
that holds my retirement funds, once sent me an email in 2011 pointing to their 
webpage on “Preventing Another Flash Crash.” The webpage explained that, al-
though it might look like they were up to something nefarious, they were just be-
ing competitive by “leveling the playing field for all market participants”: 
Co-location facilities: Orders from data centers that are physically located near 
exchanges can shave milliseconds of f of the time it takes to complete a trade. Be-
ing faster than rivals to the best price—that is, having the lowest “latency”—is an 
advantage that some traders seek in today’s markets. Regulators are concerned 
that these facilities may give trading advantages to professional traders and thus 
disadvantage regular retail customers. (Fidelity Investments 2011)
This is Fidelity telling me not to try and trade on my own. They automatically lag 
less, and I have no chance. The truth was far worse, though.
The financial speculating act is often presumed to operate without delay, yet 
all speculations are a kind of exchange that takes time. Even for computers, time 
is materialized in chunks that are defined by its internal clocks and by the built-
in sensors that make up moments of incoming and outcoming signals. The entire 
point of having a clock was to keep the variations in signals in time. Lag was only 
noticed when it was too long, when signals didn’t arrive on time. Otherwise, mo-
ments were standardized and variations within them didn’t matter. Speculations 
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didn’t take lag into account, at least, until a way was found to exploit it, to turn it 
into the difference that made a difference. A difference that mattered—material-
ized delay that became a new kind of speculation.
In 2015, Brad Katsuyama explained this transformation. He recalled that, back 
in 2006, a trader would see on his screen that there were 100,000 shares available 
on an exchange for a specific price, hit a button, and purchase them all. By 2007, 
however, the trader would only end up purchasing 80%, and by 2009, only 60%. 
This turned out to be because his one order would be divided up into four differ-
ent exchanges, essentially server farms located in physically different buildings 
in different areas of New Jersey. Each 25,000-share part of his order would take 
a different amount of time to get to the four exchanges, depending on how much 
further out they were. Compared to the first exchange, the sixty-mile distance to 
the final exchange would take an additional two milliseconds for the order to ar-
rive at it. Two milliseconds may seem fast (an eyeblink takes 300 milliseconds), but 
some high-frequency traders (HFT) had built special fiber optic cables that could 
race ahead four times faster (476 microseconds). These cables ran in a straight line 
rather than following the railroad tracks. What had once been fast was now a signif-
icant lag. The HFT computer could now see that someone had purchased the 25k 
shares and block them out of the other ones before their order arrived, forcing 
them to buy it at a higher price. This was called “latency arbitrage,” taking advantage 
of the fact that information, even at the speed of light, takes time to travel and can be out-
raced (Katsuyama 2015; cf. Lewis 2014). 
Many financial exchange institutions had morphed from the marketplaces 
where the trades take place—a kind of neutral institution that would take a small 
fee from each transaction for providing that neutrality—into time brokers, selling 
new forms of speed for extraordinary amounts of money. They sold “fast data,” 
access to data with less lag. “Why do people pay hundreds of millions of dollars 
for the technology to be right next to stock exchanges? Because it gives them the 
ability to trade hundreds of times, thousands of times, before that same piece of 
information makes it to the last person” (Katsuyama 2015). 
The standardized lag of clicking contained within it not just delay but its own 
form of time. This was truly insider trading, trades taking place inside the time 
of speculation. This warped the very possibility of previous kinds of speculation: 
now you couldn’t speculate because you would always be late, always lag behind 
those who paid for the new time. Speculation here created the need to talk about 
microseconds and then nanoseconds: new forms of financial time that now mat-
tered. 
One brilliant response by a Canadian group was to create a new kind of ex-
change, one that aimed not to race time but to freeze it: 
Joseph Dumit102
What we’ve done at IEX is we’ve slowed everyone down by an equal amount. We 
actually did this, we simulated physical distance [in a little box]. We’ve coiled 38 
miles of cable in a box, and it creates 350 microseconds—millionths of a second—
of a delay. And that delay actually deters many of the high-speed trading strate-
gies. (Katsuyama 2015) 
Literally turning space into time, the spool of fiber optic cable means that all 
trades have to travel an extra 38 miles at the speed of light to get into and out of 
the exchange. This “speed bump” or “magic shoe box,” as it is called, creates a new 
level of lag that renders speculative trades relatively equivalent in time, eliminat-
ing the ability to conduct latency arbitrage.
What we learn from this example is that lag can become an exploit, which in 
turn transforms/terraforms the market (situation) it inhabits. This is not an aber-
ration or a bug but a feature of lag: each lag can make its own kind of time, and 
has the potential to take over the form of time of the system it started in. The story 
I just narrated from the financial industry takes place over and over in the digital 
gaming world. 
Lag Is (In)tolerance Is Reality
The first thing to realize about lag is that most of it is tolerated. We adapt to lag 
so that it becomes our background, the environment within which we act. Adrian 
Mackenzie writes, 
Players habituate themselves to the delay in the circuit between hand and eye and 
eventually, within certain limits, do not even regard it as an obstacle. Embodied 
anticipation can ‘overcome’ the delay, or render it latent, so that delays in the flux 
of images are not even obvious to the player. (Mackenzie 2006: 166–167) 
The “input lag” time between clicking a button and one’s digital character jumping 
is unnoticed, incorporated, literally part of our bodies—we do things with this 
time. 
And yet, there is a limit. Overly long delays in the digital world become frus-
trating: the environment effect breaks down and the jump feels not like the same 
thing as the button press, but instead like another, separate thing. And yet, the 
limit is different for different people. Some people feel this annoyance and sepa-
ration at 200 milliseconds (ms); most people, like this author, notice it around 100 
ms. But a few notice even small lag, as little as 13 ms. It bothers them, interrupts 
their play, and they complain that they cannot stand it. It seems to rattle their 
nervous system. 
Chapter 4: Lagging Realities 103
Discussions of input lag are riven by these differences in people: “People like 
to throw that idea out there [that 100 ms input lag is okay], but they are wrong. I 
can clearly notice and it’s impossible to play serious games with that kind of lag” 
(RRettig responding to GivingCreditWhereDue 2016). Psychologists have re-
searched this problem and have investigated the effects of too much input lag on 
people. 
Lag intolerance marks the human edge of digital interactivity shaping the 
very features of devices and interfaces. Most multiplayer digital games, like most 
multi-person digital interfaces, balance on the edge between better resolution 
with more features and less lag. Skype and other video-chat programs try to up-
grade and downgrade video quality to prevent delay-degradation from becoming 
too annoying. But the internet is finicky, with its own ebbs and f lows and jitters 
and stutters. We adjust, we switch to audio, we hang up and try again, we blame 
the wifi, the cell service, the program. 
Lag is also the reality of multi-person online interaction. Whether you are 
Zooming or working on a document together or playing a game in “real time,” you 
cannot escape the experience and frustration of lag. Multiplayer game designers 
in particular have to design their games not only to minimize frustration but to 
maximize fairness. For turn-based (asynchronous) games such as chess or Scrab-
ble, this is not a problem. But synchronous, high-speed reaction “twitchy” games 
such as first-person shooters, races, and brawlers need to be played across the in-
ternet. This means figuring out how to balance the fact that each player’s com-
puter must communicate to a server somewhere (with some at a delay of 50 mil-
liseconds and others over 300) which registers all the players’ moves (key presses 
or joystick actions), coordinates them, and sends them back (with another delay). 
This turnaround time between a message from one computer to the server and 
back is called “ping” (the imagined sound of sonar hitting an object and returning). 
In a first-person shooter game such as Quake (a real-time game simulating sol-
diers shooting at each other in a building complex), everyone is simultaneously 
moving, shooting, and speculating on where everyone else will be moving and 
shooting, as fast as their thumbs can twitch. Yet because they are separated by 
lags longer than twitches, the results of everyone’s actions are a bit behind and 
possibly conf licting: I shoot where you are right now (from my perspective on my 
machine), but you have already moved (from your perspective on your machine). 
The server-side software coordinating the various players’ actions must there-
fore split the difference and sometimes rewind time to make the best of the si-
multaneously delayed actions. Players can adapt to this lag (even when they see 
their avatars jitter), but oftentimes some of the players are only delayed by 50 ms 
(a low ping) while others are delayed by 200+ ms (or 4+ times more). This is asym-
metry in relative action time: the machines that have a low ping can literally act 
and react before the high-ping machines even know that something is happening. 
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According to one player, “A Low Ping Bastard (ping under ~100 ms) was generally 
able to see and kill you before you had a chance to react” (fappaderp, responding 
to TokingMessiah 2016). Another player writes,
I was an LPB (low-ping bastard) thanks to my job—I worked for a national ISP and 
we had a T3 [high-speed internet connection] in our call center, which had all of 6 
people using it when I worked the overnight shif t. It was glorious, that quarter-sec-
ond edge we had against the majority of players made you feel like you were the 
best player in the world and everybody else was a slow loser. Me and my co-work-
ers would find a busy server near us (we worked in Dallas), all join at once, and 
dominate the top of the scoreboards until the admin would almost invariably boot 
us. (MelsWhitePubes, responding to TokingMessiah 2016)
The author here describes himself as a “Low Ping Bastard,” a name that arose to 
describe the unfair advantage that less lag accorded over “High Ping Bastards,” 
whose machines were too many internet hops away to react as speedily. The term 
has oscillated between insult, envy, and admiration as the lag difference came 
to create new kinds of players and interactions based on virtual–real spacetime 
differences that are not linear.
This lag difference formed not only player types but divided games into types: 
“Quake 1 introduced a scoreboard that not only had someone’s name and score, but 
also their ping time in milliseconds. This allowed players to judge who was an LPB 
and HPB (and hope to justify their skill or lack thereof)” (fappaderp, responding to 
TokingMessiah 2016). Players created servers that were limited to HPB or LPB only. 
Other players developed playstyles that depended on their system’s lag: “I lived 
in Alaska. My ping averaged about 900–1000. I practiced playing the maps blind, 
because relying on what you could see would throw you off and get you stuck in a 
doorway or falling into lava” (Shalrath, responding to TokingMessiah 2016). 
Players from the days of extreme lag report that they have compensatory 
“muscle memory”: “Whenever I have lag, the muscle memory to compensate kicks 
right in. If it’s server side lag, it’s actually a bit of an advantage, since most of the 
other players never learned to play that way” (definitely_not_cylon, responding to 
TokingMessiah 2016). While others had their bodies trained to play with lag so 
much that when new systems decreased it, or they played not over the internet 
but by LAN (physically connecting the systems together with cables), they had to 
unlearn these habits: “I can remember my first LAN, we played Team Fortress and 
Unreal tournament. I was so used to lag it was impossible for me to get used to 0 
ping” (Stupidpuma1, responding to TokingMessiah 2016).
The above mutations in game play were player driven. As twitchy multiplayer 
games gained in popularity and “seriousness,” including tournaments, game de-
signers increasingly had to find ways to make the games more fair across unequal 
Chapter 4: Lagging Realities 105
lag differences. The result was a unique and evolving set of “Lag Compensation 
Algorithms” that attempted to manage this sense of playing on an even battlefield: 
In fast-paced action games, even a delay of a few milliseconds can cause a laggy 
gameplay feeling and make it hard to hit other players or interact with moving ob-
jects. Besides bandwidth limitations and network latencies, information can get 
lost due to network packet loss. To cope with the issues introduced by network 
communication, the Source engine server employs techniques such as data com-
pression and lag compensation which are invisible to the client. The client then 
performs prediction and interpolation to further improve the experience. (Valve 
Developer Community 2005)
Lag compensation algorithms turn out to be a collection of modifications and 
tricks because player experience is the key variable: how to give the player the sense 
that the game world is fair and predictable. David Aldridge, network designer for 
Halo—one of the most popular online shooter games with tens of millions of play-
ers—has noted that “player perception is everything,” describing how he needed 
to become friends with everyone on the design team in order to make the game 
feel fair (Aldridge 2011). Creating the sense of a fair, lagless world involved several 
tricks: limiting the data sent between computer and server in order to maximize 
the data that matters; changing the appearance of certain actions, such as throw-
ing a grenade, by partially blocking the player’s view and thus disguising the de-
lay between hitting the button and lobbing the grenade; pulling back the in-game 
camera during a knife attack to hide the fact that the other player is also moving 
and may not be there; and so on. As Aldridge suggested, “Players fill in the gaps. 
So—no visible latency, no complaints of lag” (Aldridge 2011). The physics of the 
game engine often had to be altered in order to prevent lag from becoming notice-
able to players. Aldridge summed this up with four rules:
1. [Decide:] Which parts of your gameplay need to be adjudicated by a single  
 authority?
2. Always ask: where am I hiding the lag? 
3. Don’t be afraid to change game mechanics to improve networking.
4. Reserve time to iterate. (Aldridge 2011)
Network lag, in other words, was not a problem to be overcome, but the fabric of 
reality that had to be designed. The challenge was to make speculative risk-re-
duction equitable, and there were multiple solutions to this. Where Halo aimed to 
create a seamless lagged world, other games created lag compensation algorithms 
that created multiple universes within one game according to their lag. Some 
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first-person shooter war games, such as Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 (2012), altered 
game physics according to one’s lag: 
It’s really hard to explain lag comp in a simple way. Really, really hard. BUT....I can 
explain its ef fects on players relatively simply […] Low latency/good connection 
[experiences] faster bullets, faster movement into cover, [but] appears out from 
cover/corner earlier […] High latency/bad connection [is experienced as] Sneaky—
your appearance is delayed to enemies when coming out of corners/cover […] en-
emies are slower to escape into cover, [but your] bullets travel slower, [and] your 
movements are [more] sluggish. (Darius510 2012) 
The intended effect of these coexisting multiple physics was to create a shared 
world in which the tradeoffs of different lags could be equalized. But players took 
this further, with some purposefully throttling their own internet connection 
speed in order to “get the lag comp that players with poor internet get” (Noteful, 
responding to TemperVOiD 2016). These players were choosing the physics that 
fit their playstyle. In response, other games have revised their lag compensation 
scheme in response to this type of advantage and now explicitly “favor players that 
have the faster and more stable connection […, giving them] the best experience 
possible while maintaining the accessibility for higher ping players” (Rainbow Six 
Siege Developers 2017).
Game designers often build in extra lag (similar to the financial “magic shoe-
box”) in an attempt to mitigate the vicissitudes of various latencies. Solving this 
sometimes means that they also give a bit too much control to players’ consoles. 
One game allowed the player with the fastest connection to “be the server” rather 
than having a central server that everyone connected to. This created better expe-
riences for many players but some found a way to take advantage of it. For exam-
ple, numerous YouTube videos instruct gamers on how to build a “lag switch,” in 
which you cut open the Ethernet cable connecting your Xbox to the internet and 
install an old-fashioned light switch. You are then able to temporarily cut your-
self off from the internet. If your Xbox happens to be the server for a first-person 
shooter game, then all of your opponents experience lag but you do not—during 
which time you run up and kill them. Then you reopen the switch and they find 
themselves dead without knowing why.
In other games, such as the online role-playing game Runescape, which hosts 
thousands of players simultaneously playing fighters and wizards in a shared dig-
ital world full of dungeons, dragons, and magical runes, the system is tuned to as 
much fairness in speed as possible. Of course, in a competitive world, if you lag 
even slightly while fighting, you die. Yet lag is always there—due to slow com-
puters, internet delays (especially around 5:00 PM), wireless connections, and so 
forth. The game stutters, freezes, jumps—and players take advantage. 
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Some players have found a place in the game where two servers meet, meaning 
that everyone crossing an invisible line experiences a slight delay as their charac-
ter is ported from one server to the next. The players in the know call this a “lag 
line” and wait on the other side of it for someone to cross. For a second or two, they 
appear frozen, but can be attacked. In what they call a “lagxploit,” the nefarious 
players rush the laggard. The little delay now means that when the laggard un-
freezes, they are dead by dozens of hits and their corpse has been looted. Again, 
there are countless videos online explaining how to take advantage of a lagxploit. 
Playing the game requires not overcoming but attuning to the reality of lag. 
Are these invented playstyles cheating? And/or are they forms of affirmative 
speculation, making each kind of lag itself into something new out of the previ-
ously predictable digital world? At minimum, they are thick descriptions of the 
ways in which people do things with lag. 
To combat this type of invention, most competitive e-sports, especially those 
with money on the line, have to invent a notion of complete uniformity for compe-
tition between players at different computers. Everything down to inches of Eth-
ernet cable must be identical:
One concern is uniformity, or verifying that playing conditions are equal for all 
players in a match. This is important because it would be an unfair advantage for 
one team to get lightning fast computers while the other is stuck with the spinning 
hourglass. This starts with installing identical hardware on all computers in the 
arena, including those used by the referees and elsewhere, Veiser said. Addition-
ally, when they first set up an event, they create a master image of a single hard 
drive and copy it onto every computer, so that every single bit is the same. This 
level of attention to evenhandedness even extends to the length of Ethernet cable 
that connects players to the game. Both teams in a match will sit symmetrically in 
a row of computers, so that there is no speed advantage for being positioned very 
slightly closer to the local router. This might sound like overkill, something that no 
one would notice, but these players are so good that a few milliseconds could be 
the dif ference between a win and a loss. (Johnson 2015)
Lag, in other words, defines and splits and then invents game physics as well as 
players and playstyles. Whereas games like finance may initially imagine an ide-
alized world without lag, a world where pure speculation and play can take place, 
taking account of lag requires a complete reinvention of the firmament of the 
world, even whole new worlds. 
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Lag Is Human, Humans Lag
Lag doesn’t just shape digital gaming, it is also the very foundation of many games, 
especially multiplayer role-playing games (RPGs). Digital RPGs are fascinating 
in part because they are incredibly time consuming; many are designed to pass 
time, to lag life. Some games brag about 100+ hours of content! Online forums 
reviewing and discussing games often compare the price of a game to the number 
of hours it takes to complete. Many players agree, for example, that a game that 
takes forty hours to play is worth more than one that can be completed in twenty. 
From an outside perspective, these players have a lot of excess time to pass! The 
challenge for game companies is how to monetize this excess, speculating on how 
to get players to pay to lag.
Massively multiplayer online RPGs (MMORPGs, such as Runescape and World 
of Warcraf t) can have thousands to tens of thousands of players sharing in a virtu-
al world, each controlling their own character, each spending hundreds to thou-
sands of hours adventuring with that character (or serially with multiple char-
acters). The games have developed complicated processes to enable characters to 
advance in ability and power regularly, though slowly, through repetitive activ-
ities that are derisively and approvingly called “grinding.” Gaining more skill in 
woodcutting, for instance, means clicking on a tree, waiting five seconds until the 
tree is cut, then clicking on another tree, waiting five more seconds, and so forth, 
until 250 trees have been cut down. At that point, one “gains a level” in woodcut-
ting and can use a better axe to cut down harder-wood trees—which one then 
does 500 more times to gain the next level to cut down even bigger trees, now 
1000 of them, and so on: exponentially more clicks regulating the real-world time 
it takes for one to achieve status and power within the game. 
This enforced lag in advancement spreads out those who have “put the time” 
into the game. Lag = Power. The more time one has spent not living outside but 
inside the game, the more advancement one’s characters have. From the game and 
most gamers’ perspective this is a desired type of fairness. Unlike the first-person 
shooter games where one’s status comes from being very skilled with high-speed 
twitching, in most MMORPGs one’s status is a fairly direct measure of the time 
one has put into the game, as well as the social networking and information-gath-
ering one has managed to acquire during all of this clicking time through in-game 
chatting and out-of-game forum browsing.
But grinding is tedious. Too tedious for many. Game designers face an array of 
challenges in providing enough micro-rewards alongside repetitive activities to 
keep them interesting, or at least tolerable, and providing shortcuts to advance-
ment that risk making the “equal lag for equal advancement” patently unequal. 
Many games offer “pay-to-win” options, in which players can make cash payments 
to advance their characters. Pay-to-win is a variation on decades of some players 
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putting in the clicking-time and then selling their advanced characters to others 
who have money but either no time or no patience. For contemporary game de-
signers, advancement lag has in turn become the new economy: how to design a 
game so that the delay is not ideally suited to equal status, but instead just frus-
trating enough that more and more players pay a little to get a little jump, or pay a 
lot to get a big jump. Lag, in other words, is no longer about passing time but about 
generating enough temporal friction against just enough desire to get players to 
speculate that skipping the lag is worth it. 
Around most massively multiplayer games there is also a lively economy cross-
ing in-game and out-of-game worlds. I might spend two days clicking on enough 
high-value trees in Runescape to make a superb magic weapon and trade it to you 
for a rare Pokémon in another game, or perhaps sell it to you for cash. At eleven 
years old, my son referred to the in-game accumulation of items by clicking as 
“work,” and he made money at it. There are various methods employed by the Ru-
nescape company Jagex to prevent too-rapid accumulation. Most of these methods 
involve delaying acquisition. It takes a lot of mouse-clicks to get a thousand runes. 
There is labor—prosumption—being paid for.
But when he was twelve years old, he was banned from Runescape for a week 
because he was detected using “bots,” in other words, macros that automatically 
repeat the mouse-clicking process in precise ways over and over. These bots saved 
him the tedium of becoming a robot himself. His bot activities were not detected 
by a human, however; he was “auto-banned” by the system itself. A program de-
tected the too-quick clicking: the lack of normal human lag was the key to detect-
ing that my son was using a bot. Here, this autoplay was not allowed. He was not 
playing fair, he was banned.
Runescape was using its own automated programs—“botcops”—to specula-
tively detect the difference between a human player doing something robotically 
and a bot pretending to be a human doing something robotically. Here is another 
f lipside of passing time: the entire premise is that the human finds the activity 
repetitive and boring and dreams of automating it to do it faster, or at least, to do 
something else while it is happening. 
One of the first solutions Runescape employed to prevent bots was to create 
“anti-macro monsters,” special creatures that would appear whenever someone 
spent a lot of time doing the same thing repeatedly. For players attentively click-
ing, the monsters were easy to dispatch; but for bots mindlessly clicking, the mon-
sters could be deadly. That is, until they could be anticipated. 
Soon the bots became more sophisticated. In the world of “botting” today, 
one uses programs that simulate all manner of human-appropriate lags—curved 
mouse movements, mis-clicks, programmed random breaks (to represent time 
away from the keyboard, perhaps for eating, bathroom use, sleeping), and even 
mini-conversations—in order to mimic the mindlessly robotic behavior of a hu-
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man stretched to the limits of boredom playing the game. Whereas simulation is 
often used as a form of reductive speculation, calculating an array of possibilities 
in order to reduce the risk of being surprised, here the hackers reverse engineer 
the surveillance in order to give the company exactly what it wants to see, pre-
cisely in order to get away with something underneath. In this metagame, the 
hacker-simulated human is designed not to figure something out, but to jam the 
speculative practices of the humans at the game company trying to programmati-
cally detect the difference between these robots imitating humans playing robot-
ically and actual humans playing robotically. 
The following summer, my son took up botting again. This time, he ran an en-
tire bot farm, with each bot on a different account, each one running as fast as 
it could. He was playing two metagames at once. In one, he was participating in 
forums discussing the best bot strategies with meta-contests to see who could last 
the longest before getting caught and banned. This was “Getting Banned Is Fun.” 
Videos and descriptions of epic “suicide botting” runs were posted on sites such 
as powerbot.org.
In his other metagame, he was accumulating gold as fast as possible, then 
trading it online for cash—PayPal, Amazon gift cards, and so on. He got scammed 
more than once, but he made enough money to buy some high-end bots. Then, he 
got banned from PayPal. Not fun.
I learned that there were entire forums devoted to bot makers; but even more 
fascinating were the forums devoted to bot users who would create new accounts, 
program their bots, and run them in different types of competitions. Similar to 
the speed runs analyzed by Stephanie Boluk and Patrick LeMieux (2017), these bot 
users had all sorts of categories to differentiate: how long a bot could run, how 
much gold it could accumulate by chopping down trees, killing monsters, and so 
forth, before it got banned. The game was not so much to elude banning altogether, 
but to elude capture longer or better than others. 
In the Pokémon Go hacking world of 2016, tens of thousands of hackers gath-
ered on Reddit and Facebook and Github to exchange tips in order to spend less 
time catching the digital Pokémon that they wanted. Many of them instead spent 
their time making bots: programs running on laptops that did not need the phone 
apps at all but instead pretended to be phones. Pokémon Go’s maker Niantic was 
overwhelmed by the millions of mobile players in the first six months and spent 
most of its time upgrading its server capacity rather than preventing the relatively 
few creative hackers. The main challenge for the hackers was what they explicitly 
called “‘human’ randomization”: making one’s pretend phone behave as if it were 
in the hands of an actual human moving at walking speed and clicking with “hu-
man like” delays (jabbink 2016). These automated human lags were imagined to 
aid in evading detection by Niantic. 
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Much more collective action went into this practice than can be discussed 
here, but for our purposes, the lag in detection was being exploited. Speeding up 
Niantic’s change detection, checking every millisecond, would be possible in the-
ory—but the detection itself takes time, and the effect would be to slow the entire 
system down. This reveals a Heisenberg uncertainty problem plaguing digital 
security: the act of checking is an action that changes the system it is checking, 
because it lags everything else. In Cory Doctorow’s novel For the Win (2010), an 
internet worker revolution occurs through this exact speculative strategy: namely, 
causing security measures to escalate so much that the whole system lags cata-
strophically and crashes. Some video game players today find out that the security 
settings of their home routers, inspecting every packet of data coming in or out of 
their homes—normally a virtue for preventing viruses and attacks—actually slow 
down their ping to the point where the game may not be worth playing. 
Lest all this seem a bit removed from everyday life, let us recall that Alan Tur-
ing’s classic 1950 essay, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” defined machine 
intelligence through a test: using a typing interface, can a man tell the difference 
between a computer pretending to be a woman, on the one hand, and a man pre-
tending to be a woman, on the other? Turing noted that the computer would have 
to be prevented from answering questions (for example, math or chess questions) 
inhumanly fast: its programming would have to ensure appropriate lags. (The an-
swer Turing had the computer give was also wrong.) Lagging in behavior and con-
versation is part of what we recognize as human. Temporality proper to humans 
involves normal delays, normal lags. Responding too quickly can be as suspicious 
as responding too slowly.
Humans take time to make decisions, they are made up of delays that define 
them. Experimental psychology was founded, in no small part, on reaction time 
measurements. Different lags in reading words, for instance, provided clues to 
psychic mechanisms and their diagrams. Though everyone takes time to respond, 
lags have their social limits, wherein too much delay in response is read as mean-
ness, cognitive deficit, disease, and so forth. Americans often use the language of 
lag—for example, “that person is slow” and “mental retardation”—to define prop-
er and improper lag. These lags vary historically and culturally. 
In researching sufferers of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) and ADHD, I 
found many instances where the asynchronous lag of email enabled them to 
achieve a f luency not achievable in net-chatting or phone or face-to-face talking 
(Dumit 2006). In person, people with CFS were often frustrating to other people, 
because they were experienced as too slow to respond to the speed of neurotypi-
cal conversation. But a two-hour message-typing session resulting in a paragraph 
reads quite f luently when received in email or on a bulletin board. In one, I found 
that a slowly written description by one CFS sufferer about her experiences con-
vinced a friend (who read it quickly) that she was actually suffering.
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Lag temporalities that are proper to humans need to be investigated. Human 
lags are part of interaction, and delays are not simple at all. It is our temporalities, 
with our lags, that are in fact the measure of what matters for us in machines 
and games. In 2019, the fact that computers can beat the best players at Go has 
been hailed a breakthrough. A computer beating someone at tic-tac-toe or even 
checkers is uninteresting: we expect that these finite games are computationally 
solvable, and it as silly to compare humans to computers in regard to these games 
as it would be for humans to compete with a calculator at long division. Similarly, 
the fact that a computer could beat someone at chess if it had hundreds of years to 
make a move is not meaningful. We all might agree that, given enough time, chess 
is finite—unimaginably huge, but computationally solvable. Like all games, chess 
is, in fact, defined by time. Matches give each player a limited amount of time 
to play their moves (sometimes each move has a time limit, sometimes the total 
move time is limited, as in speed chess). The fact that players lag in making a move 
(but not too much) and that computers initially could not play fast enough to seem 
human meant that, in the last forty years, we could witness computers catching up. 
Lag Is Another Time
Lag is a gateway twixt worlds. On one side, it is ignored, devalued. We specula-
tively leap over it, seeing only what it delays. We treat it as compressible, imagine 
it quantitative—to be reduced to zero if possible, or else to become impercepti-
ble. No one need care much about it. On the other side, it gnaws apart our reality, 
inventing new times, new forms of temporality. It terraforms our metric life—
transforming standardized milliseconds into gaping eons of profit, an in-breath 
into an opening, a server switch into a kill zone, thirty seconds into thirty minutes 
of clutch basketball, an injury in the moment of defeat into a delay of game into 
a victory, awesome hair into a crashed system. That which had been tolerated as 
part of the duration of the world (page loading, switching servers, enough time to 
trust a transaction) becomes a strategy to put the world into disarray.
While there is no time to go into the technical details, I would be remiss if 
I did not mention the most ironic and vile combination of speculation and lag: 
bitcoin. The darling of investment speculation in the twenty-first century, bitcoin 
and the blockchain ledger promise a fully trustable digital currency that does not 
require banks or governments. Its value soared and now remains a core icon of a 
speculative future cyber-economy. Yet at its material core is an endless need for 
more computing power: its trust model requires that a large number of computers 
solve a cryptographic puzzle so difficult that the world’s fastest computers need 
ten minutes to calculate it. This prevents any one group from being able to cheat 
the system: it is truly a brilliant form of crowdsourced trust. The tragic side effect 
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of increasing computing power is that bitcoin mining never gets efficient; rather, 
the very lag that enables trust requires more and more energy to stay trustworthy 
(Bitcoin Wiki 2010). As one analysis put it, “if more computing power joins the 
network, the result isn’t that more bitcoins get created. Instead, it takes more 
computing power to produce each bitcoin, making existing mining hardware less 
profitable than before—and driving up the energy consumed per bitcoin” (Lee 
2018). By the end of 2019, bitcoin-mining computers, run mostly in giant clusters—
and often located in cold climates to reduce the hardware cooling costs—were 
consuming as much electricity as Belgium, now somewhere around 0.33 per cent 
of the entire world’s energy consumption and rising (Cambridge Centre for Alter-
native Finance 2019). 
As with other forms of lag, this one also transmogrifies the form of time it is 
supposed to inhabit. Here, the lag that is supposed to create trust among humans 
starts to contribute to global warming and the end of humanity. The ten-minute 
lag becomes a speculative contributor to a planetary countdown.
Clock time, which was supposed to standardize us, turns out to be an excuse 
to not pay attention to how each type of lag makes a new form of time measured 
by a new kind of clock (Galison 2004; Bender/Wellbery 1991). This is not the im-
possibility of measuring time that Wittgenstein ([1977] 1980) talked about, but the 
time of measuring itself which turns out to be ref lexive of the world. And it is not 
generalizable: in fact, it is ever specifying. Each lag is unique. Each generalization 
is precisely what is turned on its head: to generalize is to speculate that time re-
mains the same—and therefore to be caught f latfooted when it varies within itself. 
What varies in lag time is the very consistency of what is in time and what is 
out. Each form of time also has its exceptions, the ineradicable metagame of the 
outside that time pretends to keep out. And because it is time, which has its lim-
its, that becomes intolerable when it goes on too long, intolerable by humans and 
machines, it opens itself to more lags. Because they are in time, the very rulings 
and interruptions and ref lections all too take time. And then we have to ask again, 
which kind of time do they take? What kind of lag time is this?
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Embodiment: Speculating with Matter

Chapter 5: “La vie impossible” 
Germfree Life in the Microbiome Era
Melissa Wills
David Vetter spent his entire life waiting for the future to arrive. Diagnosed pre-
natally with Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID), he was delivered by 
sterile Cesarean section in 1971 and transferred immediately to the plastic-film 
isolator that would earn him the nickname “Bubble Boy.” The bubble was his ref-
uge, a place of therapeutic safety against the microbes that would otherwise dev-
astate his vulnerable body. And there he lived for twelve years, eating sterilized 
food and drinking sterilized water, reading sterilized books and doing school-
work on sterilized paper, his entire world structured to preserve the integrity of 
the membrane surrounding him.
Figure 5.1: David Vetter featured in “First Grader in a Bubble,” Buddy’s Weekly Reader, 
January 1979. 
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David—and the worldwide audience following his story—looked toward his even-
tual exit from that bubble, as medical researchers searched for a cure that would 
liberate him to a coexistence with the germs, and the people, of the world. In the 
public eye, David’s confinement was often bemoaned, with news reports and 
magazines emphasizing the experiences and social contacts he lacked. Yet above 
all, his life was a medical miracle, “a triumphal tale of technological innovation 
and medical mavericks” (Elman 2014: 30). His bubble was, if regrettable, a place of 
safety. It was a refuge, a haven in which to wait (fig. 5.1). 
As the first child to be kept alive long-term in a germfree space, he was also the 
biomedical future made manifest. David’s case—his survival, normal develop-
ment, and general good health—seemed to prophesy the salvation of other immu-
nodeficient children, whose bodies would otherwise be fatally wracked in infancy 
by contact with microorganisms. But even more people stood to benefit, as well, 
as doctors and scientists began to wonder whether the technology extending his 
life might be used to treat ailments spanning the entire lifespan. 
David’s bubble had been made possible by eight decades of progressive refine-
ment of isolator technology in the field of gnotobiology, the study of organisms pos-
sessing either no microbes or only a small, specified contingent of them. With the 
creation of David’s bubble, the human germfree future appeared both achievable 
and imminent. When David was a year old, the keynote speaker at a prominent 
conference on germfree research, Wallace Herrell, predicted “that gnotobiotic re-
search may have some clinical application in nearly every medical specialty and 
sub-specialty ranging from pediatrics to geriatrics” (Herrell 1973: 11). He called for 
researchers “to immediately initiate extensive use of these germfree programs” 
(16). In the space age, that mission appeared as noble and as transformative as 
landing on the moon. Herrell asked, “if we can spend billions of dollars getting to 
the moon to find out among other things that it is germfree, why not spend a few 
million on the germfree programs?” (16–17). To many, David was an astronaut on 
Earth—a pioneer of life without germs. 
Such boundless optimism in the saving power of medical technology was 
largely warranted in David’s case. He lived to the age of twelve, fully a decade be-
yond the life expectancy of untreated SCID patients. The isolator technology was 
nearly f lawless, and while he did acquire some microorganisms over time and was 
thus not strictly germfree, he evaded infection until the end of his life. His death, 
in fact, resulted from efforts to bring him out of the bubble: a bone marrow trans-
plant meant to confer a functional immune system harbored an undetected virus 
that cost him his life. David emerged from his bubble only in his last days, already 
grievously ill. It was the cure, then, and not the enclosure that killed him. Until the 
end, his bubble remained a protective space within which to survive and to thrive. 
Or so the story used to go. But that is not the David Vetter story of today. 
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In this time of the human microbiome, living without germs seems a bizarre, 
even contradictory prospect. With large-scale genomic sequencing initiatives 
such as the Human Microbiome Project in the U.S., the sheer scope and variety of 
microorganisms associated with the human body—the microbiome—are coming 
into focus. It is increasingly clear that microbes confer vital health benefits and 
that reduced microbial biodiversity can propel illness. Such findings have driv-
en a major shift in the public conversation surrounding microbes and disease, 
predominantly through the vast body of popular science writing on the micro-
biome. This discourse, which I term “microbiome writing” in this chapter, spans 
news reports, journalistic interviews, books, videos and other media narrating 
microbiome research and its applications. Microbiome writing generally shares a 
common persuasive goal of convincing readers to leave behind outdated ideas of 
microbes as disease-causing invaders, to recognize their necessity to human life, 
and to live more intentionally with them. We simply cannot do without our mi-
crobes, these texts insist. We are barely human at all, according to Alanna Collen’s 
book 10% Human: How Your Body’s Microbes Hold the Key to Health and Happiness 
(2015). We must attend to the tiny legions inside, according to Ed Yong’s book I 
Contain Multitudes: The Microbes within Us and a Grander View of Life (2016). Or, as 
Rob Knight suggests in his TED talk, “How Our Microbes Make Us Who We Are” 
(2014), we must acknowledge our microbes, ourselves. 
Even as microbiome writing celebrates the teeming abundance of microbial 
life, the thought of life without germs is never far from mind. Particularly in the 
book-length texts that are the focus of this chapter, authors almost universally 
argue that microbiome research overturns the pervasive modern attitude of what 
might be termed antibiosis: a philosophy of “anti-life” in which microorganisms 
are viewed chief ly as antagonists to be eliminated at all costs.1 Antibiosis encom-
passes antibiotic therapy as well as a host of contemporary practices, from hand 
sanitizers and Clorox wipes to hospital birth and processed foods, that systemat-
ically exclude the organisms with which humans coevolved. Microbiome books 
assert that the regime of antibiosis has resulted in a dramatic rise of noncommu-
nicable diseases associated with the loss of microbial diversity. Almost in unison, 
authors claim that modern humans are on the brink of antimicrobial crisis. In his 
book Missing Microbes: How the Overuse of Antibiotics Is Fueling Our Modern Plagues, 
Martin Blaser even predicts an “antibiotic winter” of apocalyptic suffering should 
we fail to correct course (Blaser 2014: 6). 
Germfree life emblematizes that threat. David Vetter appears frequently in 
microbiome books, alongside gnotobiotic mice in their miniature bubbles. Au-
1  While I draw this term from Landecker (2016: 20), where it is used specifically in the context of 
antibiotic drugs, it accurately describes a more comprehensive attitude of “anti-life” in micro-
biome writing.
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thors recount visits to germfree animal facilities, cite research on gnotobiolo-
gy, and delve into the history and technology of germfree isolators. Microbiome 
writers sometimes emphasize the research utility of germfree animals, namely, 
their role as negative controls in elucidating the inf luence of microorganisms on 
mammalian physiology, development, and neurobiology.2 As research organisms, 
germfree animals are generally studied for their relevance to human biology; 
murine pathologies lead to inferences about human counterparts. In this sense, 
germfree mice serve as model organisms within biomedicine.3
In microbiome writing, however, germfree life is primarily deployed for its 
symbolic value. Gnotobiotic mice and David the Bubble Boy become figures for 
the microbially depleted modern body, products of the regime of antibiosis. This 
symbolism is made possible by a significant shift in their status. As represented 
in microbiome writing, the germfree state is no longer an achievement but rath-
er a catastrophe, no longer lifegiving but rather intrinsically risky. If gnotobiotic 
organisms are model organisms in biomedicine, in microbiome writing they are 
more properly what anthropologists Heather Paxson and Stefan Helmreich have 
termed model ecosystems, functioning “in a prescriptive sense, as tokens of how 
organisms and human ecological relations with them could, should, or might be” 
(Paxson/Helmreich 2014: 165). In this chapter, I show how microbiome writing 
employs germfree bodies as model ecosystems in reverse, as non-ecosystems held 
up prescriptively to illustrate how humans and microbes should not be, that is, 
separate. Germfree life signals grave costs to body, psyche, and society; it germi-
nates a moral imperative to live with germs in the wider world. 
The David Vetter story of today is a parable for the folly of attempting to live 
without germs, in which their absence, not their presence, is lethal. In this chapter, 
I show how microbiome writers accomplish the rewriting of his life and legacy 
into a register suited to the microbiome era. Conducting a close-reading analysis 
of ten popular science microbiome books, I examine how the history and status of 
germfree life—animal and human—are subtly reframed to align with the authors’ 
2  For a scientific perspective on microbiomics and gnotobiology see Falk et al. (1998). For a more 
comprehensive view of gnotobiology’s applications, including in infectious disease research, 
see Carter/Foster (2006). The philosophers O’Malley/Skillings (2018) also discuss germfree 
animal research in relation to the history of microbiomics. Microbiome writing’s engagement 
with gnotobiology occurs almost exclusively in the more capacious space of full-length books. 
Such texts began appearing with frequency around 2008, af ter the launch of the Human Mi-
crobiome Project in the U.S.
3  They are model organisms in the sense that they produce findings generalizable beyond them-
selves and model whole-organism processes, such as human–microbe interactions (Ankeny/
Leonelli 2011). See Davies (2013) on the structuring role of narrative in shaping relations be-
tween animal biology and human disease, and Rader (2004) on the standardization of labo-
ratory mice.
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critiques of antibiosis. Through a subtle web of historical disjunctions, recurring 
tropes, a touch of misquotation, and a dose of hyperbole, germfree life in the mi-
crobiome era becomes sick. Transforming the germfree isolator from a historical 
invention to a modern one, from a protective space to an imminently dangerous 
one, microbiome writers reconceptualize germfree bodies as profoundly suffer-
ing, urgently in need of reintegration with the microbial world.
I argue that reappraisal of germfree life in microbiome writing is unified by a 
recurrent speculative maneuver in which the germfree body signifies the materi-
alized future, a small-scale perfection of antibiosis. Microbiome writers continu-
ally forge parallels between germfree organisms and human bodies overexposed 
to antibiotics, asking readers to identify the conditions of their own bodies repli-
cated in the space of the gnotobiotic isolator. Germfree life comes not only to ex-
emplify the present suffering of human bodies but also to foretell the devastating 
failures of body and society that are the terminus of antibiosis. As embodiments 
of a catastrophe already underway in the antibiotic-laden modern world, germ-
free mice and bubble boys are deployed as interventions in the present: they func-
tion as deterrents to the trajectory of antibiosis, revealing the crisis of life without 
germs as foretold by the bodies of germfree mice and David Vetter. 
Germfree Dreaming 
Germfree animals have a long scientific history that is seldom recognized in mi-
crobiome writing. They were first conceptualized in 1885 by Louis Pasteur, who 
proposed deriving a sterile chick in order to assess the impact of microorganisms 
on vertebrate biology. Supposing the interior of the egg to be free of microbes, he 
suggested that this state could be preserved by transferring the newborn chick to 
a chamber supplied with sterile air, water, and food. Pasteur believed microbes 
to be vital to the physiological functioning of higher organisms, especially in di-
gestion; he hypothesized that the germfree state would be biologically untenable, 
“que la vie, dans ces conditions, deviendrait impossible” (Pasteur 1885: 68). 
By 1895, two German researchers, George Nuttall and Hans Thierfelder, chal-
lenged that hypothesis by providing the first indication that the survival of germ-
free life was in fact possible. Adapting Pasteur’s proposal to vertebrates, they sur-
gically extracted a guinea pig fetus from the sterile space of its mother’s uterus, 
raising it for eight days inside a massively complex apparatus of glass, metal, and 
rubber that was kept sterile using steam, chloroform, and wax (Nuttall/Thier-
felder 1895). Across Europe, researchers modified these methods to isolate germ-
free goats, mice, tadpoles, insects and more, including at last Max Schottelius’s 
derivation of the germfree chicken in 1899 (Schottelius 1899). 
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Germfree organisms in the early twentieth century were technological mar-
vels, encased in meticulously engineered chambers that required constant and 
intensive maintenance to prevent the onslaught of environmental microbes. Still, 
they lived. 
It was how they lived that now became controversial, as researchers found that 
these organisms generally failed to gain weight, suffered from malnutrition, ex-
hibited a range of physiological anomalies, and lived only a short time. It seemed 
that microbes, while not strictly required for life, were indeed necessary for long-
term health. Yet scientists gradually developed modified feeding and supplemen-
tation regimes to compensate for the loss of microbes. These, alongside refine-
ments in isolator technology by the American machinist James Reyniers, enabled 
germfree organisms—especially mice—to be maintained long-term in breeding 
colonies by the mid-twentieth century. And with the engineering of f lexible-film 
plastic incubators, they eventually became cheap and transportable, extensively 
used in biomedical research as tools for the study of host–microbe ecology.4 They 
now appear in laboratories around the world, still dependent on their isolators 
and careful nutritional management, but thriving. 
The existence of breeding colonies of germfree animals, as documented in 
the scientific literature, demonstrates that life without microbes is quite possi-
ble. Contemporary microbiome writers, however, have recurrently resurrected 
Pasteur’s hypothesis to affirm the sentiment that we simply cannot do without 
our microbes. “La vie impossible” thereby comes to signify not the life and death 
of a particular, isolator-bound chicken but rather the impossibility of human life 
in the absence of microorganisms—technical achievability aside. Pasteur’s pre-
diction becomes detached from his task of proposing the strategic exclusion of 
microbes, becoming remade into a claim, in the model-ecosystem mode, about 
the absent modern microbiome in an age of antibiosis.
The twenty-first-century rewriting of Pasteur is accomplished through a dis-
tortion of the historical development of germfree life that situates it in our more 
recent past. The misrepresentations I detail below are largely innocuous, likely 
arising from the simple fact that science writers are not historians; nor are they 
specialists in gnotobiology. Nevertheless, their renarrations of the historical re-
cord matter, helping to articulate an imminent crisis of post-microbial life loom-
ing large in microbiome writing. 
Although they almost universally reference Pasteur’s 1885 hypothesis, micro-
biome writers consistently obscure the long and largely successful early history of 
gnotobiology; the proposed experiment is generally suggested to have been left 
unexplored. In Good Germs, Bad Germs: Health and Survival in a Bacterial World, Jes-
sica Snyder Sachs writes that “Pasteur’s greatest protégé, the Nobel Prize-winning 
4  On the history of gnotobiology, see Kirk (2012a, 2012b) and Luckey (1963).
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Elie Metchnikoff,” believed that people would be better off without their bacteria, 
and he “openly scoffed at what he considered his mentor’s naïveté” (Sachs 2007: 
29). Sachs frames Metchnikoff’s rejection as the disdain of an insolent student, 
with material consequences: identifying Metchnikoff as leading the “winning” 
side in gnotobiological debates, she implies an institutional diminishing of the 
proposal, setting Pasteur in opposition to the (prize-winning, great) microbiolog-
ical mainstream (30). 
More broadly, microbiome writers steadily minimize the substantial suc-
cesses of gnotobiology in the early nineteenth century. Sachs neglects to mention 
Metchnikoff’s own deep investment in germfree animal research, casting him 
solely as critic of Pasteur. Similarly, she entirely overlooks his wife Olga’s deri-
vation of germfree tadpoles, crediting her instead with an “unsuccessful attempt 
to keep tadpoles alive under sterile conditions” (30).5 Other microbiome writers 
repeat the pattern. In The Psychobiotic Revolution: Mood, Food, and the New Science 
of the Gut-Brain Connection, Scott C. Anderson and his coauthors note the eventual 
implementation of the germfree chicken isolation proposed by Pasteur. But rather 
than mentioning that germfree guinea pigs and other animals had already been 
isolated by 1899, they describe only the “decade of failure” before Schottelius was 
“finally able to breed germ-free chickens” (Anderson et al. 2017: 31–32). Likewise, 
in The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners That Shape Who We 
Are Today, Rob Dunn depicts early experiments in gnotobiology as relying on in-
effective, low-tech methods of “scrubbing the germs off […] a kind of Mr. Clean 
approach […] Those attempts had failed” (Dunn 2011: 68). 
After decades of neglect or failed efforts, this narrative goes, germfree life fi-
nally emerged with force in the mid-twentieth century. While it is true that germ-
free research accelerated at this time, with specimens becoming more transport-
able and more commonly studied, microbiome writers generally suggest them to 
have been invented or even conceived of at this moment. The timeline is a point of 
general consensus among microbiome writers. Anderson as well as Yong place its 
origins in the 1940s, while others are somewhat less precise. In I, Superorganism: 
Learning to Love Your Inner Ecosystem, Jon Turney says “50 years ago” (Turney 2015: 
55). In The Human Superorganism: How the Microbiome Is Revolutionizing the Pursuit 
of a Healthy Life, Rodney Dietert says “forty to fifty” years ago (Dietert 2016: 44). 
In An Epidemic of Absence: A New Way of Understanding Allergies and Autoimmune 
Diseases, Moises Velasquez-Manoff simply puts it in the “mid-twentieth century” 
(Velasquez-Manoff 2012: 169). 
In this vein, Dunn suggests Reyniers’s isolator technology to have been the 
invention of a lone genius, first dreamed up in a heady era of technological in-
novation. He writes, “the iron lung had just been invented, as had the first robot. 
5  Five of Metchnikof f’s tadpoles lived, and remained sterile, beyond 63 days (Metchnikof f 1901). 
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What if, Reyniers thought, he used the same sorts of technologies to construct a 
microbe-free world?” (Dunn 2011: 68). Dunn’s account assigns key insights from 
the first decade of gnotobiology, including Pasteur’s recognition of the sterility of 
the chicken egg and the extension of this concept to the guinea pig by Nuttall and 
Thierfelder, to Reyniers himself.6 He concludes, “if Reyniers could accomplish his 
goal, he might be the first person in history to produce an animal devoid of germs 
[…] Such an animal would be fascinating and modern” (68–69). In light of the lon-
ger history of gnotobiology I have been discussing, of course, such an animal was 
neither modern, nor invented by Reyniers.
If Dunn frames gnotobiology as a continuation of the technological advances 
of the mid-twentieth century, other authors link it more specifically to the anti-
microbial advances of the same period. Anderson and his colleagues introduce 
Pasteur’s hypothesis but only mention the actual existence of germfree animals 
following their section on penicillin, implying that it was only in the wake of anti-
biotics that germfree mice were “finally created” via C-section birth (Anderson et 
al. 2017: 33). Similarly, Velasquez-Manoff writes,
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, following a hundred years of almost mi-
raculous progress in medicine—including the triumph of germ theory, the advent 
of antibiotics, and the polio vaccine—scientists finally looked into Pasteur’s idea. 
They delivered mice by C-section, fed them sterile food, and raised them in germ-
free bubbles […] (Velasquez-Manof f 2012: 169)
Velasquez-Manoff suggests Pasteur’s vision to have lain dormant for a half cen-
tury, emerging only after the solidification of a systemic program of microbial 
eradication, and from a cultural moment in which such progress was hailed as 
“miraculous” and a “triumph.” Each of these books, then, suggests that Pasteur’s 
vision of germfree animals could only be realized in the wonder-drug era.7 Gnoto-
biology, disjointed from its historical origins, becomes symptomatic of a prevail-
ing attitude of antibiosis.
Indeed, microbiome writers share a preoccupation with antibiotic drugs, 
which often function as symbolic distillations of a less-than-rational quest for 
control over germs and disease. Antibiotics metonymize an obsessive vision of 
6  The suggestion that the Cesarean delivery of germfree mice was an innovation of the 
mid-twentieth century is also made in Anderson/Cryan/Dinan (2017: 33) and Velasquez-Manof f 
(2012: 169). 
7  The historian Robert Bud has documented the robust cultural legacy of penicillin, namely, the 
drug’s “associat[ion] with unprecedented power, science, and modern medicine” (2007: 74). Mi-
crobiome writers inherit these associations, with the gnotobiotic isolator recapitulating the fa-
miliar linkage between antibiotics and technological achievement. 
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microbial transcendence pursued at any cost. Transported into the era of wonder 
drugs and vaccines, then, germfree animals become products of an ill-advised de-
sire for life beyond germs. 
For microbiome writers, germfree fantasy rather than technological rational-
ity has guided the development of gnotobiology. Dunn’s account in The Wild Life of 
Our Bodies features a Reyniers driven to the pursuit of germfree steel isolators by 
a fantasy of both personal and biological transcendence: he “dreamed of germfree 
rats and, with them, grandeur” (Dunn 2011: 68). A lengthy discussion of Reyniers’s 
work describes him as nearly crazed in his obsessive pursuit of the “dream” of 
germfree life, “interested, beyond reason” (67) in Pasteur’s hypothesis and irra-
tionally driven to disprove it. Dunn repeatedly emphasizes Reyniers’s youth—he 
was nineteen—and calls him “a boy” (69, 70). Dunn also plays up Reyniers’s un-
orthodox training as a machinist rather than as a biologist and his appointment 
to academic posts without the expected degrees. Dunn’s Reyniers is an audacious 
dreamer, carried beyond reason in his imagination of germfree life. While oth-
er microbiome writers treat Reyniers with more circumspection, the situation of 
gnotobiology in a post-antibiotic world is widely echoed: the germfree animal in 
its germfree world is framed as the terminus, and culmination, of antibiosis. 
Accusations such as Dunn’s—that the pursuit of germfree life is rooted in un-
reasonable fantasy—recur throughout microbiome writing, particularly in dis-
cussions of the material elimination of microorganisms through antibiotics. In 
microbiome-era retellings of gnotobiological history, the discovery of penicillin is 
said to have launched the persistent imagination of a germfree human future. As 
Anderson and his collaborators put it,
The world began to wonder: Could germs be completely eliminated? The idea of 
living in a sterilized world—a world free of disease—was tantalizing. People fan-
tasized about a future in which children would be brought up as superkids, liber-
ated by their germ-free environment. Without bacteria, they would never be sick 
and could live for hundreds of years. It was a vision of purity, a sparkling biological 
utopia. (Anderson et al. 2017: 32–33)
Wonder, fantasy, vision: penicillin gives rise irresistibly to the possibility of germ-
free utopia, to the wild dream of liberation from illness and death. 
With germfree animals, microbiome writers suggest, the dream became real. 
Dunn attributes an irresistible allure to Reyniers’s animals, suggesting that even 
scientists were led astray by the discovery that it was, after all, possible to live 
without microbes:
Reyniers spoke of ten and with the weight of his institute and accomplishments. 
His voice came to dominate the field […] Each new talk or study added punctua-
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tion until one could almost hear it, a drumming chorus of “Kill the germs!” “Kill the 
germs!” and we would be free of our past. Kill the germs and we would be healthier 
and happier, just like the guinea pigs in their giant metal worlds. (Dunn 2011: 74)
The scientific response to Reyniers’s guinea pigs, Dunn implies, has actually been 
a collective mania in which biologists’ own antibiotic fantasies are recursively am-
plified by the materialization of germfree animals. Significantly, Dunn presents 
the scientific aspiration toward microbial transcendence as being motivated by an 
explicit desire to kill the germs, not merely to study life without them: gnotobiol-
ogy is synonymous with microbicide.
The public, Dunn suggests, has been similarly affected by appearance of germ-
free animals. Noting that germfree animals generally outlive their conventional 
counterparts, he writes that Reyniers “had inspired the imagination of the masses, 
inspired them to believe that we all might live like his guinea pigs, germ-free and 
nearly forever” (73). Germfree guinea pigs were more than scientific model organ-
isms, becoming also “a model of what was possible” and foretelling “the chambers 
of the future, where we were completely removed from the plagues of our past” 
(72–74). But the imagined germfree future does not remain hypothetical: Dunn 
suggests that it has also driven efforts to manifest a germfree state in the present. 
For the public, such efforts take shape not as elaborate isolators but rather as more 
ordinary antimicrobial compulsions, attempts to “make our lives more like the 
lives in those guinea pig chambers” (74). Dunn declares antimicrobial actions to be 
attempts toward a literal germfree bubble, reinforced by the “barriers we attempt 
to erect with antibiotic wipes, antibiotic sprays, and the like” (76). 
For Dunn, the familiar antimicrobial practices of daily human life are consis-
tent with the same germfree dreaming that produced gnotobiology. This senti-
ment recurs across microbiome books, with authors continually equating modern 
life with a deeply rooted and irrational desire to eliminate, not just to manage, 
microorganisms. Dietert, in The Human Superorganism, laments our “modernized 
world of antibiotic-administered, formula-fed, cesarean-delivered babies grow-
ing up in urban environments, surrounded by hand sanitizers and antibacterial 
wipes” (Dietert 2016: 6). Dietert suggests a spatial boundedness to this antibiotic 
lifestyle in which babies, not unlike germfree mice, are born and raised within 
strict barriers keeping germs at bay—as if living in a bubble. 
The scientific literature characterizes the effects of depleted microbiome bio-
diversity as dysbiosis: a lost biodiversity ref lected in an imbalance in the expected 
proportions, but not the total volume, of species comprising a body’s microf lora.8 
In popular science writing, however, dysbiosis is often reinvented as a state of mi-
crobiological barrenness. Microbes are not imbalanced, but rather gone entirely 
8  For a philosophical critique of the explanatory potential of dysbiosis: O’Malley/Skillings (2018). 
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in an “epidemic of absence” (Velasquez-Manoff 2012) and a crisis of “missing mi-
crobes” (Blaser 2014). The human body perceives the loss: Blaser describes “a dance 
without a partner,” Dunn a “longing” or “an ache for the context you miss,” like the 
“pain of a missing limb” (Blaser 2014: 122; Dunn 2011: 23, xii, xiii). These tropes are 
supplemented by microbiome writing’s proliferation of environmental destruc-
tion metaphors, such that the antibiotic-laden modern body is said to suffer like 
a landscape that is scorched, deforested, desolate without its extinct species, and 
polluted by nuclear fallout.9 Contained within antibiotic barriers rigorously main-
tained, the human body becomes figuratively germfree. 
Microbiome writers do not hold that our bodies are literally germfree, but 
rather that the germfree imagination continues unabated in a continual striving 
toward germfree utopia. It is in this trajectory that they seek to intervene. The 
solution to germfree fantasy, according to these authors, is scientific rationality. 
They suggest that microbiome science, with its sobering attention to the conse-
quences of microbial depletion, can puncture the inf lated dream of life beyond 
germs. Microbiomic rationality exposes the germfree dream to be a germfree 
nightmare; it defines the microbeless body as disastrous rather than transcendent. 
In advocating for a saner approach to germs, microbiome writers take on the 
rhetorical mantle of historical antibiotic reformers: mid-twentieth-century infec-
tious disease researchers who sought to curb the overzealous use of antibiotics. 
According to Scott H. Podolsky, reformers defined the overuse of antibiotics as 
driven by a deep-seated irrationality, and they advocated for “therapeutic ratio-
nality” in response (Podolsky 2015: 2). For microbiome writers, too, accusations 
of irrationality sharpen arguments for a more sparing use of antibiotics as well 
as a more deliberate approach to living with microorganisms.10 Time and again, 
the yearning for life without microbes is countered by an emphasis on the risks of 
such a life. As we will see, the “impossible life” of the germfree organism comes to 
mean something worse than death: a life of unbearable suffering. 
9  Blaser (2014) employs these metaphors relentlessly, but they abound across microbiome writ-
ing. They are inherited, in part, from antibiotic reformers’ tendency toward natural destruc-
tion metaphors (Podolsky 2015) and contemporary catastrophe discourse in microbiology 
(Nerlich 2009). 
10  On hysteria surrounding microbes and the “gospel of germs,” see Tomes (1998); on American 
culture’s particular obsession with cleanliness, see Hoy (1996). 
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Germfree Suffering
Living without germs leaves a mark. From the outset of gnotobiology, scientists 
have identified multiple physiological and immunological anomalies of gnotobi-
osis: altered anatomical features, digestive and metabolic anomalies, heightened 
nutrient requirements, and more.11 Yet these anomalies are familiar, well charac-
terized, and manageable. When successfully accommodated with the appropriate 
supplements and care, germfree animals thrive. In itself, germfreeness is not an 
obstacle to long-term survival. Gnotobiotic animals even tend to outlive their con-
ventional counterparts. 
The gnotobiotic isolator might reasonably be considered a triumph of engi-
neering and, given its success in medicine, a lifesaving innovation. But microbi-
ome writers define the technology almost exclusively as transgressive—as Dunn 
writes, “monstrous” (Dunn 2011: 73). Monstrosity, not achievement, characterizes 
the mission to separate an organism from its microbes. Other authors also de-
scribe germfree isolators as violations of the natural order, emphasizing their 
strangeness, awkwardness, or sheer technological immensity: Ed Yong calls them 
“some of the strangest environments in the world” (Yong 2016: 112); Turney, “an 
expensive and awkward business” (Turney 2015: 55). The monstrous space of the 
isolator extends to the bodies enclosed within, as microbiome writers consistently 
transform the familiar physiological anomalies of the germfree mouse into indi-
cators of suffering. Difference becomes abnormality; isolation becomes pathol-
ogy. Germfree mice are remade as victims, irreparably harmed and decisively 
artificial. 
The artifice of germfree life, for instance, is highlighted in microbiome writ-
ers’ frequent assertion that all germfree mice are Cesarean-delivered before being 
transferred to their isolators.12 While this procedure has remained in use since the 
nineteenth century, it has largely been eliminated—except in the establishment of 
new colonies—due to the development of breeding colonies in which animals give 
birth without intervention. Rampant C-section birth is a convenient suggestion, 
however, for writers wishing to establish these animals as thoroughly artificial—
reproductively inviable—from birth to death. With assisted obstetrics a condition 
of their very existence, they embody a horrifying vision of technological intrusion: 
babies wrested from mothers, skin replaced with iron. 
The pattern repeats in discussions of the distinctive physiologies of germfree 
mice. Microbiome writers seldom acknowledge that scientists modify the care of 
germfree animals to ensure their long-term survival, instead defining difference 
itself as pathological. Inf luential microbiologist and proto-microbiome writer 
11  See Carter/Foster (2006) and, for a historical perspective, Gordon/Pesti (1971).
12  E.g. Turney (2015); Rosebury (1969); and Velasquez-Manof f (2012).
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Theodor Rosebury set this tone in his 1969 book, Life on Man, writing that germfree 
animals “turn out to be puny and deformed […] with deficiencies and weaknesses 
yet to be counted” (Rosebury 1969: 149).13 Contemporary writers follow Rosebury’s 
lead, almost always portraying these animals as both deformed and deficient. 
Sachs recites a litany of defects: “unusually thin” intestinal tracts, and bodies 
“unusually vulnerable” to toxins and “unusually susceptible to deadly infections” 
(Sachs 2007: 45). Sachs does not mention that these differences are managed by 
researchers; rather, the unusual physiology of the germfree mouse becomes in-
trinsically problematic. 
Germfree mouse bodies are sometimes more overtly characterized as gro-
tesque. Yong notes the “weird biology of germ-free animals” (Yong 2016: 54), 
while Velasquez-Manoff depicts them as having a “really weird” physiology that 
is “off,” “abnormal,” “malformed,” “strange,” “shrunken,” and “arrested” (Velas-
quez-Manoff 2012: 169–170). For Collen, they are revolting: an animal researcher 
she interviews recalls “that the first time she dissected a germ-free mouse, she 
was horrified by the size of the caecum, which took up most of the space in the 
abdomen” (Collen 2015: 128). The researcher’s horror is recreated for the reader 
thanks to the inclusion of colored images of f layed mouse guts, in which the con-
ventional as well as the germfree cecum might well be repulsive to the average 
reader. For these writers, the normal physiological differences of the germfree 
body are equated with suffering. 
Significantly, in these accounts the research utility of germfree animals is 
rarely discussed; their crucial contributions to the study of human-microbial ecol-
ogy go unnoticed. Instead, they are deployed primarily for their symbolic value. 
Transformed into bodily victims of a regime that values germfreeness above func-
tion and accepts countless deformities as the cost of its achievement, germfree 
mice are meant to be startlingly familiar. As depicted by microbiome writers, the 
grotesque germfree body is both alien and deeply resonant with the human bod-
ies also suffering the consequences of antibiosis. Mice and humans are common 
victims of the dream of a germfree world.
Microbiome writers generally suggest that the microbially-depleted human 
body suffers profoundly in its “dance without a partner.” Blaser even describes the 
lost biodiversity of the human microbiome as “exacting a terrible price”:
We are suf fering from a mysterious array of what I call “modern plagues”: obesi-
ty, childhood diabetes, asthma, hay fever, food allergies, esophageal reflux and 
cancer, celiac disease, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, autism, eczema […] Un-
13  I include Rosebury’s work in this chapter because it has been particularly influential for mi-
crobiome scientists as well as popular science writers, and because it prefigures many of the 
themes and narratives of contemporary microbiome books. 
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like most lethal plagues of the past that struck relatively fast and hard, these are 
chronic conditions that diminish and degrade their victims’ quality of life for de-
cades. (Blaser 2014: 6, 2)
In Blaser’s assessment, these modern plagues are unleashing an unprecedented 
misery that is subtler than infectious diseases—the “lethal plagues of the past”—
but no less profound. He suggests an urgent need to become attuned to these new-
er, more nuanced illnesses produced by the damaged microbiome. 
We are meant to recognize ourselves within the space of the germfree isola-
tor, identifying the bodily aff lictions wrought by our own antimicrobial dreams. 
Contemporary human bodies mirror the “monstrous” germfree mice in microbi-
ome writing, even if they do not (yet) appear so grotesque. In this sense, germ-
free animals might be understood as serving a diagnostic function, presenting 
aff lictions that allow humans to identify their own dysbiotic suffering even in a 
not-quite-germfree world. The gnotobiotic isolator and the modern human world 
thereby become parallel spaces, limned spatially or rhetorically by a sterile bound-
ary within which life suffers. 
But the key innovation of microbiome writing’s reappraisal of germfree life 
is that it is more than merely diagnostic of present human illness, also serving a 
crucial deterrent function; the virtual witnessing of germfree catastrophe is mo-
bilized to intervene in the future. Microbiome writers generally suggest that the 
crisis of noncommunicable diseases, already dangerously out of control, threat-
ens to worsen as the germfree fantasy draws ever closer to completion. Germfree 
mice and David Vetter, as early manifestations of that dream, suggest humanity’s 
trajectory. Revealing the germfree dream to be a biological catastrophe, they are 
deployed to startle the reader into a more rational apprehension of microbial life 
and to forestall the devastations of antibiosis. 
There is abundant cultural precedent for this speculative neutralization of the 
germfree dream. Science fiction authors pioneered the narration of germfree life’s 
damages as a means of critiquing dominant, eradicative attitudes toward micro-
organisms. For instance, Michael Crichton’s novel The Andromeda Strain (1969) 
imagines the development of Kalocin, a “universal antibiotic” that fully eliminates 
a patient’s microbial load to horrifying effect. Crichton emphasizes the risk of su-
perinfection, the uncontrolled inf lux of microorganisms into the germfree body. 
In the novel, the clinical volunteers who test this powerful antibiotic suffer painful 
deaths upon discontinuing treatment: 
The forty volunteers each had died of obscure and horrible diseases no one had 
ever seen before. One man experienced swelling of his body, from head to foot, a 
hot, bloated swelling until he suf focated from pulmonary edema. Another man 
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fell prey to an organism that ate away his stomach in a matter of hours. A third was 
hit by a virus that dissolved his brain to a jelly. And so it went. (Crichton 1969: 266) 
This side effect is so severe that the drug is ultimately denied even to a key scientist 
who becomes infected with the gruesome Andromeda Strain. “It might cure you 
for a while,” the lead researcher explains, “but you’d never survive later, when you 
were taken off” (267). Germfreeness is the greater evil, a state not to be pursued 
even under the gravest circumstances—not even in the face of a ghastly death.
Scientific discourse has also historically relied on the power of the apocalyptic 
imagination to counter prevailing germophobias, through thought experiments 
exploring the catastrophic disappearance of microorganisms in the global ecosys-
tem. The foundational example is bacteriologist Otto Rahn’s 1945 popular press 
book Microbes of Merit, featuring an epilogue that summarizes the diverse roles of 
bacteria by imagining their disappearance in the wake of an antimicrobial comet. 
Rahn observes that the immediate resolution of bacterial diseases would be wel-
comed, but any celebration would quickly cease with the unfolding of successive 
global crises: stalled agriculture, the accumulation of undecomposed bodies, dev-
astated landscapes, undrinkable water. These consequences reveal the demoniza-
tion of microorganisms to be short-sighted, thinkable only by those who “take the 
cooperation of microbes for granted” (Rahn 1945: 274). The imagined hellscape of 
a world without microbes is meant to return readers to a more holistic attitude in 
which they join Rahn in concluding: “Let us hope that we never collide with the tail 
of such a comet” (274). 
In their engagements with germfree life, microbiome writers largely reprise 
the lessons of Crichton’s Kalocin, Rahn’s antimicrobial comet, and countless other 
devices historically recruited to illustrate graphically the toll of the germfree aspi-
ration. Yet where these precursors have always announced themselves as thought 
experiments or as science fiction, microbiome writers extract the same insight 
from real, embodied organisms. One need no longer turn to the imagination, it 
would seem; looking into the gnotobiotic isolator brings the germfree nightmare 
to life before our very eyes. As perfections of an abiotic state dreamed of but not 
hitherto attained in the human world, germfree animals materialize antibiosis 
and its costs. 
Rosebury first brought this speculative maneuver to microbiome writing in 
his discussion of gnotobiology. He writes that the numerous deficiencies of germ-
free animals demand we “abolish at once any notion we might have had that the 
animal would be generally better off without his germs […] The germ-free animal 
is, by and large, a miserable creature” (Rosebury 1969: 49). Rosebury here com-
ments on more than simply the status of germfree animals: his detailing of their 
miseries serves to rebut the notion that life without germs might be desirable—
for humans. Animal misery forebodes human misery. He continues, “Knowing 
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things like this, would you willingly separate your infant from his microbes if 
you could? Or ought you to be glad you can’t?” (54). The paired questions affirm 
the stubborn persistence of gnotobiotic fantasy, despite the recognition that its 
achievement would be devastating. For Rosebury, that aspiration might only be 
dispelled by a speculative intervention: by asking the reader to imagine their own 
infant as germfree and therefore subject to the atrocities wreaked upon gnotobi-
otic animals.
Contemporary microbiome writers also turn to germfree animals as indi-
cators of human suffering, though they generally assert a stronger potency for 
the deterrent possibilities of germfree imagination. Dietert is perhaps the most 
explicit in identifying the speculative mode animating microbiome writers’ en-
gagements with germfree life. He explicates at some length a 1971 gnotobiology 
review article summarizing the physiological anomalies of germfree animals.14 
Significantly, Dietert interprets the article as a catalogue of present and future 
human horrors, despite the fact that it makes no claims about human applications. 
He argues that it “foretells exactly what happens when we are a single mamma-
lian species. Without those microbes, we face a life of biological deficiencies, ill-
nesses, and death” (Dietert 2016: 44). From the bodies of gnotobiotic animals, he 
extrapolates to a dire human future of required nutritional supplements, swelling, 
immune susceptibility, and imminent death. It is germfree animals that lead him 
to conclude that “there are consequences to degrading or damaging the human 
microbiome garden,” which is absolutely required in order “to have a healthy and 
prolonged life” (45). 
For Dietert, germfree animals are more than model organisms; they also fore-
tell our impending germfree future. It is a vision from which the reader is meant 
to recoil, to be surprised into a new appreciation of microbial life. Recognizing the 
kinship of this maneuver with the sorts of science fictional devices I mentioned 
above, Dietert explains his symbolic use of germfree organisms through the lens 
of speculative fiction: 
A wealth of studies in rodents and other animals shows us what happens when 
the microbiome is degraded, damaged, or even lost. The storyline strikes me as a 
little similar to the classic Frank Capra movie It’s a Wonderful Life. We have the in-
formation to look ahead and see what the future brings for living with a damaged 
microbiome. It is not pretty. It is not something we would want for ourselves or our 
children. (44) 
Germfree animals, then, are our future. In them we are meant to glimpse the cul-
mination of antibiotic fantasy, and to find it so appalling that we are provoked to 
14  The review, which goes uncited, is likely Gordon/Pesti (1971).
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reject such fantasy. With this digression, Dietert asks his readers to take on the 
role of George Bailey, the protagonist of It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) who wishes he’d 
never been born. The film narrates Bailey’s glimpsing of a world without him—that 
is, a world in which impulsive dreams of absence are actualized. Merely a glimpse 
is enough to affirm for Bailey the necessity of reintegrating with his social and 
familial context. The same is meant to be true for readers of Dietert’s book: merely 
a glimpse of the post-microbial future, as embodied in germfree mice, should af-
firm the necessity of reintegrating with one’s micro-ecological context. An apoca-
lyptic vision of the future thus comes to prevent that vision coming true. 
The Germs That Bind
Nowhere is the imminent futurity of gnotobiosis more evident than in the case 
of David Vetter, whose bubble-bound form is continually recruited by microbi-
ome writers to define the costs of life without germs. Where gnotobiotic animals 
generally illustrate physiological effects, however, David’s humanity enables an 
argument for the social consequences of germfree life. Paxson and Helmreich 
write that as model ecosystems, microbial communities are “made to signify larg-
er biological worlds and socialities, wider perils and promises, in worlds imagined 
yet to come” (Paxson/Helmreich 2014: 171). David’s story is only nominally about 
a celebrity of the past. As told by microbiome writers, it also entails a model-eco-
system claim in which David signifies the promises and, especially, the perils of 
imagined worlds without germs. As with the germfree mice discussed above, his 
story is retold as a deterrent: the recitation of his struggles is intended to guide 
readers to step out of their own bubbles and into a life interconnected with human 
and microbial bodies. 
In microbiome writing, David’s enclosure in the bubble is generally suggest-
ed to have been motivated by irrational germophobia more than any therapeutic 
agenda. He becomes the product of the persistent dream of life beyond germs first 
realized in gnotobiology. In The Psychobiotic Revolution, Anderson and his coau-
thors claim that penicillin launched dreams of “superkids” raised in “a sparkling 
biological utopia” (Anderson et al. 2017: 32–33)—and David seemed to materialize 
those dreams. They write that “in 1971 the ultimate germ-free animal was created: 
a human.”15 As ultimate germfree animal, David here becomes the culmination—
the dream come true—of both antibiotics and gnotobiology. It is a claim echoed 
by Dunn in The Wild Life of Our Bodies, writing that David’s life and eventual death 
15  Kirk details the early history of gnotobiological therapeutics, writing that these precedents 
“helped determine David’s role as an object of scientific interest, comparable, if not directly 
akin, to the laboratory animal” (2012a: 269).
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resulted from the belief that “we might achieve some germ-free utopia for our-
selves” (Dunn 2011: 76).16
Framed as the achievement of germfree utopia, David is transformed into 
gnotobiotic specimen. His SCID diagnosis recedes; his dramatically improved 
lifespan is forgotten. Instead, he is made to exemplify the catastrophically miss-
ing contemporary microbiome. In reality, he was not germfree, possessing a lim-
ited microf lora due to leaks and contaminations (Williamson 1977). Microbiome 
writers consistently disregard that fact. Anderson and his colleagues insist that 
this “ultimate germ-free animal” was “freed from germs” (Anderson et al. 2017: 34). 
That point is echoed by Dietert, who asserts that he had “no immune system and 
no microbiome to co-mature with him and to enable him to function biologically 
in the environment of the world” (Dietert 2016: 73–74)—a phrasing that strongly 
implies that it was gnotobiosis, rather than SCID, from which David suffered. 
In the context of microbiome writing’s preoccupation with gnotobiology, 
readers are encouraged to consider David’s putative germfreeness with the defor-
mity and physiological suffering so consistently attributed to germfree animals. 
No longer an engineering triumph, no longer a safe space, the bubble comes to 
signify a violation of the natural order. Crucially, though, David’s own story com-
plicates this narrative: microbiome writers must confront the inconvenient fact of 
his physiological normalcy. Physically healthy, typically developing, charismatic 
and curious even under the circumstances of his confinement, David fails to ex-
hibit the deficiencies so insistently associated with germfree life in microbiome 
writing.
In 10% Human, Collen reconciles this contradiction by allowing David to have 
been less-than-fully germfree. She explains his microf lora as the result of medical 
failure: “[D]espite their best efforts to keep David germ-free, from birth onward 
his gut had been colonised by more and more species of bacteria” (Collen 2015: 
127). Collen suggests those bacteria to have been his salvation; had the bubble been 
executed as intended, the results would have been disastrous. The hypothetical 
here becomes an occasion to invoke the speculative-deterrent mode of germfree 
life once more: 
Had David been truly germ-free, the coroner at his autopsy might have discovered 
that David’s digestive system was drastically out of proportion. The first tennis-
ball-like section of the large intestine—the caecum—to which the appendix is at-
tached, might have been more like a football than a tennis ball. The folded surface 
of the small intestine would probably have had a much smaller surface area than 
normal, and fewer blood vessels supplying it. As it was, David’s digestive system 
was as normal as any other child’s. (128)
16  Weinstein (2010: 17–27) describes gnotobiology’s perennial invitation of utopian dreaming.
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Might have been, but was not: Collen composes an alternative history in which 
David’s body, enclosed in a perfected germfree isolator, bears identity with the 
anomalies of germfree mice. Her enumeration of digestive aberrancies that might 
have been is reinforced by her description and graphic illustration of the ‘horrify-
ingly’ enlarged mouse cecum, as noted above. Gnotobiotic disaster has been fore-
stalled by the lifesaving presence of a few accidental microbes. It is a maneuver 
meant to correct the course of germfree dreaming, not only for David but also for 
the reader. 
Other microbiome writers resolve the apparent contradiction of healthy germ-
freeness by rewriting his biography into a story of unrelenting anguish that is not 
physical but rather social, emotional, and societal. In this they align with the ro-
bust cultural censure of isolator life and bubble boys that has emerged since Da-
vid’s death. Movies, songs, and literature have for decades portrayed bubble boys 
as both miraculous and victimized, heroically surviving in the face of profound, 
if intangible costs. More generally, the phrase “living in a bubble” has come to 
signify a perspective that is sheltered or shortsighted, divorced from intellectual 
context.17 Microbiome writers harness these diverse meanings, transmuting them 
into a condemnation of antibiosis. The bubble is not the problem; the missing mi-
crobiome is the problem. Taking David to be the embodiment of the epidemic of 
absence, these authors rewrite his legacy, together crafting a consistent narrative 
of profound social suffering. 
In these accounts, David is simply “bubble boy,” sometimes anonymous be-
yond this familiar nickname, and always defined by deprivation. Collen narrates 
a life of total social isolation:
David was born in 1971 by Caesarean section into a sterile plastic bubble. He was 
handled through plastic gloves and fed sterilised infant formula. He never knew 
the scent of his mother’s skin, or the touch of his father’s hand. He never played 
with another child without plastic sheeting preventing the sharing of toys and 
laughter. (127)
Collen narrates his life almost exclusively in the negative, through a list of things 
never known and sensations never felt. Gone is the celebratory tone with which 
the media documented David’s story while he lived; here and elsewhere, microbi-
ome writers emphasize only lack.
And from that lack follows an encompassing desolation. In The Psychobiotic 
Revolution, Anderson and his colleagues emphasize the boy’s psychological dis-
tress: 
17  Elman (2014) has extensively charted the cultural memory of Vetter’s life. For the political res-
onances of “living in a bubble,” see Safire (1993).
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David didn’t take long to realize that he was doomed to be cut of f from the world, 
and he started questioning his life. He was depressed, but whether that was from 
being germ free or just because he lived in a plastic bubble with no physical human 
contact is debatable. (Anderson et al. 2017: 34)
Again, David is defined exclusively by isolation and lack. His depression is sug-
gested to be due either to his germfree state or to his isolation; it is therefore re-
mediable only by integration with the human and germy world, an integration 
incompatible with his own survival. 
Figure 5.2: David Vetter with his parents, sister, and family dog. Photograph archived 
in the David Vetter Collection (1971–1986): Box 9 (David Vetter and Family, 1976–1983). 
Courtesy of Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Insti-
tution, Washington, DC. 
In Dunn’s The Wild Life of Our Bodies, social isolation appears to be the indirect 
cause of death. Omitting the contributions of David’s very involved parents and 
sister (fig. 5.2), Dunn writes that “inside his chamber, he was raised by doctors 
until the age of twelve” (Dunn 2011: 76). 
Like some Mowgli raised by wolves, this David exists entirely beyond the hu-
man realm, a separation that he attempts to transcend with grave consequenc-
es. Dunn continues, “at twelve, he wanted out. At twelve, something needed to 
change and so he was given a bone marrow transplant in an attempt to restore his 
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immune system” (76).18 That this transplant ultimately ended his life consolidates 
David’s status as a sufferer of the fatal pathology of isolation. To live with people 
is to live with germs; their lack is unsustainable on any level. 
In retelling David’s story, these authors highlight the denial of desires uni-
versal to human experience—for a parent’s touch, for friendly interaction, for 
shared laughter and a bit of teenage rebellion—and so forge an argument for the 
social suffering of the germfree state. Microbiome writers generally describe the 
toll of dysbiosis for ordinary people in similar terms, suggesting that the result-
ing illnesses resulting from a too-clean environment force sufferers into condi-
tions of social withdrawal. In Good Germs, Bad Germs, Sachs details the plights of 
two young boys whose severe food allergies force them to withdraw from friends, 
classmates, and even family (Sachs 2007: 7, 73). In An Epidemic of Absence, Velas-
quez-Manoff describes “asthmatic teenagers wondering if they’ll be able to join 
friends in a game of baseball” (Velasquez-Manoff 2012: 6). David’s case shows this 
social cost at its most extreme. Once more, germfree life is invoked as a deterrent 
to the dream of life beyond germs. 
In microbiome writing, however, David symbolizes more than merely indi-
vidual isolation. His germfreeness also forebodes a societal breakdown felt well 
beyond his bubble. In The Human Superorganism, Dietert pivots from David to ex-
pansive claims about the consequences of microbial depletion at the societal level, 
depicting a dramatic rise in “microbially incomplete” babies—an entire “incom-
plete generation” (Dietert 2016: 73). Dietert takes David’s bubble to be an outward 
indicator of his own “microbial incompleteness,” a state that kept him “removed 
from the world’s normal environment and segregated into a completely artificial 
environment” (74). Dietert, in other words, identifies David’s segregation as the 
fate awaiting the incomplete generation. He observes that the skyrocketing rate 
of dysbiotic illness means that “increasing numbers of us may have severely re-
stricted environments in which we can safely function” and “restrict[ed] access to 
the full environment normally enjoyed by others” (74). The result is a widespread 
“social fracturing,” detectable in a breakdown of social cohesion (76). With food 
allergies, for instance, familiar social rituals come unglued: 
Individuals may […] have to withdraw from what used to be routine social gath-
erings and interactions with friends, family, and business colleagues […] Holiday 
dinner celebrations, wedding receptions, community dinners, summer picnics, 
conference meals, and even single-family meals are increasingly af fected. (76)
18  Dunn’s implication of adolescent rebellion is consistent with representations of David’s life as 
a coming-of-age tale, especially in film adaptations (Elman 2014). 
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Dietert calls these deprivations a “new cost in human capital, our capacity to con-
gregate around a meal, and a type of freedom humans used to have” (77). 
David thus portends the looming societal disasters produced by the pursuit 
of life beyond germs. Echoing his description of Vetter as “segregated” into his 
bubble, Dietert suggests that the social withdrawal necessitated by dysbiotic ill-
ness threatens to solidify into full-f ledged institutionalized injustice. He predicts 
a recapitulation of the “physical segregation of people in the course of human his-
tory” due to factors such as “race, religion, lifestyle […] politics, and wealth” (77). 
Invoking leper colonies and the Indian caste system, Dietert here articulates the 
most sweeping extrapolation possible from David’s isolator, looking to a future 
fractured by “an ever-increasing divide among humans” (78). 
In microbiome writing, then, David represents both the individual and the so-
cial costs of antibiosis. Further, his life comes to represent a germfree catastrophe 
threatening all of society, in which people are held apart from one another as from 
the germs that bind—from the germs that constitute the very fabric of functional 
society.
David’s story comes to represent how much we stand to lose should we fail 
to stop dreaming of a world without microbes. He thus becomes, for Anderson 
and his colleagues, the “ultimate germ-free animal” in a second sense: the last and 
final germ-free animal, such that there will be no more bubble boys. The authors 
write of his death: 
The public was taken aback by this human experiment that had gone so wrong, and 
at a stroke, it seemed, we awoke from the dream of a germ-free world. David, freed 
from germs, was not a superkid. The microbes, it seemed, had won a reprieve. (An-
derson et al. 2017: 34)
A sudden, unified awakening: this is the impact of witnessing David’s life and 
death, in a phrasing that encapsulates the use of germfree life in microbiome 
writing more broadly. David and his various miseries, like the deformities at-
tributed to germfree mice, are suggested to carry with them the power to rouse 
an entire society (or at least, a diligent reader) from a decades-long dream of life 
beyond germs. Fantasy is countered with a speculative glimpse of our own future 
and, at a stroke, we awake. 
Conclusion
The specter of germfree life haunts our dreams of the future. As this chapter has 
shown, in microbiome writing the miseries of microbeless bodies—whether an-
imal or human—ref lect onto the present. Authors identify the deformities of the 
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germfree mouse, or the social ruptures of David the Bubble Boy, as the terminus 
of a trajectory already in progress. Glimpsing our own germfree futures, microbi-
ome writing suggests, we are compelled to intervene. 
In this context, it is unsurprising that microbiome writers unanimously 
suggest ways of emerging from the bubbles of our modern, sanitized existence. 
They champion responsible means of rewilding bodies devastated by antibiotics, 
whether through consumption of fermented foods, through “natural” ways of 
birthing and feeding babies, or through the dictum to get your hands dirty. As we 
have seen, not only human bodies but the very functioning of society and com-
munity are at stake. In the post-microbiome vision of the future, we step out of 
our bubbles, awaken from the dream, and build for ourselves better, and germier, 
lives.
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Chapter 6: Spores of Speculation 
Negotiating Mold as Contamination
Christoph Schemann
This essay ref lects on some of the often worrying worldings1 of well-known fungal 
companions called “mold.”2 It highlights the speculative character of mold-related 
negotiations and practices that originate from encounters in different contexts 
and settings. More specifically, it argues that we can usefully distinguish between 
a “firmative” and an “affirmative” mode of speculation, as proposed by the uncer-
tain commons (2013) collective. Efforts that are determined to proceed by encod-
ing and fixing mold as a signifier of contamination for human health and the in-
habited built environment are framed here as firmative speculation. While mold 
can undoubtedly be harmful to humans (and to other organic materials especially 
when becoming its substrates), such attempts are nevertheless rife with obstacles 
and uncertainties. They are speculative, insofar as the individual susceptibility 
to mold is highly variable—depending on the conditions of one’s own immune 
system, for example, acute or chronic immunodeficiencies and allergic disposi-
tions—and the principle of cause and effect is hardly linear or generalizable when 
it comes to providing a clear-cut diagnosis once symptoms occur. Furthermore, 
considering the extent and duration of exposition, the complex of problems needs 
to be related not only to the human body but also to the fungi, taking into account 
the quantity and quality of the diverse sorts of mold and their biomaterial char-
acteristics, substrates, metabolisms, and varying forms of spatialization. Thus, 
other convergences with mold that open up rather contingent ways of negotiation 
and cohabitation can instead be understood as actualizing an affirmative mode of 
speculation. Attending to such affirmative engagements also signals possibilities 
1  Drawing upon the work of Donna Haraway (2008), the notion of “worlding” or “becoming with” 
(301) “insists on the coconstitution, the material-semiotic interplay, that shapes what is” (van 
Dooren/Kirksey/Münster 2016: 12).
2  While I use the semantics of “mold” and “fungus” interchangeably here, they do not necessarily 
denominate the same objects. Their respective meanings—along with those of related terms, 
such as “mildew”—have been shaped in dif ferent contexts, e.g. biology, medicine, vernacular 
language, metaphoric usage, and so forth (cf. Bates 2015: 49–50).
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of shifting from speculations about mold toward ways of speculating with mold as 
contamination.
In proposing this shift, this essay connects to what Donna Haraway has 
termed the “Chthulucene.” Challenging the anthropocentric perspective aimed 
at controlling far-reaching socio-ecological entanglements between humans and 
nonhumans in what has become known as the Anthropocene, the Chthulucene 
is instead about ways of “staying with the trouble” and “making kin” with such 
potentially risky creatures as mold (Haraway 2015, 2016). In exploring different 
ways of speculating, I also draw on Karen Barad’s elaborations on “agential re-
alism.” Barad’s entwined onto-epistemological concepts of the “apparatus”3 and 
“intra-action”4 will be deployed here as an analytical framework to avoid essen-
tializing the living entities commonly assembled under the term “mold” and to 
highlight the performative (and necessarily selective) character of knowledge 
production around mold and contamination within the cases discussed. As Barad 
puts it: “Intra-actions always entail particular exclusions, and exclusions foreclose 
any possibility of determinism, providing the condition of an open future” (Barad 
2003: 826). Hence, apparatuses are themselves materializing practices that per-
form “particular ways of drawing boundaries between ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’” 
(Barad 2012: 31)—so-called “agential cuts” that produce knowledge around what 
mold can be and do within specific settings. 
In what follows, I examine the performativity of mold in relation to four ap-
paratuses for “cutting together-apart the mould” (Bates 2015). My analysis draws 
on ethnographic research conducted between winter 2016 and fall 2017 in a va-
riety of sites.5 The first two apparatuses, the “distributed sporesmeter” and the 
“(human) ventilator,” bring into relief firmative modes of speculation connected to 
3  Barad presents her outline of an apparatus in the fourth chapter of Meeting the Universe Halfway 
(2007: 132–185). Importantly, an apparatus does not necessarily denote a given sociotechnical 
device in the classical sense but can refer to any material-semiotic assemblage through which 
knowledge regarding certain phenomena can be perceived. Furthermore, apparatuses do not 
exist in themselves but only through intra-active practices that perform them.
4  Barad coins the term “intra-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the 
prior existence of independent entities/relata)” to highlight that the entities isolated by an 
apparatus that examines them do not exist as individual elements independently from this 
apparatus (2003: 815; cf. Barad 2007).
5  All research has been done by the author. Based on an ethnographic multi-sited research de-
sign, the data collected draws on field notes from participatory observations, review of special-
ized literature, ethnographic photography, conversations with experts in the fields of micro-
biology, mycology, sanitation, the building sector, and pest control, interviews with activists 
engaged in urban exploration and food saving, and discussions with concerned laypeople who 
shared their own personal experiences with me. In addition, the research also involved an ex-
periment with a rapid testing device for analyzing the moldy load of indoor air, which will be 
described in detail in the section on the “sporesmeter.” 
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mold in common housing spaces. The last two apparatuses, labelled as “ruin-ar-
chive” and “waste container,” help to spotlight affirmative modes of speculation 
by drawing on the example of a decaying industrial ruin and the linkage of mold 
to both edibles and waste. In addition, these two latter cases of speculation ema-
nate not from already prescribed regulative material-semiotic practices but from 
much less enclosed performances related to urban exploration and potentialities 
of affect, disclosing much more unanticipated apparatuses in turn. Finally, dif-
ferentiating between a firmative mode and a more dynamic, affirmative mode of 
speculation will allow for modifying the prevalent understanding of contamina-
tion as threat, indicating a more contingent translation of contamination as col-
laborative encounters with diversity (Tsing 2015). This, I suggest, can further our 
understanding of human entanglements with mold and contribute to cultivating 
a more attentive and immersive notion of multispecies conjunctions (van Dooren/
Kirksey/Münster 2016).
Part One: Speculating about Mold
The Distributed Sporesmeter: Making Spores Visible
Mold in buildings is a key area of mold-related interventions. Such interventions 
involve a range of actors, including technical experts and their various instru-
ments, apart from the visible and invisible components of mold itself. Thereby, ap-
paratuses of visualization for scientifically reducing uncertainties and the fuzz-
iness of risk are key to such efforts.6 Attempts to fix the problem of uncertainty, 
which constantly challenges the field of expertise, can here be viewed as bounding 
practices of speculation that deploy technologies within a rigorously outcome-ori-
ented mode that predominantly anticipates mold as contamination. All sorts of 
mold, along with their spores and material entanglements, are expected here to fit 
within technological frameworks meant to discipline them. Interventions in rela-
tion to mold in houses are enacted not only by professionals that often command 
the most up-to-date technical equipment but also by concerned laypeople.
The distributed apparatus I would like to discuss here is what I call the 
“sporesmeter.” A sporesmeter is a biotechnological device designed to diagnose the 
degree of contamination in the ambient air of closed rooms. Its main component, 
the “Sporometer,” is simply a kind of Petri dish or contact plate coated with agar 
6  Questions of visualization have been discussed extensively in science and technology studies 
and other disciplines; for context, see, Burri/Dumit (2008); Rheinberger (2009); and Heßler/
Mersch (2009).
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as typically used in biological and medical sectors (fig. 6.1).7 It features a seem-
ingly professional instructional manual containing descriptions for correct han-
dling and can be purchased on the internet or in larger hardware and home-supply 
stores. The whole testing kit includes: a neatly vacuum-packed Sporometer with a 
contact plate that is pre-coated with an undefined agar; a brochure that informs 
the purchaser about fungi, possible health problems, and options for remediation, 
as well as advertising the manufacturing company; and an operating manual that 
provides further information about the testing procedure. The manual also in-
cludes an exemplification, a chart with specific values to denote the factor of con-
tamination, and a protocol form for recording the findings as handwritten notes 
(fig. 6.2). An impartial volunteer, a 29-year-old student, carried out the entire test 
in her apartment with no visible mold in any location and no history of mold-re-
lated damage.
To start the experiment, the Sporometer was placed on a table in the living 
room of the f lat, leaving the lid of the Petri dish open for thirty minutes, as stipu-
lated by the operating manual. The little plastic box was then closed and sealed and 
put in a shaded place, leaving the agar and its potential new but yet invisible in-
habitants to their own resources. Interestingly, after the recommended five days 
of incubation, the Petri dish transformed into a plastic greenhouse accommodat-
ing colorful bouquets of diverse mold cultures (fig. 6.1). The next step scheduled in 
the operating manual was to count out the visibly evolved spores that had taken 
residence and to make them readable in the protocol (fig. 6.2, third section from 
top). Apart from gathering information about the surveyed location as well as the 
date and the timespan of testing, the protocol offers a picture of the Sporometer 
segmented into two major quadrants—each further segmented into four minor 
quadrants—to locate and measure the concrete spots of the colonies, even though 
they appeared to be hardly separable. In fact, distinguishing them turned out to 
be the most challenging task in the entire test. Finally, the entities were pinned 
down to an approximate number of twenty discrete bio-settlers made visible in 
the Sporometer. In accordance with the chart provided, the degree of contami-
nation in the apartment was classified as category C: “critical pollution” (fig. 6.2, 
second section from top).8
7  The manufacturer calls this agar-coated plate a “Sporometer.” In modifying this name, I use the 
term “sporesmeter” to refer to the entire buyable test setup, which includes Petri dish, instruc-
tion manual, protocol, and so on.
8  The contamination levels in the chart are: A (< 10) = noncritical pollution; B (10–16) = increased 
pollution; and C (> 16) = critical pollution.
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Figure 6.1: The incubated Sporometer.
Christoph Schemann150
 
Figure 6.2: The completed protocol form.
Chapter 6: Spores of Speculation 151
Despite the fact that, strictly speaking, there was no mold visible or perceivable 
by any other senses in the apartment, the student volunteer’s feeling of being at 
ease with her living situation—which had been considered healthy prior to these 
findings—subsequently eroded. The mere presence of the incubated Sporometer 
exposing such an amount of unexpected beings in her f lat had discomforted her 
during the preceding days, when she had to watch the mold colonies slowly grow 
up from day to day underneath her table. Moreover, having heard about the po-
tential threat of respiratory problems connected to the molding of potting soil, she 
started to be concerned about the potted plants and f lowers decorating her f lat. 
However, besides searching for a reasonable cause of the contamination with-
in the realm of her own responsibility, she nevertheless started to question the 
alarming outcome of the procedure.
She was not the only one to express doubts. In the course of research, I met a 
microbiologist who runs an accredited and renowned environmental health in-
stitute that provides mold- and dampness-related damage assessments (among 
other services, such as drinking water analysis and hospital hygiene consultation). 
According to this specialist, there are quite a few obstacles to conducting such a 
do-it-yourself test with scientific rigor. Indeed, a failure of scientific standards 
is almost inevitable, as there are just too many misleading factors and potential 
sources of disruption that cannot be controlled by this lay practice. How constant 
was the temperature during the five days of incubation? Was there a window open 
or any other ventilation going on in the room during collection of the spores? 
What is the domestic architecture, and how does the arrangement of the room’s 
interior—including the array of all possibly relevant objects and materials such 
as plants and f lowers, furniture, radiators, etc.—inf luence the test? Has the box 
been placed in a spot protected from sunlight? What exact kind of agar has the 
Petri dish been coated with? Despite the fact that the manual of the sporesmeter 
informs the user about avoiding some of these obstacles, they are nevertheless 
hard to control completely—at any time. Seen from the perspective of scientific 
expertise, the distribution of such an apparatus does not make much sense, as its 
very application will multiply rather than reduce uncertainties regarding degrees 
of contamination.
Tellingly, the device also includes an advertising leaf let for mold-decontam-
ination products as well as a printed form for submitting an analysis order (for 
an additional fee). The order form instructs the user to send the protocol with 
the recorded results and the mold-charged Sporometer to an assigned microbio-
logical contractor to verify the findings and clarify the magnitude of threat.9 The 
9  Even if the results are sent in to a laboratory, they cannot be taken as fully correct and exact 
under scientific premises, as any ex post facto evaluation would be incapable of reconstructing 
the actual testing situation that occurred in the user’s place.
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spore-catching and visualizing apparatus of this measuring instrument, with all 
its complementary components and processes, can therefore best be understood as 
what Muniesa, Millo, and Callon call a “market device”: “the material and discur-
sive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets” (Muniesa/Millo/
Callon 2007: 2). Here, the necessary intervention to be made is to trap spores, turn 
them into distinct visible mold and translate the now (ac)countable colonies into 
an official form, making the results immutable and mobile so that they can easily 
be negotiated as supposedly reliable facts.10 Thus, the acts of selling and buying 
the gadget, on the one hand, and the fee-based follow-up requirements of sending 
in and defining what is at stake, on the other, represent the economic surplus of 
a market construction that relies on the ability “to stabilize a particular state of 
power relations by associating the largest number of irreversibly linked elements” 
(Callon/Latour 1981: 293). In this case, the major linkage at stake that needs to be 
stabilized consists of all the elements that get folded into the sporesmeter (test kit, 
spores of mold, temperature, moisture, humans, and so on), pushing speculation 
into the one-way street of always anticipating—and therefore calculating, imag-
ining, and performing (Anderson 2010: 787)—contamination as economic payoff.
The (Human) Ventilator: Keeping Spores in Circulation
Frequently, the inhabitants of buildings are warned to avoid mold straight from 
the outset. In particular, what is often stated as having gone wrong when there 
are visible occurrences of residential fungi—not least by landlords—is the main-
taining of sufficient circulation of air, which prevents spores from settling down 
in too large numbers. Despite the practical limitations of keeping air in circula-
tion in every part of a building, despite the existence of other factors for mold to 
grow, and despite the fact that mold does not necessarily impair human health, 
having mold in one’s residence is therefore often connected to feelings of guilt. As 
one person I interviewed (“Lynn”) aptly elaborated,
Mold can always be taken as a sign, indicating that something goes wrong, that 
something happens, which normally shouldn’t. […] It’s just like some people have 
a bad conscience when mold occurs in their homes, when they get the feeling that 
because something like this happens they might be living in the wrong way. For ex-
ample, that they are not airing their apartment enough or something like that. […] 
And mold always shows that things are somehow out of control, that these norms 
10  Here I draw on the concept of translation as developed in actor-network theory (e.g. Callon 
1984) to highlight the sociotechnical process of (re)formatting the inscription of mold/con-
tamination as “material semiotics” (cf. Law 2008) and on Latour’s notion of “immutable mo-
biles” (e.g. Latour 1987: 227; cf. Law/Mol 2001).
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of conduct are not applicable or at least that one can’t meet these obligations 
properly. I think this is felt as a personal failure rather quickly, because actually 
you know what to do so that something like this doesn’t happen.11 
Just like in the experiment concerning the sporesmeter—where the person carry-
ing out the test suspected that the potting soil might be the problem and that she 
simply possesses too many plants—discomfort and a sense of personal failure can 
be felt. In both cases, what brings mold into appearance is an accumulation of risk 
factors that are related to blocking the f low of spores. The inscription of respon-
sibility and guilt into people’s practices of circulation can thus be viewed as a key 
driver for the apparatus I call the “ventilator.”
To keep spores from accumulating, settling down and spawning up to poten-
tially harmful levels due to ventilation signals a shift in mold apparatuses away 
from measuring a concrete process of contamination toward a mode of preemp-
tion aiming at the virtual (cf. Massumi 2009). In contrast to the prevention of a 
concretely contoured thread in the making, preemption “is a mode of power that 
takes threat, which has no actual referent, as its object” (Massumi 2010: 59). In 
this case, the practice of ‘airing’ is not dependent on anticipating calculable con-
tamination because it is framed around diligent behaviors steadily integrated into 
normal, uncontaminated daily life. Diligence, in turn, gets empowered through 
principles of guidance and regulation, as Foucault ([2004] 2007, [2004] 2008) has 
analyzed in his works on (neo)liberal political economy. This governmental pow-
er-mechanism is key to an understanding of the ventilator as a decidedly ‘con-
ductive’ apparatus on behalf of a biopolitical precautionary principle regarding 
spatial purity connected to human health. It is also a savagely preemptive appara-
tus against the nonhuman life cycle of mold. As Ben Anderson has also noted, the 
logics of preemption, precaution, and preparedness, as soon as they foster socie-
tal implementation of normalization and standardization, work even without any 
occasion of concrete suspicion (Anderson 2010: 787–792). The ventilator appara-
tus, in other words, seeks to preempt any (bio)material outcomes, and even any 
breeding of mold, by instigating cautionary actions independently of any specific 
indication of contamination.12
Nevertheless, in preempting the growth of mold by keeping spores in circula-
tion, the ventilator retains mold as a key signifying component—but only its se-
miotics, not its bio-essential materiality and diversity. This indicates its major dif-
11  Translated from German by the author. Besides being concerned with indoor mold, this highly 
reflective interviewee is also a food-saving activist and will be cited again in the section below 
on the “waste container” apparatus.
12  Or the behavior-relieving installation of permanent technological solutions with aeration 
equipment, such as automated ventilation systems.
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ference in terms of the material-semiotic outcome in relation to an anticipating 
apparatus such as the sporesmeter: ‘mold’ primarily gets passed on discursively as 
a guilt-laden and shame-ridden sign, indicating a socially ostracized and person-
ally felt loss of control. In turn, to preempt such an unpleasant situation of con-
tamination where feelings of guilt and shame affect the assigned human polluter, 
mold becomes a semiotic element that does not necessarily need a projected mate-
rial correlate anymore as mold is exactly the materiality that is to be avoided. Fir-
mative speculation functions here by stabilizing mold as contamination detached 
from any actual threat or risk to health. Even though firmatively minimized to the 
highest possible extent, the process is still—or even more—speculative in gener-
al, precisely because there is no factual evidence or even any predictable conse-
quence regarding what the mobile spores might actually do once they are no lon-
ger ventilated. Thus, this preemptive variation of firmative speculation is based 
on exactly the kind of uncertainty that the anticipating sporesmeter pretends to 
overcome by intentionally producing and visualizing mold in contrast. However, 
both differentiations—anticipation and preemption—correspond to a firmative 
modus of speculation “that seeks to pin down, delimit, constrain, and enclose—to 
make things definitive, firm” (uncertain commons 2013: ch. 1).
Yet, regarding mold in buildings, there are also deviant and subversive be-
havioral patterns that withdraw from preemptive conduct by tolerating at least a 
certain degree of mold in residential spaces. Some people remove spatially quite 
limited mold spots from time to time with cleaning agents or enclose them with 
wall paint. Others even choose to strategically “stay with the trouble” (Haraway 
2016) of growing mold without any attempts to eradicate it—for instance, in order 
to enforce an abatement of rent13—keeping the fungi more or less as “‘domestic’ 
organisms […] whose species being has changed to a form that survives for human 
needs” (Tsing 2018: 232). However, the mechanisms that link anticipation to vi-
sualization and preemption to ventilation undermine the affirmative speculative 
potential of these more-than-human microbial apparatuses.14 Thus, in contrast to 
these firmative speculative practices that are more interactive than intra-active, 
arising from largely predefined material and semiotic apparatuses, the following 
13  This can normally only be the case (sometimes even negotiated before the law) if it can be 
asserted that the spatialization of mold is due to defects or deficiencies in the construction 
and not by misconduct on behalf of the tenant(s), and if the landlord does not fix the problem 
in time. However, as I have been told by experts from the building sector as well as individual 
renters, not all tenants actually want to get rid of residential mold, just as clarifying cause and 
ef fect is not always a fast problem to deal with.
14  The sporesmeter is also rife with possible speculations, both in handling the apparatus and 
negotiating the outcomes. Likewise, for the yet unsettled spores in circulation, it remains un-
known what specific ef fects a failure of ventilating may actually cause to matter (and mean-
ing) in particular spaces and places.
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two negotiations fairly invert this ratio by highlighting more contingent practices 
of speculation and bringing more unorthodox settings into scope. 
Part Two: Speculating with Mold
The Ruin-Archive: Exploring Spores out of Time
To negotiate material-semiotic assemblages of mold differently from a firmative 
orientation requires an openness to uncertain ways of knowing. Akin to Caitlin 
DeSilvey’s idea to follow “the invisible bookworm into the encyclopaedia” (DeSil-
vey 2006: 322), this can also mean to occasionally follow spores on their metabolic 
f lights through the (sub)urban environment into rather unruly edgelands (Farley/
Roberts 2011). Here an industrial ruin was one such destination.
The ruin I entered in the course of research used to be an iron foundry in the 
northern part of Bavaria, f lame-cut by a fire accident and subsequently vacat-
ed in 2012. Since fire brigades f looded the remaining building blocks with huge 
amounts of water and subsequently left the area largely unsheltered, moisture had 
been able to enter, facilitating a range of biological processes that had been con-
tributing to the ruin’s progressive decay. The proliferation of fungi like mold with-
in the entire complex, but especially in its remaining semi-closed rooms, forms 
part of this larger process. Not only do such places as ruins abandoned by humans 
provide an asylum for rats, pigeons, insects and other pollutants like mold, they 
also allow these critters to literally ‘take place’ and to grow and foster the very 
sorts of contamination that are typically eliminated by “papering over the mold 
and cracks” in our buildings and by covering “the world with a chemical armory 
[…] to escape rot’s degenerative force” (Lorimer 2016: 236). In this sense, places left 
to rot, where the preemptive mechanisms for keeping spores in constant circula-
tion through human and nonhuman ventilators are no longer operative, can also 
be seen as blended, unpurified spaces of defilement (Sibley 1995: 49–89).
Exploring ruins as assemblages where all kinds of human and nonhuman, liv-
ing and nonliving materials and actors are no longer kept apart has the potential 
of giving rise to an affirmative apparatus where time is not necessarily linear and 
space is rarely Euclidean. As will be shown, the appearance of mold can be an in-
dex of the sort of ‘topological’ spatiality here, which Michel Serres has famously 
illustrated through the allegory of a handkerchief crumpled in a pocket, which 
brings points once far apart into an unexpected close contact (Serres 1995: 60–61). 
This means that a full-grown mold can be seen as a continuous reminder of an ini-
tial point of contamination lying in the past while being diffractively able to affect 
and alter encounters of contamination in the present: instants of time and materi-
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ality get refolded in mold–substrate amalgams through the biochemical mode of 
decomposition that mold spores induce in their manifold substrata. 
But it is not only the rotting materials that get transformed over time through 
decomposition. Their semiotics are also time-shifting, as they retain connections 
to the ruin’s remaining “phantom networks” (Edensor 2005a: 63) where mold and 
their substrates are spatially embedded in history. As Dylan Trigg notes:
In the ruin, time runs of f, so becoming timeless. The convergence of temporal cate-
gories means that linear progress loses its power of persuasion. We are confronted 
with an ambiguous space. Time has ceased, yet simultaneously attracts the im-
pression of becoming. (Trigg 2006: 185)
It is precisely the persistent tension between an activating impression of becom-
ing, on the one hand, and the overall impression of loss and decay in a seeming-
ly passive state of ceasing progress, on the other, that the unpredictable melding 
of mold with its various material substrata can bring into relief. Therefore, past 
points of contamination in time can be encountered in the present, insofar as 
mold contains the potential to alter time-relations due to affirmative contingent 
impressions. In the vocabulary of agential realism, the processual experiencing of 
moldy materialities in ruins can be referred to as “spacetimemattering,” denoting 
“a dynamic ongoing reconfiguring of a field of relationalities among ‘moments,’ 
‘places,’ and ‘things’ (in their inseparability)” (Barad 2017: G111). This is the case es-
pecially when ruins are engaged in the intra-active practices of “urban exploration” 
(Garrett 2010, 2014). Entering such spaces where the presence of absence becomes 
mediated through all kinds of waste material provokes an affirmative mode of 
speculating with the lost and the found-again. This is because the
political assumptions and desires which lie behind the ordering of matter in space 
are thus revealed by the ef fects of objects in ruins, and they provoke speculation 
about how space and materiality might be interpreted, experienced and imagined 
otherwise. (Edensor 2005b: 330)
What speculations with mold can look like then becomes patently apparent in the 
foundry’s decaying archive (figs. 6.3 and 6.4).
The old foundry’s management and employment archive in one of the admin-
istrative offices is still filled up with files and folders that include staff lists, labor 
time schedules, conference protocols, accounting sheets, technical instructions 
and proceedings, guidelines, diaries, and so on. Ecologies of rot and decay have 
taken over the lead in (dis)ordering the materials over time. Intruding human 
and nonhuman visitors have moreover been walking through the archive, leaving 
their tags and marks behind, just as the f lames had done before. Peter, one of the 
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Figures 6.3 and 6.4: Exploring the old foundry’s former archive. Photographs by 
Christoph Schemann.
human visitors I accompanied, an urban explorer who had been drawn to ruins 
and other lost places for years, highlighted this archive as being exceptional be-
cause of its contradictory character: all these documents were once archived to be 
sustained and preserved for future times and to be retrieved whenever required; 
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now they are left to rot and be forgotten, with some of the files already almost un-
readable and sooner or later possibly completely inaccessible. What has attracted 
various visits on the part of this explorer and his colleagues is just this paradoxical 
situation of the archive still being right in place yet falling apart in time. While 
browsing and f licking through the files, these explorers fantasized what this place 
might have been like for the workers, what kind of data the firm might have col-
lected, scrutinizing which names can still be read on the schedules and wondering 
how many employees eventually tried to cheat management with sick notes. As 
Peter expressed it to me, they have become some kind of “contemporary witness” 
of a dying place with a gradual loss of memory to be eaten away by natural agents 
like fungi. Or, as Miles Ogborn reasons, “memory is chemical and biological”—
and for spores of “archival fungi,” this is nothing but a favorable opportunity to 
live it up: “These fungi absorb nutrients from the dead or living organic matter on 
which they grow. For them books are good sources of cellulose and starches, albeit 
hard to digest” (Ogborn 2004: 240–241).
Affirmative speculations “produce futures while refusing the foreclosure of 
potentialities,” even as they “hold on to the spectrum of possibilities” (uncertain 
commons 2013: ch. 1). Therefore, ruins and their degrading walls, rooms, artefacts, 
and material leftovers can be seen as birth-giving substrates for mold and oth-
er commonly suppressed organisms that, in entanglement, stimulate commem-
orative intra-actions that render possible more contingent interpretations and 
engagements with the surroundings “presented in a speculative spirit” (DeSil-
vey 2006: 335). Urban explorers can speculatively realize productive possibilities, 
memories and desires to sense ruins (Edensor 2007; DeSilvey/Edensor 2012: 471–
478) that otherwise would have been spoiled and demolished by virtue of adminis-
trative politics and economic (re)investments. When it comes to negotiating con-
tamination in all this, it is especially the intertwining of human-nonhuman (de)
composition of history and memory that can be speculated-with in an affirmative 
mode of exploring the material semiotics of the present past in ruins.
The Waste Container: Affecting Spores of (Dis)gusto
In contrast to the already mentioned contaminated fungal substrates, I will now 
highlight some affirmative speculations regarding mold on edibles.15 The main 
argument here is that what links mold to waste lies in the material capability of 
15  Leaving out edible mold as a delicacy—for example, on certain kinds of cheese—I am solely 
focusing on mold as unintended contamination at this point. Concerning the microbiopolitics 
of craf ting cheese and its relation to mold where “post-Pasteurians move beyond an antisep-
tic attitude to embrace mold and bacteria as allies” (Paxson 2008: 18), see the work of Heather 
Paxson, especially her monograph, The Life of Cheese (2013: 46–49, 158–186; cf. Paxson 2014).
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mold to bodily affect people, urging them to react in one way or another when 
encountered. The notion of a “waste container” as an apparatus enacted by prac-
tices related to affect has at least two dimensions in this context. First, a container 
can physically be something like a bin for household garbage, used to get rid of 
rotten and contaminated foods, which detains spores and prevents smells from 
circulating. Therefore, the possibility of placing food in a container is what dis-
tinguishes mold on edibles from mold on house walls and other spatially fixed 
materials. Here, attention turns first and foremost to the hedging or enclosure set 
in process when moldy food is thrown away. Second, as Mary Douglas has shown 
in her study Purity and Danger ([1966] 2002), waste is commonly culturally coded 
as impure and disorderly. As devices for minimizing contact with such impure 
matter and dissociating it from the domestic space, the refuse sacks of waste bins 
can easily be handled and bundled to carry garbage off—putting it out of sight 
and out of scent—highlighting the semiotic aspects of containment. 
Mold that is becoming perceptible on food causes many people to displace the 
infected comestibles directly into the bin, as it often triggers an affective response 
of bodily repugnance—if not self-protection against poisoning and disease. Im-
portantly, this response indicates a material-semiotic threshold, as tasty edibles 
become ‘dis-gusting’ and transform into something potentially unhealthy—ren-
dered mere waste, accompanied by the foul-smelling odor of lingering decompo-
sition. In consequence, there often does not seem to be much tolerance for the 
affects that the emergence of food-related mold can trigger. Thus, mold’s biomate-
rial capacity to elicit affective reactions of concern and disgust can be understood 
as a demarcation or agential cut (Barad 2012), indicating that what used to be food 
has just exceeded edibility.
Nevertheless, there is a diverse range of ways in which contaminations can 
be kept at unproblematic levels, for example, isolating the still fresh and tasty 
pieces from the rotten ones or cutting off molded bits. Even though such forms 
of customary knowledge among many people might not lead to a more generous 
approach to mold, they do indicate more affirmative modes of speculating with 
mold: they call attention to different practical possibilities to (re)negotiate and 
concretely localize the threshold between edibility and waste, disgust and gus-
to. The threshold between enjoyable food and repellent waste therefore cannot be 
seen as a fixed boundary. One possibility here consists of differentiating between 
diverse material qualities of foods as substrate: edibles with a rather soft texture 
such as marmalade, meat or certain sorts of fruits and cheese are more likely to be 
completely binned when contaminated with mold than bread, vegetables or other 
foods of a harder and more solid consistency. Rational reconsideration, alongside 
a more relational evaluation, can thus foster a more contingent engagement with 
mold, while at the same time also altering the affective predisposition for disgust.
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Such an altered embodiment of mold intra-actions is particularly pronounced 
in the case of food-saving activists who, due to their socio-ecological orientations 
and their interventionist approach to the waste of food, engage in “dumpster div-
ing.” Technically legal in the U.S. but illegal in Germany, this practice consists of 
reopening and climbing down the commercial waste containers of grocery stores, 
which dispose of large quantities of still edible foods due to strict legal regulations. 
In diving down these containers, the activists I interviewed speculatively reeval-
uated (dis)gusto in relation to what has been thrown away, inverting the waste 
container apparatus by containing their responsivity (and not the rotting food). 
They therefore maintained the ability to respond differently in speculating with 
contamination:
[“Mario”] Well, I don’t know the risk, I can’t really estimate it. That’s why … it’s a very 
unknown risk. I don’t know, I mean you can’t … Well it is hard to relate. Either way, 
I eat a rotten tomato, or I take a smoke from a cigarette, so to say. I can’t compare 
that. And I do smoke cigarettes from time to time. […] It’s just the same if you go 
dumpster diving. You take a look in the container and see: There, at the corner, is a 
molded lemon that is completely green and next to it, there is a perfect eggplant 
that has been in contact for, I don’t know, two or three hours—I nevertheless take 
out the eggplant and just wash it of f.
[“Lynn”] Sure! The brink of disgust has totally been reduced! Well, three, four years 
ago, before I started food-saving—that’s when the reduction of disgust initially 
started—then, five years ago, I wouldn’t go dumpster diving. I thought it was to-
tally disgusting and I found it completely repulsive.
What can be f leshed out from these passages is that the practice of diving into 
the sometimes unpleasant interior of containers situates subjects within a state 
of affairs where the affects of (dis)gusto can be altered and acted upon different-
ly. While the problematizing of an unnecessary binning of food, capitalistic over-
production, sell-by dates and the like may certainly be the key drivers for these 
engagements, it is the ability to partly resist and resituate the negative affective 
intensities of moldy waste that allows the activists to renegotiate the degree of 
biomaterial contamination. In turn, both aspects—material and discursive—tak-
en together could actualize and reframe the potential to critically address broad-
er societal questions ranging from negotiations about consumption and value to 
sociocultural demands on the freshness of perishable foods (Freidberg 2009). The 
“affective life” (Hutta 2015) of this multifarious, living semiotic being called food 
mold—which frequently enters the encountering subject’s expressive registers by 
provoking deprecatory facial expressions or a shift in vocal intonation—is there-
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fore the intra-active nexus that can either constrain the scope of speculating with 
mold or open it up to the possibility of reassessing its substrates again and again. 
Conclusion
This essay began by picking up Donna Haraway’s invitation to stay with the some-
times troubling entanglements of humans and nonhumans in favor of “chipping 
and shredding and layering like a mad gardener, mak[ing] a much hotter compost 
pile for still possible pasts, presents, and futures” (Haraway 2016: 57). As the like-
wise colorful and pillowy compost piles of mold are regularly seen as threat to 
humanly colonized environments, ‘contamination’ is one of the key categories we 
can use to describe related negotiations. In turn, such negotiations rely on prac-
tices that are speculative inasmuch as they need to produce knowledge about a 
vital entity that cannot easily be reduced to a set of fixed qualities or a fixed scope 
of inferences—much less when seen in connection to its numerous metabolites 
and ingrowing substrates.
While the first two apparatuses have been identified to demonstrate how the 
practices related to them get firmatively restricted in their speculative potential 
due to sociotechnical endeavors to anticipate and preempt mold as a material-se-
miotic signifier for unpleasant contamination, the last two agential practices 
can aptly be termed speculating with instead of about mold to draw attention to 
the fact that entering into active collaboration denotes a necessarily contingent 
shift in terms of what can (and not must or should) be encountered. Picking up 
Anna Tsing’s notion of “contamination as collaboration,” contamination itself can 
further be categorically expanded, denoting yet-to-be-known speculations that 
simultaneously reaffirm fungi such as mold (or Matsutake, in Tsing’s case) and 
human subjects (Tsing 2015: 27–34). As for Tsing, “we are contaminated by our en-
counters” whereas “purity is not an option” (27). Likewise, Donna Haraway points 
in a similar direction by referring to “sympoiesis” (in contrast to a self-referencing 
“autopoiesis”) as the central attunement to face the Anthropocene/Chthulucene, 
where “making-with” becomes the crucial condition of living in common (Har-
away 2016: 58–98, 2017: M25–M31). Finally, engendering perceptive apparatuses 
that always cut together and apart such sympoietic contaminations requires an 
“accountability for the cuts that are made and the constitutive entanglements that 
are effected” (Barad 2012: 31). Hence, to perform speculations with mold in an af-
firmative manner also means to queer and blur demarcations in negotiating the 
role of the human and the nonhuman, the predefined and the possible, while re-
maining attentive toward the alterations made.
To negotiate mold and other cohabitants fraught with risk in a state of con-
tamination can therefore be detached from a fixed understanding of contamina-
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tion as mere threat, irregular and something to be avoided by any means neces-
sary. Instead, it can be understood as creative and productive in a world whose 
future can only be speculated about but will definitely need further exploration of 
its awkward16 multispecies entanglements and constitutive contaminations.
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Chapter 7: Enacting Speculation 
The Paradoxical Epistemology of Performance as Research 
Wolf-Dieter Ernst and Jan Simon Hutta
The generation of knowledge—i.e. predominantly propositional knowledge in 
Western traditions of science—depends on embodied and situated practices, as 
the sociology of knowledge and the feminist discussion of situated knowledges 
have made clear. But apart from this well-rehearsed argument that all knowl-
edge is situated, what precisely constitutes embodied, performative dimensions 
of knowledge production, and how these relate to cognitive and propositional 
dimensions, has remained rather unclear. Are embodiment and performativity 
aspects that ought to be controlled or critically ref lected upon, or are they gen-
erative resources to be affirmed? Are there any particular strategies for fostering 
or intensifying performative dimensions of knowledge generation? Which kinds 
of settings, formats and collaborations does this entail? And what are some of the 
concrete implications regarding the practice of teaching and research? This essay 
tackles these questions by relating the issue of speculation, which has received 
increasing interest across the humanities and social sciences, to discussions on 
performative research and “performance as research” (Kershaw 2008, 2009; Stutz 
2008). As a way of thinking that goes beyond existent propositional knowledge, 
speculation enables the formation of new knowledge. But as an embodied activ-
ity, speculation also supports ways of knowing that exceed cognitive reasoning. 
In this essay, we examine some of the conditions of possibility of this double ca-
pacity of speculation, of generating knowledge and fostering embodied ways of 
knowing. We consider especially the role that performative enactments play in 
facilitating speculative moments as they unsettle entrenched hierarchies between 
cognitive and bodily, abstract and situated practices. More specifically, we high-
light the productive role of paradoxical constellations of scientific inscription and 
practical performance.
Our discussion focuses on the 2016 interdisciplinary seminar “Mapping 
Bayreuth” that we conducted, in collaboration with Matt Adams from the arts col-
lective Blast Theory, with our students at the University of Bayreuth. Practically 
speaking, the seminar offered a welcome context for experimentation and exem-
plification around issues of speculation and embodied knowledge. But we also 
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focus on teaching and collaborative learning/research here, as we see potential 
in using interdisciplinary seminars to foster the kinds of speculative practice on 
which learning as well as research depends. In fact, following Paulo Freire (1970), 
any real learning might be productively viewed as a form of research in the first 
place. In what follows, we will begin by situating our approach within the wider 
shift from critical rationalism to “abductive” and “affirmative” epistemologies. 
We then introduce our strategy of enacting speculation in order to unpack some 
concrete ways of, and challenges in, performing speculative research. 
From Critical Rationalism to Affirmative Speculation
Every theory needs speculation. Even Karl Popper (1959), who sought to purge 
speculation from the realm of science, had to admit the relevance of something 
like Henri Bergson’s ([1907] 1911) “creative intuition” in regard to the generation of 
new hypotheses. Yet, for Popper, epistemology proper had no business engaging 
with speculation. Rather than proceeding through speculative forms of induc-
tion or abduction, only the persistent elimination of unwarranted assumptions 
through the method of falsification could ultimately yield scientific results. In 
Popper’s critical rationalism, which provided an epistemological foundation to 
the quantitative approaches developed since World War II, science was thus ulti-
mately distinguished from other kinds of practice if it succeeded in operationaliz-
ing the rational capacity to negate.
In demonstrating the limits of abstraction, negation is credited here for puri-
fying scientific knowledge from subjective beliefs, imaginations or speculations. 
At the methodological level of research practice, this focus on negation has also 
entailed eliminating any ‘confounding factor’ in the objects studied as related to 
context, situation or body. To do so, positivistic science has deployed technologies 
such as containment, reiteration and controlled observation to arrive at reliable 
and valid statements. In the terms of the uncertain commons collective (2013), 
such a research practice can also be viewed as a “firmative” mode of speculation in 
its orientation towards the unknown. Firmative speculation, in this sense, seeks 
to predict and control uncertainties, “turning uncertainty into (external, calcula-
ble, knowable) risk” (uncertain commons 2013: ch. 2). Following in the footsteps of 
Western enlightenment as imprinted from Descartes to Kant and Hegel, this neg-
ativist bias—along with its devaluation of the body—still reverberates through 
both mainstream and critical social research. It also chimes with an instrumental 
view on research as the gradual ‘filling of gaps’ and piling up of knowledge. Even 
in a work such as Bruno Latour’s Science in Action (1987), which shifts the focus 
from rational reasoning to the powerful, embodied and messy social practices 
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that enable science in the first place, processes of knowledge production are still 
depicted as the result of rational-instrumental accumulation cycles.
By the time Latour’s book was first published in the late 1980s, though, a more 
af firmative undercurrent had already appeared in philosophy and the social sci-
ences—not to mention the humanities, which had never succumbed to the posi-
tivistic agenda in the same ways. For instance, the narrative turn in 1980s social 
and cultural anthropology cast the “poetic” dimensions of knowledge production 
into relief (cf. Clifford/Marcus 1986), and the growing interest in complexity the-
ories drew attention to the spontaneous emergence of novelty (Thrift 1999). Along 
with the surge in feminist and participatory methodologies, the ‘turn to affect’ of 
the 1990s and 2000s, and the more recent ‘speculative turn,’ these engagements 
have helped reopening the epistemological door to those speculative dimensions 
of knowledge production that had accompanied pre-World War II epistemolo-
gies all along—from Romanticism and Dilthey to Freud, Whitehead or Bergson. 
A bridge between, say, the 1920s interest in desire and the post-war agenda of a 
positivist science was constructed in the 1950s and 1960s by Guy Debord and the 
Situationist International. Using what Debord called “dérive” (drift), by which he 
meant an ‘aimless strolling’ in urban space, the researchers-activists still sought 
to study “the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, 
whether consciously organized or not, on the affective behavior of individuals” 
(Debord [1955] 2006; translation altered).
Epistemologically speaking, we might frame the broader move beyond critical 
rationalism since the 1970s and 1980s in terms of an “abductive turn” (cf. Reichertz 
2010). Credited with the potential of generating new orders of knowledge and 
meaning, Charles Sanders Peirce’s ideas around abductive inference (e.g. Peirce 
[1901] 1958)—in contradistinction to deductive and inductive interference—have 
struck a chord with researchers from a range of disciplines.1 Following Peirce, ab-
duction is generally understood here as a kind of careful guessing in search of 
plausible explanations for given observations, as opposed to rigid explanations 
derived from causal connections that have already been established in advance. 
While in Popper’s critical rationalism it is irrelevant how the hypothesis to be test-
ed came into being, abduction is all about speculative hypothesizing. This af fir-
mative mode of speculating stays with these uncertainties and seeks new ways of 
relating to the future’s inherent complexity—it “progresses and lives by attending 
to what it does not know” (uncertain commons 2013: ch. 2).
1  As Jo Reichertz summarizes: “educationists, linguists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, semioti-
cians, theater-scientists, theologians, criminologists, researchers in artificial intelligence, and 
sociologists announce in their research reports that their new discoveries are due to abduction” 
(Reichertz 2010: 6).
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Some of the most consequential elaborations of such an affirmatively specu-
lative approach have emanated from Anglophone experimental, performative and 
live methodologies, which have also increasingly interconnected the humanities 
and the social sciences, as well as the practical fields of curating, arts, political ac-
tivism or the use of social media.2 Intersecting with the reinvigoration of dynamic, 
processual and interactive ontologies in discussions of affect or the so-called new 
materialism, some of these approaches can also be related to earlier generations 
of researchers proposing ecological approaches to thought and practice, includ-
ing Gregory Bateson, Félix Guattari or eco-feminists. On a conceptual level, an 
affirmatively speculative project has moreover been formulated in engagements 
with Gilles Deleuze, and Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson in 
particular (Deleuze [1969] 2004).
In our endeavor to explore the epistemological potentials of speculation 
in an embodied and affirmative register, we follow in the footsteps of some of 
these wider debates, from Situationism to engagements with Deleuze. Howev-
er, whereas especially in Deleuze-inspired discussions, ideas of ‘affirmation’ and 
‘becoming’—along with the vitalist ontology that has often underpinned these 
terms—have tended to be embraced in celebratory and idealized ways, abstractly 
denying negativity (Harrison 2015), we would like to argue here that affirmative 
speculation does not need to ignore the firmative strategies of falsification and 
critique, nor scientific technologies such as containment and inscription. Instead, 
we suggest that a performative approach to speculation teases out, and thrives on, 
the paradoxes that arise as such firmative epistemological strategies and tech-
nologies are performatively enacted and combined with affirmatively speculative 
strategies. In other words, we suggest that new knowledge, as well as embodied 
ways of knowing, are prone to be generated as the firmative closures of contain-
ment, reiteration, observation and inscription are paradoxically constellated with 
the affirmative openings of embodied enactment. Paradoxicality is therefore our 
ally.
The Paradox of Scientific Inscription and Performative Enactment 
A key strategy for moving from positivistic reasoning to the speculative genera-
tion of new ideas is the use of paradox. Deriving from Ancient Greek παράδοξος 
(parádoxos), meaning “unexpected, strange,” the notion of paradox address-
es apparently self-contradictory statements, such as, “this sentence is false,” or 
counterintuitive conclusions, for instance, “drinking a lot of water can make you 
2  Examples include Bay-Cheng (2010), Back/Puwar (2012a), and Thompson/Independent Curators 
International (2009); cf. Law (2004), and Wilkie/Savransky/Rosengarten (2017).
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feel thirsty.” Often, paradoxes also arise when contradictory ideas or elements si-
multaneously coexist, as in “not having a fashion is a fashion.” Authors such as 
the logician Lewis Carroll have spotlighted a creative capacity in paradoxicality, 
showing that what at first sight seems to be absurd or self-contradictory might 
lead to realistic explanations when looking at complex problems. Among the most 
prominent discussions in this line is Denis Diderot’s elaboration on the paradox 
of the actor’s passion: Should an actor playing a murderer feel what a murderer 
feels? While intuitively one might agree, this soon leads into murky waters in eth-
ical terms. Wouldn’t then the best preparation for the actor be to commit murder? 
Contemplating this ethical intricacy, Diderot then goes on to claim the opposite: 
The more an actor identifies with a character’s passion, the less they will be able 
to act. This is the formulation of a counterintuitive paradox that leads to the elab-
oration of how the best actor is the ‘cool’ actor who shows no personal affective 
disposition whatsoever; the one “too apt for too many things,” then, is the best 
actor (Diderot [1835] 1957: 18).
The use of paradoxes and the effects of surprise or puzzlement they elicit can 
thus foster the generation of new insights and ways of reasoning. As a strategy for 
using paradox as an epistemological resource, we want to highlight in particular 
ways of dealing with the simultaneous presence of contradictory elements. Going 
beyond the formulation of paradoxical statements, we take paradoxicality to the 
level of research practice by exploring the generative potentials that arise from the 
combination of scientific inscription and performative enactment.
In Science in Action, Bruno Latour showed how the modern science system 
has tended to accumulate knowledge in central locations, whereby it supports 
and stabilizes hegemonic political and economic processes. This accumulation of 
knowledge necessitates a great variety of technologies that make the researched 
objects controllable and mutually combinable. Moreover, it uses what Latour calls 
“inscription devices,” such as cartography, laboratory instruments, ethnography 
and so on, which transfer local knowledge into the abstract grids of scientif-
ic texts. In return, only knowledge that appears as part of these grids counts as 
scientifically sound (Latour 1987). While this conception of scientific knowledge 
production assists in illuminating some of the logics and power-effects of mod-
ern science, more recent ethnographies of science have directed attention at the 
specific “enactments” of scientific methods, which relationally shape both objects 
and actors (e.g. Mol 2002). Following this interest in the contingent ways in which 
subjects and objects of knowledge are relationally enacted in actual practice, we 
want to push the discussion a step further by asking what embodied ways of learn-
ing take place as scientific methods are enacted, not within their apparatuses of 
control and inscription, but in experimental and performative processes that also 
involve putting these very methods in new ways on display. The field “performance 
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as research” offers useful practical and discursive queues for pursuing this inves-
tigation.
Performance as Research
In collaboration with Matt Adams, cofounder of the artist collective Blast Theory, 
we offered a series of workshops in 2016 for graduate students from human ge-
ography (Hutta) and opera studies (Ernst), using the rather ambitious title “Em-
bodying Speculation.” Among other issues, the workshops addressed how digital 
media and the increasing digitalization of everyday life impact both research and 
the subjects conducting it. As a starting point, we combined teaching in a semi-
nar room with performative experiments in the urban spaces of the midsize town 
of Bayreuth. Considering the distinctive kinds of activity and interaction taking 
place in urban space, it became clear that a text-based approach to the cultures of 
speculation can productively be enhanced by some kind of performance and em-
bodied practice. A workshop was therefore scheduled to introduce all participants 
to basic principles of body work, including warm-up, movement and expression 
exercises as well as theatre games. Drawing on the work developed by perform-
ers, researchers and educators such as the Californian dancer Anna Halprin, these 
activities focused especially on sensual awareness and a very rough introduction 
into movement techniques.
On a conceptual level, we introduced the “live-methods” discussion in sociolo-
gy, which advocates the use of embodied and creative research techniques (Back/
Puwar 2012a, 2012b), as well as arts-based approaches in human geography and 
examples from performance art and theory. We then moved towards the follow-
ing idea, generally shared by all participants: we can understand performative 
research as taking place when theories and methods are both a way of doing re-
search and an object studied in the process of enactment. In this double gesture of 
applying and ref lecting on theory and methods, performative research is partic-
ularly suited for engaging with digital interactive practices, such as gaming and 
mapping, as they share its volatility and anti-expert character. Yet, the practical 
consequences of opting for performative research were less than evident, to say 
the least. Admittedly, there are easier—and more predictable—course designs at 
hand than delivering such a theory-practice mashup. Would we gain any usable 
results by moving around Bayreuth, equipped with Open Street Map and inter-
active applications on our mobile devices? Or would that mean merely repeating 
some of the insights we could learn from books? What kind of site-specific learn-
ing environments and situated knowledges might we encounter and produce 
through conducting performance as research in and around Bayreuth?
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Our experiment was inf luenced by extant ref lections in the ‘pedagogics’ of 
performance as research. On the website of one of the leading research projects in 
this field, Practice as Research in Performance, led by Baz Kershaw at the University 
of Bristol from 2000–2006, we find a helpful explanation: 
Broadly speaking, practice as research is an attempt to see and understand per-
formance media practices and processes as arenas in which knowledge might be 
opened. The institutional acceptance of practice as research in the higher educa-
tion sector acknowledges fundamental epistemological issues that can only be ad-
dressed in and through theatre, dance, film, TV and video practices. (PARIP 2002)
So, practice as research generates or reveals enactive ways of knowing, which are 
stimulated by the materiality and mediality of its very production and distribu-
tion or circulation—for instance, among university students. Knowledge emerg-
ing through ways of speculating with what Kershaw and colleagues call “perfor-
mance media practices and processes” can and should thus be studied through 
embodied methods. Practice as research makes use here of the paradoxes arising 
as different media and knowledge practices are engaged simultaneously: “One 
kind of knowledge—theory, books, libraries, archives—is challenged profoundly 
by another” (Kershaw 2008: 23). What is emphasized in particular is that specula-
tive ways of knowing—‘knowing how’ instead of ‘knowing that ’—are best achieved 
when they are embodied. 
We were therefore confronted with a series of paradoxical shifts, moving 
from text-based to embodied knowledge practices and back again. While in oth-
er frameworks, different speculative ways of generating knowledge might occur, 
our approach opened up in particular disciplinary boundaries inasmuch as it in-
vited ref lections on how knowledge is usually generated, accumulated and evalu-
ated. These ref lections started with the researcher’s own position in space. Are the 
students sitting at a table with text in front of their eyes, which they decode using 
their silent inner voice? Or are they standing or moving around in the theatre lab 
or in urban space? As long as they are in the seminar room, they will most likely 
understand themselves as listening and arguing academics. Once they are under-
going their physical warm-up, they gradually enlarge their awareness and add to 
it layers of their casual, private and artistic habits and experiences.
For example, one of the workshop exercises asked participants to move around 
in space and think of another person present in the room. Upon a certain cue, they 
were asked to address that person with their index finger as quickly and accu-
rately as possible, calling them loudly by their name. This exercise performative-
ly transformed the bodily order of the class room with its triangulation of silent 
voice–text–teacher into a diffusely interactive situation, where silent and loud 
voice constantly alternated. This also entailed shifts in the very ways we addressed 
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each other. The formal “Mr./Mrs.” or “Dr.” with family name, or “Sie,” commonly 
used in German seminar rooms, gave way to a non-hierarchical ‘du’ and first name 
for the time of the exercise. This address turned out to be just more fitting to the 
kind of deliberate collaboration that emerged in the lab, not least fueled by “kin-
esthetic empathy” (Foster 2008). Such a collaborative atmosphere might as well 
emerge when students are confronted with new methods in the seminar room. In 
most cases, such new methods are considered as new tools for gaining knowledge, 
but would not necessarily change the way of knowledge production itself. Perfor-
mance as research aims precisely at this. 
It might therefore be one of the crucial characteristics of performance as re-
search that it both confronts and paradoxically aggregates the firmative knowl-
edge practices of standard learning environments together with affirmative ways 
of knowing that emerge through performative enactment. No doubt, following 
such an approach would lead us into uncharted waters, posing a series of thorny 
questions, some of which we will discuss in the following sections. In particular, 
there are three paradoxical problems ahead: 1) the paradox of facts becoming fic-
tional; 2) the paradox of boundless specificity; and 3) the paradox of inscribing the 
ephemeral. All three paradoxes are part and parcel of the issue of whether and 
how we acknowledge a performance’s effect as a way of knowing something. Does 
knowledge obtained in performance encounter its limits in the attempt to system-
atize and chart it? Or does it, by contrast, comment on or even change existing 
regimes of truth?
Paradox 1: Facts Becoming Fictional
The first paradox addressed in our workshop emerged from the performative 
enactment of scientific factuality. ‘Facts’ in a positivistic framework are senso-
ry ‘data’ registered through controlled, reproducible and mutually combinable 
means and inscribed into abstract grids. Standard cartographic methods, for in-
stance, deploy a clearly defined set of operations to transpose real-world spatial 
data onto a two-dimensional plane. This plane then contains an apparently stable 
yet portable set of spatial data that can be moved around, combined with other 
such planes and decoded by means of another set of procedures. It thereby also 
enables firmative processes of speculation, whereby new data are included into 
extant grids. But what happens when the map is manipulated in ways that exceed 
these well-defined encoding and decoding operations, when mapping and reading 
follow as yet undefined strategies? What kinds of cartographic practice does this 
inspire? What insights regarding maps and mapping are solicited by such kinds 
of performance? How do these insights ref lect back on understandings of ‘facts’?
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Some may think that the kind of knowledge such performance-as-research ac-
tivities generate was related to the arts and theatre in particular and thus neither 
real nor relevant to scientific exploration. This objection does not fully acknowl-
edge, though, that ‘performance’ equally refers to artistic, scientific, and every-
day practice.3 Not least, in anthropology and sociology, as well as in gender stud-
ies—particularly fueled by Judith Butler’s (1990) work on the social construction of 
both sex and gender—the concept has opened up a critical semantic spectrum for 
considering the efficacy of embodied acts inside and outside the performing arts.4 
We would therefore agree that not only actions on stage but literally any scripted 
behavior can be understood as performed by someone and for someone, including 
the scripted behavior of scientists. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the 
performance paradigm demands a broader understanding of what theatre is. Yet, 
to conversely also consider scientific facts and data as subject of a mise-en-scène 
is another challenge, as it undermines the status of the apparently neutral scien-
tist. (It is precisely this insight into science’s constructed nature that performance 
studies shares with science and technology studies and the history of science.) The 
method of performance as research is therefore critical as it forces the researcher 
to consider whether their data should be taken as self-evident or make-believe, 
and according to what standards this decision should be taken. Drawing on Don-
na Haraway, we might approach any knowledge production as a type of “sf world-
ing,” where the signifier “sf” is extended beyond its common use as abbreviating 
“science fiction” to signal how “speculative fiction and speculative facts” are neces-
sarily entangled (Haraway 2007: 93). 
In the workshop sessions, this paradoxical simultaneity of facticity and fiction-
ality was purposefully intensified and performed through a series of techniques. 
Matt Adams, for instance, introduced ‘play’ as a vital dimension of creative in-
teraction (resonating with Haraway’s discussion of the role of play in sf—science 
fiction, speculative fiction, speculative facts—as worlding). Encouraging playful-
ness, one of our workshops focused on speculative experimentations with map-
pings, following on from our theoretical engagement with Situationism, critical 
cartography and the uses of cartography in choreography and performance arts. 
Our focus was here on cartography’s capacity to conjure inversions of the tradi-
3  Within the discipline of performance studies, one distinguishes performance art from cultural 
performance such as sport events, rituals, and festivities. In performance theory, the concept is 
further stratified into performance signifying any ‘show’ in the broadest sense, a ‘cultural per-
formance’ manifesting a certain culture; and a ‘radical act’ able to unsettle given oppositions (cf. 
Ernst et al. 2014).
4  In philosophy, the concepts of performance and the performative have unfolded similar border 
crossings, starting with J. L. Austin’s lectures on the speech-act to the debate between Jacques 
Derrida and John Searle about the citationality of performance. See the helpful introductions by 
Carlson (1996), Wirth (2001), Shepherd (2016), and Schechner (2002).
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tional relationship between (firmative) inscription and (affirmative) performance: 
as the scientific inscription of world onto map tends to fix the world’s inherent 
processuality, so the map’s practical, performative use and modification are able 
to remobilize this processuality. Thus, students who embark on experiments in 
drawing alternative maps and walking rare itineraries—for example, by symboli-
cally rearranging significant locations of Bayreuth on the theatre-lab f loor—do so 
in real space and with regard to the way maps work as inscription devices. Yet, as 
they simulate and change what is given, the students also approach their learning 
task in a playful manner, and nothing can prevent them from switching into a the-
atrical as-if mode. The use of maps thus invites fictitious reinscriptions of the real. 
This way, inscription and performance are able to penetrate each other, initiating 
a process of factual-fictitious speculation.
How can we better understand the way firmative knowledge is opened up by 
affirmative speculation? Inspired by the Situationists’ experiments around the 
manipulation and reinterpretion of already existing cartography, one of our exer-
cises was to manipulate Bayreuth city maps that were available for free, in order 
to read them differently.
Students were therefore invited to manipulate copies of the map. The maps 
could be folded, torn, crumpled, inscribed, or edited in another form (perfor-
mance). The resulting map object should then be provided with a new legend (re-
inscription), from which paradoxical jumps and a-logic connections (speculation) 
arouse. For this exercise, no fictional framing was necessary. The assumption that 
one would rearrange the map as a fictional character in the context of a fictional 
action would have been far too complex. It was rather a ‘task performance’ that, 
abstaining from overt fiction, simply asked participants to alienate the existing 
map and add a new legend. And yet the task appealed more to associative think-
ing, imagination, and hands-on experimentation than to rational-cognitive abili-
ties of scientific inscription alone. Additionally, the manipulation was performed 
while other participants could watch it. It thereby revealed its theatrical merits. 
Probably, the location of this experiment was also of some importance, as all par-
ticipants seemed to consider the folding maps as props rather than navigation 
devices. In the center, therefore, was the experience of creating and perceiving 
practical-performative approaches to cartography and setting them in paradoxi-
cal relation to accustomed forms of inscription and analysis. In a certain way, this 
experience compares to the one you may have when you become a cartographer 
by using an open-source online mapping tool. However, in our experiment the 
changes included the map’s destruction and other absurd acts, such as when the 
second was transferred to the third dimension through folding, or when gaps and 
fragments appeared in place of the overview.
This suggests that the participants took the experiment very far, namely, in the 
direction of an implicit idea of art as a possible space of performative rewriting. 
Chapter 7: Enacting Speculation 177
The a-logical jumps articulated in the feedback discussions also indicated that new 
insights into the map’s/city’s reality were produced precisely by the ‘alienation’ of 
the real finding. Participants implicitly displayed an exact idea here of what a map 
performs and of what logical and functional use it might be. Staged knowledge, 
therefore, can be viewed as located right between fictional assertion and factual 
knowledge. Kershaw also speaks of a “dislocation of knowledge” here that is typi-
cal of performance as research:
Such dislocation of knowledge by action is characteristic of performance practice 
as research, especially in its more radical forms. […] As a result, any facts, truths, 
ideas, principles attributable to the scene become as fleet and wayward as au-
tumn breezes; like all performance, there but not there. (Kershaw 2009: 4) 
What is at stake is therefore no different or radically new propositional knowledge, 
but a shift and dynamization of the solid ground, on which we tend to believe ex-
act knowledge is based. With regard to the contemporary rhetoric of ‘alternative 
facts,’ one might be concerned about this loss of certainty. Yet, if we accept what 
Haraway (1988) calls “situated knowledges” or what Hans Blumenberg ([1971] 2001) 
describes as the rhetorical constitution of human existence, it is not a question of 
whether, but of how and with what interest knowledge is dislocated and subject 
to change. What we want to emphasize, though, is that in dislocating firmative 
knowledge, the paradox of facticity and fictionality—“there but not there”—also 
opens up a space of affirmative speculation, as it calls for a response. It “pro-
duce[s] undecidability and in Derrida’s sense: implying a decision that makes us 
responsible for their meaning” (Kershaw 2009: 4). It is this space of affirmative 
speculation that we want to further explore through a second experiment.
Paradox 2: Unlimited Embodiment
One of the key ways in which performance as research solicits affirmative spec-
ulation has to do with its capacity to touch upon the somatic and subjective di-
mensions of knowledge production. For it is not concerned with filtering out in-
f luences that would blur our sensory perception—a problem for which different 
disciplines have developed sophisticated methods. Instead, performance as re-
search attempts to make productive use of the somatic, subjective and situational 
dispositions as a source of knowledge. It thus engages the issue of embodiment 
also raised in ethnographic approaches as well as in the feminist discussion of 
situated knowledge. Where these approaches understand knowledge production 
as a necessarily embodied process, performance as research goes a step further. It 
seeks out and affirms the conditions of embodiment, amplifying them as much 
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as possible, so that we can obtain new findings precisely from what is seemingly 
not at hand or adequate. What Haraway (1988) has called “the privilege of partial 
perspective” is brought down here to the concrete enactments of all participants 
in a given research setting. In this regard, performance as research subscribes to a 
“boundless specificity” (Kershaw 2008: 26) as its constitutive paradox. The method 
oscillates between an unlimited expansion of its subject area, on the one hand,5 
and its condition to consider each performance as embodied and specifically lo-
calized, on the other. Every human behavior can be understood as a performance, 
in line with Goffman, and complementary to this observation, every performance 
is a highly subjective act. Paraphrasing John Cage, Schechner thus notes, “simply 
framing an activity ‘as’ a performance—viewing it as such—makes it into a per-
formance” (Schechner 2003: 22).
The decision to conceive every possible situation as a performance and, at the 
same time, to jeopardize the distinction between observers and performers, can 
be illustrated by the following experiment. The workshop participants were asked 
to take their lunch break in the cafeteria as an exercise in collective disability—in 
the sense of the alienation of everyday activities mentioned above. For this pur-
pose, the group assembled within a rubber-cord loop of approximately twenty 
feet. The task was to have lunch together, while ensuring that everyone remained 
in the loop without letting the rope touch the ground. It was agreed that any com-
munication should be limited to the most necessary, as the exercise was primar-
ily about bodily and interpersonal coordination. Metaphorically speaking, any 
tension within the group had to be controlled, as an individual, existential need 
was being satisfied. The ensuing complications were predictable and unfolded on 
three complementary levels, each expressing specific issues of embodied perfor-
mative research.
First of all, we observed that most of us focused on the in-group, as our own 
bodies became the central points of performative action. We thereby continued 
the performative exploration processes that had been prepared and started in the 
previous workshop exercises. Concentration and attention to one’s own body and 
the bodies of others was thus rather high compared to usual lunch breaks. Only a 
few participants showed signs of what we called “being private.” On a second level, 
though, the workshop atmosphere, which was characterized by a certain intimacy, 
collided with the cafeteria setting and the specific habitus in which we usually 
take our meals. At times, students were approached by fellow students; at times, it 
became obvious how they routinely maneuvered around the canteen crowds, act-
ing strategically in order to get the food they liked. In some cases, participants 
lost sight of the task, the rubber cord threatening to be stretched or relaxed. At 
5  As Schechner notes, “there is no cultural or historical limit to what is or is not ‘performance’” 
(2002: 2).
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the same time, these were also the moments in which other participants decided 
to de-privilege their own needs and to step in for the others, which served the 
common goal. This in turn led other participants to organize a portion for others, 
and so on.
The intermingling of habitual action and exceptional, situational experiment 
required a constant reorientation of one’s own actions. On a third level, this was 
further intensified by the performative character of the exercise and the bound-
less specificity of the performance, as we were noted by the involuntary spectators 
in the cafeteria. The way spectators and actors looked at each other suggested that 
everyone knew they were dealing with a non-everyday action—despite the ordi-
nary nature of the activity of picking up a meal and taking it in. The experiment 
thus intentionally intersected the expansion of the concept of performance with a 
specificity here and now. It was clear to everyone that the actions could be carried 
out with little effort, as few special skills were required. Putting Cage’s definition 
of performance to practice, you could even dispense with the rubber band and 
see the intake of the meal itself as a performance. For instance, our constriction 
within the rubber band was curiously mirrored by the balustrade surrounding the 
terrace on which some of the other eaters were sitting, enacting a kind of invol-
untary reverse performance. What is considered a performance cannot be limited, 
then—it is ‘boundless’—and, metaphorically speaking, also not to be delimited 
by a rubber band. At the same time, this experiment took place with very specific 
participants and in a very specific place, namely, ‘our’ cafeteria, which is connect-
ed to the conditions of student and teacher life, to our biographies, as well as to 
our relationships to others.
These three aspects—group focus versus private action, habitus versus sit-
uational practice, everyday activity versus performance—are all generative of 
speculative processes, as they constantly evoke paradoxes that call for new re-
sponses. The rubber band, as constitutive element of the exercise, illustrates their 
mutual imbrication. On the one hand, the band functioned semiotically as a sign 
of an ‘as-if’ situation—especially for the unprepared spectators. The spectators 
reacted to it as in a ‘hidden camera’ trick—with joy and astonishment, but also rel-
atively relaxed as soon as they understood what was going on. The participants, in 
turn, answered questions, said “hello” to friends, but mostly remained with their 
task. In addition to the semiotic function, the rubber cord also unmistakably had 
its material qualities, which allowed to provide immediate embodied feedback. It 
took on an extreme form when an uninvolved person, for example, pressed them-
selves into the group or wanted to cross their path and gradually became aware of 
the rope. Or, there was the moment when the group agreed on how to sit down at 
the tables. The most extreme situation, however, occurred when all of the partici-
pants were back in the theater and were reluctant to leave the rope.
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From such extreme feedbacks, those feedbacks are to be distinguished which 
point to continuous bodily attention, the feeling that figures as somatic and sub-
jective knowledge. However, this knowledge, in the sense of an abductive process, 
only arises in the interplay of the mentioned complications that are related to the 
paradoxicality of embodiment and boundlessness: the persistent intersecting of 
demarcation and expansion as concerns group and individual, habitus and situa-
tion, routine and performance, stipulates new practical responses and intellectual 
ref lections. The bodily as well as intellectual knowledge thus generated is affir-
matively speculative as it defies any clear definition of the research field—spatial-
ly and epistemologically. The open-ended setup of the experiment therefore does 
not lend itself to the firmative control of predictable repetition. Instead of lending 
itself to the deductive testing of pre-established hypotheses, each repetition will 
invariably incite slightly different knowledge. Despite its essential association 
with the local, this knowledge ironically cannot be controlled or restricted to the 
local circumstances. Haraway speaks of irony as an essential moment of such par-
adoxical knowledge production: “Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve 
into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible 
things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humour 
and serious play” (Haraway [1985] 2001: 291). The paradoxical formulation “serious 
play” nicely captures the simultaneously consequential and circumstantial nature 
of the boundless specificity of performative research.
Paradox 3: Ephemerality and Inscription 
The rubber-cord experiment has demonstrated how intensifying paradox through 
performance incites affirmative speculations that are enacted by embodied sub-
jectivities, while persistently challenging the boundaries of situated embodiment. 
Returning to our overarching paradox, we now want to consider further the rela-
tion between knowledge derived from performance as research and the abstract 
knowledge generated through scientific inscription devices. The map experiment 
has already indicated how the performative enactment of scientific inscription 
enables new ways of knowing cartography. But if it is thus possible to performa-
tively open up scientific inscription, does it conversely also make sense to inscribe 
performance? What kinds of inscription devices are useful here, and how can 
paradoxes of the firmative and the affirmative be productively mobilized in the 
process of inscription?
Kershaw points out two distinct problems, one relating to ephemerality, the 
other one to inscription:
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Firstly, how can the ephemeral be of lasting value; that is, how might valid know-
ledge claims emerge through the ephemerality of performance events? Secondly, 
how can the “live” of the past be revived through its remains; that is, how might 
knowledge created by the liveness of performance be transmitted in its documen-
tary traces? (Kershaw 2008: 26)
While the first question contemplates possibilities of creating “lasting value” pre-
cisely in the absence of (traditional) inscription devices, the second question calls 
for new techniques of inscription. Such techniques should be capable, not only of 
fixing performance events for the sake of knowledge accumulation, but to revive 
the eventful past in the present. How, in other words, might the eventful, para-
dox-ridden past come to bear on the present? And to what extent does paradox-
icality itself need to be conjured in the present if the past’s liveness is not to be 
deadened by the inscription?
Let’s take this text as an example. At one level, our essay has enacted an abduc-
tive process of speculation oriented towards abstractable knowledge regarding 
the paradoxical relations of performance and inscription. This abstractive abduc-
tion has entailed recursive forms of evoking the workshop’s live events through 
description and distancing ourselves through analytic accounts. The more we 
have distanced ourselves from what happened in the ‘live’ of the workshop, the 
more we have been able to build up a new hypothesis from our initial assump-
tions around speculative knowledge. In order to do so, the performance’s diverse 
traces needed to be read over and over again, which allowed us to ref lect on how 
knowledge is both embodied and inscribed. Similar abductive abstractions al-
ready happened during the workshop itself where participants responded to given 
tasks with different commitments and based on different experiences, ref lecting 
on these responses in discussions and writing.
Recursive evocation has thus been a key element in our affirmatively specula-
tive inscription device. Performance studies provide us with helpful tools to re-
cord, remember and re-evoke the ephemeral event. In some respects, this tool-kit 
also corresponds to ethnographic methods in social research (e.g. Emerson/Fretz/
Shaw 1995). However, whereas such techniques of documentation and analysis 
often serve to inscribe ephemeral events into grids of apparently neutral-objec-
tive knowledge, they might also be used to cast into relief the ways in which the 
concrete paradoxes that have animated research-performances of the past have 
been responded to. They might thus be deployed to retrace these events on a dy-
namically unfolding and situated—rather than fixed and neutral—level of analy-
sis. Perhaps more than we have managed to do here, this therefore entails not only 
factually tracing the eventful past, but rather affectively evoking it, for instance, 
through narrative and poetic means (which also connects to the ethnographic dis-
cussion on “writing culture”). Feminist researchers, especially, have productively 
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connected scientific inscription to such “evocative” descriptions and fabulations 
(cf. Hutta 2015). Methodological attentiveness to the evocative potential of analy-
sis moreover suggests nuanced engagement with visualization beyond mere rep-
resentation and illustration. This signals the value of collaborative formats that 
connect text-based research with expertise in areas such as visual arts, as also 
proposed in the discussion around live methods and live sociology.6 
As Back and Puwar (2012a) have noted, “live sociology”—or what we have 
termed performative research—is enhanced as researchers become increasingly 
“crafty” in making use of the evocative inscription devices developed in visual or 
performance arts or curation. This imbrication of research and arts concerns pro-
cesses of empirical research as well as of analysis and presentation. Regarding the 
empirical process of engaging with real-world objects such as maps of Bayreuth, 
the students of our workshops ‘artistically’ manipulated these objects and com-
bined them with other material and semiotic objects. They speculatively in-folded 
various elements—map, signs, gestures, and spatial arrangements in the theatre 
lab—into their performative activity, which went along with a process of fiction-
alizing empirical facts. As our discussion has suggested, such creative speculation 
can be instigated through the use of play, irony and the creation of ‘as-if’ situations, 
especially in contexts like theatre or urban spaces. At the level of analytically and 
curatively reengaging with the various traces thus performatively produced, on 
the other hand, what has been performatively ‘in-folded’ is evocatively un-folded.
This brings to mind the ethnographic understanding of “thick description” as a 
process of “explicating” (which literally means ‘unfolding’) social events and inter-
actions (Geertz 1973). In performance as research, however, what is to be explicat-
ed are not merely cultural sets of meanings and practices, but rather the creative 
responses participants have formulated in relation to paradoxes of fact and fiction, 
embodiment and privacy, group and privacy, habitus and situation or everyday 
situation and staged performance. While analysis and presentation retrace some 
of the material and factual processes ‘im-plicated’ (infolded) in a fictionalized per-
formance, they simultaneously need to re-evoke these fact-fictions in the here and 
now—thereby necessarily altering whatever components have entered into the 
performance as these are selectively related to a different context.
Regarding the mode of analysis, we see a shift in focus here from the firmative 
inscription of events to the affirmative re-evocation of their paradoxical intensi-
ties. In such an approach, conceptual abstractions—such as group focus versus 
private action, habitus versus situational practice, everyday activity versus per-
formance—cease to function as the neutral grids of universal knowledge. Instead, 
they become vital means enabling thought to open itself up towards the eventful-
6  In their discussion of “curating sociology,” Nirmal Puwar and Sanjay Sharma (2012) have insight-
fully demonstrated this value.
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ness that unfolds through perceptual and affective registers (cf. Deleuze/Guat-
tari [1991] 1994). If there is thus considerable potential for analysis to be enhanced 
through techniques of evocation, however, this does not stop the paradox of in-
scription and ephemerality from reappearing all along—persistently demanding 
our response. Paradoxicality thus re-emerges in the very process of eventful in-
scription.
A variant of this paradox has surfaced in our double role as observers and par-
ticipants. While conducting the workshop, we were also part of the group—for 
instance, during the cafeteria experiment or the warm-up sessions—and thus 
shared to some extent the somatic and subjective dimensions of the project. At 
no point were we able to observe the group from a safe distance. In ethnograph-
ic research, the simultaneity of bodily participation and analytic observation is 
commonly discussed under the rubric of “participant observation”—an activity 
that, starting from the haphazard jottings of ephemeral situations and continuing 
with the descriptive re-creation of significant scenes, leads, step by step, to the 
formulation of analytic claims and insights (cf. Emerson/Fretz/Shaw 1995). This 
ethnographic activity, though, tends to posit the observant participant-research-
er-author as the central subject of knowledge. Yet, the text you are reading is only 
one of many possible traces of the workshop. Other such traces exist, for example, 
as feedback discussions, notes, photographs, a weblog, various notes—and like-
ly the embodied memories of mapping exercises and lunch breaks. This suggests 
that knowledge formation ought to be conceived as more dispersed.
What is more, the ethnographic approach commonly centers the generation of 
knowledge on the sphere of textual production and analysis, sidelining the bodi-
ly levels on which it simultaneously occurs. A more consequential interrogation 
of the paradox of inscription and ephemerality calls instead for considering the 
body itself as a possible device for what we have called the evocative inscription 
of knowledge. This brings us back to speculation’s double capacity of generating 
knowledge and fostering embodied ways of knowing.
To Conclude: Researching Performance, Performing Research
What is the epistemic status of the knowledge generated by means of perfor-
mance? To the extent that the speculative cartography of performance as research 
is concerned with the formulation of propositional statements relating to the 
concrete issues engaged with, there might appear to be few new or substantial-
ly different findings compared to what one can read in academic literatures on 
performance art or live sociology. There are two ways in which this affirmative-
ly speculative knowledge production matters, though. On a formal level, this 
knowledge is radically different inasmuch as it is embodied. This suggests not 
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only a different pedagogical approach in academic teaching, but also a different 
approach to knowledge production. Performance as research relates to the every-
day practice of orientation in space by means of maps, digital devices and so on, 
only to transfer it to the instable, or ‘multi-stable,’ space between the theatre lab 
and its others (including experience, city space, social research and so on). It has 
turned out to be much easier to open up and unsettle existing grids of knowledge 
in the theatre lab as well as in public space than in the seminar room, where this 
might be a bigger challenge. Performance as research, then, claims to unsettle 
that which, as an effect of its accumulation, is considered self-evident. It does so 
by means of embodiment and in reference to implicit knowledge, which has al-
ways already been transferred more via evocation and performance than by being 
stored in neutral grids of knowledge. Thus, after the experiment, we can claim 
that we ‘know’ the meaning of navigation through public space in close proximity 
to another. We ‘know’ how our awareness can shift from the usual perspective 
of a sitting or standing body to a bodily awareness of the space. We ‘know’ how 
to imagine a-logical itineraries and cartographies that juxtapose and challenge 
existing regimes of navigation.
Additionally, on the meta-level we have used to frame this essay, we can now 
more profoundly evaluate the strategies, potentials and limitations of experi-
ments and research endeavors in the performance arts, the Situationists’ move-
ment or abductive approaches. For instance,  in focusing on the dynamic conjunc-
tion of firmative and affirmative speculation, we have sought to rework a paradox 
that has implicitly accompanied approaches from Situationism to the turn to ab-
duction. As Reichertz points out, abduction’s “secret charm” resides in the fact 
that “it is a logical inference (and thereby reasonable and scientific), however it ex-
tends into the realm of profound insight (and therefore generates new knowledge)” 
(Reichertz 2010: 7). Similarly, the Situationists have affirmed the desiring f luxes 
of embodied subjects that speculatively drift through space, while at the same 
time seeking to articulate “precise laws,” to use Debord’s above-cited formulation. 
Various approaches that can be credited with promoting affirmatively speculative 
research designs are therefore founded on a paradoxical simultaneity of firma-
tive and affirmative registers. Yet—not least in the German social sciences—the 
endeavor to generate ‘scientific’ knowledge has frequently gotten the upper hand, 
whereas affirmatively speculative moments have been relegated to the secondary 
status of generating hypotheses to be deductively tested—and potentially falsi-
fied.7 Rather than making productive use of paradoxes of emic and etic, concrete 
and abstract, affirmative and firmative, these approaches have therefore ambiv-
7  Qualitative approaches seeking to embrace abduction have been especially haunted by the spec-
ter of ‘neutral objectivity’—avowals of the emic, contextual and explicatory notwithstanding.
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alently oscillated between different registers, often hierarchically subordinating 
the affirmative to the firmative.8
As we have argued, though, it is precisely the dynamic coexistence of hetero-
geneous elements in the paradox that has a potential for generating new practices 
and insights (cf. Hutta 2010). Instead of warding off paradoxicality by integrating 
the affirmative into the firmative, we have sought to discuss settings of learning 
and research that open up space for paradoxicality to be enacted. In a certain way, 
we have returned to some of Peirce’s own elaborations on abduction.9 
There is thus more at stake than a mere reproduction of artistic or theoretical 
ideas. In fact, rather weak criteria such as expectation, empathy and suspense 
need to be considered as equally important and productive aspects for conducting 
a performance analysis as the instruments that enable scientific inscription. This 
entails productively accepting the limitation of our interpreting efforts, as set by 
the mere fact of performance’s ephemerality. It also asks us to develop forms of 
re-inscription that proffer affective evocation in place of neutralizing distance. 
Therefore, the fact that we might find ourselves distanced from positive knowl-
edge as a modern certainty even in the act of remembering it should not leave us 
in despair, for it is more and more a lesson to learn in digital culture. 
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Figuration: Speculating with Fiction

Chapter 8: Scale and Speculative Futures 
in Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker and Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s 2312
Matthew Hannah and Sylvia Mayer
Any fictional text can be regarded as speculative—in the sense that all fiction 
invents alternative realities and thus engages with questions of how we under-
stand our present worlds and ourselves, our knowledge of the past, and our con-
ceptualizations of the future. As readers we enjoy the “cognitive provisionality” 
fictional texts provide us with, the opportunity to suspend disbelief, engage in 
“imaginative play” (Gallagher 2006: 347), and speculate about the (im)probable, the 
(im)possible, the (un)desirable of proposed realities. Some genres, however, have 
lent themselves particularly well to speculation about possible futures. Whether 
labeled “utopia,” “dystopia,” “science fiction,” “speculative fiction,” or “post-apoc-
alyptic fiction,” future-oriented fictional texts all engage in the imagination of 
possible future worlds, thereby responding to the political, social, economic, or 
cultural challenges of the times in which they are written. In some way or another, 
these genres all share the qualities that Fitting (2010) regards as characteristic for 
modern science fiction. They represent “a response to the effects of the scientific 
transformation of the world beginning around the end of the eighteenth century: 
in the European awareness of history and the future, and in the increasing impact 
of the scientific method and of technological change on people’s lives” (136).1
This essay addresses two novels that create speculative future worlds as re-
sponses to the economic, scientific, and technological challenges that marked the 
times of their writing: Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker and Kim Stanley Robinson’s 
2312. Each of these novels responds very differently to “the terrors and delights 
of technological modernity” (Luckhurst 2005: 170) that science fiction explores. 
1  On the speculative quality of any fictional text, see Chu’s science-fictional theory of mimesis, 
which argues that realism and science fiction “exist on a continuum” (Chu 2010: 7), and Freed-
man’s claim that even the most realistic fiction reveals “an irreducible degree of alterity and es-
trangement” (Freedman 2000: 21). For a survey of more recent scholarship on such genre catego-
rization, including discussions on the distinction between science fiction and speculative fiction, 
see also Fitting (2010); Vieira (2011); and Voigts (2015). 
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Riddley Walker engages in an exploration of the challenges of twentieth-century 
nuclear technology and develops a thoroughly dystopian far-future scenario. 2312 
engages in an exploration of the challenges of early twenty-first-century comput-
er, biomedical, and geo-engineering technologies and develops a future scenario 
marked by a mixture of utopian and dystopian features. 
Hoban’s novel, published in 1980, imagines the far-reaching effects of nuclear 
catastrophe. Variously labeled “apocalyptic sf” (Mousoutzanis 2009), “post-apoc-
alyptic science fiction” (Branscomb 1991; Maynor/Patteson 1984), or “post-nuclear 
dystopia” (Horstmann 2015), the novel envisions a geographically isolated, rural 
society in southeast England some 2,500 years after a nuclear war. The depiction 
of this future society’s habits of living, political and economic structures, and re-
ligious beliefs positions it in what can be identified as a new iron age where daily 
work routines lack the mechanical assistance of an industrial age existence and 
life expectancy is low. To Natalie Maynor and Richard F. Patteson, Hoban’s ac-
count of this post-apocalyptic world, as well as his invention of an English lan-
guage variant that ref lects the dramatically altered conditions of social reality, 
turns Riddley Walker into one of “the most sophisticated work[s] of fiction ever to 
speculate about man’s future on earth and the implications of a potentially de-
structive technology” (Maynor/Patteson 1984: 18). 
Robinson’s novel, published in 2012, is set 300 years in the future, when hu-
manity has successfully colonized the solar system, while planet Earth still strug-
gles with ecological devastation, overpopulation, and political strife that extends 
into space. The local settings of the novel include planets, moons, and asteroids 
that have been terraformed—in part, to preserve biomes that had been destroyed 
on Earth due to anthropogenic global climate change—and, in the case of the as-
teroids, are not only inhabited by humans but also used as means of rapid trans-
portation. Dramatic advances in science and technology have made such terra-
forming possible while also accelerating travel and mobility for the privileged, 
spurring bodily human enhancements, creating f lexible sexualities and genders, 
and significantly increasing life expectancy. 2312 can be classified as a critical uto-
pia (Moylan 1986) that engages with the social, economic, political, and cultural 
risks, the chances and threats, generated by the ongoing technological processes 
of modernization.
While the speculative genre of science fiction is clearly defined by its future 
orientation, the relevance of spatiality for the genre has also increasingly been 
acknowledged, especially in the wake of postmodern theorizing and the spatial 
turn in literary and cultural studies. In 1987, drawing on his notion of the predom-
inance of space in postmodern culture, Fredric Jameson argued that “we need to 
explore the proposition that the distinctiveness of SF as a genre has less to do with 
time (history, past, future) than with space” ([1987] 2005: 313). More recently, James 
Kneale (2009) claimed that the genre of science fiction lends itself particularly well 
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to the analysis of the shapes and functions of spatial structure in light of current 
work in human geography as well as literary spatial studies, since it imagines al-
ternative worlds without a referent in so-called real life. As “representations of 
places that do not or cannot exist” (424), science fiction draws particular attention 
to the relationality, heterogeneity, and process-character that mark the construc-
tion of space and place—whether in fiction or in the ‘real’ world. 
Drawing on these ideas, we focus our analysis on the significance of “scale” for 
the spatial representation of the two novels’ speculative future worlds. The catego-
ry of scale, too, has become increasingly relevant in human geography and in lit-
erary spatial studies. In geography, there are two general kinds of scale definition, 
one quite technical and cartographic, the other “a kind of shorthand to describe 
either an areal unit on the Earth’s surface (as when studying a phenomenon ‘at 
the regional scale’) or the extent of a process’s or a phenomenon’s geographical 
reach (as when suggesting that a particular process is ‘a regional’ or ‘a national’ 
one)” (Herod 2011: xi). The literary critic Hsuan L. Hsu offers a more encompassing 
transdisciplinary definition:
At once an epistemological framework, an imaginative construct, and an idea 
materialized in real spaces and activities, scale can only be understood through 
interdisciplinary analysis that attends to its fictive, geographical, and political eco-
nomic properties. (Hsu 2017: 125) 
In this essay, we understand scalar concepts to pertain to graduated scales in this 
geographical sense as treated in literary works. Focusing on the role of scale in 
the novels, we explore how scale is employed in Riddley Walker and 2312 for the 
purpose of drawing attention to processes of spatial structuring and to specific 
thematic preoccupations in the two novels.
In the next section, we provide definitions of the scale concepts that we turn 
into tools for textual analysis and interpretation. We then explore the ‘re-scaled’ 
worlds of the two novels, attending to the loss of the global or planetary scale in 
Riddley Walker and the expansion of scale in 2312. By explaining processes and out-
comes of re-scaling, we shed light on the local, temporal, and social settings from 
which the novels’ respective plots unfold. We compare scale-related strategies in 
the two novels, including failed attempts at scale-jumping in Riddley Walker and 
key instances of successful scale-jumping in 2312. Our analysis focuses on the 
desperate and misguided mimetic attempts in Riddley Walker to regain access to 
atomic and molecular knowledge that promises to reopen access to distant parts 
of the planet, and on the plan to save Earth in 2312 by making use of the opportu-
nities of an expanded scale system. 
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Scale, Human Geography, and Science Fiction
In international debates in human geography since the 1970s, a number of key 
concepts have played central roles for addressing the mutual constitution of social 
and spatial relations. Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones (2008) identify 
four such concepts: territory, place, scale, and networks. These concepts have each 
been the focus of lasting discussion. In the course of examining them, it has be-
come clear that all four can be seen as socially constructed (and often contested) 
heuristic devices, which, through the understandings of social actors, neverthe-
less produce real effects in socio-spatial organization of life. It is by now also clear 
that specific constructions of territory, place, scale, and network inf luence each 
other in complex ways. 
In everyday parlance, scale is usually assumed to refer to a nested hierarchy 
of geographical levels. More broadly, scale is a way to structure our understand-
ings of relative geographical size or extent not along a continuous spectrum but 
with reference to a small number of conventionally accepted ‘levels.’ In public and 
scholarly discourses about social life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
a differentiation is typically made between ‘local’ or ‘urban,’ ‘regional,’ ‘national,’ 
and ‘global’ scales. These constructs, of course, can have real effects—in political 
terms, for instance, where scale structures are usually fixed in legal and constitu-
tional documents as administrative hierarchies: as ‘municipal’ or ‘local,’ ‘state’ or 
‘provincial’ and ‘national’ governmental units, or in reference to the ‘international’ 
scale (Herod 2011: ch. 1). However, as human geographers have delved ever more 
deeply into the concept of scale, they have fundamentally complicated our under-
standing of what scale is and how it plays a role in social life. Starting in the 1980s, 
prominently in Neil Smith’s theorization of the historical geography of capitalism 
and capitalist reconfigurations of ‘nature,’ scale came to be understood as a con-
tingent, contestable way of framing reality that has real effects (Smith 1990; cf. 
Herod 2011: 25). 
Changes in conventionally accepted scale structures are often termed re-scal-
ing, which is defined, for example, in the literature on political scale as “the pro-
cess in which policies and politics that formerly took place at one scale are shifted 
to others in ways that reshape the practices themselves, redefine the scales to and 
from which they are shifted, and reorganize interactions between scales” (Mc-
Cann 2003: 162). 
Re-scaling “necessarily entail[s] a disruption and recomposition of the net-
works of power that tie political actors together within and across scales” (McCann 
2003: 163). Finally, it is important to note that re-scaling can mean ‘down-scaling’ 
as well as ‘up-scaling.’ The development of scale concepts in the context of seek-
ing to understand the historical geography of capitalism has led scholars to focus 
much more often upon expansions than upon contractions or narrowings of scale 
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structures. Yet, the latter type of re-scaling is also a possibility. As these discus-
sions of re-scaling suggest, the specific scale levels within any one scale structure 
(such as local, national, or global) each only make sense in relation to the other lev-
els (Agnew 1997: 100). Scale, in other words, is not only constructed but relational. 
Since scale can be understood “not just as an outcome of social process but 
also an instrument for reshaping power dynamics” (Gruby/Campbell 2013: 2048)—
what Smith calls the “politics of scale” (Smith 1990: 173–175)—a number of authors 
have focused upon “scalar strategies” or ways of using specific scalar levels to 
achieve something at the same or other scalar levels (Lindseth 2006: 740). A spe-
cific kind of scalar strategy is identified by Smith as “scale jumping” (1990: 174–175), 
a strategy he illustrates in his analysis of local protests against gentrification in 
New York City and their successful attempts to become more broadly visible at the 
neighborhood and city levels.
Recently, human geographers have begun to extend the scope of their re-
search beyond the confines of the Earth itself, with an eye to how long-standing 
disciplinary research themes may be taken up and potentially transformed by a 
broadened engagement with extraplanetary realms. In a 2017 forum in Progress in 
Human Geography entitled “Geographies of Outer Space: Progress and New Oppor-
tunities,” the forum editors argue that, in this enterprise, “[h]uman geographers 
are well-placed to draw on a breadth of conceptual developments from its range of 
subdisciplinary perspectives, including an established engagement with concepts 
of scale” (Dunnett/Maclaren 2019: 315). And yet, this connection is not developed. 
Instead the contributors to the forum take up other concepts and subfields: labor 
geographies and astro-capitalism; environmental geographies and human-nature 
relations; geographical imaginations of outer space and geographies of knowledge 
about it; landscapes and moral geographies of outer space; and connections be-
tween exploration and control of space and nationalism.
Regarding scale as a meaning-making feature not only in the ‘real world,’ but 
also in fictional future worlds, the starting point of literary analysis is the same as 
that in the geographical literature. When David Delaney and Helga Leitner argue 
that geographical scale is considered “socially constructed rather than ontologi-
cally pre-given” and that “the geographic scales constructed are themselves im-
plicated in the constitution of social, economic and political processes” (Delaney/
Leitner 1997: 93), they refer in part to the constructing power of language and nar-
rative. Such an analytical approach needs to be taken with science fiction texts, 
which, whether utopian or dystopian in outlook, have for a long time imagined 
spaces in which humanity has increased the geographical extent of its presence 
in the universe beyond what is currently the highest conventionally understood 
geographical scale we inhabit, the global or planetary scale. It also needs to be 
taken with texts centered on contact with or invasion by extraterrestrial beings, 
exploring the question of how scales conceived as being beyond that of the Earth 
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might impact life on the planetary scale. And it needs to be taken with texts such 
as Riddley Walker that draw attention to the shrinking of geographical reach due 
to technological catastrophe.
The Re-scaled Future Worlds of Riddley Walker and 2312
Riddley Walker is set about 2,500 years after a nuclear catastrophe that occurred 
in the late 1990s and returned the southeast of England (and probably most other 
regions of the world) to a level of cultural, technological, and economic sophistica-
tion comparable to the prehistoric iron age. The region is known to its inhabitants 
as “Inland” (after “England”). Inland serves as the highest-order level of geograph-
ical reference or scale at which human life relevant to the narrative is organized. 
The chief economic activities in Inland are some rudimentary farming, salvaging 
of metals left over from pre-catastrophe civilization, and basic manufacturing of 
iron tools fueled by charcoal. Social organization is at the level of small, loosely 
organized groups of roughly between ten and fifty people who either control sta-
tionary farms or travel around doing salvage jobs. Life expectancy has dramati-
cally dropped. Travel on land is by foot. The fastest form of communication is by 
carrier pigeon.
The society in which Riddley Walker, the novel’s protagonist and autodiegetic 
narrator, grows up is marked by a ritualized search for long-lost knowledge that 
would allow the reconstruction of a technologically much more advanced way of 
life. It is in ritualistically performed narratives that some rudimentary knowl-
edge about the ancient world as well as the causes of its catastrophe have been 
preserved. This knowledge, however, proves to be insufficient. In focusing on a 
future scenario marked by an inability to overcome scientific and technological 
ignorance, Riddley Walker presents a cautionary tale about the effects of nuclear 
technology and a narrative of a failed quest for essential scientific knowledge.
Loss of knowledge is ref lected in—and mediated by—the language used by 
Riddley and by the other characters, a language that itself seems to have been ru-
ined by the catastrophe. Many words have survived from pre-catastrophe times, 
but with spellings mangled almost to the point of unrecognizability. The place 
names in what used to be late twentieth-century Kent and surrounding areas like-
wise survive only in twisted form. More poignantly, the referents of many words 
no longer exist, and the novel’s characters must rely on imprecise, often simply 
false understandings of what these words once meant. 
The culture in which these (mis)understandings are preserved and relayed has 
been almost exclusively oral, though some people can write. The tenuous grasp the 
characters have of human history and their place in it is thus still largely conveyed 
by storytellers. The most important story to be interpreted, and the meager core 
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of the shared culture of Inland, is the Eusa Story—an adaptation of the story of St. 
Eustace, a painting of whom in Canterbury Cathedral was the original inspiration 
for the novel. 
The tellers of the Eusa Story are Abel Goodparley and Erny Orfing, two repre-
sentatives of the “Mincery” (“ministry”), which passes for the rudimentary gov-
ernment of Inland. Goodparley, the “Pry Mincer,” and Orfing, the “Wes Mincer,” 
travel around Inland periodically in a circuit, accompanied by “hevvys” (a category 
of bodyguards) and tell the Eusa Story through a puppet show in the style of the 
Punch and Judy tradition, using the same kind of puppets and miniature stage or 
“fit-up.” This periodic circuit by representatives of the Mincery is the chief way in 
which Inland as the largest effective scale is produced and reproduced. All local 
groups are aware of the extent of territory covered by Goodparley and Orfing, and 
this serves as their widest geographical reference.
The Eusa Story centers upon Eusa, a pre-catastrophe scientist who worked out 
how to harness nuclear power but was forced to surrender this knowledge to Mr. 
Clevver (modeled on the devil figure in Punch and Judy shows). Mr. Clevver then 
built and detonated the bomb that destroyed civilization. For giving up the tech-
nical knowledge that led to catastrophe, Eusa was beheaded, but his disembodied 
head, as Goodparley explains to Riddley, instructed survivors to tell his story for 
posterity: 
Make a show of me for memberment and for the ansers to your askings. Make a 
show with han figgers put a littl woodin head of me on your finger in memberment 
of my real head on a poal. Keap the Eusa folk a live in memberment of the hardship 
they brung on. (Hoban [1980] 2002: 122) 
The Eusa story is thus in part a cautionary tale. But it also includes some distort-
ed information about the chemistry of gunpowder and nuclear fission, as does a 
related story circulating in Inland called “the hart of the wood” (2–4). The Eusa 
story cryptically holds out the promise of recovery of the knowledge necessary to 
rebuild civilization: 
Out of that hardship let them bring a Ardship 12 years on and 12 years come agen. 
Let the head of Inland ask the Ardship then. Let the head of Inland road the circel 
ful and to the senter asking what he wants to know for all of Inland. When the right 
head of Inland fynds the right head of Eusa the anser wil come and Inland wil rise 
up out of what she ben brung down to. (122)
Goodparley, Orfing and others, eventually including Riddley, are tantalized by the 
hints handed down in the Eusa story as to how nuclear power might once again be 
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understood and harnessed, though the stories they rely on lead them to conf late 
the secrets of nuclear fission with the recipe for gunpowder. 
Riddley and others are keenly aware that they live in a degraded situation. 
Often the focus of the novel is upon the loss of technological capabilities and the 
mathematical and physical knowledge that underlies them. But the “clevverness” 
that brought this knowledge is portrayed as dangerous, as in Lorna Elswint’s tell-
ing of the story “Why the Dog Wont Show Its Eyes”: “They had the Nos. of the rain 
bow and the Power of the air all workit out with counting which is how they got 
boats in the air and picters on the wind. Counting clevverness is what it wer” (19).
Probably because of the skepticism encouraged in these stories, Riddley is at 
first not particularly interested in trying to regain such lost technological knowl-
edge. But then he has a moment of conversion at Fork Stoan (Folkestone), where 
the ruins of what seems to be a nuclear power plant elicit unexpected emotions: 
“How cud any 1 not want to get that shyning Power back from time back way back? 
How cud any 1 not want to be like them what had boats in the air and picters on the 
wind? How cud any 1 not want to see them shyning weals terning?” (100). Imagin-
ing the “boats in the air and picters on the wind,” Riddley begins to link the loss of 
technological knowledge with the disappearance of larger scales. The lost ability 
to f ly and to transmit information refers metonymically to the loss of global reach. 
Later, Goodparley spells out more clearly the connection between the molecular 
sources of power and the possibility of travel and communication over much larg-
er distances:
What wer it put them boats up there in the air dyou think? Power it musve ben 
musnt it. Youve got to have the Power then befor youwl have the res of it havent 
you. Which theres Power in this here Salt 4 we know that much. Its 1 of the Nos. of 
the 1 Big 1. All weve got to do is put it to gether with the others. (143)
In the Eusa Story itself, Eusa’s scientific abilities are depicted essentially as the 
ability to convert one scale into another: “Eusa wuz a noing man he noet how tu 
bigger the smaul & he noet how tu smauler the big” (30). The ‘smaller—bigger’ 
relation is at the core of all specific scale constructions. This is the question of 
relative size in a nutshell, to which conventional scale hierarchies provide handy 
practical guides. The re-scaled world of Riddley Walker is a world that has failed to 
recover the necessary knowledge of processes at what we would call the molecular 
and atomic scales that is needed to reconstruct larger geographical scales, to put 
“boats in the air and picters on the wind.”
In its re-scaling of a future world, 2312 differs dramatically from Riddley Walk-
er. In contrast to the latter’s narrowing of scale or down-scaling, 2312 imagines a 
world that is marked by the expansion of scale, by an up-scaling beyond the plan-
etary scale taken for granted as the largest geographical extent relevant to most 
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human social life. The 300 years that lie between the early twenty-first century 
and the novel’s fictional future have seen a multitude of fundamental disruptions 
and reorganizations of scale. The twenty-first and twenty-second centuries—des-
ignated in the novel’s system of historical periodization as “The Dithering: 2005–
2060” and “The Crisis: 2060–2130”—experience climate collapse on Earth and 
“catastrophic death on all continents” (Robinson 2012: 277), but also first successes 
in the settlement of the moon and Mars. Depending on their geographical posi-
tion and socioeconomic status, people experience down-scaling and up-scaling 
simultaneously during these periods. The periods of “The Turnaround: 2130–2160” 
and “The Accelerando: 2160–2220” then see an accelerated expansion of spatial 
reach with the “[f]ull application of all the new technological powers, including 
human longevity increases; terraforming of Mars […]; full diaspora into solar sys-
tem […]; start of terraforming of Venus” (278). While this acceleration slows down 
somewhat in the following two periods, “The Ritard: 2220–2270” and “The Bal-
kanization: 2270–2320,” due largely to political tensions, the solar system is by 
then firmly established as the highest geographical reference for the human pop-
ulation’s “place-based identification, economic activities, and access to mobility 
across space” (Hsu 2017: 125). 
Dramatic advances in the sciences and massive technological innovation have 
revolutionized transportation and terraforming capabilities, shifting the politi-
cal and economic focus from a planetary to an interplanetary perspective. New 
forms of transportation, new ways of inhabitation, but also striking biomedical 
advances and advances in computer technology form the basis for an interplane-
tary civilization still in the making. While Earth is still the socioeconomic, polit-
ical, and cultural reference point of the thousands of small and larger communi-
ties that have formed in the solar system, it is no longer portrayed as the highest 
level of human scale configuration. The new absolute limit for humanity is the 
space beyond the solar system, the universe: it is now the stars, and no longer the 
planets, that “exist beyond human time, beyond human reach” (Robinson 2012: 
375). Of course, any expansion beyond the traditional terrestrial scale-system can 
be refined much further: “Thinking through the nuances of the ‘spaces of outer 
space’ through terms such as extraterrestrial or extra-global space, earth-orbit-
al space (involving polar, parabolic, or geostationary trajectories), interplanetary 
space, exo-planetary space, interstellar or celestial space, the cosmos, or even the 
heavens, invokes a variety of scales” (Dunnett/Maclaren 2019: 315). These nuances 
are secondary in 2312, where tensions between terrestrials and “spacers” are rep-
resented in a binary fashion.
In the year 2312, the enormous increase in transportation capabilities has be-
come manifest most significantly between planets but also on individual planets, 
including Earth. Some of the characters regularly travel by spacecraft between 
different terrestrial planets, as well as to—and on—asteroids, called “starships” 
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(Robinson 2012: 281), that were formed into terraria. On Mercury, the entire city of 
Terminator moves on giant tracks, always slightly ahead of the sun’s rays, which 
threaten to destroy it but also drive it forward by thermally expanding the tracks 
on which it moves (29–30). The available range of geographical mobility is most 
conspicuously expressed in the movements of one of the protagonists, Swan Er 
Hong. These movements extend from slow travel by foot underground, to fast 
travel by trains and airplanes on Mercury and Earth, to wave-surfing on the F-ring 
of Saturn, to interplanetary trips in space ferries, space elevators, and various oth-
er types of spacecraft. Swan is a spacer, the novel’s version of the typical science 
fiction traveler who introduces readers to the fictional future world. Spacers are 
humans who live most of the time in space and enjoy the privilege of regular space 
travel. They need to return to Earth with some regularity to maintain their health 
and longevity; they know that “neglect of this practice leads to a high risk of dying 
many decades before” (94). Spacers thus personify the new superordinate scale, 
the highest level of spatial mobility and communication encompassing human life 
throughout the solar system.
Advances in terraforming have made possible extensive and politically, eco-
nomically, and culturally diverse inhabitation of the solar system. Not only do hu-
mans inhabit terrestrial planets such as Mercury, Mars, and Venus, but they also 
inhabit some of their moons. They create terraria on asteroids, and in 2312 they 
have even begun to inhabit the moons of low-density giant planets such as Saturn. 
A more recent innovation that enhances the attractiveness of some already colo-
nized solar bodies is the large-scale transfer of light from a set of small “Vulcanoid” 
asteroids in a belt between the sun and Mercury (397–398). The novel here provides 
the reader with a very direct and physical sense in which the solar-system scale is 
being configured. 
The solar system emerges as a space not only characterized by an ongoing in-
tensification of human inhabitation, but also by an interplanetary political and 
socioeconomic order originating in space exploration and colonization by the 
powerful nations on Earth. Thus, the scale hierarchy typical of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, in which the national scale is placed below the global scale, 
is no longer adequate as a shorthand. The emerging interplanetary order is marked 
by conf lict that ref lects the conf lict-ridden situation on Earth, which is to a large 
extent caused by competing economic models. At the time of the “Accelerando,” 
there were “several competing economies on Earth, all decisively under the thumb 
of late capitalism” (139). In the year 2312, “feudalistic” economies are competing 
with the “non-market economy” of the Mondragon settlements and with the type 
of capitalist system practiced on Mars, a “social-democratic system” in which 
political regulation plays a prominent role (139). All these systems inf luence so-
cial and political organization: they are fundamental to the “power geometry” (cf. 
Massey 1994) of the interplanetary order and the power geometry of single solar 
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bodies, as they determine access to resources and to the means and experiences of 
mobility. When Wahram muses at one point that “[a]ll trouble comes from Earth” 
(Robinson 2012: 301), he indicates that, despite existing political conf licts on the 
interplanetary level, power struggles originate and are still fiercest on Earth.
In 2312, Earth has become “a mess, a sad place,” as Swan muses at one point, 
but it still remains “the center of the story” (99). After climate collapse in the twen-
ty-first century, Earth is still an overpopulated place with an ecology at break-
ing point. After an eleven-meter-sea-level rise, all the coastlines of the twentieth 
century are gone, and with them many plant and animal species; existing social 
systems are unable to respond adequately to the environmental needs of both hu-
mans and non-humans; political conf lict and social ills are widespread. For sur-
vival, the human population on Earth has become increasingly dependent on re-
sources from space. Operating on the new solar-system scale to alleviate planetary 
ills has thus restructured the scale system and created new networks of power.
The expanded and restructured scale system in 2312 is formally ref lected by 
the novel’s expansive, open, and ultimately epic aesthetics that diametrically con-
trast with the closed aesthetics of Riddley Walker, where the reader, caught in the 
perceptions and thoughts of a single narrator-focalizer, is denied information es-
sential for understanding the situation more fully. 2312 presents a diversity of nar-
rative voices that provide information in a collage of different types of texts. The 
major plot strand of the novel, the attempt of a small group of people to uncover a 
conspiracy that involves the manipulation of humanoid beings—beings made of 
“human material” and “qubes” (quantum computers)—and thereby secure peace-
ful interplanetary cooperation, is presented in sections that are focalized by sev-
eral of the major characters. Additional information about the solar system and 
about the history of its colonization is given in sections called “lists,” in sections 
named after planets and moons, and in sections called “extracts.” The latter are 
paragraphs taken from history books that look retrospectively at the year 2312, at 
the centuries that precede it, and at the decades immediately following. This col-
lage technique recalls a prevalent mode of representation for the planetary scale, 
as Ursula Heise has suggested: “Epic, one of the oldest allegorical forms of nar-
rative in which the fate of the entire known world is usually at stake, has made a 
comeback as a way of establishing a planetary scope in storytelling.” Epic, she ar-
gues, is able to “accommodate ecological dynamisms, disequilibria, and disjunc-
tions along with ecosystems’ imbrications in heterogeneous human cultures and 
politics” (Heise 2008: 64). One narrative element that signals the shift to levels of 
geographical reach beyond the planetary scale may be seen in the fact that both 
the lists and the “extracts” that consist of syntactically incomplete paragraphs 
convey an overall sense of incompleteness and openness. They also convey a sense 
of a continuing lack of knowledge that characterizes the world of 2312—albeit on 
a strikingly different level compared to Riddley Walker.
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In 2312, a lack of knowledge is also signaled by the novel’s main plot, a mys-
tery plot. The group of spacers, first assembled by Swan’s grandmother Alex, then 
joined by Swan and led by inspector Genette, has to find out the sources of the acts 
of sabotage that have accumulated in recent years and that threaten the interplan-
etary political order the group finds most desirable. Moreover, all the major scien-
tific and technological advances continue to produce the unknowable side-effects 
or unintended consequences that have characterized industrial modernity since 
the eighteenth century: there is a lack of knowledge concerning the consequences 
of some biomedical technologies, and there is a lack of knowledge concerning the 
capabilities of advanced artificial intelligence. Despite the enormous successes in 
terraforming thousands of solar bodies, finally, there is still a lack of technological 
knowledge needed for improving the environmental situation on Earth: 
It was one of the ironies of their time that they could radically change the surfaces 
of the other planets, but not Earth. The methods they employed in space were al-
most all too crude and violent. Only with the utmost caution could they tinker with 
anything on Earth, because everything there was so tightly balanced and interwo-
ven. (Robinson 2012: 347)
Scalar Strategies in Riddley Walker and 2312
In Hoban’s post-apocalyptic future, the characters’ yearning for the rediscovery of 
molecular processes and the reconstruction of larger geographical capabilities this 
would allow fuels a range of attempts to rediscover the forgotten or misremem-
bered technological secrets. It is here that we can see a “scalar strategy” (Lindseth 
2006) come into play, that is, a way of trying to move from the relatively small 
to the relatively big or the reverse. In effect, this strategy is an attempt at “scale 
jumping,” the transference of events or phenomena at one scale to other scales.
Riddley, Goodparley, and others are severely hampered by ignorance of the 
electrical and chemical processes needed to produce the power to restart a lost civ-
ilization. But this ignorance is compounded by a second level of ignorance about 
how to put the knowledge they do possess to work. Not all of their beliefs about 
chemistry are completely wrong, and Granser, one of the itinerant charcoal burn-
ers, reveals to Goodparley and Riddley that gunpowder, “the 1 Littl 1,” is not to be 
confused with nuclear power, “the 1 Big 1” (Hoban [1980] 2002: 188–189). Granser 
uses the sulfur yellowcake Riddley has found to mix and detonate gunpowder late 
in the novel—in the process killing himself and Goodparley. Even the myths sur-
rounding atomic fission, preserved in the figure of the “Littl Shyning Man” split 
in two, are not completely unconnected to what we would consider valid science. 
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But what science is and how scientific method works is completely beyond the 
characters. This is clear from the way Goodparley describes the efforts he and oth-
ers have gone to: 
Weve got to work the E qwations [equations] and the low cations [locations] weve 
got to comb the nations [combinations] of it. We ben looking for Eusas head 1 way 
and a nother this long time. We ben digging in the groun for it we ben spare the 
mending [experimenting] we ben tryl narrering [trial-and-erroring] for it. (143) 
Scientific terms—if in highly distorted forms—are invoked here, but without the 
faintest hint of understanding of what they mean or entail. 
The figure of the ring or circle is at the heart of the scalar strategies pursued by 
Goodparley and Riddley in trying to make sense of how Eusa discovered the secret 
of radiation by splitting the atom (the “Littl Shyning Man”):
Owt uv thay 2 peaces of the Littl Shyning Man the Addom thayr cum shyningness 
[radiation] in wayvs in spredin circels. Wivverin & wayverin & humin with a hy 
soun. Lytin up the dark wud. Eusa seen the Littl 1 goin roun & roun insyd the Big 1 
& the Big 1 humin roun insyd the Littl 1. He seen thay Master Chaynjis uv the 1 Big 1. 
Qwik then he riten down thay Nos. uv them. (32) 
The path to rediscovering the “Nos.” needed to generate nuclear power, according 
to the disembodied head of Eusa, is to mime or reproduce this circular motion at 
the scale of Inland itself, that is, to “road the circel”: “Let the head of Inland road 
the circel ful and to the senter asking what he wants to know for all of Inland. 
When the right head of Inland fynds the right head of Eusa the anser wil come and 
Inland wil rise up out of what she ben brung down to” (122). 
Roading the circel, traveling with the puppet show counter-clockwise around 
through Bernt Arse to Fork Stoan and back northwards to “the senter” (Canter-
bury), is what Goodparley—as “Pry Mincer” the “head of Inland”—had been doing 
for years, performing the scalar strategy of jumping scale downwards, seeking 
to invoke molecular-level knowledge of electron orbits and fission by traveling in 
analogous circles through Inland. He had tried to “smauler the big” (32). The ulti-
mate goal is to deploy the knowledge thus gained in putting “boats in the sky and 
picters on the wind,” that is, to “bigger the smaul.” Ultimately, however, all of this 
is in vain, in technological terms. There is no rekindling of advanced technolo-
gy. Riddley and his contemporaries must continue “slogging through the mud,” 
haunted by the knowledge of lost scales.
In contrast to the failure of the scalar strategy in Riddley Walker, 2312 provides 
two major examples of effectively employed scalar strategies. The successful in-
teraction and interpenetration of scales becomes visible, first, in the implementa-
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tion of Alex’s plan to stabilize environmental and thus political and socioeconomic 
conditions on Earth, and second, in the course of action of the group of spacers 
that investigate the various acts of sabotage that threaten the power symmetry of 
the solar system.
After Alex’s death, Swan learns that she and her allies had been working on 
a plan to help save Earth from itself. Alex planned “the re-wilding of Earth” (458) 
for the purpose of triggering an ecological recovery, that is, the reintroduction 
of a multitude of species that had become extinct on the planet. Alex and the in-
terplanetary community that supported her had stockpiled “food and animals in 
the terraria” (81) over many years, intending to reintroduce them on Earth. While 
the terraria had already been providing an important part of Earth’s food, more 
unilateral, interventionist attempts by spacers or interplanetary organizations 
to ‘help’ Earth were highly controversial and often resented. All attempts at larg-
er-scale or more invasive terraforming of Earth had upset its delicate balances, 
causing widespread death and destruction (304). Therefore, Alex and her associ-
ates had been working in secret. 
On August 5, 2312, Alex’s friends decide to execute her scheme, sending tens 
of thousands of animals taken from the terraria down to the Earth’s surface, first 
in big landers, then in smaller parachuted landers, then in aerogel balloon bags, 
“each transparent bubble holding inside it an animal or an animal family” (395). 
Thus, a scalar strategy comes to fruition, in which endangered species are initially 
moved systematically beyond the global scale to secure their longer-term survival, 
but then reintroduced on Earth to help shore up or revitalize struggling or disap-
pearing ecosystems. This re-wilding by spacers also illustrates one of many ways 
in which the specific scale levels in any scale structure are never independent of 
each other but are reshaped or acquire different meanings when the overall struc-
ture itself changes.
The second example of a successfully employed scalar strategy is the sabotage 
that endangers several places in the solar system and their inhabitants. The group 
of spacers around Alex is also concerned with a more acute danger, namely, a 
possible plot among qubes, the miniaturized but ultra-powerful computers dis-
playing artificial intelligence. Inspector Genette and Wang, two leading members 
of the group, have begun to detect strange patterns of qube activity and wonder 
whether this activity is related to seemingly unconnected incidents throughout 
the solar system. This suspicion intensifies dramatically when a huge and unex-
plained explosion wrecks the tracks on which Terminator glides along the surface 
of Mercury, ultimately destroying the city.
The group eventually figures out that the explosion could only have been caused 
by the simultaneous convergence upon one location of thousands or millions of 
objects, each too small by itself to trigger Mercury’s protective systems. These ob-
jects had to be launched from a vast array of different places in the solar system 
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at different times. Genette realizes that only the most powerful qubes would have 
been able to carry out the calculations necessary to calibrate these launches with 
such precision. One of the most impressive of all the imagined technological feats 
in 2312 is thus centrally about the interpenetration of the solar and the local scales, 
or, in the language of Riddley Walker, of “bigging the smaul.”
Conclusion: Shifting Scales and the Instability of Scale Systems
The analytical focus on scale as narrative strategy has shown that the speculative 
futures of Riddley Walker and 2312 draw attention to processes of spatial struc-
turing and to the instability of any scale system, which depends strongly on the 
inextricable link between spatial and social—or, to be more precise, socioeco-
nomic and cultural—construction. The re-scaled worlds of these novels challenge 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century scale systems by envisioning dramatically 
different consequences of technological modernization. On the one hand, Riddley 
Walker provides a devastating assessment of nuclear technology, the employment 
of which causes a narrowing of scale and the breakdown of civilization. On the 
other hand, without ignoring their dangers, 2312 emphasizes the opportunities 
that risk technologies such as geo-engineering or biomedical and computer/AI 
technologies provide by presenting a new civilization characterized by an expan-
sion of scale. In both novels, the global scale remains a pivotal construct—but it 
functions very differently in the respective scale systems. In Riddley Walker, the 
global scale is lost in practical terms, but it remains central to the entire narrative 
as a ‘present absence’ that acts as the focus of desire and a motivation for the ac-
tions undertaken by the story’s main characters. In this dystopic world, the global 
scale is present as a haunting. By contrast, in 2312, the global scale remains very 
much alive. Its significance, however, has been fundamentally altered by the fact 
that it is no longer the largest level of spatial extent structuring human society. 
Earth still remains utterly central, both because it is still home to the vast majority 
of human beings and because spacers must return to Earth periodically for health 
and longevity reasons. But its lingering or worsening environmental, social, and 
economic problems can now be addressed ‘from below’ at smaller scales and also 
‘from above,’ that is, from other planets and by interplanetary alliances, consortia, 
or groups. 
In both novels, re-scaling is thus not only a matter of adding or subtracting 
specific scale levels in a way that leaves the other previously accepted conventional 
scales intact. In Riddley Walker, the absence of knowledge of molecular processes 
and of access to other parts of the globe intensifies the significance of what we 
would call local and bodily scales. In 2312, the Earth is changed by its new position 
in the solar system not only in ways discussed above, such as the re-wilding epi-
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sode, but also by the emergence of “Solar System Cities” or “Interplanetary Cities” 
(which can be seen as amplifications of the economically important “global cities” 
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). These cities support the terrestrial 
spaceports, thus giving them a crucial interscalar position.
Finally, in their exploration of the relevance of knowledge, science, and tech-
nology for the construction of geographical scale, the novels draw attention to 
environmental crisis and to the significance of energy sources on which spatial 
practices and configurations of scale ultimately depend. Riddley Walker presents 
a civilization in which the non-human environment has again become a threat to 
humans. Lacking basic scientific knowledge as well as machines to sustain the 
economy and to ensure protection in daily life, this civilization creates a space that 
leaves its inhabitants acutely vulnerable. In terms of energy, the result of an earlier 
nuclear catastrophe is that this civilization relies almost exclusively on charcoal, a 
source of energy that locks the characters in place and effectively rules out the es-
tablishment of a geographically wider scale. In contrast, the energy regime in 2312 
consists of a large variety of sources—most importantly, solar energy in a variety 
of physical forms—that allow for various types of movement and the expansion 
of scale toward the solar system. While Earth is still plagued by ecological crisis, 
the spatial practices that the expansion of scale makes possible offer at least some 
hope that the situation will, after all, be remedied at some point. Exploring these 
shifting meanings and functions of scale in the novel thus contributes to what 
Eric C. Otto (2012) has called “green speculations,” in other words, science fiction-
al engagements with the contemporary global environmental crisis. 
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Geek Temporalities and Digital Labor
Jordan S. Carroll
Saturday Night Live played an important role in defining the geek: beginning in 
1978, the show ran a series of comedic skits that introduced the American pub-
lic to the term “nerd” and cemented many popular conventions for representing 
geeks (Lane 2018: 4–8). This process of mythmaking culminated in the infamous 
1986 sketch featuring William Shatner. Shatner, playing himself, appears on the 
fourth day of the sixteenth annual Star Trek convention. The trekkers in the crowd 
seem to be trapped in a time warp. They experience Star Trek as if it is still ongoing, 
recalling the minutest details with perfect precision, and they expect Shatner to 
do the same. Frustrated, Shatner shouts at his fans, “You have turned an enjoyable 
little job that I did as a lark for a few years into a colossal waste of time!” (Saturday 
Night Live 1986: 4:22). The star of Star Trek then goes on to berate them for never 
having “kissed a girl” or moved out of their parents’ basements, screaming at the 
geeks to “[g]row the hell up!” Here, the irate Shatner clearly speaks on behalf of 
chrononormativity, that is to say, a socially determined temporality oriented to-
ward capitalist production and heterosexist reproduction (cf. Freeman 2010: 3). 
Instead of wasting his years on fannish pursuits, a young Shatner made time with 
women and advanced his career, moving beyond the show. The geek figure, how-
ever, stands for a very different temporal order. What others see as ephemeral, 
geeks treat as a ceaseless project, a way of life they refuse to relinquish even when 
it is no longer considered mature or fashionable. Although this life-aesthetic may 
be portrayed as regressive in the tirades of moralists like Shatner, many self-de-
scribed geeks work hard to embody the temporality of Star Trek’s extreme fans.
The geek figure has become increasingly popular in recent years, both as a 
cultural phenomenon and an object of academic inquiry. Once a term of derision, 
“geek” now serves as a source of identity, pride, and belonging. Geeky practices in-
cluding technical tinkering, gaming, and science fiction fan culture are becoming 
mainstream, shedding their old stigmas. Geek culture’s growing importance has 
drawn the attention of scholars such as Andrew Ross, who theorized geek identity 
in the digital labor force by arguing that a geek is someone who refuses to dis-
tinguish between play and labor, allowing their time spent coding to swallow up 
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any leisure time (Ross 2004: 10). Fan studies takes a similar approach to the geek 
figure: Kathryn E. Lane (2018: 10) and Matthew Hills (2002: x) suggest that a geek 
is someone who spends an unusual or even excessive amount of time on their fa-
vorite medium, even after others have moved on to other pursuits.
When we see geekiness as a matter of time, we begin to see some of the contra-
dictions within the geek ethos. On one hand, geek workers often give themselves 
over to being hyper-exploited, enthusiastically allowing their work to comman-
deer their entire lives.1 On the other, however, geek culture offers an alternative 
way of inhabiting time that refuses to follow the rhythms and temporal patterns 
of heterosexual temporality.2 As Elizabeth Freeman suggests, normative time 
governs productive citizens, subjects who follow a preordained timeline of per-
sonal and economic life-achievements, “[accumulating] health and wealth for the 
future” (Freeman 2010: 3–4). Geeks, however, may choose to pursue ludic and sub-
cultural achievements while postponing or foregoing life-events such as marriage 
or career advancement. When mainstream culture pathologizes geekdom, it does 
so in part because geeks’ lives move at rhythms very different from normative life 
schedules. 
Frequently, mainstream discourse describes geeks in ways that connote back-
wardness or delay. Terms such as “fanatic” or “cult” cast geeks as archaic survivals 
from a non-secular and therefore pre-modern era (Hills 2002: 117–130). The ety-
mology of the epithet “geek” suggests madness and mental disability, while its us-
age to describe animal-devouring circus performers evokes abject savagery.3 The 
geek appears in these constructions as throwbacks. More often, though, the stock 
denunciations of geek culture present fans as childish yet queer. Geeks’ refusal to 
abandon old media—including narratives marketed for younger audiences—be-
comes equated with a refusal to grow up. Geeks, we are often told, fail to meet 
the developmental milestones associated with heterosexual maturity. The most 
common stereotype here is the man-child, but the rogue’s gallery of geek deviants 
also includes the celebrity stalker, the obsessive fangirl, and the negligent gamer 
parent, figures whose addictive or psychotic forms of fandom seem to preclude 
progress in social and familial relations (Jenson 1992: 9–29). In these cautionary 
tales, geeks often present as perverse, frustrated, or asexual, lagging behind their 
age cohorts to remain in childhood or adolescence. Thus, popular culture lauds 
the stereotyped tech geek for youthful precocity while condemning him or her 
as a perpetual virgin. Geek temporalities remain in tension with normative time, 
alternately exploited and disavowed. 
1  I of fer a longer discussion of geek temporality and capitalist exploitation in Carroll (2019).
2  For an excellent overview of the temporal turn in queer theory, see Lothian (2018: 5–14).
3  See “Geek, n.” (2018). For an exploration of “geek” as a keyword, see Dunbar-Hester (2016).
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Robots and artificial intelligences from speculative fiction often serve as fig-
ures for this temporality. For example, Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation—
who became a focal point for many fans—inhabits a very different time scale than 
that of his crewmates. Data not only learns cognitive skills much faster than so-
cial or emotional ones, but also he experiences the outside world as glacially slow 
compared to his own interior life thanks to his positronic brain’s rapid processing 
speed. Data and other geek figures appear as space cadets, desynchronized and 
separated from their mundane, earthbound counterparts by signal latency and 
time dilation.
The equation between geekiness and artificial intelligence is explored 
throughout Ted Chiang’s The Lifecycle of Sof tware Objects (2010). Chiang’s novella 
is particularly useful here given that it ref lects the author’s experience working 
within the technology field, where he wrote technical documents for Microsoft 
(Clark 2015). Moreover, speculative fiction is an especially effective way of giving 
an account of geek time because, as Alexis Lothian suggests, the genre frequently 
thematizes other temporalities, offering visions of inevitable progress or apoca-
lyptic redemption alongside alternative temporal modes including nondevelop-
mental or otherwise queer futurities (Lothian 2018: 19–22). However, I would go 
even further. Speculative practices in fan culture do more than allow audiences 
to sense or imagine other times—they also entrain media consumers to follow 
alternative temporalities. Speculative fiction, in particular, invites the reader to 
become absorbed in the genre, encouraging timeless moments of wonder and sus-
tained devotion to time-consuming practices such as conventions, fanzines, fan 
fiction, and cosplay.4 Even otherwise heteronormative fans often find themselves 
negotiating under strained circumstances when the time required for geek activ-
ities competes with the temporality of the couple and family forms. The Lifecycle 
of Sof tware Objects, although a relatively short text, presupposes and comments 
upon a much longer engagement with more demanding forms of speculative 
world-making.5
Set in the near future, Chiang’s narrative follows the story of digients—sen-
tient, commercially-produced software objects living in an online virtual world. 
Although they have been designed to look like anthropomorphic baby animals and 
cute steampunk robots, the digients behave more like the so-called child-machine 
envisioned by Alan Turing. Through a “genomic engine” under the brand name 
Neuroblast, the digients have been programmed to learn through experience (Chi-
ang 2010: 4).6 This makes them incredibly adaptive, but it also makes their care and 
4  On this “timeless” or “atemporal” sense of wonder, see Landon (2002: 20).
5  Time also proves to be a major concern throughout Chiang’s work. See “Story of Your Life” and 
“Understand” in The Story of Your Life and Others.
6  For an exploration of Blue Gamma digients and artificial intelligence, see Shaviro (2015: 71–102).
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training very time-intensive, prompting the digient developer—Blue Gamma—to 
hire former zookeeper Ana Alvarado to help prepare the company’s models or 
mascots for the consumer market. Ana, along with avatar designer Derek Brooks, 
geeks out about the digients, devoting her life to furthering their upbringing and, 
later, promoting their cause. In the process, she alienates several successive boy-
friends and earns the disdain of expecting parents who see digients as pallid sub-
stitutes for children. Similarly, Derek’s marriage founders partly due to his wife’s 
frustration with the amount of time he puts into his digient hobby. Prolonged and 
indefinite immersion into the lives of digients seems to strain against the dictates 
of heteronormative time, including the schedule demands of domestic life. 
Although Ana and Derek’s tireless engagement with digients springs from a 
real ethical commitment, their geeky affinity is clearly captured and exploited by 
Blue Gamma. As home life diminishes and deteriorates to accommodate greater 
work hours, the postindustrial workplace seems to become a site of refuge, mean-
ing, and play (Hochschild 1997). Ana and Derek join the ranks of the nudist on 
the late shift, the programmer sacked out in the nap corner, and the fast-track 
employee using company subsidized oocyte cryopreservation so they can spend 
their most productive years focused exclusively on career advancement.7 This 
geek devotion manifests itself as a science-fictional novum in the world of Lifecycle, 
where many employers require their employees to wear smart devices that inject 
compounds of oxytocin and opioid hormones into their bodies while they are on 
the job. InstantRapport transdermals—originally designed to “strengthen rocky 
marriages and strained parent-child relationships”—now make frustrated em-
ployees feel like they are spending quality time with their work families (Chiang 
2010: 104). By fostering the geek disposition, managers work to overcome any psy-
chic or social barriers to labor’s colonization of leisure time.8
Ana’s experience ref lects a very real problem in the video game industry of our 
present moment. Gaming company employees often report grueling schedules 
and unfair labor practices, especially in the weeks or months before launch day: 
crunch time. A widely shared Livejournal entry by an anonymous family member 
of an Electronic Arts employee—EA Spouse—reported that her partner worked 90 
hours a week with no overtime pay or compensation time off. After detailing the 
immiseration of EA employees—many of whom burn out and leave—she asked EA 
CEO Larry Probst, “When you make your profit calculations and your cost analy-
ses, you know that a great measure of that cost is being paid in raw human dignity, 
right?” (EA Spouse 2004). EA Spouse’s husband ultimately succeeded in winning 
7  As this last example suggests, women have been hit hardest by this development, taking on 
additional hours of paid labor while still also performing more unwaged housework than men 
(Brennan 2003: 22).
8  For a broader discussion of this temporal phenomenon, see Crary (2013).
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a class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime, but the practice of crunch time still 
persists in the industry in part because employers have become adept at exploiting 
tech worker’s geeky love for what they do. As one developer put it, “It has gotten 
so bad that a lot more experienced [developers] will see the word ‘passion’ on a job 
description as a red f lag” (quoted in Schreier 2015). In technology industries, geek 
ardor has become a method for rationalizing if not palliating excessive hours on 
the clock. 
Although geeks often prove to be eager and efficient workers, they do not 
always remain on schedule. Like their owners, the digients inhabit an alternate 
temporality. They can be suspended and rolled back to previous states, leading 
some owners to replay certain periods in digient life over and over in order to op-
timize their behavior or avoid more difficult growth periods. Digients can also 
experience rapidly accelerated time in what are termed hothouses. In some ways, 
the reader shares their time-sense: although the narrative takes place in the pres-
ent tense, it skips forward between sections, sometimes years at a time, like a 
digient consciousness being suspended and reactivated. Furthermore, like their 
geek counterparts, the digients do not follow normative, human life-paths. Their 
patterns of development do not match up with expectations for children, and it 
is possible that they will keep learning and changing forever. Only time will tell 
how they will turn out, and there is no way to circumvent this by programming 
them with given knowledge or already formed attributes. As Ana comes to real-
ize through her travails with the digients, “experience is algorithmically incom-
pressible” (Chiang 2010: 138). To borrow a phrase from Kathryn Bond Stockton’s 
work on queer children, instead of growing up, digients seem to “grow sideways,” 
evolving in ways that are not teleological, finite, predictable, or stagist (Stockton 
2009: 52). 
In this regard, the digients follow the same Darwinian temporality suggested 
by their genomic engines. Digients are not built or programmed—they “evolve” 
from “biomes” (Chiang 2010: 65). As Elizabeth Grosz argues, in Darwinian time 
every biological change or mutation is an unforeseen event that introduces unpre-
dictability and chance into the Newtonian world of deterministic cause and ef-
fect (Grosz 2004: 8–9). Because evolution depends on selecting from among these 
seemingly random variations, Darwinian temporality severs the present and fu-
ture from the past, making it impossible to predict the direction of evolution with 
any precision. Innovation in the digient genome, then, can only be described ret-
rospectively. Years after the digient launch, there are still geeks holding how hope 
that “[t]he Alan Turing of Neuroblast digients is just waiting to be born” (Chiang 
2010: 135). Digients could very well become anything. 
Ongoing uncertainty about digient capacities leads to an intense debate with-
in the fan community depicted in the novella about when to end their nonage and 
allow them to own themselves as corporations. The question of digient age of con-
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sent becomes particularly pressing when digients ask to be copied and sold to a 
virtual sex doll manufacturer. Although the debate is never completely resolved, 
this discussion makes clear that the temporal patterns governing the digients’ 
lives and our own are both radically contingent. Blurring between childhood and 
maturity replicates the same experience documented by Lynn Spigel and Henry 
Jenkins in their work on fans of the Batman television series (Spigel/Jenkins 1991: 
117–148). As they suggest, returning to the favorite media of their youth allows 
fans to take an impish, child-like perspective, calling into question adult norms 
while generating playful and even utopian possibilities. This geek temporality 
suggests that the proper lifeline for fans, as well as digients, can only be deter-
mined through experimentation free from pre-given plans or timelines. 
Their openness toward an unknowable future allows the digients and the care-
takers who follow their twists and turns to resonate, at moments, with a postford-
ist labor landscape that no longer offers stable careers. Fernando Flores and John 
Gray argue that the “wired mode of life” inhabited by tech workers does not follow 
“a single narrative of gradual development, but by a number of discrete, even dis-
crepant, achievements—brief lives as Nietzsche calls them” (Flores/Gray 2002: 21). 
As workers are forced to give up job security, they also shed their “lifelong identi-
ties,” coming to experience their biographies as discontinuous and fragmentary 
(Flores/Gray 2002: 24). As in the present day, the tech workers in Chiang’s novel-
la are accustomed to a peripatetic work life that often requires them to take lay-
offs or short-term gigs in stride. Although geeks may no longer be tied down to a 
dream that ends with paying off a thirty-year mortgage on a family home, they 
also often find themselves unable to plan ahead for any other life project that they 
might want to pursue. 
Because of its orientation toward a radically different future, Chiang’s novella 
contains an implicit critique of the kind of nostalgia found in geek narratives that 
exploit the pleasure of recognition and the pride of insider knowledge, rewarding 
media consumers for liking what they already like and knowing what they already 
know. Although the mainstream videogame industry monetizes this impulse 
through an array of reboots, mashups, and sequels, the indie game has often dis-
played a very different relationship to twentieth-century video game history. Both 
technical feasibility and personal affinity have pushed many small video game 
developers to reimagine Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) genres such as 
platform and roguelike games. Some of the most popular indie games call atten-
tion to the creator’s emulation of 8-bit console technology by narrating stories of 
innocence lost. Thematizing how audiences now see NES graphics and gameplay 
with different eyes, games such as Braid, The Binding of Isaac, and Undertale fea-
ture adorable, kawaii characters who gradually shift into more sinister or pathetic 
figures over time. To borrow Maria B. Garda’s useful distinction, these are “re-
f lective” rather than “restorative” retro games: while restorative nostalgia in game 
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design attempts to somehow recreate the past, ref lective nostalgia reworks and 
reinterprets historical aesthetics (Garda 2013: 2).9 Opposed to the restorative nos-
talgia, these games urge players to renegotiate their relationships to previous at-
tachments.10 
We see much the same sentiment in Chiang’s novella. Initially, the digients ap-
pear cute in the manner of super deformed anime characters: their heads are dis-
proportionately large compared to their bodies, giving them babyish appearances. 
As the narrative continues, however, they alter their avatars to match their learned 
behaviors. The uncontrollable passage of time is integral to the digients, leading 
Derek to remind one user that “a digient is not a videogame that you replay un-
til you get a perfect score” (Chiang 2010: 20). Although the digients move beyond 
what seems like infantilism, they are not simply putting away childish things. In-
stead, they reveal how alien they are by demanding, for example, the ability to 
“edit [their] reward maps” (125). When majority comes with the right to don a new 
body or reprogram one’s psychology to enjoy previously unpleasant or neutral 
activities, we are talking about a very different form of coming of age. Indeed, 
digients do not even have to maintain personal identity as they evolve: because a 
digient can be copied, it can split into multiple versions and explore many differ-
ent life trajectories simultaneously. Embodying the dream of fandom, a digient is 
not so much a bounded entity as it is a living matrix of speculative possibilities.
Because digients have a potentially unlimited capacity for self-transformation, 
they do not always turn into docile virtual pets or charming helpers, making them 
a very unsafe investment. The Blue Gamma company goes under and the platform 
for their virtual world loses its user base and product support after the advent 
of newer, state-of-the-art, online environments. The market for digients crash-
es because most owners expect them to act like preprogrammed digital pets and 
quickly grow impatient with them when it becomes clear that they require years 
of care to f lourish. Struggling to find money to port their software, the digient 
community dwindles and eventually becomes stranded in an online ghost town, 
living impoverished lives cut off from their favorite pastimes and online friends.
Here we catch a glimpse of the utopian promise contained within geek tem-
porality. While capitalism increasingly demands f lexibility and opportunism in 
9  See Svetlana Boym on the distinction between restorative nostalgia (a yearning to recreate the 
past with absolute fidelity) and reflective nostalgia (a more ironic attitude toward the past that 
explores history’s unrealized potentials while also admitting that lost time can never be relived or 
retrieved) (Boym 2001: 49–50). As Boym argues, U.S. popular culture tends to trade on restorative 
nostalgia (33–39).
10  Author Jo Walton has even come up with an entire mythology to describe the temporality of 
geek reflections on the mutability of the cherished childhood media: when a book turns bad 
between one reading and the next, it has been visited by the Suck Fairy, a magical creature who 
ruins narratives that have been sitting on the shelf for too long (Walton 2010). 
Jordan S� Carroll216
an age of job instability and creative destruction, geeks remain fixated on ways 
of being associated with media from years gone by. Thus geek culture may serve 
as a reaction against the precariousness of late capitalism. Ana and Derek’s fidel-
ity to their digients suggests a geek ethic that might challenge capital’s heedless 
presentism. As Alexander Cho puts it, fan practices mobilized around “cyclical-
ity, repetition, and refrain” suggest a “possible resistant queer politics rooted in 
the interplay of cyclical, erotic, and melancholic queer temporalities that linger 
in a stubborn persistence of the past” (Cho 2015: 44).11 Through the way they move 
through time, the digients resist their legal and economic status as disposable 
property. What makes them worthy of “respect” is that by the end of the novella 
they possess all of the memories and capacities that can only be achieved through 
“twenty years of being in the world” (Chiang 2010: 138). Ana and Derek devote their 
lives to shepherding the digients over onto a new platform and into a future that 
is increasingly hostile toward any form of loyalty to a life project outside of work. 
In a moment when both people and commodities become expendable while any 
attachment becomes a potential liability, geeks seek the reassurance of meaning 
and belonging through fandom.
Some digients, however, are made for the temporal regime of late capitalism. 
The only kinds of digients with financial backers to be ported out of the failing 
platform are ones produced by other companies to perform menial tasks, digients 
whose personalities have been engineered with neurotic anxieties and stereo-
typed behaviors that equip them with the superhuman ability to focus exclusive-
ly on their appointed functions. Produced by the Sophonce company, the Drayta 
models have an obsessive focus on problem solving. When asked any question, 
the Drayta anxiously repeats, “Wanna solve puzzles” (Chiang 2010: 67). Unlike 
the Neuroblast digients, their singlemindedness means the Sophonce digients do 
not require regular human interaction. This immense capacity for concentration 
allows them to disengage from human time and disappear into virtual worlds 
where time speeds up. The Drayta’s accelerated microcosms parallel the distorted 
time-reckoning of the so-called f low experience, in which lived time speeds up as 
the geek gets into a groove or slows down as they focus on a difficult move (Csiksz-
entmihalyi [1990] 1991: 66).
Despite its productivity, there is something masochistic about the f low state. 
The temporality of f low often proves inimical to the reproductive labor involved in 
maintaining one’s own life. The geek figure is often portrayed as negligent of self-
care, too absorbed in his or her obsessions to pay attention to sleep, diet, exercise, 
11  Boym makes the case that reflective nostalgia draws on aspects of both mourning and melan-
cholia insofar as it successfully grieves—realizing as it does that its lost object can never be fully 
recalled—even as it also turns inward to ruminate and reflect on its bereavement (Boym 2001: 
55).
Chapter 9: The Lifecycle of Software Engineers 217
or grooming. Neal Stephenson’s Reamde encapsulates this idea in Devin Skraelin, 
a “freakishly prolific” fantasy author who works ceaselessly producing back-sto-
ries for a game development company (Stephenson 2011: 41). Devin has built a 
protective shell around his workspace to maintain f low—he writes in a trailer 
without windows, his screen and keyboard mounted on robotic arms that follow 
his every movement. Biometric sensors attached to Devin’s body register whether 
he is in f low and, when he is, a signal is given to his assistants to pass out a “Flow 
State FAQ” to any incoming visitors to explain why he cannot see them in a timely 
manner (222). Everything about Devin’s body is carefully controlled to keep him 
in constant f low and thereby maintain his extremely fast writing pace—“all he’s 
doing is applying scientific management principles to a hundred-million-dollar 
production facility (i.e. Devin) with an astronomical profit margin” (224). Before 
he began writing content for the videogame industry, Devin could not easily sit 
in an airplane seat. Now that he does all of his work while on a treadmill, exercis-
ing many hours a day, his body fat has dropped to a painful 4.5 per cent and his 
skin has become as thin as “shrink wrap laid directly over nerve and bone” (224). 
Behind his back, people in the company call him Skeletor, after the cadaverous 
villain of He-Man and the Masters of the Universe. Devin represents very real stories 
in game development. One author writing content for a text-heavy video game 
reportedly lost 10 per cent of her body weight, falling to 99 lbs., after a nine-month 
long period of working 80-hour weeks (Schreier 2015). This is what Teresa Brennan 
refers to as the bioderegulated body (Brennan 2003: 19–22, 29–31). As the laws and 
norms that protect time outside of work fall before the onslaught of capitalism, 
the worker must keep pace with ever-faster automated processes, laboring at a 
tempo and duration that preclude any time for rest and regeneration. Labor ex-
pands to intrude upon the normal cycles of sleep and relaxation, a disruption that 
employees experience as stress, anxiety, and illness (Dyer-Witheford/de Peuter 
2011: 59). Although highly praised by managers, the f low state is an intimate of 
premature death. 
Nevertheless, this morbid state of suspended self-consciousness can be ex-
tremely enjoyable. As we can see in The Lifecycle of Sof tware Objects, the f low sub-
ject strives toward a queer antirelationality. When Drayta digients work, they exit 
from the social entirely, dropping down into timeless black holes.12 The Draytas 
do not work toward building relationships with their masters, nor do they seem 
12  The tech geek’s antisocial attitude is fundamentally bound up in gendered and economic in-
equalities. Flow allows the geek worker to appear to transcend the hassles of everyday life, 
including the concerns associated with care work, which is either foisted onto feminized oth-
ers or lef t undone. Moreover, as Sarah Sharma argues, the accelerated, 24/7 temporalities of 
privileged workers such as business travelers of ten depends on an entire infrastructure main-
tained by hyperexploited workers such as taxicab drivers and hotel cleaning staf f, whose time 
is not equally valued or supported (Sharma 2014: 139).
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interested in self-improvement or becoming more human. While the Neuroblast 
digients move along an open-ended and unpredictable temporality, the Draytas 
ignore everything except for the impulse to repeat the assigned tasks they were 
evolved and selected to complete.13 As such, the Draytas represent a refusal of the 
future. Following the stereotype of geek as stunted child, the standard avatar for 
the Drayta model is a “hydrocephalic dwarf,” a feature that, along with its limit-
ed language abilities, gives it the semblance of an overgrown baby (Chiang 2010: 
20). However, the Drayta—being a software object—represents not a return to 
childhood but a return to inorganic matter. Indulging in the cyberpunk’s mas-
culinist contempt for the body as meat, the temporality of geek work feeds into 
a repetition-compulsion not unlike the death drive (Edelman 2004: 9–11; Hayles 
1999). The Draytas’ self-shattering urge propels them whether they are tasked with 
playing games, writing code, or providing erotic gratification: we later learn of “a 
harem of Draytas dressed in Marilyn Monroe avatars, all bleating Wanna suck dick” 
(Chiang 2010: 20). As Gabriella Coleman points out, hackers—whom she later calls 
“geeks”—seem to merge with their machines when they enter f low, experiencing 
an ecstasy comparable to jouissance (Coleman 2013: 46, 13). In the brief moments 
before the crash, the f low state allows geeks to feel the obliterating rush of being 
propelled by accelerating forces beyond their control.14 Even as it serves capital, 
the geek figure enjoys a transgressive pleasure.
Geek temporalities prove to be politically ambiguous. They can provide sup-
port for capital’s ever-growing need for labor and consumption and they can also 
subtend a restorative nostalgia for media that sometimes precludes cultural inno-
vation or social change. Increasingly, managers have worked to harness the lived 
experience of geek time to produce disciplined workers who willing participate 
in their own hyperexploitation.15 Nevertheless, the desynchronized forms of life 
found in the work of Chiang and others show that geek temporalities maintain 
the capacity to unsettle rhythms that have come to seem natural and inevitable. 
The fannish desire to hold onto the past can motivate protests against capital’s 
destruction of other modes of temporality. Whether they seem to cast forward 
into the future or backward into the past, geek temporalities offer speculative al-
ternatives to the present.
13  For an ethnographic account of this work experience, see Ullman (1995).
14  Csikszentmihalyi himself goes so far as to name the Marquis de Sade as a master of flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi [1990] 1991: 69).
15  An entire school of management science has arisen around geek temporality. See, for example, 
Glen (2003).
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Chapter 10: Uncertainty between Image and Text in 
Ben Templesmith’s Singularity 7 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Narrative 
and Performance
Jeanne Cortiel and Christine Hanke
Comics perform a peculiar mediality in the interplay between image and text, 
which serves as the basis of their specific aesthetic quality and their storytelling 
capacity. This interplay sets the comics medium apart from written text (as in nov-
els or short stories, for example) and audiovisual media. Many scholars who have 
discussed comics as a medium argue that comics require a specific imaginative 
input by the reader (McCloud [1993] 1994: 65–66; Saraceni 2003: 9, 51–52). While ev-
ery text works with gaps of information the reader needs to fill, comics deploy vis-
ible gaps (the gutter) to modulate the pacing and development of the narrative. In 
this way, comics rely on a fundamental uncertainty as each gutter opens a space of 
speculation on how the reader is to interpret the difference between two frames. 
Between what the panel shows and what the gutter hides, speculation in comics 
makes thinkable what is inaccessible to propositional knowledge at the moment. 
Because of this intrinsic quality, comics may help us analyze acts of speculation 
more generally. Ref lecting on or filling in gaps, speculation is, after all, a way of 
dealing with the uncertainty of not knowing for sure. 
Yet unlike in written text, visuals in comics also introduce a different instance 
of apparent certainty in tension with another form of uncertainty. This has to do 
with their mode of showing and the visual pleasure they offer (Mersch 2005, 2011; 
cf. Boehm 2007). Images seem to suspend speculation, because what one sees has 
a certain presence for the beholder. The image in comics makes the fictional world 
present in a way that a written text cannot. Yet, as has been emphasized by phe-
nomenology, this sense of presence in image objects has a particular quality: they 
bear an “artificial presence”—“a presence precisely without substantial atten-
dance” (Wiesing [2005] 2009: 20). Although comics work through varying degrees 
of abstraction and a conventional visual ‘language’ is recognizable to readers fa-
miliar with the code (Varnum/Gibbons 2001; Saraceni 2003), they retain this qual-
ity of evidence beyond or before speculation and narrative. This artificial presence 
introduces a paradox for the role of the image in acts of speculation: the image ob-
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ject is both present and absent at the same time. It is, after all, no coincidence that 
the etymology of “speculation” connects to the spectacle and to an act of looking. 
This paradoxical relationship of the image to a mode of presence has important 
implications for how comics modulate uncertainty between image and text. 
Comics specifically use and play with these tensions between certainty and 
uncertainty in any act of reading and viewing, which opens up space for specu-
lation in a performative rather than a narrative mode. Image and text in comics 
thus not only work together to tell a story, but to produce an effect: they can create 
speculative worlds that have a reality effect for the reader/viewer. This bifurcation 
of realities does nothing to bring the story forward, but it adds another level of 
uncertainty—and, with Singularity 7, of discomfort—unsettling meaning-mak-
ing. In comics, this bifurcation enables conscious acts of producing uncertainty, 
demanding equivalent acts of speculation by the reader that both maintain and 
suspend the ambiguity between present tense and past (or future) tense. While 
the box commentary may speak in the past tense, the images and the speech bub-
bles unfold the story in the present. In comics, seeing, deciphering, speculating, 
world-making, and storytelling operate on several layers that the act of reading 
and seeing keeps together and in tension. This is how comics work as a medium. 
While all comics share this quality, there are comics that make this type of 
speculation their central concern. Singularity 7 (2004) by Ben Templesmith is such 
an example.1 Singularity 7  creates a fascinating and disturbing aesthetic experi-
ence between its apocalyptic narrative and haunting images. Pushing the conven-
tions of both science fiction and horror to their limits, the comic engages with 
forms of non-knowing and uncertainty in narrative and scientific speculation—
always contending with the (illusory) certainty of the visual. Singularity 7 makes 
use of the language of comics to present worlds within the tension between the 
possible, the probable, and the impossible in science fiction, in ways that are rele-
vant to thinking about how speculation works. This tension plays out in the comic 
between the written text, the visual image, the narrative, and the performative in 
multiple layers. 
Although comics studies is now an established field if not a discipline, ap-
proaches to comics as a medium differ between disciplines. Scholarship has long 
understood comics as imagetext, and comics studies has been an interdisciplin-
ary endeavor from its inception.2 However, disciplinary proclivities continue to 
shape perspectives. Scholars trained in literary studies tend to focus on comics as 
1  All citations of Singularity 7 in this chapter refer to the 2011 digital edition.
2  On comics as both text and image and neither, see Robin Varnum and Christina T. Gibbons’s ed-
ited volume, The Language of Comics: Word and Image, which focuses explicitly on “the balance of 
power between words and images” (Varbum/Gibbon 2001: ix). The journals Image[&]Narrative 
and ImageTexT likewise focus on this synthesis, attending not only to comic strips and comics but 
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narrative (Kukkonen 2013; Groensteen [2011] 2013). Scholars trained in fields that 
focus on mediality or visual culture tend to look at comics as sequential art—fol-
lowing the lead of comics artists Will Eisner (1985) and Scott McCloud ([1993] 1994), 
and continuing with Jan Baetens’s work (2011), to name just a few examples. These 
different perspectives produce discrepant, sometimes contradictory readings, 
calling for an interdisciplinary approach to comics that makes these conf licts pro-
ductive. Such a dual perspective informs our study of comics as a specific practice 
of speculation. An interdisciplinary dialogue between literary studies and image 
studies enables us to show how the comic accomplishes this conscious play with 
uncertainty by tapping and interrelating two principal modes of speculation: nar-
ration and performance. 
Furthermore, because of the unique relationship between image and text, 
comics favor affirmative (exploratory) types of speculation. In Speculate This!, the 
uncertain commons conceptualize “affirmative speculation” through its open-
ness: “To speculate affirmatively is to produce futures while refusing the foreclo-
sure of potentialities, to hold on to the spectrum of possibilities while remaining 
open to multiple futures whose context of actualization can never be fully antic-
ipated” (uncertain commons 2013: ch. 1). The sometimes uneasy tension between 
image and text constitutive of comics opens up spaces of speculation instead of 
shutting them out.
How does Singularity 7 engage in such speculative practices? Most obviously, 
the narrative is speculative fiction—a dystopian science fiction story that imag-
ines an unusual alien invasion, in which the aliens terraform the earth for future 
colonization. The sequence of images, however, encourages speculation by the 
reader, as well, and this is crucial to the narrative. Without such guesswork, the 
story does not come together to make sense as a dystopian narrative. Combining 
and layering images and written text to present a dystopian world, the comic creates 
a disturbing narrative f low that culminates in extinction (even of the alien in-
vaders) and an uncertain new beginning. Box commentary and character speech, 
then, work together (or across one another) to undermine the stabilizing tenden-
cies of both story and image. 
From the perspective of narrative analysis, Singularity 7 engages virtually all 
speculative genres. Not only that, the comic ref lects upon the act of storytelling 
as speculation, as well as on the fundamental uncertainty and non-knowing that 
emerge from science and technology knowing too much. All comics tell a story 
through the interaction between text and image, yet Singularity 7 adds another 
layer through narrative embedding, a story within a story. Even though the nar-
rative holds the comic together, there is much more to speculation in this comic 
also to illustrated fiction and children’s books. The journal ImageTexT takes its title from W. J. T. 
Mitchell’s coinage of “imagetext” in Picture Theory (Mitchell 1994: 83).
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than just storytelling, and this other aspect does not yield meaning or reveal itself 
through interpretation. Image studies, a young field of research in the European 
humanities, enables us to inquire into the specific visual experience that comics 
offer. The images give the comic as a whole a completely new dimension—a di-
mension that does not have to be directly linked to narration. Singularity 7 features 
particularly striking visuals. The images are richly colorful, deliberately working 
with the vivid contrasts between complementary colors and juxtaposing differ-
ent design styles (typographies, graphics, schemata, scientific scribblings). There 
is so much to see in each panel and across the pages; even photographic layers 
are included—for example, a photograph of the UN headquarters (Templesmith 
[2004] 2011, #1: 7). Singularity 7 fully engages visual pleasure—even scopophilia. 
While the images in this comic attract attention and stimulate a positive affective 
response, they also encourage a strong repulsion that throws the reader from the 
realm of pleasure into a sense of disgust, horror, and anxiety. The images show 
grotesquely distorted characters, physical destruction of the landscape, human 
bodies suffering atrocious violation. This strange tension between attraction and 
repulsion produces a discomfort that works hand in hand with the story told—yet 
it is the visuals and the mixed response they elicit that make Singularity 7 so dis-
quieting. The pleasure one experiences regarding these images is deeply disturb-
ing. 
Responding to these observations from two distinct methodological angles 
allows us to focus on narrative embedding, voice, and intertextuality, as well as 
on visual layers, artificial presence, and sequencing to explore how uncertainty 
shapes the interactions between these differing medial practices. Which textu-
al and visual strategies are performed by Singularity 7? How do these strategies 
work together to tell a speculative story? Which effects are produced by the visu-
als, and how do they relate to those produced by the text? How do the images enact 
a paradoxical presence of speculation? How does this presence interact with the 
narrative of disappearance? Addressing these questions together will enable us 
to investigate the comic’s specific intermedial performativity in relation to story-
telling, and to explore the potential of intermedial comic assemblages in general. 
Narration and Sequential Images
In the interplay between images and text in comics, one may regard the narrative 
as the backbone or hinge, the element that keeps all parts together even as they 
tend to drift apart. The embedded narrative enables Singularity 7 to ref lect upon 
and disrupt the act of fictional speculation, but it also interweaves major specula-
tive genres and tropes, including genesis and apocalypse. The narrator turns out 
to be a character in the story: an old man with all the paraphernalia of a teacher. 
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Figure 10.1: Mapping the night sky. Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 2011, #1: 3).
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He speaks to a group of young children in an enclosed space that looks like a cave. 
He is telling a story of origin for the dystopian narrative world, and his narrative 
connects with biblical Genesis. The box commentary f loating on the opening page 
duplicates what is shown in the image, but it also gives it specific meaning in rela-
tion to the narrative: “So, it started with a light in the sky” (fig. 10.1). 
The image and the text perform together here: the mise-en-abîme, the act of 
storytelling within the story, enables a rupture in the narrative voice right from 
the beginning. This embedded narrative comes to an abrupt end when the Gosio-
do—the creatures whose simultaneous approach has been traced at the bottom 
of the page—invade the enclosure and kill the whole group, including the narra-
tor and the children listening to him. This is especially disturbing, since many of 
these characters are named as if they were going to feature as central characters in 
the story. This disruption of the first narrative strand introduces a second: an alien 
invasion narrative with nanotechnology as its central risk technology. So, the dys-
topian narrative is cut short by the intrusion of the science-fictional apocalypse, 
with a new narrator voice that speaks in the present tense and shifts the perfor-
mance of storytelling to another diegetic level. This shift dissolves the temporal 
distance between narrative and image. All inhabitants of the human enclosure 
have been killed, with one exception: Chon, the boy with the dragon tattoo. A third 
narrative strand emerges that centers around a group of special human beings 
who are immune to the nanites and in fact are enhanced by them. These char-
acters introduce a connection to superhero fiction. The three narrative strands—
story of origin (dystopian world), catastrophe (alien invasion), and balked rescue 
(superhero narrative)—correspond with three central biblical narratives: genesis, 
apocalypse, and redemption. Repeatedly disrupting the plot arcs it sets up, con-
tinually gesturing toward completion without fully suturing the ruptures in the 
storyline, this comic demands ref lection upon acts of speculation that too easily 
rest on well-worn narrative expectations.
Time and narrative sustain an uneasy relationship in this comic, not only on 
the level of narrative voice but also in how the images work with the text to create 
a world and a story. First of all, there is a tension between the presence and imme-
diacy of a whole page as image and the temporalization that only comes into being 
through an image sequence, frame by frame, gutter by gutter. But temporaliza-
tion is not the same as narrativization—some uncertainties remain. For example, 
the three narrow panels on the top of page 6 (fig. 10.2) can be understood (accord-
ing to McCloud’s terminology) either as moment-to-moment—that is, tempo-
ral—transitions that show the transformation of Bobby into the Singularity, or 
as aspect-to-aspect transitions that depict the very moment of change. Due to the 
narrowness of the frames, they appear like three stroboscopic snapshots happen-
ing at almost the same time. Time itself appears unhinged, jagged, disrupted.
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Figure 10.2: Moment-to-moment or aspect-to-aspect transition? Singularity 7 
(Templesmith [2004] 2011, #1: 6).
Figure 10.3: Looking straight at the beholder. Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 2011, 
#1: 6).
Singularity 7 deploys a number of visual strategies to further increase the uncer-
tainties about the comic’s temporality and its relationship to the moment of read-
ing. The gaze of Bobby the Singularity breaks the ‘fourth wall’ of the narration: at 
the moment of reading, he is looking directly at us, the audience (fig. 10.3). This is 
anathema to classic cinematography, but quite common in comics. The Singular-
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ity addresses us directly—we are hailed. This disturbing sense of being watched, 
of the image gazing back at us, is an effect of the image—not the text. It invokes 
a Christian iconography of the Messiah realizing the medial performativity of the 
image: “what we see looks back at us” (Didi-Huberman 1992). The same pages of 
the comic use parallel montage, a cinematic strategy. In the blue frames below 
the embedded narrative, a parallel storyline unfolds. While the narrator tells his 
story, unaware of the imminent threat, the reader sees the Gosiodo approaching. 
The color contrast between the frames and the repetition of this pattern on sev-
eral pages separates them as two realms and indicates this as a parallel montage, 
although this second realm initially emerges almost unnoticed and then merges 
with the first in a subtle way. Two layers of the story are pictured in different col-
ors: a swarm of nanites attacking and Chon being attacked. But the colorful con-
trasting images produce uncertainties. While the story tells us that the nanites 
arbitrarily form a protection buffer making Chon special, which depends on a 
spatial continuity, the images present two worlds that, on some pages, are sharply 
separated by colorful contrasts. These contrasts both distinguish two spaces and 
suggest simultaneity, creating a tension between the two presented spaces as well 
as between the written text and the visuals. Singularity 7 incorporates other cine-
matographic temporalizations, as well—ones that support the narration. We see 
Chon cry out loud (#1: 17), requiring us to translate a drawing of an open mouth 
into another medium: sound. What happens with Chon in this panel? The end 
of the page acts like a clif f hanger and turning the page opens a new chapter in 
the story (#1: 18). Here, the frames slowly fade in and, for these three frames, we 
suddenly have a subjective perspective of Chon, the new hero, reopening his eyes. 
However, while cinema deploys parallel montage, color contrasts, and—at least in 
conventional cinema—a correlation between image and sound, the comic intrin-
sically retains an indeterminacy between simultaneity and sequence. The sound 
remains imagined, the pitch, timbre, and accent of the narrative voice unspecified 
(adding other indeterminacies, as well, including the gender of the speaker). The 
mise-en-page and each individual panel suggest both a temporal sequence en-
abling narrative f low and an immediate presence, drawing attention away from 
this f low. Singularity 7 makes full use of the medium’s ability to push the story 
forward and to encourage a lingering gaze at the image, both at the same time. 
In this comic, different narrative layers thus come together and collide, creat-
ing a structure of uncertainty that engenders or even presents and performs spec-
ulation itself. The images participate in telling the speculative story, but the spec-
ulation is already realized: we see what happens, a disturbing and new strange 
world, the events unfold in front of our eyes, the world becomes present and, in 
the moment of seeing, is no longer speculation.
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Presence Effects of the Image
How to understand the medial differences between images and texts, between 
narrativity and showing? To take up an idea from Lessing’s Laokoon (1766), we 
could differentiate iconic and textual qualities as follows: while verbal text as a 
discursive medium operates in a linear progression, the image as an aisthetic me-
dium presents itself in a spatial mode, where the whole image is visible at once.3 
Comics, however, show how these distinctions intersect with each other. The se-
quentiality of images in comics operates in a mode between image and text: simi-
lar to reading, it enables a linear and thus discursive progression in the perception 
of a series of panels. Usually the panels in a comic are organized according to the 
reading direction of the respective language. Therefore, comics in English start 
at the top of the page, beginning with the first frame, and move from left to right 
and downwards, very much like written text does. At the same time, the perfor-
mativity of the image and the specificity of visual perception guides the recep-
tion of comics. While texts have to be read to be understood and to be interpreted, 
images address our sensual perception. Thus, even if we start looking at a comic 
according to our writing and reading conventions, the whole page and the jux-
taposition of the images will be in sight and call for our perception—we will not 
be able to not see the contrasting colors and figures of the whole page. The medial 
specificity of the image allows us to see the panels as separated (by the gutter) as well 
as connected, an ensemble image that spreads over a whole page, since all panels on 
a page are present at the same time. In a similar way, written text in comics—to be 
precise, its ‘writtenness’ (cf. Krämer 2003)—also has iconic qualities: its typography 
might indicate its function as speech via italics, or as commentary via boxing and 
capitalization, or as sound via onomatopoetic visualization. The visual mode of 
showing (Mersch 2002b, 2011) is why the image is connected to a certain presence, 
thereby producing effects of evidence.4 This is what we propose to call the “visual 
performativity of comics.” As the image produces presence, it generates visibility, 
it shows something and shows itself. The presence of what is shown stands in con-
f lict with claims of the possibility of subjunctive images (cf. Wolf 1999; Buckland 
1999; Metz 2008). The grammatical format of the subjunctive, like the possibility 
of negation, seems instead to belong to the medial logic of the text/language in a 
literal sense. This becomes evident, for example, when the image performs an act 
of immediate interpellation—as when the character looks out of the panel as a 
3  In order to underline that focus is not on “aesthetics” (with its associations of beauty and the arts) 
but instead on a mode of sensory perception (Ancient Greek: αἴσθησις, aísthēsis), we use the term 
“aisthesis” here with respect to the dimensions of showing/looking related to the image.
4  A textual mode of showing in literature might also yield instants of a peculiar presence, which 
Roland Barthes named the “reality ef fect” (Barthes [1969] 1989).
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disturbing presence addressing us, the beholders (fig. 10.3). This visual evidence- 
effect exceeds the meaning-making process of the narrative, while the text nar-
rates the event as in the past. Two realities, two worlds, two narrative possibilities 
face the reader at the same time. The staring face addresses us as readers in the 
here and now, drawing us not only into the story but into the story world, while the 
narrative instance situates us both somewhere else and in another time.
Textual and Visual Layering
The textual and the visual dimensions of the comic therefore engage us in dif-
ferent ways. Images address our visual perception, they can affect us before or 
beyond any cognitive process, before or beyond understanding: we see them and 
they might look back (Didi-Huberman 1992) or puncture our perception (Barthes 
[1980] 1981). Text addresses our cognition, requires us to read and understand 
words and sentences. The boundaries between these two aspects of the comic are 
blurry since text has to be seen in order to be read and images frequently have to be 
read in order to be understood. It is this imbrication of modes that makes comics 
so interesting as a medium of speculation. The narrative emerges between the text 
and the image, a process that requires our imagination, our ability to speculate, to 
fill in gaps. But the interplay between text and images also has an effect that goes 
beyond their function in creating a narrative—together, they perform a presence 
that counteracts the temporal f low of the sequence and the story. In other words, 
they are performative, in the sense of J. L. Austin’s definition of a performative 
speech act: they do something by saying and by showing (Austin 1962: 6).
Singularity 7 not only uses the performative and narrative means of comics as a 
medium, but also ref lects upon the act of storytelling through speculation, and its 
images ref lect upon their status as images as well as their relation to spoken and 
written text. This raises the question of how Singularity 7 deals with uncertainty 
and speculation specifically. One of the most prominent features of Singularity 
7, one which it shares with many other speculative comics, is the use of multiple 
layering techniques. As explained above, the images give the comic as a whole a 
completely new dimension—a dimension that does not have to be directly linked 
to narration. They are characterized by a richness and a distinctive layered aes-
thetic that is a result of the specific production process, which Ben Templesmith 
describes as follows:
[T]he art is all hand drawn, on tonal paper, then I ink it, lay in some grey tones and 
white highlights using paint and markers and anything that comes to hand. Then I 
scan them in and add photographic layers, be it textures of cracked walls, collages 
I’ve made and bits of faces, before adding color, all in Photoshop. At the end of the 
Chapter 10: Uncertainty between Image and Text in Ben Templesmith’s Singularity 7 231
day it’s still about 80% drawn and 20% computer. But I don’t actually draw on it, I 
just use Photoshop as a composition and layering tool really. (Templesmith quoted 
in Ambush Bug 2008)
This layering process allows Templesmith to superimpose very different tech-
niques and textures. Yet while the layers remain visually effective, we have to con-
cede that, superimposed upon each other, they melt into one visual experience, 
one picture, in which the different layers become at the same time indistinguish-
able as they constitute the initial visual effect. 
Figure 10.4: Layering with photographic images. Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 
2011, #1: 9).
It is this interweaving of different layers and different styles that make it difficult 
to notice why the characters in Singularity 7 are so disturbing. Many of the drawn 
faces are layered with photographic images (fig. 10.4; cf. #1: 9, panel 1). A careful 
look reveals that some parts of the faces include photographic traces: parts of the 
chin, the eyes, but mostly the regions around the nose. To understand the strange 
effect and affect of this photographic layer, we have to take into account that the 
photographic medium in our culture is understood as indexical: what can be seen 
on the photograph has been in front of the camera. Because of the indexicality 
of this medium, photography is often ascribed a status of mechanical objectivity, 
neutrally registering what has been in front of the lens, a realistic medium (Bar-
thes [1964] 1977; Kracauer 1960; Daston/Galison 2007). Furthermore, in contrast 
to the abstracting or typifying graphics in comics, a photograph always presents 
a concrete individual and concrete object. For the comic as an otherwise clearly 
constructed, fictional and abstracted product, this insertion of bits of face-photo-
graphs produces a very disturbing yet unconscious effect. It brings the characters 
closer to us, they become human like us, as if they were our own undead in a pho-
tographic-indexical sense (cf. Fürst/Krautkrämer/Wiemer 2010).
This means that, in terms of the images, the comic dissolves the boundaries 
between the characters and the readers, the dystopian narrative world and the 
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world in which we live, at the moment of reading. They ‘have been there’—to in-
voke Roland Barthes’s account of the photographic “having-been-there” (Barthes 
[1964] 1977: 44). Through the photographic layer, these image objects appear as 
emanation of a referent, as if they existed in our ‘real’ world. Not only the pro-
tagonists are shaped by these traces of humanity and individuality, but also the 
foils, the Gosiodo. This makes the aisthetic experience even more ambivalent: we 
cannot ban the antagonists as nonhuman, for they share the same traces of hu-
manity even in their grotesque physical form. Again and again, a Gosiodo gazes 
out of the frame, looking directly into our eyes—they are us at the same time they 
are the Other, they are addressing us, calling for response and pulling us into their 
disturbing world.
With respect to the textual performance in comics, we can observe that the 
written text depends on the images and, at the same time, enforces a temporal 
f low in the panel. Yet the relationship between text and images in comics is far 
from trivial. Speech bubbles and commentary boxes frame much of the text, sug-
gesting a particular relationship with the visuals that oscillate between immedi-
acy and (narrative) mediation. Speech bubbles, like quotation marks in a novel, 
suggest the presence of voice and add not only temporal sequence but also an au-
ditory layer to the image, highlighting the performative dimension of written text. 
Yet the text in commentary boxes, using past tense, serves to create a temporal 
distance between the moment of reading and the story world, the diegesis. In Sin-
gularity 7, written text is used in different ways to further emphasize this distance. 
The narrative begins with an embedded narrative related to text written in quota-
tion marks in box commentaries. Text is also scribbled into the images themselves, 
usually providing seemingly redundant information—for example, an onomato-
poetic “boom” creates a sound effect for the image, whose high-contrast composi-
tion already suggests a loud sound in a synesthetic manner (#1: 13, panel 7). While 
the images address the beholder directly in the present tense, the text here creates 
an effect of distance and absence through the use of past tense. Thus, while the 
narrative rests on the interplay between text and image, it is the written text that 
situates the narrative temporarily and marks its genre affiliation. In comics there 
is therefore always a tension between the temporal distance of the narrative world 
in the act of storytelling and its presence through the embeddedness in the imag-
es. The act of narration as presented in fiction also constitutes the make-believe or 
imagination of presence: the narrator and the reader conceived as embodied and 
engaged in the act of making meaning at the same time (Berns 2014). The act of 
narration is not only the performance of telling a story; it is also the performance 
of gender (cf. Lanser 1981)—alongside ethnicity, sexuality, and class. 
The images in comics make the fictional world present and rely on the written 
text to create the sense of a performance with actors acting out the narrative on 
a stage. This is relevant when we look at graphic narratives as practices of specu-
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lation in a wider sense, since speculation always requires a point of reference. In 
other words, speculative fiction is fictional only in relation to an assumed actual 
world: the world in which the act of reading must take place. The assumed actual 
world affords to the fiction the condition of make-believe. In this way, in comics, 
speech bubbles signal performance and immediacy, yet the box commentary also 
serves to indicate the presence of mediating speech. Singularity 7 at the beginning 
presents a character in the act of storytelling, whose speech is identified through 
quotation marks in the box commentary—highlighting the embeddedness of the 
narrator’s words within the control of another narrative instance, but also sig-
naling the physical presence of the narrator in the frame. The quotation marks 
suggest both temporal distance and immediate presence, allowing the comic as 
a whole to oscillate between narrative and performance, both pulling the story 
forward and producing a series of immediate effects between image and text. 
Intertextuality/Interpictoriality
While the aisthetic experience in this comic breaches the boundaries between 
speculation and evident factuality, between this world and another, the images 
also have another agenda that connects them with other images. Just as narra-
tive in Singularity 7 draws from the traditions of storytelling in biblical apocalypse, 
science fiction, dystopia, and superhero fiction, so too do the images draw from 
the visual iconography of shared fear and hope. Visual intertextualities become 
relevant to the comic’s entanglement or engagement with speculation; these inter-
textualities are quite transparent, but they do bring in another level of complexity 
to the speculative work these images perform. 
As the story of genesis told in the embedded opening narration, a redemption 
narrative is set up and swiftly cut short without much fanfare. When the aliens 
finally arrive on earth to survey the terraforming work performed by their nanites, 
the Singularity greets them as “the Masters” in a pose that clearly references 
Christ on the cross (fig. 10.5). 
The Christ imagery is far from subtle and thus tightens the irony of the mo-
ment. It also reinforces the religiously informed visual language used throughout 
the comic that references the visual history of the Bible without either creating 
a critique of Christianity or hailing religion as a solution to the technoscientific 
uncertainties that literally plague the narrative world. 
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Figure 10.5: Christ imagery when the Singularity greets the aliens as “the Masters.” 
Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 2011, #4: 17).
This imagery is reminiscent of German Renaissance artist Albrecht Dürer, who 
was instrumental in shaping Western religious iconography. His series of fifteen 
woodcuts on the Apocalypse, Die heimlich of fenbarung iohannis (Apocalipsis cum 
figuris) (1498), still have a powerful presence in the visual tradition of the end of 
history. References to this tradition in Singularity 7 anchor the comic’s religious 
borrowings from an era before the advent of both modern fiction and probability 
calculation, that is, before the emergence of a contingent future in the modern 
world (cf. Esposito 2007: 7–12). These images contradict the idea of the future as 
subject to change based on events in the world rather than predestined by an ex-
ternal power. On one level, these visual references point to an idea of certainty 
that is lost by imagining the future as contingent upon what happens in the world. 
This memory of certainty is in tension with the radical uncertainty with which the 
comic is saturated, in terms of both its visual aesthetics and its narrative. In other 
words, the idea of certainty suggested by—in this case—the figure of Christ on 
the cross throws into relief the uncertainties in the comic.
In a less obvious way, a young woman who appears out of nowhere in issue 
#3 may also be seen as a related instance of visual intertextuality. She appears 
incongruously at a point in the narrative when the makeshift superhero-posse 
gets ready to face the threat of the Singularity. On a cinematic, three-panel page 
showing different iterations of light at the end of a tunnel, she emerges from the 
light apparently walking directly towards the viewer. The first panel is empty; the 
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second panel shows her walking form indistinctly; and the third panel shows her 
gazing out of the center of the image pleadingly, holding an infant, awash in light 
from the tunnel: “Help me, please . . .” (Templesmith [2004] 2011, #3: 17). This im-
age calls up representations of the Virgin Mary with the Christ child (including 
Dürer’s), suggesting fragility, vulnerability, and invoking nostalgic notions of do-
mestic bliss, reproduction, and procreation—as well as the question of who may 
be the father of the child. Ultimately, the woman turns out to be a bomb. She will 
become one in a series of terminal catastrophes in the comic, all of which are en-
tirely contingent and follow no apparent logic other than that of destruction. The 
child will be the only remnant of humanity, its lone survival testament to the way 
in which the comic scoffs at teleological speculation.
A very different interpictorial strategy is invoked by the promotional group 
shot that announces the superhero narrative in the comic (fig. 10.6), another op-
portunity to frame a narrative of redemption. 
Figure 10.6: Superhero group shot. Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 2011, #1: 24).
The group shot invokes a particular subgenre of the superhero narrative that 
features bands of superheroes working together to counteract and manage the 
contingencies of the narrative world and restore a safe equilibrium. The classic 
superhero provides certainty in a contingent world. Like the references to Christ 
and Mary, the band of superheroes in this comic ultimately signify the opposite 
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of what they visually suggest. Applying the weaponized nanites produced by the 
human scientists, they cause the complete dissolution of virtually everything in 
the narrative world, including the seemingly omnipotent aliens. Again, the in-
tertextual reference introduces an additional layer of meaning to the image here, 
one that highlights the contradictions among the disturbing visual aesthetics, the 
iconography of certainty, and the ambiguous and paradoxically open-ended nar-
rative.
These various references invoke the certainties of religion and classic super-
hero narratives neither nostalgically nor critically. These certainties simply hover 
in the background and intensify the effect of the comic’s disturbing uncertainties. 
While it makes sense to read the images, to contextualize them culturally and his-
torically, the images also create an affective response long before we start think-
ing about them, long before we historicize and categorize the images of Christ, 
Mary, superheroes, and science. Narrative embedding and layering, as well as a 
multiplicity of different layers in each individual image, become instrumental in 
engaging with uncertainty in this comic. Yet the comic adds yet another, crucial 
layer that comments on these acts of speculation; in this layer, the comic looks 
back at itself and ref lects upon its status as a composite of images, written text, 
performance, and narration. 
Reflexivities: Disrupting Boundaries between Text and Image
Taking a closer look at the opening page (fig. 10.1), which we discussed above in 
terms of narrative embedding, we see another layer of text in addition to the box 
commentary: the star constellations of the zodiac superimposed on the image of 
the night sky. Besides just presenting a world, this page also invites an intertex-
tual reading, for it represents an astronomical map that spatially organizes the 
sky and gives it meaning. It references long-established scientific certainties, the 
periodic return of the same, marking the seasons, marking time. The image thus 
points to both the biblical story of origin and the beginnings of science, two his-
torical paragons of absolute certainty. 
Yet in addition to this graphic reference and the box commentary, the page 
features handwritten notes haphazardly scratched across the image, as if the im-
age were just a draft and not a page in a carefully edited and published book. The 
note says “the light”—or perhaps “THE light”—turning the indefinite article of 
the narrator’s speech (“a light”) into a definite light, the light of the story, the light 
that always marks the beginning, that is, the clichéd light of all creation narratives, 
duplicating the light already seen in the image and also undermining it, as if im-
aging were insufficient to convey these meanings on its own. This note introduces 
another layer of uncertainty while simultaneously announcing the text’s fictional 
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status, as well as its perhaps ironic reference to myth. The handwritten note poses 
as a simple description of the light in the image, yet it remains entirely indeter-
minate. At the same time, it is not clear at all where this writing comes from or 
where it belongs. It is almost invisible. And what about all the other written text: 
the speech box, the astronomical terms? The use of three different typographies 
points to the visuality of written text, its notational iconicity (Schrif tbildlichkeit) 
(Krämer 2003) and the relation between image and text: the visual appearance of 
the letters gives us hints for assigning them specific functions in the comic. Yet 
the layering of three different typographies on this first page of the comic appears 
to make script itself indeterminate. Is the scribbled phrase “the light” an image 
caption? Is it a performative speech act that makes the light appear? Or is itself an 
image of a written text (or act of writing)? This image play is reminiscent of René 
Magritte’s many variations in his picture series Ceci n’est pas une pipe (1928–1966), 
which performs the differences between image and text, words and things, while 
at the same time blurring the relations between them (Foucault [1973] 1983; cf. 
Mersch 2002a: 294–305). The play between image and text is infinite. The inde-
terminacy of the written “the light” ref lects the mediality of the comic medium 
itself—and, in doing so, frames this comic as self-ref lexive of its own medium. 
The interplay between image and text, the visibility and iconicity of script, and the 
schematic and abstract graphics themselves become texts instead of images. Yet 
it is the visual dimension of the comic that produces this indeterminacy between 
text and image.
Rereading Singularity 7 with awareness of this framing calls attention to mul-
tiple iterations of such scribblings. For example, the panel that presents the su-
perhero posse of “specials”—human beings somewhat immune to the nanite in-
vasion—also features multiple layers of script (fig. 10.6). On a narrative level, the 
specials are taunting the Gosiodo and getting ready to fight them. Yet the panel 
does not simply tell the story and ironically reference the superhero genre. The 
narrative f low is disrupted yet again by a haphazardly scribbled note in square 
brackets on top of the scene: “standard group shot.” Very similar to “the light,” this 
note offers a descriptive commentary that does not describe the scene in the nar-
rative world, but instead categorizes the type of image as a clichéd shot showing 
a group of superheroes displaying their individual superpowers as well as their 
coherence as a group. There are many handwritten notes throughout the comic, 
but these two offer explicit metalevel commentary, outside not only the narrative 
world but the act of narration itself. They announce that the comic is embedded 
in cultural practices of speculating (envisioning) origins and destinations, pasts 
and futures. Since the two scribbled notes appear to be in different handwriting, 
they may also be notes from previous readers providing their critical reading of 
the comic. 
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Figure 10.7: Nanites dissolving a human. Singularity 7 (Templesmith [2004] 2011,  
#1: 22).
The way in which the images visualize catastrophe and dissolution creates another 
medial ref lexivity. Figure 10.7, for instance, shows the physical dissolution of a 
living human subject in an experiment conducted by surviving scientists in a des-
perate attempt to stop the nanite infections: the body not only dies but vanishes 
as a whole. This decomposition is visually performed as a dissolution of the very 
material constituents of the comic itself. The texture of the face disappears, the 
graphic lines dissolve, and nothing but a green mist remains—without iconic con-
trasts anymore, as if the image itself vanishes or becomes an almost empty green 
plane—a non-image which appears more as a modern abstract painting. 
In the final catastrophe this aesthetic strategy is much more radicalized (Tem-
plesmith [2004] 2011, #4: 24–25). The final destruction dissolves the Gosiodo and 
the Singularity again by dissolving the graphic lines and then infecting the whole 
page spread, erasing the frames and, in the end, dissolving the medium itself—
everything becomes a whitish picture plane, nothing will be left over, and we are 
almost at the end of the comic. It would have been even more radical if these were 
the very last pages of the comic, but they are not.
Visually, the comic dissolves, but the reference to biblical apocalypse here 
also gives this page spread a narrative significance. Specifically, the image can be 
read as a reference to the book of Revelation in the Bible, which details the final 
judgment: “And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into 
the lake of fire” (Rev. 20:15, King James Version). This line does not represent the 
end of revelation, as the next verse envisions “a new heaven and a new earth: for 
the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea” 
(Rev. 20:16). In this context, the final words on this comic page, “this is the end of 
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everything,” correlate with the uncertainty, the guessing in the narrative world 
and in the act of reading, but also with the certainties of demise and resurrection, 
prophecy and revelation suggested in biblical apocalypse and superhero narrative 
alike. In Singularity 7, as in the biblical book of Revelation, the end is a new begin-
ning, even if it remains entirely uncertain here. The certainties suggested by the 
evidentiary character of the images, by the biblical narrative and the superhero 
genre, throw into relief the fundamental uncertainties radically explored in this 
comic. And these are the catastrophic uncertainties emerging from the idea of 
accidental human disappearance, with no narrative left to imagine an alternative 
ending, except an improbable fresh start with a crying baby that may bring life or 
new death. Who knows?
References
Ambush Bug (2008): “AICN Comics News Shoot the Messenger: News! Q&@ With 
Ben Templesmith! & The Tournament Continues: Winners & Bracket 2!” In: 
Ain’t It Cool News, April 7 (http://www.aintitcool.com/node/36308).
Austin, J. L. (1962): How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baetens, Jan (2011): “Abstraction in Comics.” In: SubStance 40, 94–113.
Barthes, Roland ([1964] 1977): “Rhetoric of the Image.” In: Roland Barthes: Image–
Music–Text. Stephen Heath (ed. and trans.). London: Fontana Press, 32–51.
Barthes, Roland ([1969] 1989): “The Reality Effect.” In: Roland Barthes: The Rustle 
of Language. Richard Howard (trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 
141–148. 
Barthes, Roland ([1980] 1981): Camera Lucida. Richard Howard (trans.). New York: 
Hill and Wang.
Berns, Ute (2014): “Performativity.” In: Peter Hühn/John Pier/Wolf Schmid/Jörg 
Schönert (eds.): The Living Handbook of Narratology. Hamburg: Hamburg Uni-
versity (http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/performativity).
Boehm, Gottfried (2007): Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen: Die Macht des Zeigens. Berlin: 
Berlin University Press.
Buckland, Warren (1999): “Between Science Fact and Science Fiction: Spielberg’s 
Digital Dinosaurs, Possible Worlds, and the New Aesthetic Realism.” In: Screen 
40, 177–192.
Daston, Loraine, and Peter Galison (2007): Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Didi-Huberman, Georges (1992): Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde. Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit.
Eisner, Will (1985): Comics and Sequential Art. Tamarac, FL: Poorhouse Press. 
Esposito, Elena (2007): Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität. Nicole Reinhardt 
(trans.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 
Jeanne Cortiel and Christine Hanke240
Foucault, Michel ([1973] 1983): This Is Not a Pipe. James Harkness (ed. and trans.). 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fürst, Michael/Krautkrämer, Florian/Wiemer, Serjoscha (eds.) (2010): Untot: Zom-
bie Film Theorie. München: Belleville.
Groensteen, Thierry ([2011] 2013). Comics and Narration. Ann Miller (trans.). Jack-
son: University Press of Mississippi.
Kracauer, Siegfried (1960): Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Krämer, Sybille (2003): “Writing, Notational Iconicity, Calculus: On Writing as a 
Cultural Technique.” Anita McChesney (trans.). In: Modern Language Notes 118, 
518–537.
Kukkonen, Karin (2013): Studying Comics and Graphic Novels. Chichester: Wiley- 
Blackwell. 
Lanser, Susan S. (1981): The Narrative Act: Point of View in Prose Fiction. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
McCloud, Scott ([1993] 1994): Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. New York: 
HarperPerennial.
Mersch, Dieter (2002a): Was sich zeigt: Materialität, Präsenz, Ereignis. München: 
Fink. 
Mersch, Dieter (2002b): “Wort, Bild, Ton, Zahl: Eine Einleitung in die Medien-
philosophie.” In: Dieter Mersch: Kunst und Medium: Zwei Vorlesungen. Kiel: 
Schriften der Muthesius Kunsthochschule, 131-253.
Mersch, Dieter (2005): “Das Bild als Argument.” In: Christoph Wulf/Jörg Zirfas 
(eds.): Ikonologien des Performativen. München: Fink, 322–344.
Mersch, Dieter (2011): “Aspects of Visual Epistemology: On the ‘Logic’ of the Icon-
ic.” In: András Benedek/Kristóf Nyíri (eds.): Images in Language: Metaphors and 
Metamorphoses. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 169–194.
Metz, Anneke M. (2008): “A Fantasy Made Real: The Evolution of the Subjunctive 
Documentary on US Cable Science Channels.” In: Television and New Media 9, 
333–348.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1994): Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Saraceni, Mario (2003): The Language of Comics. London: Routledge. 
Templesmith, Ben ([2004] 2011): Singularity 7. Issues #1–4. Digital Edition. San 
Diego: IDW Publishing (https://www.idwpublishing.com/product-category/
singularity-7/).
uncertain commons (2013): Speculate This! Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Varnum, Robin/Gibbons, Christina T. (eds.) (2001): The Language of Comics: Word 
and Image. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
Wiesing, Lambert ([2005] 2009): Artificial Presence: Philosophical Studies in Image 
Theory. Nils f. Schott (trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Chapter 10: Uncertainty between Image and Text in Ben Templesmith’s Singularity 7 241
Wolf, Mark J. P. (1999): “Subjunctive Documentary: Computer Imaging and Sim-
ulation.” In: Jane M. Gaines/Michael Renov (eds.): Collecting Visible Evidence. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 274–291.

Chapter 11: This World Which Is Not One 
Superhero Comics and Other Dimensions of Reference
Mark Jerng and Colin Milburn
In 1961, the Flash discovered the secret history of comic books—a history of alter-
nate histories, multiple worlds, and retroactive continuities. The original Flash, a 
young scientist named Jay Garrick, first appeared in 1940 in the anthology series 
Flash Comics, published by All-American Publications. Created by Gardner Fox 
and Harry Lampert, the Flash was one of many comic-book superheroes invented 
after the breakout success of Superman in 1938. The Flash eventually got his own 
series, All-Flash, but as sales of superhero comics dwindled following the end of 
World War II, the adventures of the Flash—along with many other heroes from 
the so-called Golden Age of comics—were cancelled, consigned to the rubbish bin 
of history. By 1951, the Flash had disappeared from this world.
But in 1956, a completely new Flash character appeared in the DC comics an-
thology Showcase #4. Created by Robert Kanigher and Carmine Infantino, the 
new Flash—now a police scientist named Barry Allen—had similar attributes 
to the old Flash, including superfast speed and lightning-bolt motifs on his 
costume. But otherwise he was a totally distinct character, living in a world in 
which the old Flash, Jay Garrick, had never existed. The popular success of the 
new Flash led to the rebooting of many other superhero characters in the 1950s 
and 1960s, ushering in what has come to be known as the Silver Age of comics. 
Then something remarkable happened. In the 1961 story “Flash of Two Worlds” (The 
Flash #123), written by Gardner Fox and drawn by Carmine Infantino, Barry Allen 
discovered that he could alter the speed of his molecular vibrations in such a way 
that he could enter another dimension of spacetime, a parallel world: “The way I 
see it, I vibrated so fast—I tore a gap in the vibratory shields separating our worlds! 
As you know—two objects can occupy the same space and time—if they vibrate at 
different speeds!” (Fox/Infantino/Broome [1961] 2009: 15). As Barry explored this 
other universe, overlapping his own universe but separated by an impossible vi-
brational barrier, he suddenly came face to face with Jay Garrick. As it turns out, 
the old Flash did not cease to exist in 1951. On the contrary, he and his world had 
continued in their own fashion: an entirely separate timeline, a different Earth 
than the one inhabited by Barry Allen. This science-fiction conceit, allowing both 
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the original Flash and the new Flash to have independent realities, each with its 
own historical events, characters, and thematic concerns, was to have a profound 
impact on the narrative logic of superhero comics. 
It was not actually the first time that a superhero had met an alternate version 
of themselves in a different universe. Wonder Woman had already discovered a 
parallel Earth and a parallel Wonder Woman in the 1951 story “Wonder Woman’s 
Invisible Twin,” written by Robert Kanigher and drawn by H. G. Peter (Wonder 
Woman #59). But “The Flash of Two Worlds” definitively established that all previ-
ously published comics were equally canonical, and if there were any discontinu-
ities—internal contradictions, discrepancies in characterization, or even entire 
franchises that seemed narratively incompatible with other franchises—there 
was now a rational explanation: these things happened in other worlds, parallel 
realities. For DC Comics, it inaugurated the concept of the “multiverse”—initial-
ly involving just two different storyworlds, Earth-1 and Earth-2, but eventually 
coming to involve a sprawling multitude of alternate dimensions and timelines. 
Over time, as more and more comics were published, the multiverse became an in-
valuable trope for managing the proliferating complexities of ongoing serial nar-
ratives, branching plots, intersecting titles, and the occasional franchise reboot. 
Marvel Comics, Milestone Comics, Image Comics, and other companies would 
likewise embrace some version of a multiverse as a core feature of the superhero 
genre.
But in thematizing the concept of alternate timelines, the “Flash of Two Worlds” 
story also made a bold claim for superhero comic books as speculative media, with 
unique capacities to ref lect upon events past, present, and future, to examine the 
unactualized potentialities of history. Indeed, when Barry Allen meets Jay Garrick 
for the first time in the alternate universe, he realizes to his great surprise that he 
has actually met the old Flash before, in a fashion: “You were once well-known in 
my world—as a fictional character appearing in a magazine called Flash Comics! 
When I was a youngster—you were my favorite hero!” (Fox/Infantino/Broome [1961] 
2009: 17). As it turns out, according to “Flash of Two Worlds,” comic-book writers 
and artists in all worlds have a super power of their own: they are preternaturally 
sensitive to the “vibrations” of other universes, and they are able to render these 
divergent realities graphically visible, making them available for cultural delec-
tation and deliberation in comic-book form. As Barry Allen tells Jay Garrick, “A 
writer named Gardner Fox wrote about your adventures—which he claimed came 
to him in dreams! Obviously when Fox was asleep, his mind was ‘tuned in’ to your 
vibratory Earth!” (17). In this metafictional twist, the comics writer Gardner Fox 
becomes a character in Barry Allen’s world—an alternate Gardner Fox from the 
one in our world, apparently, where both Flashes are nothing more than fictional 
characters. But at the end of this story, Barry Allen decides that his discovery of a 
parallel world is such an outlandish notion that only comic-book fans would take 
Chapter 11: This World Which Is Not One 245
it seriously: “The only ones who’d really believe it would be the readers of Flash 
Comics! That’s why I’m going to look up Gardner Fox who wrote the original Flash 
stories and tell it to him! He can write the whole thing up—in a comic book!” (32). 
A recursive joke, a self-ref lexive quip about the tendency of comics to present no-
tions of radical difference both seriously and ironically at the same time, it never-
theless implies that superhero comic books even in our own mundane world may 
be peculiarly attuned to vibrations from a different history entirely—reworking 
the givens of the present by forging new, retroactive continuities.
In other words, “Flash of Two Worlds” represents the speculative affordances 
of the residual. According to the cultural theorist Raymond Williams, processes 
of cultural formation are characterized by dynamic interrelations of dominant, 
emergent, and residual elements. For Williams, “The residual, by definition, has 
been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process, not 
only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of 
the present” (Williams 1977: 122). In this regard, “Flash of Two Worlds” literalized 
the residual as an active and effective force in superhero comics. Furthermore, it 
suggested that the residual is not merely a lingering cultural memory—for ex-
ample, Barry Allen’s recollection of reading about Jay Garrick’s allegedly fictive 
adventures in his childhood. For the residual also describes unactualized alterna-
tives to the present, the residue of potential histories that did not take place or be-
come culturally dominant but remain available for other reconstructable futures: 
they are reminders of what could have been and what might yet still come. 
The cultural theorist Stuart Hall has likewise emphasized the importance 
of the residual: “An adequate account of the whole culture of the modern world 
cannot be given without reference to the traces of residual ideas and practices 
which are appropriated into an enormous variety of social struggles. […] The point 
is that these images from the past are recuperated into the present, where they 
work again. We work on and with them; we even build on bits of them in order 
to envisage what we cannot know, what we have no image for” (Hall 2016: 49–50; 
cf. Bardini 2011). To be sure, after the two Flashes meet one another, they initially 
decide to proceed independently, each fighting crime in their separate ways. But 
they soon realize that they are more effective when they team up: “Together, the 
new Flash and the old Flash streak out to take up the challenges of the super-crim-
inals—uniting as a duo for the very first time” (Fox/Infantino/Broome [1961] 2009: 
26). The present recuperates the past, and previously unimagined futures sudden-
ly emerge: “Vibrating in unison, the scarlet speedsters catapult forward . . .” (28). 
Moreover, even after Barry Allen returns to his own Earth at the end of “Flash of 
Two Worlds,” the knowledge that each Flash has of the other—that there is an-
other Earth, another mode of existence—continues to inform their actions. They 
would go on to have many adventures together over the years, often intersecting at 
pivotal moments with dramatic implications for the fate of the multiverse.
Mark Jerng and Colin Milburn246
Indeed, “Flash of Two Worlds” became a key reference point for subsequent 
developments in the vast narrative of DC Comics. In 1962, for example, when the 
Flashes reunited in “Double Danger on Earth” (The Flash #129), a discreet footnote 
reminded readers of previous events: “*Editor’s note: See The Flash #123, ‘Flash 
of Two Worlds’” (Fox/Infantino/Broome [1962] 2009: 37). Later multiverse stories, 
such as Crisis on Infinite Earths (1985–1986), Final Crisis (2008), Flashpoint (2011), 
Convergence (2015), and DC Rebirth (2016), likewise make references to “Flash of 
Two Worlds,” whether in terms of specific plot callbacks, or visual allusions to 
the original artwork, or the characterization of Barry Allen as the only superhe-
ro capable of transporting himself between universes by controlling his molecu-
lar vibrations. Grant Morrison’s The Multiversity (2014–2015) even returns to the 
metafictional conceit introduced in “Flash of Two Worlds” that superhero comic 
books are windows onto other actually existing worlds, running with the idea 
that comics writers possess a preternatural capacity to glimpse events from oth-
er timelines, other universes, and make them available for serious contemplation 
among comics readers.1 
Yet even as references to the foundational meeting between the two Flashes 
have served to provide a sense of continuity over the decades, calling back and 
reanimating the residual across many radical changes to the internal narrative 
history of DC Comics, each point of retroactive continuity, each retcon, has actu-
ally drawn attention to the radical discontinuities, the dynamic multiplicities of 
the superhero multiverse.2 To be sure, in Convergence, the entire multiverse turns 
out to have been merely one multiverse among other multiverses. Which is to say, 
the retroactive continuity references, situating each major event in the history of 
the multiverse by calling back to the ‘origin’ of the superhero multiverse concept, 
actually highlight how superhero comics embed references in ways that active-
ly resist coherency or unification. Residual elements remain vibrant—vibrating 
with potential, available for reinterpretation—even after their assimilation by the 
conditions of the present. It is in this way that superhero comics reveal their se-
cret capacity for transformative radical politics, despite the tendency of many su-
perhero narratives to recapitulate conservative or reactionary themes (cf. Fawaz 
2016).
1  On the conventions of worldbuilding in comics series, see Bukatman (2016); Bainbridge (2009); 
and Friedenthal (2019).
2  Kukkonen argues that comics require readers to hold onto a “multiworld model of reality” as an 
“ontological given” and contain a variety of visual and narrative strategies to help facilitate this 
(Kukkonen 2013: 156). For debates about whether superhero comics are organized around con-
tinuity or multiplicity or both and to what degree, see Klock (2002); Kaveney (2008); Ndalianis 
(2009); Jenkins (2009); Hyman (2017); and Singer (2018). 
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In other discursive contexts—for example, historical narratives, scientific 
reports, or realist novels—references are stabilizing elements, explanations for 
causality, shared history, and the uniform worldness of the world. Literally, ref-
erences are supposed to create the conditions for a frame of reference, a world in 
common. But in superhero comics, references are rather more speculative, link-
ing the present to more worlds than one and opening altered perspectives on the 
continuity of lived history, which proves to have never been continuous or sin-
gular at all. The endless recombination of referential elements, drawing together 
characters and events from diverse and perhaps incommensurable narratives into 
the same representational space, is less about apprehending a world of differences 
than about affirming the difference of worlds, opening up the present to multiple 
other futures. It suggests that, even within the confines of one world, inside the 
“vibratory shields” of our consensus reality, we might yet glimpse a f lash of the 
otherwise—and vibrate to the tune of another timeline.
What’s in a Reference?
Superhero comics are littered with references.3 Historical persons are drawn di-
rectly into comic book pages. Current events become incorporated into the month-
by-month developing storylines. A real-world global conf lict is mentioned as 
background for a comic plot. In their everyday speech, characters make analogies 
to contemporaneous and past moments and invoke cultural references. From the 
longstanding comparisons and debates about Charles Xavier and Martin Luther 
King, to the way in which the Marvel “Civil War” story arc mirrored the post-9/11 
passage of the Patriot Act, to the writing of Barack Obama’s historic presidential 
inauguration into The Amazing Spider-Man #583, superhero comics have incorpo-
rated, responded to, ref lected, and refracted their extra-diegetic contexts.4
At the same time, though, superhero comics reference persons, events, or 
discourses from their own diegetic worlds, whether the Marvel Universe, the DC 
Multiverse, the Valiant Universe, the Milestone Dakataverse, or other comics fran-
chises. Precisely because of the serialized production of comics and the ongoing 
3  Gardner analogizes the form of comics to the archive because of its “excess data—the remains of 
the everyday” (Gardner 2012: 177).
4  Coogan locates this convention with what he calls the “reconstructive stage” of superhero comics 
(Coogan 2006: 221). For essays that foreground the relationship between comic books and cultur-
al history, see Pustz (2012). Wright draws out sweeping sets of correspondences between super-
hero comics, their evolution, and U.S. social and cultural politics (Wright 2001: 226–253). A great 
deal of scholarship working on superheroes in relation to their historical contexts focus on U.S. 
militarism and geopolitics. See Hassler-Forest (2012); and Chute (2017). On Captain America and 
other nationalist superheroes, see Dittmer (2013).
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construction of continuities both within individual titles and across titles, refer-
ences to previous issues, characters, and story arcs abound.5 One of the earliest 
forms of this kind of reference-making is the footnote, usually marked by an as-
terisk. Such references help readers to configure a provisional continuity; gaps 
in the storyline, for example, can be patched up by footnotes advising readers to 
consult other issues in the series or other series. Footnotes can also explain nar-
rative references to characters who are no longer part of the current action, as in 
this footnote for “The Viper” in Captain America and the Falcon #174: “That super-
villain sparked all this in CA&F #163. —Roy” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 
2017: 115). In this case, the footnote produces a retroactive understanding of cause 
and continuity (indeed, some readers might not otherwise agree that the Viper 
“sparked all this”). Such references, then, may not simply allude to an already un-
derstood past. They may reconstruct, fill in the gaps, or draw out overlooked as-
pects in order to reframe the current action. While footnotes are the most explicit 
forms of intra-diegetic reference, other forms include how a character is drawn, 
the details of his or her costume, and references to characters’ pasts.
The superhero comics page becomes a space of incongruous interaction among 
imaginary, intra-diegetic, and historical references (fig. 11.1). These references do 
not work harmoniously to stabilize the relation between fictional text and histo-
ry. Rather, each reference—each cite—is a site of speculation where continuities 
across worlds are fashioned at the same instant they are proliferated, always 
opening up new and potentially other worlds that were, in effect, already there. 
Because the reference does not belong to one world, it follows less a criterion 
of temporal progression than a process of articulation, what Hall describes as the 
“articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different 
ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness’” (Hall 2016: 142; cf. Hall 1986). 
What brings together elements that “have no necessary ‘belongingness’” are the 
culturally defined ways in which we know and feel about these references. Dis-
cussing the communicative function of images in comic books, the cartoonist Will 
Eisner notes, 
Comprehension of an image requires a commonality of experience. This demands 
of the sequential artist an understanding of the reader’s life experience if his mes-
sage is to be understood. An interaction has to develop because the artist is evok-
ing images stored in the minds of both parties. (Eisner [1985] 2008: 7) 
5  On the range of comic books’ allusions, see Pustz (1999: 143–156). On the role of allusions and 
intertextuality for self-reflexivity in comics and the emergence of revisionary superhero narra-
tives, see Klock (2002).
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Figure 11.1: Worlds collide in a blend of references: dinosaurs and pilgrims and 
spaceships, oh my! Crisis on Infinite Earths #5, “Worlds in Limbo” (Wolfman/Pérez 
[1985] 2000: 127). 
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This “commonality of experience” is itself a contested domain of collective apper-
ceptions or apprehensions of particular references—for example, how a reference 
is commented on, talked about, and understood. After all, in order for a reference 
to be a reference, it must be commented on and used in an allusive, metaphorical, 
allegorical, metonymic, or indexical fashion. It must ‘stand for’ something. The 
interaction between the reader’s and the sequential artist’s minds foregrounds 
the relationship between our cultural consciousness of these shared images and 
the manner in which they are narrated and thematized. The reference, a shared 
bit of cultural lore, does not have to be from the past: it could be from a not-yet 
present or even far future, so long as it is part of a shared cultural consciousness 
that invokes the referent in a particular way.
As such, the strange phenomenon of the reference in superhero comics forces 
readers to question in what sense histories are ‘shared’ and in what sense worlds 
can be held in common. As sites of speculation, references draw worlds togeth-
er—underscoring the processes through which continuities are forged. When su-
perhero comics use references, then, they are simultaneously speculating on our 
cultural consciousness—how we as readers might feel or how we might under-
stand any residual element—dramatizing the crisis of what world(s) we do or do 
not share. In this way, references in superhero comics always instantiate the logic 
of the multiverse, that is, the multiverse as an epistemic formation. For even when 
they serve to anchor the assumptions of a single world, forging continuities both 
prescriptively and retroactively, the referential operations of superhero comics re-
quire us to think multiple worlds simultaneously.
Reference and Retcon 
Let us consider a salient example. Published from January 10, 1974 to June 10, 1975, 
Steve Englehart’s “Secret Empire” and “Nomad” storylines of Captain America and 
the Falcon (issues #169–186) explicitly speculate on the cultural consciousness of 
particular events, symbols, and figures during the then-ongoing Watergate scan-
dal in the United States and the resignation of President Nixon. These sequential 
storylines revolve around the question of reference, in the strict sense of what 
something ‘stands for.’ Englehart writes, 
[Captain America] was being considered for cancellation when I got it, because it 
had no reason for existence. […] The problem across the board at Marvel was that 
this was the 70s—prime anti-war years—and here was a guy with a flag on his 
chest who was supposed to represent what most people distrusted. No one knew 
what to do with him. (Englehart 2002a)
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Englehart further clarifies how the “Secret Empire” arc alludes to Watergate: 
I was writing a man [Captain America] who believed in America’s highest ideals 
at a time when America’s President was a crook. I could not ignore that. And so, in 
the Marvel Universe, which so closely resembled our own, Cap followed a criminal 
conspiracy into the White House and saw the President commit suicide. (Engle-
hart 2002b) 
The literary scholar Matthew Vernon summarizes Captain America’s perpetual 
dilemma: “Captain America embodies the problem of being torn between two 
worlds while seeking a way to reconcile them” (Vernon 2016: 126). Vernon analyzes 
two worlds that are separated by time. In Englehart’s stories, Captain America 
must navigate worlds separated by shared referents.
These storylines depict Steve Rogers’s crisis of consciousness as he uncovers a 
“secret empire” conspiracy, which begins with a media campaign targeting Cap-
tain America as an enemy of the state. The conspiracy, as it turns out, goes all the 
way up to the president of the United States. Seeing that corruption and greed 
extend to the president, Steve Rogers retires as Captain America only to reemerge 
as a new superhero, Nomad. The inexplicable reappearance of his old nemesis, the 
Red Skull, and the killing of Roscoe (who had taken up Captain America’s mantle 
in Rogers’s stead) prompts Rogers to become Captain America once more, vowing: 
“I won’t be blind again” (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006, #183: 135). This new Captain 
America will no longer have his nationalist blinkers on; instead, he will supposedly 
become deeply self-ref lexive about what he stands for.
In issue #169, which begins the “Secret Empire” arc, Captain America is framed 
as a vigilante, an anti-American villain, by the Committee to Regain America’s 
Principles. The accusation eventually leads Captain America and Falcon to defeat 
the secret empire plot, in which the leader (Number One) is a thinly disguised ver-
sion of Richard Nixon. The Committee to Regain America’s Principles (CRAP) ref-
erences the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), the group whose illegal 
activities led to Watergate. Of course, it is not a simple presentist reference. The 
name of the committee, emphasizing a desire to “Regain America’s Principles,” al-
ready anticipates the ignominious downfall of American consciousness following 
the Watergate affair and prospectively imagines linking the concerns of illegal 
vigilantism with a questioning of who is the proper referent for “America.” The 
committee’s ad attacking Captain America questions whether or not he stands 
for “Your America?” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017, #169: 11) (fig. 11.2). 
In issue #176, Captain America’s crisis of consciousness in both himself and the 
nation is figured through the incompatibility between different “versions” of 
what America is: “In the land of the free, each of us is able to do what he wants 
to do—think what he wants to think. That’s as it should be—But it makes for a 
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great many different versions of what America is.” The dilemma becomes clear: 
“So when people the world over look at me—which America am I supposed to sym-
bolize?” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017, #176: 157) (fig. 11.3). Here, in the 
cartoon panel, racial difference is drawn as a conf lict between different exercises 
of freedom and attached to the crisis of consciousness regarding one’s faith in 
the nation. Moreover, it is internalized for Steve Rogers as a problem of reference: 
“when people the world over look at me.”
Figure 11.2: CREEP reimagined as CRAP. Captain America and the Falcon #169 
(Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017: 11).
Figure 11.3: Which America? Whose America? Captain America and the Falcon #176 
(Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017: 157).
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These storylines do not resolve this question by reviving Captain America’s old 
enemies from World War II. They do not restore to Captain America the symbol 
of America or reconcile a different version of America to Captain America in any 
nostalgic way. His renewed commitment that he “won’t be blind again” is not a 
renewed attachment to an ideal, but rather a drive in the psychoanalytic sense of a 
“constant force” that will never be satisfied (Lacan [1973] 1998: 179). In other words, 
this question of reference is answered neither through shoring up national iden-
tity against oppositional, un-American threats, nor by identifying Rogers more 
firmly as a symbol of the American people.6 Instead, it is answered through cre-
ating psychic and cultural drives for Captain America in and amongst alternative 
continuities. The reference, working on and through the residual, shapes these 
drives; it forges and reconfigures continuities on which the coherence of political 
imaginaries depends. 
Rogers’s crisis (“which America am I supposed to symbolize?”) articulates a 
world in which crises of belief are brought to signification by invoking challeng-
es to white nationalism. The historical Watergate scandal—a political blunder in 
which one political party did not play by the proper rules of politics—is inserted 
as the background assumption of a cultural consciousness having to do with the 
ongoing white resistance to black struggles for freedom. As we move from “Secret 
Empire” to “Nomad,” the new antagonist becomes the Serpent Squad and its brand 
of anti-capitalist terrorism. The Serpent Squad is described as “crazy,” “fanatic,” 
and fighting for the “cause” of “nihilism” (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006, #183: 102). 
But the Serpent Squad’s “cause” is quickly pictured through a mainstream popular 
consciousness of black street politics. The Serpent Squad’s story finds a powerful 
site of dissemination in a crowd led by the stereotypical image of an ‘angry black 
man’ (fig. 11.4). Relying on the iconicity of the race riot and the consciousness that 
links it to the false understanding of black struggle as reactionary, the superhero 
comic produces a cultural background that becomes Nomad’s understanding of 
historical forces. Seeing the crowd, Nomad (formerly Captain America) thinks to 
himself: “Good lord! It’s already started—the very thing the Viper predicted—The 
building of a legend around her, to inspire others to the goals she pretended to es-
pouse! And they’re calling me a vigilante, just the way the Committee to Regain Amer-
ica’s Principles did!” (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006, #183: 122). What bothers Nomad 
so much is the inversion of consequence and cause, where consequence becomes 
cause in the future. He draws a continuity between CRAP and the Serpent Squad, 
creating a peculiar consciousness of his own persecution.
6  Dittmer (2013) analyzes Captain America in relation to a U.S. nationalism that continually evolves 
and incorporates geopolitical questions of gender, race, body and territory. He briefly treats the 
“Secret Empire” run (Dittmer 2013: 119–121), using it as an example of the rigid nationalist politics 
of a process of renewal and regenerative identification of Captain America with the nation. 
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Figure 11.4: Serpent Squad drawn as racial unrest. Captain America and the Falcon 
#183 (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006: 122).
This technique of using residual elements of race riot images in order to forge 
white political consciousness mirrors the strategies used by Richard Nixon and 
Alabama Governor George Wallace before him. As Carol Anderson writes: “H. R. 
Haldeman, one of the Republican candidate’s most trusted aides, later recalled, 
‘He [Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole problem is 
really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not ap-
pearing to’” (Anderson 2016: 104). This recognition “while not appearing to” relies 
on race-neutral language and the strategic use of images to picture African Amer-
icans without referring to them. What distinguishes superhero comics’ use of an 
otherwise familiar technique is that it creates continuities such that events are 
cognized in terms of historical drives. 
Enter the retcon—that is, the technique of creating retroactive continuity in 
serial narratives and media franchises. The retcon, as Joshua Clover eloquently 
describes, “involves a kind of rearrangement of the already given facts into a new 
logically consistent constellation that can account for later, initially inconsistent 
developments” (Clover 2014: 15). Here, the retcon smooths over Nomad’s drives by 
drawing from histories of racial affect. The retcon is used not so much to repro-
duce political identities as it is to form new drives.
Across a series in which the relationship between Captain America’s identity 
as symbol of the United States and his drive to struggle for liberty are being ques-
tioned, it is the remaking of consciousness around juxtaposed residual elements 
of racial signification that creates a new continuity for this relationship. For ex-
ample, after Rogers “abandon[s] the role of Captain America” because he is “deeply 
troubled by current political events,” he remarks on the kind of freedom that he 
feels: 
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You know, Sharon, I don’t think I’ve ever felt as free as I have these past weeks. I’ve 
had no master but myself, and no cause but my own. I don’t mean that selfishly, 
now—Just that I’ve been able to live entirely as myself and not at all as a piece of 
public property! (Englehart et al. [1974] 2006, #179: 44–45)
It is a freedom, made clear by the comic itself through Rogers’s rhetoric of “master,” 
“cause,” and “property,” that is dependent on slavery and dependent on creating a 
distance between Steve Rogers and Falcon. It furthers the interests of capitalism 
because it creates a conceptual division that enables the creation of new under-
standings of what capitalist freedom looks like, one that is dependent on marking 
a distance from the appropriation of gendered labor, racialized labor, and other 
forms of devalued social standing (Singh 2017; Roediger 1999). Indeed, before be-
coming Nomad, Steve Rogers’s freedom allows him to partake of the pleasures 
of heterosexual, romantic coupling with Sharon Carter. Previously, in issue #166, 
Rogers had been evicted and dispossessed from his apartment room, and Sam 
Wilson (Falcon) let him sleep in his social welfare office. After hearing Rogers 
complain about his dispossession, Wilson commented, “Easy, Steve! In Harlem, 
we been puttin’ up with landlords like Trimble since forever” (Englehart/Busce-
ma [1973] 2013: 16), bringing Rogers’s relationship with labor and property close 
to his own. But in the passage from issue #179 above, Rogers is not worried about 
‘work’ at all. Instead, this newfound freedom “banishes the specter of wageless life” 
(Singh 2017: 94). That this freedom is felt in relation to racial formations of terri-
tory and property is made clear in Rogers’s off hand remark after an explosion 
that disturbs his taking a walk with Sharon: “Unless the American Indian Move-
ment wants Manhattan back, somebody just tried to kill one of us!” (Englehart et 
al. [1974] 2006, #179: 46). 
The reference as concretization of the residual takes center stage at a pivotal 
moment when Rogers tries to link his new superhero identity of Nomad to some 
new drive untainted by America’s failures of democracy and the sign of Watergate. 
Early in the “Nomad” run, Nomad stands in front of the Lincoln Memorial. Rather 
than being a site for the unification of worlds of reference and thereby clarifying 
the single political horizon in which Captain America/Nomad will find meaning, 
the reference to the Lincoln Memorial becomes a site for speculation that refuses 
those totalizing logics. Words f lood the page: first, a quotation from a speech that 
Lincoln gave at Independence Hall on February 22, 1861; and then, a second, longer 
quote from a speech given at Edwardsville, Illinois on September 11, 1858 (fig. 11.5). 
These quotations do not mirror the ones actually present on the Lincoln Memo-
rial, which are instead drawn from the Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863) 
and Lincoln’s second inauguration speech (March 4, 1865). The panel emphasizes 
a non-correspondence with monumental history, a disjunction between possible 
worlds.
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Figure 11.5: The Lincoln Memorial and its multiple continuities. Captain America and 
the Falcon #181 (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006: 82).
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Lincoln’s line begins the issue: “I have never had a feeling, politically, that did not 
spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.” The 
narration for the comic continues: “Abraham Lincoln said all that … but Steve Rog-
ers—once called Captain America, now called Nomad—has often thought the 
same. He is thinking it now, here in Washington’s Lincoln Memorial” (Englehart 
et al. [1975] 2006, #181: 82). Extracted from the rest of the speech, the quoted lines 
make an argument about resisting despotism and tyranny, not through strength 
of arms, but through inner spirit and inner love of liberty. The circuit defining 
Rogers’s new drive forges a continuity with the Declaration of Independence.
In what sense is this a speculative retcon and not just a historical reference or 
revisionist history? It is not actually interested in revising our understanding of 
the past (revisionist history). Nor is it a historical reference that takes some event 
as given. Rather, it is a moment that rearranges the given facts in order to form a 
new continuity, a new way of orienting to the antagonisms of the contemporary 
era. This new continuity makes little mention of slavery, excising the original his-
torical context. In the full speech from which these quotations are drawn, Lincoln 
directly addressed the Dred Scott decision. In U.S. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
final majority opinion on the Dred Scott case, Taney admitted that it was difficult 
to reimagine public sentiment, whether at the time of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence or at the time when the Constitution was adopted; but he nevertheless pro-
fessed to do exactly that in bringing forward the hardened thought of “more than 
a century” in which “[the negro] had no rights which the white man was bound 
to respect” (Taney 1857: 407). Taney’s speculations on historical consciousness be-
came the basis for professing historical ‘fact.’ In Captain America and the Falcon, the 
blind spots in Taney’s historical imagination of sentiment are reproduced through 
the comic’s selective quotations from Lincoln that emphasize the transhistorical 
conduit of sentiment over other lines of thought.
Lincoln’s argument in his 1858 speech was actually that the Dred Scott deci-
sion spuriously founded the “right of self-government” on the right to brutalize 
the “negro” (Lincoln [1858] 1953: 95). He stated that what Judge Stephen A. Douglas 
insisted on calling “popular sovereignty” really meant installing in the notion of 
“peoplehood” itself the right to treat black men and women with impunity (Lincoln 
[1858] 1953: 95). But Lincoln’s rhetoric also aimed to rouse white sentiment and fear, 
compelling his audience to safeguard black interests with the idea that “you’re 
next.” Indeed, the lines immediately before the portion of Lincoln’s speech quoted 
in the comic are: 
Now, when by all these means you have succeeded in dehumanizing the negro; 
when you have put him down, and made it forever impossible for him to be but as 
the beasts of the field; when you have extinguished his soul, and placed him where 
the ray of hope is blown out in darkness like that which broods over the spirits of 
Mark Jerng and Colin Milburn258
the damned; are you quite sure the demon which you have roused will not turn and 
rend you? (Lincoln [1858] 1953: 95) 
The continuity that Steve Rogers derives from this partial reference involves both 
a severing of the concept of freedom from the history of slavery and a carrying 
forward of the sentiments of fear that white men, too, could become targets. Lin-
coln’s own limited way of imagining U.S. anti-blackness only in terms of its po-
tential threat to white men is carried forward into Rogers’s cultural consciousness. 
The retroactive continuity making sense of Captain America’s transformation into 
Nomad runs through the residual meanings actively formed in the sentiments of 
slavery and freedom.
But at the same time, this form of speculative history through which Captain 
America crafts his own consciousness is willfully blind. The sequence of panels 
displays this blindness. As Rogers stands in front of the Lincoln Memorial, lost in 
thought, an arrow points to a partially exposed arm with the line, “Which is why 
he’s oblivious to … this!” The next panel repeats the blindness. Rogers thinks to 
himself, “Lincoln: Why did he sound so eloquent when everyone today sounds so 
forced? Why did our forefathers seem to understand America more clearly than 
we do now? We’ve been through so much, and yet—Eh? Someone behind me—!” 
(Englehart et al. [1974] 2006, #181: 83). He is suddenly interrupted by the Sub-Mar-
iner, a figure whose fictional continuity with Captain America is crucial (after all, 
he is the character who discovered Captain America encased in ice). At this mo-
ment, Nomad is attempting to create a continuity with a retconned version of the 
historical past, one that brings forward the eloquence of Lincoln in order to align 
voice and body into a sentiment of freedom that has nothing to do with slavery 
and everything to do with the fear of tyranny. But the Sub-Mariner reintroduces 
another continuity: the problematic identity of Captain America. 
This reintroduction unearths the multiple worlds drawn together in this scene. 
Here, the collisions of intra-diegetic references and extra-diegetic references open 
up multiple racialized histories that cannot be subsumed into a single line extend-
ing from the U.S. Civil War to the Civil Rights movement. While the story arc fo-
cuses on Captain America’s crisis of consciousness linked to Watergate, the issue 
that introduces the entire “Secret Empire” arc actually begins with another ongo-
ing storyline—one that centers on the Falcon’s desire to get new powers so that he 
no longer feels inferior to Captain America. The Falcon storyline interpolates the 
Secret Empire plot into the longer-running narrative of Falcon’s powers and his 
‘place’ in relation to Captain America.7 In the issue that begins the “Secret Empire” 
plot, Captain America saves the Falcon, again leading Falcon to ask for extra pow-
7  As a sidekick character whose position appears to mirror structural inequalities, Falcon has gar-
nered less attention from scholars writing on the politics of race and comics. See Brown (2001); 
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ers. Captain America responds, “He has a right to better himself, of course. I only 
wish I believed that what he wants is for the better” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema 
[1974] 2017, #169: 10). Captain America here references longstanding discourses of 
black freedom struggle and white resistance to that freedom. It also references 
the deep hypocrisy of white superiority in the language of rights discourse. But 
more importantly, it situates the whole CRAP advertising campaign in relation to 
the spacetime of the Falcon’s long discontent and his critique of Captain America: 
Falcon’s history as a history of white retrenchment. 
For the critical theorist and poet Fred Moten, interpolation can interrupt in-
terpellation, the way in which we are recruited by ideologies and constituted as 
subjects. The insertion of new matter simultaneously disrupts continuities and 
creates new continuities (Moten 2017: 28–33). In issue #174 of “Secret Empire,” Fal-
con learns from Professor Charles Xavier of the X-Men that he may be a mutant 
and have a “paranormal mind” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017, #174: 
114). This speculative retcon of Falcon’s origins would explain his uncannily tele-
pathic relationship with the falcon, Redwing. In this sense, the Falcon as superhe-
ro carries forward the residual—untapped potentialities, discarded alternatives. 
Captain America refuses to follow this alternate continuity. Early in the Nomad 
storyline when Falcon tries to get Steve Rogers to investigate with him whether 
he might in fact be a mutant, Rogers responds: “No, Sam—You have to find out! 
Captain America doesn’t exist anymore! He’s a legend of World War II—no longer 
living! And since he doesn’t exist, he doesn’t go on patrol!” (Englehart et al. [1974] 
2006, #177: 10). Rogers registers his complete indifference to this possible ret-
conned storyline. In fact, he disavows this possible continuity, diminishing Fal-
con’s desired mission as simply going “on patrol.” But Falcon’s mission potentially 
revises his origin story by articulating a different set of reference points—namely, 
the X-Men—with the long struggle of black resistance to conceptions of freedom 
centered on white affect. Falcon is a fragment from another world, but one that 
anticipates the conditions of possibility by which he is made into a problem.
As a further manifestation of Falcon’s interruptions, he continually points to 
Captain America’s affective drives: “Cap was so intent on gettin’ this trip started, 
he didn’t even take time to switch to civvies! This thing is really eatin’ at ‘im!” And 
then, “Partner, you have got to lighten up! You nearly drove that dude into scream-
in’ paranoia!” (Englehart/Friedrich/Buscema [1974] 2017, #172: 72). Falcon repeat-
edly notes how crazy and forgetful Captain America has become, making clear 
the reactionary nature of Captain America’s actions. In the example above of Fal-
con’s response to Rogers’s eviction (“we been puttin’ up with landlords like Trim-
ble since forever”), Falcon’s “since forever” inserts a different temporality, which 
Howard/Jackson (2013); Gateward/Jennings (2015); carrington (2016); and Wanzo (2009) for anal-
yses of black superheroes, masculinities, stereotypes, and genres. 
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interrupts Rogers’s indignant focus on the immediate past and immediate future. 
Falcon puts the brakes on the reactionary emotions that drive Captain America 
forward and that structure his cultural and historical consciousness. 
The manner in which the crossing of intra-diegetic and extra-diegetic refer-
ences opens up sociopolitical horizons is further articulated through the referent 
of whiteness. When Steve Rogers as Captain America announces his retirement, 
various characters insert themselves into the vacated position. First, the famous 
baseball player Bob Russo takes his shot at being Captain America. Seven panels 
is all it takes to dispose this wannabe Captain America: Russo swings into a wall 
and breaks his arm. Second, a biker gang member, Scar Turpin, makes his move 
to take on the mantle: “I been kinda leary about trottin’ my costumed bod down 
to the cops, to show ‘em who they got workin’ with ‘em now—They might just put 
me away for disrespectin’ the f lag” (Englehart et al. [1974] 2006, #179: 56). These 
interpolations from different sectors of society (baseball and biker culture in San 
Rafael, California) display both the popular accessibility of the icon (people believe 
they can become Captain America) and the exceptional quality of the icon (they 
inevitably fail to do so). The third and most significant interpolation is Roscoe Si-
mons, who trains with Falcon to be the new Captain America and whose death 
at the hands of the Red Skull actually propels Steve Rogers to resume his role as 
Captain America.
These failures are signaled precisely in their deviation from a specific align-
ment of whiteness in relation to labor and language. Scar Turpin imagines Cap-
tain America as someone who “works” and who affiliates with the “cops,” neither 
of which apply to him. Roscoe’s defining characteristic is his speech written in 
dialect: “Ain’t dis a kick inna teet’? I bend da rules ta scam Mr. Rogers’ address in 
da gym registry—and den he ain’t home! But heck, if I lived inna welfare office, 
I’d travel a lot, too! I didn’t know tings was so bad for ‘im” (Englehart et al. [1974] 
2006, #180: 74). This dialect places Roscoe Simons within a range of possible ethnic 
identities—Irish, Jewish—and the uses of ‘dis’ and ‘dat’ recall Bre’r Rabbit carica-
tures of blackness. The failures of these men to become Captain America—failures 
of interpolation—serve the construction of Steve Rogers as generically white, that 
is to say, both general and genre-specific within the discourse of superhero comics.
These multiple, alternative continuities appear as paradoxes on the cover of 
Captain America and the Falcon #181 (fig. 11.6). This cover image does not reproduce 
a scene from the narrative. Instead, it imagines an encounter between Nomad, 
Falcon, and the new Captain America (Roscoe Simon) that never actually happens. 
Falcon says, “Stay back, Nomad! You had your chance to be Captain America! Now 
it’s his turn!” Nomad does not speak. This fictional non-encounter shows the alli-
ance between Falcon and Roscoe as something that never fully matured, but whose
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Figure 11.6: Drawing out the refused continuity. Captain America and the Falcon 
#181 (Englehart et al. [1975] 2006: 81).
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residual possibility remains available for representation as an alternate history, 
a counterfactual world. A glimpse of their possible alliance does occur earlier in 
the narrative proper when Falcon overcomes Roscoe’s racist language and Roscoe 
overcomes his own embarrassments and humiliations in being trained by Falcon.8 
Indeed, to understand this scene as something that actually happens is to inter-
polate a past in which Falcon’s multiple interruptions—here manifested through 
his command to Rogers (“Stay back”)—are given standing and in which Roscoe is 
Falcon’s partner and not the other way around. It is also to form a linkage across 
blackness and a non-generic, non-generalizable whiteness that has historically 
been foreclosed by specific political formations that have traded on black images 
of inferiority and what W. E. B. Du Bois has called the “public and psychological 
wage” of whiteness, a construction of public space, institutions, and the economic 
value of white freedom as a public good (Du Bois [1935] 1998: 700).
The cover depicts an encounter that does not happen within the story’s die-
gesis—and, in fact, it could not happen. For it is Roscoe’s death that causes Steve 
Rogers’s guilt. (He feels that he should have been the one to confront the Red 
Skull.) This guilt and mourning drive Steve Rogers to become Captain America 
once again. The pictured encounter on the cover thus replaces one set of affective 
potentialities (mourning, guilt) with another (astonishment, surprise, feelings of 
betrayal from Steve Rogers and refusal from Falcon). The cover image’s non-event 
is necessary for the dominant storyline, insofar as it enables Steve Rogers’s affec-
tive drive through the comic. In imaging what could not happen, the cover points to 
the reorganization of affective elements that would be necessary to form a conti-
nuity and thereby an alternative cultural consciousness. 
Captain America’s drive to resolve his crisis of consciousness requires revis-
ing the problem of being in the wrong history, the wrong timeline—or, as he puts 
it in issue #168, “the feeling that I’m a walking anachronism—a guy who looks 
like he’s twenty … even though he was fighting Hitler’s hordes some thirty years 
ago!” (Thomas/Isabella/Buscema [1973] 2013: 3). He expresses this crisis in terms of 
linking the idea and material reality of what he ‘stands for.’ This drive runs circles 
around and repeatedly avoids an alternative consciousness. It is a drive predicated 
on the refusal of Falcon’s claims and activated through speculating on residual 
meanings of race and history, as in the Lincoln Memorial reference. The return of 
Rogers as Captain America with his statement “I won’t be blind again” epitomiz-
es the cultural consciousness and temporal continuity that the series repeats: a 
looking ahead that disavows alternate continuities in order to secure a drive for 
liberty. As we have seen, however, Captain America is often caught not looking 
behind him. Always looking in front of him instead of behind him, Captain Amer-
8  In Captain America and the Falcon #182, Falcon forgives Roscoe for calling him a “joik” and refash-
ions the relationship as one where he watches out for Captain America, not the other way around.
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ica’s continuity relies on the retcon to smooth out inconsistencies at the same time 
that the proliferation of continuities body forth alternate modes of consciousness 
and reference-making. Falcon becomes important as a figure for and interrup-
tion of the intra-diegetic and historical continuities that weave Captain America 
and Falcon together. Falcon indicates the referential consciousness built around 
blackness that drives Captain America’s blindness and also interrupts this drive 
with other affective possibilities—specifically, a refusal of given social relations.9
Beyond the One-World World
By drawing attention to contradictions, residual histories, and alternate timelines 
even while retconning them, superhero comics expose the coercive force of con-
tinuity as the condition of a unified world—the violence and repressions inherent 
to one-world ideologies and the desire for a “one-world world” (Law 2015; cf. de la 
Cadena 2015; de la Cadena/Blaser 2018; Escobar 2018; Reiter 2018). Superheroes 
themselves have often represented such one-world ideologies: forces of vigilante 
justice or homeland security determined to bring order, unity, and liberty to an 
unruly universe. Captain America looks ahead to universal freedom, even while 
overlooking the structural occlusions and injustices on which his own sense of 
freedom relies. But the system of references in superhero comics likewise indi-
cates how the speculative drives that characterize one-world ideologies, aspiring 
to produce the conditions for one world to persist at the expense of another, ul-
timately threaten the continuity of any world whatsoever. This is, of course, the 
whole point of Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons’s Watchmen (1986–1987). 
A singular reference establishes Watchmen as an alternate history of our own 
world, marking the inf lection point when it changed: the publication of Action 
Comics #1 in 1938, representing the first appearance of Superman. In Watchmen, 
the advent of superhero comic books inspired groups of people to become heroes 
themselves. The generation of the Minutemen (allegorizing the Golden Age of 
comics) was followed by the generation of the Crimebusters (allegorizing the Sil-
ver Age of comics). In these eras, the worlds of fiction and reality collided: “[T]he 
super-heroes had escaped from their four-color world and invaded the plain, fac-
tual black and white of the headlines” (Moore/Gibbons 1987, I: 32). Because these 
real costumed heroes dominated the news media, the comic book industry in 
Watchmen instead went in a different direction, prioritizing stories of pirates and 
swashbucklers. In Watchmen, the presidency of Richard Nixon in the U.S. never 
9  Drawing on the work of the black studies scholars Saidiya Hartman and Hortense Spillers, Tif fany 
Lethabo King writes, “Blackness is a form of malleable potential and a state of change in the ‘so-
cio-political order’ of the New World” (King 2019: 103).
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ended because the Watergate scandal never came to light. (Indeed, it is implied 
that a superhero working on behalf of the U.S. government—perhaps the Comedi-
an—murdered the reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein before they could 
expose the dirty tricks carried out by the Committee to Re-Elect the President.) 
In the context of this political history, costumed heroes have come to stand for 
a one-world world, stamping out petty crime as well as mobilizing against other 
forms of social deviance, including “promiscuity,” “drugs,” “campus subversion,” 
“anti-war demos,” and “black unrest” (II: 10–11). While some heroes such as the 
Comedian and Dr. Manhattan have aligned with the U.S. military to contain the 
spread of communism, others, such as Ozymandias, aim for a unification of the 
world’s people into a common frame of reference, namely, globalized consumer 
capitalism. Ozymandias plots to achieve this goal—the end of global conf lict and 
the overcoming of ideological differences, the creation of a neoliberal planet as 
the end of history as such (Hoberek [2014] 2017)—through an elaborate scheme, 
staging a fake alien invasion of New York. Ozymandias believes that only by pro-
viding the global superpowers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as the indi-
vidual heroes that represent them—with a common enemy will a worldwide peace 
be achieved: “Unable to unite the world by conquest . . . I would trick it; frighten it 
towards salvation with history’s greatest practical joke” (XI: 24).
The story of Watchmen is explicitly about the practice of interpreting referenc-
es and the production of retroactive continuity. On the one hand, the main sto-
ryline follows the efforts of the masked heroes Rorschach and Night Owl to solve 
a series of murders and other mysterious events that suggest an extraordinary 
conspiracy to eradicate superheroes. Rorschach’s own name, of course, referenc-
es the famous psychological test that involves interpreting arbitrary inkblots as 
meaningful references. While putting together the pieces of the mystery, Night 
Owl remembers that “Ozymandias” was the ancient Greek name for the Egyptian 
pharaoh Rameses II, which turns out to be the secret password on Ozymandias’s 
office computer. Night Owl thus discovers Ozymandias’s role as the mastermind 
behind the conspiracy. 
On the other hand, Ozymandias himself is figured as an expert interpreter 
of references (fig. 11.7). As the “smartest man in the world” (XI: 32), he has built 
his personal fortune by observing patterns in popular media and television ad-
vertising that guide his strategic business investments. Watching multiple tele-
vision broadcasts simultaneously, reading across images and forging continu-
ities among a multitude of references and allusions—analogous to the practice 
of reading across comic book panels, suturing words and images (see McLuhan 
[1964] 1994: 166–168; Milburn 2015: 135–172)—Ozymandias discerns patterns of 
cultural consciousness, the lineaments of a world: “These reference points estab-
lished, an emergent worldview becomes gradually discernible amidst the media’s 
white noise” (XI: 1). For Ozymandias, comprehending the ensemble of reference 
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points is an exact practice of speculation, providing “subliminal hints of the fu-
ture” and a model of things to come: “This jigsaw-fragment model of tomorrow 
aligns itself piece by piece” (XI: 1). His speculative synthesis of reference points 
from global media streams likewise convinces him that the incommensurable 
one-world ideologies of the twentieth century will never be reconciled: 
I saw East and West, locked into an escalating arms spiral, their mutual terror and 
suspicion mounting with the missiles […] Both sides realized the suicidal implications 
of nuclear conflict, yet couldn’t stop racing towards it lest their opponents should 
overtake them. […] Simply given the mathematics of the situation, sooner or later 
conflict would be inevitable. (XI: 21) 
Ozymandias determines that only a wild science-fiction scheme—revealing to 
the people of Earth that a multidimensional multiverse does exist—will make the 
Earth whole: “To frighten governments into co-operation, I would convince them 
that Earth faced imminent attack by beings from another world” (XI: 25). 
Ozymandias commissions a team of scientists, artists, and science fiction 
writers to help him create the hoax (though Ozymandias has them all killed before 
they learn the full truth of his plan). Significantly, Ozymandias recruits Max Shea, 
the famous comics writer and novelist whose work on Tales of the Black Freighter 
expanded the artistic horizons of pirate comic books, tasking him to create horri-
fying scenes from the alien world. 
Figure 11.7: Ozymandias reads across images, connecting points of reference. Watchmen 
(Moore/Gibbons 1987, X: 8).
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Of course, Ozymandias was not the only one to have envisaged such a scenario. 
Around the same time as Moore and Gibbons were creating Watchmen, the former 
Hollywood actor and president of the United States Ronald Reagan was indulging 
similar speculative fantasies. During the 1985 Geneva Summit, Reagan and the 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev took a private walk to a cabin in the vicinity. 
Years later, Gorbachev revealed what they had discussed on this walk:
President Reagan suddenly said to me, “What would you do if the United States 
were suddenly attacked by someone from outer space? Would you help us?” I said, 
“No doubt about it.” He said, “We too.” So that’s interesting. (Gorbachev 2009)
The idea of a world united by war against an extraterrestrial threat was often on 
Reagan’s mind. For example, in his address to the 42nd Session of the United Na-
tions General Assembly on September 21, 1987, Reagan once again waxed in a sub-
junctive mood, implicitly referencing any number of science fiction stories: 
In our obsession with antagonisms of the moment, we of ten forget how much 
unites all the members of humanity. Perhaps we need some outside, universal 
threat to make us recognize this common bond. I occasionally think how quick-
ly our dif ferences worldwide would vanish if we were facing an alien threat from 
outside this world. And yet, I ask you, is not an alien force already among us? What 
could be more alien to the universal aspirations of our peoples than war and the 
threat of war? (Reagan 1987)
Like Ozymandias’s scheme, Reagan’s wish for an alien invasion to end divisive-
ness on Earth only reveals the violence inherent to the one-world ideal: eradicating 
the “alien force already among us” requires a displacement of internal hostilities 
elsewhere, a unification made possible only through the expulsion of the alien in 
whatever form it may take. Tellingly, Ozymandias’s plan to achieve peace actually 
demands the sacrifice of many thousands of innocent people: dropping a gigantic, 
bioengineered “alien” creature in the middle of Manhattan results in massive de-
struction, which Ozymandias believes is necessary to convince the people of Earth 
about the scale of risks still to come (cf. Cortiel/Oehme 2015). But more generally, 
Ozymandias’s plan highlights the speculative orientation of a one-world vision, 
where the resolution of the various conf licts referenced in Watchmen—between 
the capitalist world and the communist world, the white nationalist world and the 
black unrest world, the straight world and the queer world, the world of ordinary 
people and the world of superheroes—becomes imaginable only through the pro-
jection of a new, alternative world to hate. 
Watchmen ends with professions of peace between the Americans and Soviets, 
now committed to weaponizing the Earth together in preparation for transdimen-
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sional warfare. Enter the retcon, once more: like Captain America looking ahead, 
vowing never to be blind again, the people of Earth now look ahead to conf lict with 
all the denizens of a vast multiverse, discovering retrospectively the continuities 
of their common humanity, as if the Earth had always been a world—“one world, 
one accord” (XII: 31)—all along. But the narrative of Watchmen has already indi-
cated that this situation is doomed to failure, precisely because this new cohesion 
demands a condition of perpetual, forever war—and, of course, there really is no 
alien enemy to play the antagonist in perpetuity. Moreover, a globally unified, ever 
vigilant military-industrial complex, now looking ahead to an endless arms race 
with a phantom enemy of incalculable strength, still presents a significant threat 
to the planet Earth itself. Ozymandias had already noted that, during the Cold 
War, the anticipation of conf lict alone had damaged the natural world thanks to 
nuclear waste and reactor leaks, deforestation, and other ecological problems: 
“War aside, atomic deadlock guided us downhill towards environmental ruin” (XI: 
22). Ozymandias’s drive to create a unified world thus leaves him willfully blind 
to the limitations of any détente achieved through the displacement of internal 
conf licts elsewhere (Paik 2010). Indeed, his entire plan has been based on a thor-
oughly fatal process of misreading.
Despite Ozymandias’s self-fashioning as an expert reader of references, he has 
apparently overlooked a set of references highlighted in the narrative of Watchmen 
itself. For one thing, while Ozymandias intends his own superhero name to ref-
erence the figure of Rameses II/Ozymandias and his historical meaning in antiq-
uity, the text makes several allusions to Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem “Ozymandi-
as” (1818)—“Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!” (XI: 28)—to suggest that 
Ozymandias has, curiously enough, misread the significance of his own name in 
the context of a post-Romantic world. The whole point of Shelley’s poem is that, 
given world enough and time, even the mightiest empires will eventually crumble, 
becoming residues of other histories, remembered only by ruins. Dr. Manhattan, 
near the very end of Watchmen, does try to remind Ozymandias of the fact that 
there is no end of history: “Nothing ends, Adrian. Nothing ever ends” (XII: 27). But 
Ozymandias does not catch the reference: “Jon? What! What do you mean by . . .” 
(XII: 27).
Likewise, throughout the narrative of Watchmen, various films are playing at 
the Utopia cinema in New York: This Island Earth (1955), Things to Come (1936), The 
Day the Earth Stood Still (1951), The Sacrifice (1986), and Nostalghia (1983). These films 
each consider the hazards and pitfalls of the one-world ideal, whether explicit-
ly depicting how the drive to secure a singular, homogenous world threatens to 
displace violence onto other worlds, or critiquing the delusions and obsessions 
of those who believe they might avert catastrophe by committing sacrificial vio-
lence. After Ozymandias’s giant creature has exploded in Manhattan, the Utopia 
cinema is covered with alien gore, its entryway is littered with dead human bod-
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ies, and the marquee has fallen apart (fig. 11.8). While The Day the Earth Stood Still 
implies that a utopian future might be achieved by recognizing the existence of 
other worlds and relinquishing the internal conditions for conf lict, Ozymandias’s 
scheme has instead rendered any such “utopia” illegible. 
In the denouement shortly after this climactic event, a television rebroadcast 
of “The Architects of Fear,” a 1963 episode of The Outer Limits (1963–1965), makes the 
point even more starkly. “The Architects of Fear” is about a team of scientists who 
create a hoax alien invasion in order to produce global peace, precisely by offering 
the alien as a new enemy to fear. But the plan goes completely wrong and has no 
effect on geopolitical conditions at all. The narrator sums things up: 
Scarecrows and magic and other fatal fears do not bring people closer together. 
There is no magic substitute for sof t caring and hard work, for self-respect and mu-
tual love. If we can learn this from the mistake these frightened men made, then 
their mistake will not have been merely grotesque, it would at least have been a 
lesson. A lesson, at last, to be learned. (“Architects of Fear” [1963] 2008)
Ozymandias has misread the lesson, apparently, but Watchmen invites readers 
to connect the residual media and residual meanings excluded from Ozymandi-
as’s speculative scheme. Together, these references animate a set of other fictive 
worlds that critically ref lect upon the drive for retroactive continuity—in comics 
or otherwise.
To be sure, in his sorting through the media streams of popular culture, it 
seems that Ozymandias has utterly overlooked the referential affordances of 
comic books themselves. Throughout the chapters of Watchmen, Bernie, a young 
man of color, is reading a story in The Tales of the Black Freighter comic: the notori-
ous “Marooned” storyline written by Max Shea. The significance of this comic is 
signaled by its formal prominence in Watchmen. The main storyline is intersected 
repeatedly by resonant images, parallel phrases, and mirrored events from Tales 
of the Black Freighter. By the end, it becomes clear that the “Marooned” narrative 
is an allegory for Ozymandias’s plan to save the world from itself. Awash in ref-
erences to other works of literature, including Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner” (1798) and William Blake’s “The Tyger” (1794), “Marooned” 
depicts the formidable drive of a man who fights against overwhelming odds but 
ends up destroying the very things he loves in pursuit of phantasmatic enemies: 
the mariner protagonist accidentally murders his neighbors and his family while 
under the delusion of trying to save them from evil pirates. “Marooned” concludes 
with the mariner swimming toward the haunted Black Freighter, now fated to 
join its damned crew. Late—too late—in the story of Watchmen, Ozymandias has
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Figure 11.8: Due to Ozymandias’s shortsighted scheme, alternative references remain 
unseen and utopia becomes illegible (u-opia). Watchmen (Moore/Gibbons 1987, XII: 3).
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a brief f lash of insight, almost making a connection between his own actions and 
the plight of the mariner in the “Marooned” comic: “I dreamt about swimming 
toward . . . No, never mind” (XII: 27). The continuity fails to stick. For Ozyman-
dias, these worlds remain isolated. For the reader, however, the reference is un-
mistakable. With Tales of the Black Freighter—a comic within a comic—Watchmen 
recapitulates the famous trope from “Flash of Two Worlds,” showing how comic 
books present imaginative echoes or speculative diagrams that trace the alternate 
histories obscured by consensus reality.
As an indictment of one-world ideologies, then, Watchmen also affirms the ca-
pacities of comic books to help us see otherwise, to see multiple. Yes, comic-book 
superheroes have often contributed to power fantasies, military propaganda, and 
fascist notions of ethnic superiority—these aspects of cartoon history are ob-
jects of Watchmen’s self-referential critique of superpowers and the super as such 
(Wright 2001; Hughes 2006). But more importantly, it shows that comics can be 
read and misread in more than one way, precisely because every comic tells more 
than one story at the same time. Manifested in its system of references—both in-
ternal and external, intradiegetic and extradiegetic—the presumption of multiple 
universes is now intrinsic to the form of superhero comics. Superhero comics af-
ford ways of engaging with residual pasts and potential futures through narra-
tives of unactualized realities—and thus they present ways of living in this world 
which is not one.
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